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BALTIC STATES ANNEXATION
The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory
against forgetting.
Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (1979)
The surest way to disturb [international] relations is by
sanctioning law breaking and sacrificing the victim .. to the
aggressor.
Haile Selassie, League of Nations debate 1936
I. INTRODUCTION
For over 5000 years,' the struggle of two principles has pervaded
recorded history: one of them embodied in the Machiavellian phrase
"La forza fa giustizia," 2 and the other in the Roman maxim, "Ex ini-
1. Ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics record the forcible seizure and annexation of Up-
per Egypt by the King of Lower Egypt, Menes, in the year 3100 B.C. B. SEWELL, EGYPT
UNDER THE PHAROAHS 45 (1968). The King is depicted clubbing a submissive enemy,
inspecting rows of headless corpses and leading captives away into servitude. C. ALDRED,
EGYPT TO THE END OF THE OLD KINGDOM 43 (1965). The true effects experienced by the
inhabitants of a territory forcibly seized by an aggressor should never be forgotten:
There is a profound psychological difference between a transfer of territory
and a change in a trade treaty or pact of international cooperation. Territory is
near and plain and evokes personal feelings and group sentiments . . . . To all
[peoples] landscape is an essential part of home. Enshrined in every national
literature are the changing moods and compositions of river, mountain, plain,
forest and shore. All the familiar techniques of living are involved in the com-
plex of feeling, remembered experiences and imagination surrounding place and
home.
It is title to sentiments like these, and not merely to so-and-so many square
miles of land, that is transferred when there is a change of boundaries and rule.
A. DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS AT POTSDAM: THE ANGLO-AMERICANS AND THE EXPULSION OF THE
GERMANS 196-97 (1977). (citing Bowman, The Strategy of Territorial Decisions, 24 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 177 (1946)).
2. The principle of "might makes right" was enunciated by the Italian political scien-
tist, Nicol6 Machiavelli, in his classic 1513 work, The Prince. Machiavelli states: "You
must know there are two ways of contesting: the one by law and the other by force. The
first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently
not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second." N. MACHIAVELLI, THE
PRINCE 25 (1513) (W.K. Marriott trans. 1952). Machiavelli's recommendations to those
who conquer foreign territory are of particular interest:
And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not
destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the
watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither
time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do or pro-
vide against, they never forget that name or their privileges . . . but at every
chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had
been held in bondage by the Florentines.
Id. at 8.
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uria ius non oritur. "3 With regard to the issue of territorial change, the
first principle remained unchallenged throughout the centuries, em-
bodied in the so-called "right of conquest."4 According to this princi-
ple, the seizure by one state of another's territory was of no legal con-
cern to other members of the international community; it was a fait
accompli and legal title to territory acquired by conquest had to be
acknowledged as valid by the rest of the world.5 Only in the beginning
of the seventeenth century did the idea begin to develop that the effec-
tiveness of territorial change should be based on something more than
a unilateral tour de force, namely, on some form of assent by third
party states.6
Historically, two stages in this later development are already dis-
cernable. At first, the legal right to change the territorial status quo by
3. "Legal rights will not arise out of wrongdoing." This principle constitutes one of
the fundamental maxims of jurisprudence. Lauterpacht, The Principle of Non-Recogni-
tion in International Law, in LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EASTERN CONFLICT 139 (Q.
Wright ed. 1941). This is not to say that wrongdoing will not produce some legal results.
It may serve as a grounds for legal sanctions against the lawbreaker; it may confer rights
on third parties, acting in good faith, who seek expansion of commercial ties or desire to
protect their security interests; and it may, after passage of a considerable period of time
crystallize into a legal right as a result of prescription. Id. at 139-40. "But to admit that,
apart from these well-defined exceptions, an unlawful act or its immediate consequences
and manifestations may become suo vigore a source of legal right for the wrongdoer is to
introduce into the legal system a contradiction which cannot be solved by a denial of its
legal character." Id. at 140.
4. The definitive chronicle of the development of law prohibiting seizure of territory
is R. Langer, Seizure of Territory (1947). See also T. KOMARNICKI, LA SocIrkr DES NA-
TIONS (1923); M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORIES
(1926); M. GRAHAM, IN QUEST OF A LAW OF RECOGNITION (1933); R. SHARP, NON-RECOGNI-
TION AS A LEGAL OBLIGATION (1934); H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 142-46 (1962); R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1963); M. McDOUGAL AND M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPEC-
'rvE 658-69 (1981); Wright, The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 65
(1932); Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 39 (1933); McNair,
The Stimson Doctrine of Non-recognition, 14 BR. Y. INT'L L. 65 (1933); Fischer Williams,
The New Doctrine of Recognition, 18 GROTIUS Soc'Y TRANSACTIONS 109 (1933); Fischer
Williams, Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in International Law, 47
HARV. L. REV. 776 (1934); Middlebush, Non-recognition as a Sanction of International
Law, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 40 (1933); Chailley, La Doctrine de la Reconnaisance, 13
REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREk (1934); Schwarzenberger,
Title to Territory: Response to Challenge, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 308 (1957); Blix, Contempo-
rary Aspects of Recognition, 130 RECUEIL DES CouRs, ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
DE LA HAYE 587 (1970).
5. Briggs, Non-Recognition of Title by Conquest and Limitations on the Doctrine,.
35 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 72 (1940). Briggs points out that in a rudimentary legal
community such a conception was not without its virtue; it made for stability and was
based on common sense, self-preservation, and the realities of state practice.
6. LANGER, supra note 4, at v.
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unilateral action was challenged by states that were parties to the
agreements establishing that status. Recognition of the ill-gotten gains,
however, was inevitably granted after a short period of time due to the
power of the aggressor. It later came to be accepted that such changes
in the territorial status quo were of legitimate political and legal con-
cern to those states and international bodies politic neither directly nor
indirectly affected by the respective transfer. In response to this devel-
opment, the global community began to withhold recognition of the
advantages achieved by violence. This conception manifested itself in
the idea, now commonly known as the Stimson doctrine, of nonrecogni-
tion of territorial changes brought about by force or the threat of
force.
7
This note will examine the history of the Stimson doctrine and its
application by world governments to the Soviet Union following the
1940 seizure and occupation of the Baltic nations of Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia. It will then evaluate the effectiveness of the doctrine from
the perspective of the Baltic nations themselves and its implications
for international law.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LAW PROHIBITING FORCIBLE SEIZURE
OF TERRITORY
A. European Origins
In the feudal system of the Middle Ages, the acquisition of terri-
tory was most often accomplished by cession, conquest, discovery, in-
heritance, marriage or pariage.8 Little legal emphasis was placed on the
mode of acquisition; instead, the focus was on effective occupation of
the territory in question since good title to land could only arise after
it was effectively occupied.' The essential requirement of effective
maintenance of territory had its roots in the feudal legal system,
whereby certain territory was acquired only after its inhabitants had
sworn allegiance, as homines ligii, to their future lord. Such allegiance
was based on the obligation of the lord to protect his vassals and this
protection could only be afforded if the prince were able to maintain
the territory against foreign intruders, and ensure peace and stability
7. Wright, The Stimson Note of Jan. 7, 1932, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 342, 344 (1932).
8. See generally 3 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 297
(1970). Pariage is defined as a "curious medieval institution ... [involving] a ruler's
surrender of part of his domains to a more powerful ruler on the understanding that the
latter undertook to protect the former's remaining possessions." Id. at 324.
9. Von der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in
International Law, 29 Asi J. INr'L L. 448 (1935).
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within his realm.10 The prince who was unable to afford such protec-
tion to his vassals either forfeited, or never really acquired, his claim to
the liegeman's obedience, i.e., the title over the territory in question."
It was during this period that the first use of the instrument of
recognition occurred.' 2 The Papacy, which claimed and received the
obedience of all European states, required Europe's sovereigns to seek
its blessing as a prerequisite to the exercise of temporal power.' This
recognition by the Pontiff was an essential requirement for a state's
entry into the family of Christian nations: the Church's power being
such that the act of recognition was both indispensable and
constitutive."'
Papal recognition was also sought to consecrate territorial title. Al-
though Papal bulls did not bestow territories on princes, they did le-
galize, recognize and sanction ex post facto, territorial sovereignty. In
some cases, the bulls gave legal sanction to intended occupancy, i.e.,
inchoate title.' 5
The Reformation of the sixteenth century and the ensuing Thirty
Years' War (1618-1648)16 effectively ended the power of the Church to
sanction title to territory and entry into the family of nations.' 7 No
longer could the Church or the weakened and divided Holy Roman
Empire compete as political forces with the unified kingdoms which
began to emerge from the loosely compacted feudal states of the Mid-
dle Ages. Throughout Europe, central authority began to take the form
of strong personal monarchies, supreme over all rival claimants to
power-secular or ecclesiastical.
New doctrines of state sovereignty and equality of states arose in
response to the rapidly changing European Weltanschauung.'8 These
10. Id.
11. Von der Heydte, supra note 9, at 448-49.
12. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 4 (1963).
13. Blix, Contemporary Aspects of Recognition, 130 RECUEIL DES CouRs, ACADEMIE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE, [RECUEIL DES COURS] 587, 604 (1970).
14. Id.
15. Von der Heydte, supra note 9, at 451. The more well known bulls include the
Laudabiliter of Hadrian IV which was used to justify English claims to Ireland, id.; the
bull of Pope Alexander III in 1179 to the King of Portugal which declared: "All the
regions which you will have rescued from the hands of the Saracens, and where other
neighboring Christian princes could not acquire any legal rights, are conceded by us to
your Excellency," id.; and the Ea Quae of 1506 which confirmed the partition of colonies
between Spain and Portugal established by the Treaty of Tordesillas. Id.
16. See generally C.V. WEDGEWOOD, THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR (1981).
17. BRIERLY, supra note 12, at 8.
18. Id. at 7. The doctrine of State sovereignty was explicitly formulated by the
French scholar Jean Bodin in his book De Republica (1576). Id. at 7-11. The doctrine of
equality of states was set forth in Le Droit des Gens (1758) by the Swiss diplomat Emer-
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new theories led to important changes in the manner in which states
responded to territorial change. Accordingly, the larger European pow-
ers began to assert their right to use the instrument of recognition to
sanction title to territory and entry by a state into the European
community.
The earliest manifestation of an exercise of such power occurred
during the great historical watershed now known as the Peace of West-
phalia of 1648.1" By the treaties of Munster and Osnabruck,20 the Holy
Roman Empire, Sweden and France recognized and guaranteed the in-
dependence and territorial integrity of the Swiss Confederation which
had first rebelled against the Empire in 1291. Although it was generally
believed that the Swiss cantons were already subjects of international
law, the signatory powers believed formal recognition was necessary in
view of the fact that in 1631 the imperial courts had held the Swiss city
of Basel to be within their jurisdiction. 1
International recognition was also granted at Westphalia to the
Netherlands. The Dutch had declared their independence from Spain
in 1581, but England, France and the Holy Roman Empire declined to
officially recognize Dutch sovereignty for more than six decades. Al-
though England and France signed treaties with the Netherlands in
the years between 1581 and 1648, Dutch emmisaries to Paris and
London were denied the title of ambassador on the ground that Spain
did not recognize them as such. This policy was consistent with six-
teenth century views regarding the creation of states. At the time, it
was accepted that princes or rulers could create new states by a divi-
sion of existing ones, but it was generally believed that a revolutionary
entity could not be recognized as independent until it was recognized
as such by the former sovereign."3 It was, therefore, only after Spain
ich Vattel. Id. at 37-40.
19. The Peace of Westphalia was the starting point for the development of modern
international law. It has been contended that it constituted "the first faint beginning of
an international constitutional law" and the first instance of "deliberate enactment of
common regulations by concerted action." Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 42 AM. J.
INT'L L. 20, 26 (1948).
20. Treaty of Munster, Holy Roman Empire-France, Oct. 23, 1648, art. LXIII, 1
Parry's T.S. 337; Treaty of Osnabruck, Holy Roman Empire-Sweden, Oct. 24, 1648, art.
VI, 1 Parry's T.S. 239. These treaties, along with the treaty between Spain and Holland,
infra note 23, are collectively known as the Peace of Westphalia.
21. Frowein, Transfer of Recognition of Sovereignty-Some Early Problems in Con-
nection with Dependent Territories, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 568-71 (1971).
22. J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1979). This view
was expressed by the German scholar Samuel von Pufendorf who declared: "If a man
who, at the time, recognized the sovereignty of another as his superior, is able to become
a king, he must secure the consent of that superior who will both free him and his do-
minions from the bond by which they were tied to him." S. VON PUFENVORF, DE JURE
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signed a treaty with the Netherlands at Westphalia recognizing Dutch
independence that other European states agreed to grant the Hague
full recognition.13 A similar situation occurred with regard to Portugal
after its rebellion against Spain in 1641.2" Although certain bilateral
international agreements were concluded with Portugal, its ambassa-
dors were unable to obtain passports for the Westphalian Peace Con-
ference because other states viewed such emissaries as Spanish citi-
zens. Indeed, doubts about Portugal's sovereignty persisted as late as
1668 because Spain had never formally renounced its territorial
rights.
25
This early policy of nonrecognition was a logical development in
light of the emerging doctrines of state equality and sovereignty. Be-
cause the European order was no longer dependent on divine sanction,
international stability now required each state to commit itself to some
minimum degree of noninterference in the affairs of its neighbors. As
the illegal seizure of territory, whether by internal rebellion or external
force, posed the greatest threat to the European system, states were
duty bound to refuse recognition of premature claims. Accordingly, un-
timely and precipitate recognition was regarded as a "violation of the
dignity of the mother-State,' 6 and equitable with intervention in its
internal affairs.
B. Legal Development After the Peace of Westphalia
The Peace of Westphalia gave great impetus to the theory that the
maintenance of a state political system depends on the preservation of
a balance of power between its component and independent parts. As a
result, a rudimentary European political doctrine emerged which held
that states not directly affected by territorial realignments should be
concerned with them.'7 Indeed, the maxim, "partager pour .quilibrer"
can be traced to the territorial clauses of the Treaties of Munster and
Osnabruck.2" This is notably the case with those clauses in the treaties
which refer to the aggrandizement of France and Sweden, the indepen-
NATURAE ELT GENTIUM Lmmi OcTo (1672). Id.
23. Treaty of Munster, Jan. 30, 1648, Spain-Netherlands, art. 1 (French trans.), 1
Parry's T.S. 72.
24. Frowein, supra note 21, at 568.
25. Id. at 570. It was not generally accepted until the early 19th century that third
party states could grant recognition before the mother country extended it. Indeed, the
French recognition of the independence of the American colonies before Britain had con-
ceded defeat was seen by some as a violation of international law. Id.
26. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (1912).




dence of the Low Countries and the Swiss Confederation, and the con-
solidation of nearly 900 units of the Empire into less than 300. It was
argued, in effect, that the freedom of all states would be brought about
as a result of the establishment of a political equilibrium in Europe. To
a large extent, this thesis proved to be valid because the equilibrium
established at Westphalia prevailed, more or less, for over 150 years.2
Indeed, the most blatant territorial change during this period-the
partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772, 1793 and
1795-was carried out by Austria, Russia and Prussia only after a se-
ries of consultations with each other.
30
29. Id. The positivist notion that the states of Europe could regulate their conduct by
enforcing such an equilibrium was increasingly supported by a naturalist view of interna-
tional law which condemned conquest as a mode of acquiring territory. The Abb6 de
Mably wrote:
A prince is doubtless in the right in conquering a province which belongs to
him, and of which the restitution is refused. He can, even to punish his enemy
for his injustice and to recompense himself for the expenses of the war which he
has been forced to make, extend his conquests beyond the country which he
claims as his own. But arms of themselves give no title .... Were it otherwise,
a prince despoiled by his enemy would no longer have any right to the countries
which have been taken from him ....
1 A. MABLY, DROIT PUBLIC 109 (Amsterdam 1777), quoted in T. WOOLSEY, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 38 (1874) (emphasis added).
30. VERZIJL, supra note 8, at 382. The destruction of Poland-Lithuania by its three,
predatory neighbors horrified enlightened public opinion throughout Europe. The most
devastating of the three partitions, the Second partition of 1793, was effectuated in a
particularly blatant and unscrupulous fashion. The Polish-Lithuanian Diet met on June
17, 1793, and was presented with a proposed treaty by the Russian Ambassador, Sievers.
The treaty called for Poland-Lithuania to cede to Russia those provinces which Russian
Empress Catherine the Great had decided to incorporate into the Russian Empire. Al-
though Sievers had spent large sums to bribe the members of Parliament, there were a
few members who refused to carry out his orders. As a result, the Diet was surrounded
by Russian troops. Even under these conditions, the Diet made a show of resistance and
delayed giving its approval to the treaty which proposed to dismember the Polish-Lithu-
anian Commonwealth. L. Eversley, THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND 138-39 (1973).
On July 1, 1793, Sievers attempted to overcome the opposition by arresting and
deporting to Siberia seven leaders of the patriotic party and directing the confiscation of
their private property. Id. In spite of this coercion, the Diet still refused to approve the
treaty. On July 16, Sievers informed the deputies that he would consider any further
delay as a declaration of war, and would resort to military measures of the most extreme
kind against those who opposed the Russian scheme. Polish King Stanislas pointed out
to the Diet the futility of the Polish-Lithuanian position and indicated that resistance
.was no longer feasible. Accordingly, on July 25, 1793, the Diet ratified the treaty by a
vote of 61-23. Russia thus gained two-fifths of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth re-
duced by the first partition of 1772. King Stanislas signed the treaty the same day. Id. at
140.
Sievers then proceeded to inform the Diet that Catherine the Great had ordered the
deputies to ratify another treaty with Prussia, ceding to that power another large area of
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Although the French Revolution and the ensuing Napoleonic Wars
finally destroyed the Westphalian territorial and political order, the
concept that territorial changes effected by force required the assent of
states not directly affected by them was given new vigor by the archi-
tect of the new European order, Napoleon Bonaparte.
Despite assertions that France needed no recognition of the terri-
torial adjustments that marked the conclusion of his various cam-
paigns, Napoleon was eager to obtain the consent, in the form of "ex-
plicit recognition," of such realignments from other European
rulers-including those whose possessions were neither directly nor in-
directly affected by the respective changes. 3'
The Napoleonic era was ended by a general agreement embodied
in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, signed on June 9, 1815, by
Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Portugal and
Sweden.-" At this Congress, the great European powers constituted
Polish territory. This announcement created an uproar in the Parliament. On September
23, the Parliament was surrounded by Russian troops. Four of the most prominent depu-
ties were arrested and deported to Russia. The Diet demanded the liberation of the four
deputies, but their demands were refused. The Russian general in command of the
troops surrounding Parliament soon issued dire threats to the deputies and enjoined
them to sign the treaty. A deputy from Cracow suggested that other parliament draw up
a formal protest against the violation of its liberties by the Russian ambassador and that
the Diet's dissent should be marked by a "profound silence." Id. at 141.
Sievers proceeded to read to the Parliament the order of Empress Catherine which
directed the deputies to sign the treaty without delay. "There was a dead silence
throughout the hall. The President [of the Diet] thereupon declared that the silence of
the deputies meant their consent and that the Prussian treaty was ipso facto sanc-
tioned." Id. at 141-42.
A formal protest was later signed by the King and the Diet against the actions taken
by Russia and Prussia:
I, the King of Poland, enfeebled by age, and sinking under the accumulated
weight of so many misfortunes, and we members of the Diet, hereby declare
that, being unable, even by the sacrifice of our lives, to relieve our country from
the yoke of its oppressors, consign it to posterity, trusting that means may be
found, at some happier period, to rescue it from oppression and slavery; such
means, unfortunately, are not in our power, and other countries abandon us to
our fate.
Id.
31. LANGER, supra note 4, at 3. Among those treaties in which Napoleon received the
assent of foreign sovereigns to his territorial acquisitions were the Franco-Dutch Treaty
of the Hague, May 16, 1795, 52 Parry's T.S. 383; Treaty of Campoformio, Oct. 17, 1797,
Austria-France, 54 Parry's T.S. 157; Treaty of Amiens, Mar. 27, 1802, France-Great Brit-
ain-Spain-Batavian Republic, 56 Parry's T.S. 289; Treaty of Pressburg, Dec. 26, 1805,
Austria-France, 58 Parry's T.S. 339; Treaty of Tilsit, July 7, 1807, France-Russia, 59
Parry's T.S. 231; Treaty of Paris, Sept. 8, 1808, France-Prussia, 60 Parry's T.S. 143.
32. Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, 63 Parry's T.S. 454. The territorial
settlements made by the Congress lasted for nearly a century. Russia was confirmed as
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themselves as the "Holy Alliance" and brought about a complete reor-
ganization of the European continent. The fact that major territorial
realignments were made after consultations between the leading Euro-
pean powers is a strong indication that such settlements were not to be
unilaterally repudiated. Nevertheless, most scholars agree that it would
be going too far to see in the agreement an implied claim that the as-
sent of all the signatories was a precondition to the legal validity of any
future territorial adjustments.83 Indeed, subsequent developments,
such as the secession of Belgium from the Netherlands, the annexa-
tions of Alsace-Lorraine, the Free State of Cracow, Savoy and Schles-
wig-Holstein, and the conquest of the Austrian provinces of Lombardy
and Venetia, were simply regarded as faits accomplis by most of the
parties to the Final Act. 4
the ruler of a large section of Poland. Prussia was restored as a great power and received
large sections of German and Polish territory. Austria received much of northern Italy by
acquiring Lombardy and Venetia, while Tuscany and Modena were transferred to collat-
eral branches of the Imperial House of Hapsburg. Parma was given to Marie Louise,
Napoleon's former wife. The King of Sardinia, Ferdinand V, received Piedmont and Sa-
voy with the addition of Genoa. Holland and Belgium were united as a kingdom under
the rule of William I, Prince of Orange. Denmark lost Norway to Sweden but was given
the German duchy of Lauenburg instead. Sweden was obliged to relinquish Swedish
Pomerania to Prussia. The Pope reacquired his territories in Italy but his claims to Avi-
gnon were rejected. As a concession to Austria, Germany was left as a loose confederation
of kingdoms, duchies and principalities. See generally C. WEBSTER, THE CONGRESS OF
VIENNA (1963); G. FERRERO, THz RECONSTRUCTON OF EUROPE: TALLEYRAND AND THE CON-
GRESS OF VIENNA 1814-1815 (1941).
33. Fischer Williams, La Doctrine de la Reconnaissance en Droit International et
Ses D~v~lop~ments Rcents, 44 REcuKmL DES Couss 203, 227 (1933). Blix analogizes the
constitutive power of the Alliance to that of the Medieval Papacy. He cites the Alliance's
creation of the Republic of Cracow and the State of the Ionian Islands. Blix, supra note
13, at 605. Nevertheless, some scholars fail to discern any legal obligation which would
have required a State to notify the others of a territorial annexation:
La vie internationale d'un Etat peut cesser par la propre volontg de cet
ktat, ou par suite de conqute, sans la sanction des autres Etats; mais la trans-
formation d'un ktat ind6pendant en deux ou plusieurs Etats indpendants
.. n'est complate qu'apr~s que les autres nations en ont reconnu le caractere
national. C'est la qualit6 d'indkpendance, affirmie pour la premiere lois au
nom d'un Etat, qu'il est ncessaire de faire reconnaitre par les autres nations
et, non l'augmentation ou diminution de 'entendue des possessions territori-
ales d'un Etat reconnu. Si un ktat veut notifier aux autres Etats une augmen-
tation de son territoire par suite d'occupation ou de cession, cette notification
est un acte de courtoisie, de convenance, nullement obligatoire.
T. Twiss, DROIT DES GENS 17 (Paris 1887).
34. LANGER, supra note 4, at 9. French Premier Guizot protested the Austrian annex-
ation of Cracow in an instruction sent to the French envoy in Vienna on December 3,
1846. It states: M. le Prince de Metternich dit . . . que les trois cours avaient crL a
elles seules, le 3 mai 1815, le petit Etat de Cracovie, et qu'elles avaient ensuite
'pr~sentg au Congrbs de Vienne, pour enregistrement, la Convention passke entre elles.'
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It was at this time that the emerging political concepts of national-
ism and freedom of self-determination began to affect prescriptions re-
garding territorial change. For the first time, annexing states sought to
establish legal title to territory on the basis of a popular vote by the
inhabitants of the area in question. This notion had its immediate ori-
gin in the Decrees of the French National Convention of 1792 by which
the French Government agreed to help all those peoples "qui voudrant
conquerir leur libertk."'s Subsequent forcible annexations by France of
Holland, Flanders, Piedmont and the Papal States were justified by
the French Republic on the ground that these "reunions" represented
the free will of the population."6 Although France's annexations were
annulled by the Congress of Vienna, the use of plebiscites to legalize
territorial change gained increasing popularity. The 1860 Treaty of Tu-
rin," uniting Savoy to France, provided that "this union shall be effec-
tuated without constraining the will of the inhabitants, and that the
governments of the Emperor of the French and the King of Sardinia
will agree as soon as possible as to the best means of estimating and
certifying the demonstrations of this will." 8 In the 1866 Treaty of
Prague, 9 which ceded Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, a similar provi-
sion was included. In 1860, the Neapolitan provinces of Sicily, the
Le Gouvernement de Roi ne saurait admettre une assertion si 9trangre aux principes
et mime au language des grandes transactions qui constituent le droit public europken.
Les Puissances indipendantes qui traitent sur un pied de parfaite igalit0, et dklibirant
sur des intirts communs, ne sont jarnis appeles e enregistrer des dterminations et
des actes adopt~s sans leur participation.. . . Cited in id. at 8. Great Britain protested
the French annexation of Savoy in 1860 but its opposition was ignored by Napoleon III.
Langer states that it would be audacious to postulate that these post-1815 territorial
changes were at the outset illegal and invalid without the express or implied recognition
of all of the parties to the Congress of Vienna. Id. Indeed, 11 years later, during the
Franco-Prussian War, Britain refused to oppose Germany's plan for the annexation of
the French provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. In January 1871, British Foreign Secretary
Lord Granville declared: "[If the war continues, if France becomes totally disorganized,
a curse to herself and to Europe, Germany may have no recourse but to seize and occupy
vast territories filled with unwilling inhabitants .. " D. RAYMOND, BRITISH POLICY AND
OPINION DURING THE FRANco-PRUsSIAN WAR 345 (1921).
35. VERZIJL, supra note 8, at 358.
36. Id. at 359.
37. Treaty of Turin, Mar. 24, 1860, France-Sardinia, art. I, 122 Parry's T.S. 24:
It est entendu entre leurs Majest~s que cette reunion sera effectue sans
nulle contrainte de Ia volontk des populations, et que les Gouvernements de
l'Empereur des Franqais et du Roi de Sardaigne se concerteront les plus tbt




39. Treaty of Prague, Aug. 23, 1866, Austria-Prussia, 133 Parry's T.S. 71.
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Marches and Umbria were annexed to the Kingdom of Italy as a result
of a plebiscite by direct and universal suffrage.40
The European response to a series of nineteenth century crises in
the Balkan States further strengthened the concept that territorial
change requires the assent of nations other than those directly con-
cerned to become fully effective."1 An early step in this direction was
the intervention of the leading European powers in the Greek struggle
for independence and their collective recognition in 1830 of an inde-
pendent Greek Kingdom.42 The recognition doctrine was also embod-
ied in the Treaty of Paris, which ended the Crimean War on March 30,
1856. Not only did the belligerents (Britain, France, Sardinia-Pied-
mont, Turkey and Russia) affix their signatures to the Treaty, but so
too did the remaining powers of Europe-Austria and Prussia. Article
7 of the Treaty stated that the contracting parties:
[D]eclare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the ad-
vantages of the public law and system (Concert) of Europe.
Their majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the inde-
pendence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire,
guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement,
and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its viola-
tion as a question of general interest.
43
Other articles gave collective assurances of the autonomous status of
Serbia, Wallachia and Moldavia and collective approval of the transfer
of southwestern Bessarabia to Moldavia from Russia."
The Treaty of Paris "showed more resistance to destruction by
unilateral action than did the territorial setup created by the Final Act
of Vienna."'46 When Russia undertook in 1878 to unilaterally change
the territorial status of the Balkans (in order to create a new Bulgarian
Empire), its action was thwarted by the other signatories of the Treaty.
The only territorial readjustments permitted were those which had
gained the recognition of the signatories or their successors.' 6
At the urging of Germany's Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, this
recognition of the power of collective sanction was embodied in a new
treaty, the Act of the Congress of Berlin, concluded by Great Britain,
Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Russia, Italy and Turkey on July
40. WOOLSEY, supra note 29, at 437.
41. Id.
42. LANGER, supra note 4, at 9.
43. Treaty of Paris, Mar. 30, 1856, art. VII, 114 Parry's T.S. 414.
44. Id. at arts. XI, XII, XVIII.
45. LANGER, supra note 4, at 10.
46. K. HAUCKE, BULGARIEN 30-31 (1942).
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13, 1878. Under this agreement, the signatories agreed to create an au-
tonomous Bulgarian State, to recognize the independence of Romania,
Serbia and Montenegro, to delimit the borders of those states, and to
sanction the retrocession of southwestern Bessarabia to Russia.47
While the idea developed slowly in Europe that territorial changes
should be a matter of interest to third party states, it had been ac-
cepted in Latin America since the first years of independence from
Spain.' 8 At the first Inter-American Conference in Panama in 1826, a
"Treaty of Union, League and Perpetual Confederation" was con-
cluded by several American states. Article 22 provided that as soon as
their boundaries were delimited, they would be placed under the guar-
antee and protection of the Confederation.'"
At the Inter-American Conference held at Santiago, Chile in 1856,
seven republics signed a "Treaty of Union of the American States,"
(known as the Continental Treaty).5 0 This was the first international
instrument which attempted to establish a legal duty of nonrecognition
of territorial change.51 Article 13 provided that "the high contracting
parties undertake not to cede nor alienate, under any form, to another
state or government any part of their territories, nor to permit, within
said territories, the establishment of a foreign power, the other parties
pledge themselves not to recognize such an establishment, on whatever
grounds." '
Latin American efforts to outlaw the right of conquest were hin-
dered by the Pacific War (1879-83) involving Chile, Peru and Bolivia.
As a result of this conflict, Chile annexed several valuable Peruvian
provinces and the entire Bolivian seacoast. The annexationist goals of
the warring nations prompted the United States, which had never
47. Act of Congress of Berlin, July 13, 1878, 153 Parry's T.S. 172. See generally W.
MEDLICOrr, THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN AND AFTER (1938); 5 A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CON-
FERENCE OF PARIS (H. Temperly ed. 1921). Temperly states that by 1878, "it had become
a recognized principle of European international custom that in Eastern Europe the es-
tablishment of new States was a matter of general interest, which required the formal
recognition of the Great Powers, who, in fact, though not in law, were acting as the
Concert of Europe .... " TEMPERLY, supra, at 116. Langer, however, stresses that this
requirement was confined to Eastern Europe. LANGER, supra note 4, at 11.
48. A. OSTRIA GUTIERREZ, LA DOCTRINA DEL NO-RECONOCIMIENTO DE LA CONQUISTA EN
AMERICA 54 (1938). See also S. GUZMAN, EL DERECHO DE CONQUISTA (1881); A. ALVAREZ,
CONSIDtRATIONS G9N9RALES SUR LA CODIFICATION DU DRorr INTERNATIONAL AMkRICAIN
(1927); F. LAVINIA & H. BALDOMIR, EL PROCESO HISTORuCO DE LA DIFLOMACIA INTERAMERI-
CANA (1978).
49. GUTIERREZ, supra note 48, at 55.
50. Continental Treaty, Sept. 15, 1856, art. XIII, reprinted in ALVAREZ, supra note
48, at 55-56.
51. LANGER, supra note 4, at 34.
52. Continental Treaty, supra note 50, at art. XIII.
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before specifically addressed the issue of the legality of seizure of terri-
tory, to issue through its Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, a state-
ment deploring the so-called "right of conquest:"
This Government feels that the exercise of the right of abso-
lute conquest is dangerous to the best interests of all the re-
publics of this continent .... This Government also holds
that between two independent nations hostilities do not, from
the mere existence of war, confer the right of conquest until
the failure to furnish the indemnity and guarantee which can
rightfully be demanded. Nor can this Government admit that a
cession of territory can be properly exacted for exceeding in
value the amplest estimate of a reasonable indemnity."
53. LANGER, supra note 4, at 35. This does not mean, of course, that the United
States had never been confronted with the issue of conquest in its international rela-
tions. As early as 1804, Vice-President Aaron Burr and Louisiana Territory Governor
James Williamson had proposed a United States military expedition to conquer Texas
and Mexico and liberate the two colonies from what was perceived as "Spanish tyranny."
W. McCALEB, THE CONQUEST OF THE WEST 32 (1947).
Nevertheless, United States territorial acquisitions were for the most part peaceful,
as in the purchase of Louisiana from France for $15,000,000 in 1803. R. VAN ALSTYNE,
THE RISING AMERICAN EMPIRE 86 (1960). After the revolt against Spain broke out in
Mexico on September 16, 1810, United States citizens in West Florida staged an uprising
against Spanish authorities. On September 26, 1810, West Florida was declared an inde-
pendent state and United States citizens proposed annexation to the Union. On October
27, 1810, President James Madison declared the new State to be under the jurisdiction
of the United States. Two years later, Congress divided the territory by adding the west-
ern portion to Louisiana and the eastern to Mississippi. W. McCALEB, supra, at 41.
The United States was next faced with the legitimacy of seizure of territory during
the war between Texas and Mexico (1835-1836). The subsequent annexation of Texas in
1845 should not be regarded as an easily accomplished and well-planned act. VAN AL-
STYNE, supra, at 103. Indeed, the overwhelming desire of Texans for annexation to the
United States in 1845 was the result of a series of historical events whose roots can be
traced to the 1820's. At the end of that decade, no more than 16,000 Americans and 3000
to 4000 Mexicans lived in the vast expanses north of the Rio Grande. F. TURNER, THE
UNITED STATES 1830-1850, at 353 (1963). In the hope of erecting a buffer to keep the
United States at a distance, Mexico accepted an offer from Moses Austin, a Connecticut
Yankee, to bring in settlers. Austin's son Stephen took over shortly after his father's
death and was given a free hand to distribute land to settlers as long as they would
declare allegiance to Mexico and accept Roman Catholicism as the colony's official reli-
gion. VAN ALSTYNE, supra, at 102. "There was no conspiracy here, or even an interest on
the part of Austin and the other [settlers], to whom the Mexicans made liberal grants, in
wrenching the country away from Mexico. ... Id. at 103. But by 1830, the Mexicans
had become concerned about the influx of slaveholding Americans and fearful of inde-
pendence movements among the colonists. TURNER, supra, at 356. As revolution after
revolution occurred in Mexico, Texans became increasingly frustrated with restrictions
on imports, lack of schools and limits on further immigration as well as a lack of political
representation in Mexico City. McCALEB, supra, at 94. In 1833, a Texas consultative as-
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No action was taken by the United States, however, when victori-
sembly met and sent Austin to Mexico City to plead their case with the new Mexican
dictator, Antonio Santa Ana. Austin was imprisoned on arrival, and the following year
Santa Ana dissolved the Mexican Congress. By June 1835, clashes had broken out be-
tween colonists and Mexican troops. In December 1835, the Texans organized themselves
into an army and were able to capture San Antonio. Id. at 101. On March 6, 1836, Santa
Ana retook San Antonio by wiping out the Texas troops at the Alamo under Colonel
William Travis, Shortly thereafter, however, Sam Houston took command of the Texas
army, and on April 21, 1836 he routed the Mexicans at the decisive battle of San Jacinto.
Id. at 118. Texas thus became an independent republic.
The question of union with the United States raged for over nine years. Powerful
factions in the United States opposed annexation by seeing in it a conspiracy by slave
holders to increase their political power. VAN ALSTYNE, supra, at 103. John Quincy Ad-
ams was pressured by New Englanders to change his position and oppose Texas's union
with the United States. When John C. Calhoun, a Southerner and President Tyler's Sec-
retary of State, signed a treaty with Texas and let it be known that he favored annexa-
tion as a means of preserving slavery, Northern senators became alarmed and blocked
the treaty in the Senate. Id. In Texas, too, powerful factions favored independence and,
indeed, domination of the West all the way to the Pacific. In his farewell message of
December 1844, Texas President Sam Houston declared: "If we remain an independent
nation, our territory will be extensive-unlimited. The Pacific alone will bound the
mighty march of our race and our empire." Id. at 104. Nevertheless, popular sentiment
in Texas continued to favor annexation-partly due to the fact that United States Presi-
dent James Polk had agreed to protect all the territory claimed by Texas up to the Rio
Grande. TURNER, supra, at 542. In July 1845, a popularly elected convention voted Texas
into the United States. VAN ALST'NE, supra, at 105.
War broke out between Mexico and the United States in 1846. It was an unpopular
war in many parts of the North. The Massachusetts Legislature denounced it as a war of
conquest, "hateful in its objects" and "wanton, unjust and unconstitutional." The Presi-
dential messages that claimed Mexican troops had shed American blood on American
soil led Representative Abraham Lincoln of Illinois to demand to see the spot where the
blood had fallen. TURNER, supra, at 563. The victorious campaigns of General Zachary
Taylor soon led to the capture of Vera Cruz and Monterey. In the West, General Ste-
phen Kearny was dispatched by President Polk to capture New Mexico. Santa Fe fell in
August 1846, and by September Kearny had established a civil government for the terri-
tory. Id. at 565. In December 1846, Kearny reached the Pacific at San Diego. Id.
Revolt had broken out in California as early as June 1846 when American settlers,
apprehensive of an attack on them by the Mexican commandant at San Jose, raised the
"bear flag" and declared California an independent republic. On July 17, 1846, the
United States Navy captured Monterey and, on July 19, San Francisco. Thus, in the year
1846, the United States had conquered the vast expanse of territory lying between New
Mexico and California. Mexico was finally defeated in 1847 with the capture of Mexico
City. Soon afterwards, the Mexican Government was forced to sign the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ceded California and New Mexico to the United States in
return for payment of $15,000,000. The treaty was ratified by the United States Senate
on March 10, 1848. Id. at 565-70.
The war with Mexico produced a seminal United States Supreme Court opinion in
which the Court examined the legitimacy of conquest of territory in the context of the
United States Constitution. In Fleming and Marshall v. Page, 18 U.S. (9 How.) 278
(1849), the Court declared (when discussing the status of the Mexican port of Tampico):
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ous Chile imposed upon its defeated opponents treaties which deprived
them of large sections of territory. 4 Nevertheless, the idea that territo-
rial conquest by force should be outlawed asserted itself again during
the Simon Bolivar Centenary Celebrations in 1883. Representatives of
several Latin-American republics, meeting at Caracas, Venezuela, is-
sued a declaration known as the Caracas Protocol, which stressed the
duty to uphold the integrity of Latin-American territory and the obli-
gation to ignore "the so-called right of conquest."55
One other major Latin-American attempt to curb that right was
made prior to World War I. In 1890, an International Conference of
American States convened in Washington, D.C. under the chairman-
ship of Secretary of State Blaine. The conference adopted several "rec-
ommendations," each upholding the concept of mutual respect for ter-
ritorial integrity."6
The country in question has been conquered in war. But the origins and
character of our institutions are peaceful, and the power to declare war was not
conferred upon Congress for the purposes of aggression or aggrandizement, but
to enable the general government to vindicate by arms, if it should become nec-
essary, its own rights and the rights of its citizens.
A war, therefore, declared by Congress, can never be presumed to be waged
for the purpose of conquest or the acquisition of territory, nor does the law de-
claring the war, imply an authority to the President to enlarge the limits of the
United States by subjugating the enemy's country. The United States it is true,
may extend its boundaries by conquest or treaty and may demand the cession of
territory as the condition of peace, in order to indemnify its citizens for the inju-
ries they have suffered, or to reimburse the government for the expenses of the
war. But this can be done only by the treaty-making power or the legislative
authority, and is not part of the power conferred upon the President by the
declaration of war.
Id. at 279.
Although the United States continued to purchase territory peacefully, as in 1867
when Alaska was purchased from Russia, other territorial expansion was accomplished
by stealth and force. The annexation of Hawaii in 1893 is a case in point. United States
citizens residing in the colony formed a secret "Annexation Club" in the early 1890's.
United States mercantile interests so completely dominated the Kingdom and its minis-
ters that Queen Liliuokalani decided to attempt a coup d'6tat in 1893 to restore the
power of the monarchy and the indigenous Hawaiian peoples. VAN ALSTYNE, supra, at
179. The Queen's forces were no match for the annexationists, and on January 16, 1893,
a United States naval commander ordered his troops ashore to support the rebels. A
provisional revolutionary government took power, and the Queen and her supporters
were imprisoned. Eventually, the Queen "surrendered to the superior force of the United
States of America," and on February 14, 1893, United States Secretary of State, John W.
Foster, concluded a treaty of annexation. Id.
54. LANGER, supra note 4, at 35. See also Treaty of Peace, Oct. 20, 1883, Chile-Peru,
162 Parry's T.S. 453; Treaty of Peace, Oct. 20, 1904, Chile-Bolivia, 196 Parry's T.S. 403.
55. GUTIERREZ, supra note 48, at 158.
56. Id. at 61. The following "recommendations" were adopted at that meeting:
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In Europe, the period from 1878 to 1908 was one of relative tran-
quility in which no major territorial problems had to be solved. Per-
haps as a result of this calm, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907
were silent on the law of territorial change and, consequently, the doc-
trine of nonrecognition.5" Thirty years of relative peace were abruptly
shattered when, in 1908, Austria-Hungary proclaimed its annexation of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Bulgaria declared its independence from Tur-
key. These unilateral acts flagrantly violated the territorial status quo
established thirty years earlier by the Congress of Berlin.", Although
the results were finally accepted by the Great Powers as faits accom-
plis, serious consideration was given to the possible nonrecognition of
these changes until they were approved by all of the Treaty's
signatories.59
During the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, the powers forming the
Concert of Europe tried once again, as they had done in 1856 and 1878,
to play a leading role in deciding the legitimacy of regional territorial
adjustments. Although they succeeded in negotiating the Treaty of
London in May 1913,o0 strong nationalistic feelings among the Balkan
peoples pushed their governments into a second regional war. The in-
ter-Balkan treaties of late 1913,61 which formally concluded the Second
Balkan War, radically changed the territorial divisions in southeastern
Europe and, unlike earlier treaties, were not drafted by the Great Pow-
ers. It was possible, of course, to claim that these treaties, in order to
obtain full legal force, required the assent of the signatory powers of
the Act of the Congress of Berlin. This was the position taken by the
1. The principle of conquest is eliminated from American public law during
the period in which the treaty of arbitration is in force.
2. All cessions of territory made during the continuance of the treaty of
arbitration shall be void if made under threats of war or as a result of the pres-
sure of armed force.
3. Any nation from which such cessions shall be extracted may demand
that the validity of the cessions so made shall be decided by arbitration.
4. Any renunciation of the right to arbitrate, made under conditions
named in the second section, shall be null and void.
Id. (author's translation).
57. Although the Brazilian delegation to the 1907 Conference declared that it would
like to see the Conference adopt a provision contemplating the renunciation of the right
of conquest, no action was taken on their proposal. LANGER, supra note 4, at 12.
58. Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 134-35.
59. LANGER, supra note 4, at 13.
60. Treaty of Peace at London, May 30, 1913, 218 Parry's T.S. 159.
61. Treaty of Peace at Bucharest, Aug. 10, 1913, 218 Parry's T.S. 322; Convention
between Greece and Turkey for the Consolidation of Peace and Friendship and the Res-
toration of Normal Relations, Nov. 14, 1913, 219 Parry's T.S. 21; Treaty of Peace be-
tween Serbia and Turkey, Mar. 14, 1914, 219 Parry's T.S. 320.
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German, French and British Governments. The Italian, Russian and
Austrian Governments, however, had differing points of view.62 Any
further progress towards a European consensus on the legality of forci-
ble transfer of territory was prevented by the outbreak of World War I
in 1914.
C. Title to Territory in the Colonial Era
The growing respect for territorial sovereignty in prewar Europe
and Latin America was not heeded by the Great Powers in their quest
for colonial empires overseas. In the fifteenth century, non-European
62. LANGER, supra note 4, at 139. This disagreement concerning whether the postwar
treaties were legitimate was summarized in a note dispatched by British Foreign Secre-
tary, Sir Edward Grey to his colleagues at Whitehall. The note stated:
The French Government are of the opinion that the Balkan States who ac-
cepted the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 are bound by its stipulations. The French
Government also hold that the Powers would be justified in making their recog-
nition of the. recent territorial changes contingent upon an undertaking by the
annexing States to respect those provisions of the Treaties which guarantee the
rights of religious minorities.
The German Government entirely share the view of His Majesty's Govern-
ment.
The Russian Government consider the Great Powers, having formally inter-
vened in the Treaty of London of May 30, 1913, have hereby recognized the
cession, under Art. 2 of the Treaty, of territories by the Sultan to the Balkan
States. . . and they hold that the capitulations have ceased to exist in the newly
acquired territories by the mere fact of their annexation.
The view of the Italian Government is that the regulation of the present
Balkan situation requires the sanction of the Powers, but that such sanction
need not be expressed in a collective form, to which they are themselves op-
posed. They intend to give their own sanction independently of the other
Powers.
The Austro-Hungarian Government are reluctant to give their public assent
to any view that might call in question the full validity of the distribution of
territory made by the Treaty of Bucharest.
From the above . . . it is clear that there is no prospect of agreement, within
reasonable time, as to the procedure to be adopted in dealing with the question
In these circumstances His Majesty's Government consider that they must
act on their own view, that is, they will inform the Governments of Greece, Rou-
mania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro that His Majesty's Government, so far
as they themselves are concerned, are willing to recognize the recent annexations
of territories to the respective States, in so far as these annexations constitute a
departure from the settlement sanctioned by the Treaty of Berlin . . . provided
that the respective annexing States on their part acknowledge the binding force,
in respect to the annexed territories, of those provisions of the Treaty of Berlin
which ensure the equal rights of religious or national minorities.
Note from Sir Edward Grey to the Foreign Office, May 6, 1914, reprinted in id.
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lands had been considered terra nullius and merely symbolic acts of
annexation were recognized as bestowing possessory title. 3 Evidence of
such an attitude can be found in the orders of the explorer Prince
Henry the Navigator, who directed that Portuguese crosses and marks
be erected as a sign of Portuguese dominion in regions discovered by
his fleet.64 Similarly, in 1496, Henry VIII ordered John Cabot "to seek
out, discover, and find whatsoever islands, countries, regions or prov-
inces of the heathens and infidels, whatsoever they be, and in what
part of the world soever they be, which before this time have been un-
known to all Christians," and "to set up our banners and ensigns in
every village, town, castle, island or mainland of them newly found,"
and "subdue, occupy and possess" the same.5
Although by the late nineteenth century effective occupation had
replaced symbolic annexation as a necessary prerequisite to possessory
title," the colonial powers did not believe it was legally essential to
seek recognition of their territorial annexations by other states. At the
Congo Conference of 1885, the European powers agreed to establish
among themselves a duty of notification regarding the acquisition of
new African territories. "But its purpose was not germane to the ques-
tion of recognition. Its object was to prevent competing claims and to
regularize this mode of acquisition of territory by stipulating for a cer-
tain amount of publicity."... Consequently, when Germany annexed
New Guinea, Southwest Africa and Tanganyika, the German foreign
office informed Great Britain that these territories had been placed
under the protection of the Emperor.66 Similarly, when France an-
nexed Tunisia and Madagascar, it informed Great Britain of its moves,
but title itself was explicitly based on conquest.6 9 Conquest was also
used to justify British title to the Boer Republics of Orange Free State
-and Transvaal, which were annexed by Britain in 1900.70 The Russian
Empire was extended in Asia by conquest in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century as Russian armies conquered Chinese-held territories
along the Amur River, the Khanates of Bokhara, Khiva and Kokand as
well as the Turkoman Tribes. In the Far East, China sent 2000 troops
to conquer and subdue Tibet in 1909, and Japan forcibly annexed the
63. See M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORIES,
139 (1926).
64. Von der Heydte, supra note 9, at 453.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 457.
67. Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 131.
68. LINDLEY, supra note 63, at 293.
69. Id. at 191.
70. N. HILL, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS, 161 (1945).
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Kingdom of Korea in 1910."' Although Italy obtained the express rec-
ognition by several states of its 1912 conquest of the former Ottoman
territories of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, it did not regard such recognition
as legally essential. When Italy approached the United States with a
request for recognition, the United States replied that it was not its
custom "to proceed in that manner, especially with regard to European
affairs, that when the United States took over the Philippine Islands
and Puerto Rico, foreign governments were not asked for their acquies-
cence nor their recognition, and none was given."""
D. Post World War I Development
The First World War brought the principle of self-determination
to the fore of international politics and law."3 As the doctrine gained
increasing acceptance as an international legal norm, it became inextri-
cably linked with demands that the right of conquest be abolished for-
ever. In his address to Congress of January 22, 1917, United States
President Woodrow Wilson declared: "No peace can last or ought to
last, which does not accept the principle that governments derive all
their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right
anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty
as if they were property. '74 Indeed, the "Fourteen Points" program an-
nounced by Wilson in 1918 was based on the principles adopted by the
First International American Conference held in Washington, D.C. in
1890, which had outlawed title to territory by right of conquest.
78
Among the Fourteen Points were demands for self-determination for
71. LINDLEY, supra note 63, at 31, 219.
72. Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 131 n.3.
73. U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (1972). British
Prime Minister Herbert Asquith referred to it as "the war of self-determination." Id.
74. 54 CONG. REC. 1742 (1917).
"As is shown by his [President Wilson's] repeated refusals to favor the peti-
tions from subject nationalities which poured in on him later, as the war was
ending, the President's words did not endorse the right of secession. His mean-
ing appears, from the first, to have been that no change of sovereignty must be
made by conquest and that such national groups as wished it should be given
autonomy within the state to which they belonged. To many, however, the words
of the President in this and in his later speeches meant the ending of old tyran-
nies as well as the prevention of new ones."
1 S. WAMBAUGH, PLEBISCITES SINCE THE WORLD WAR, 4 (1933).
75. UMOZURIKE, supra note 73, at 19. President Wilson's calls for self-determination
and in particular his "Fourteen Points" speech had a profound effect on the emerging
struggle for independence in the Baltic region. Conversation with V. Kreicbergs, Coun-
selor, Latvian Legation, Wash. D.C., Dec. 1984. See also A. REI, THE DRAMA OF THE BAL-
TIC PEOPLES 66 (1970).
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the peoples of the Austrian, Ottoman and Russian Empires, restoration
of all Belgian, French, Romanian and Serbian territory seized by the
Central Powers, respect for the territorial integrity of the Balkan
States, and the re-establishment of an independent Poland.78
Wilson's call for territorial settlements based on the aspirations of
the populations involved was echoed by Pope Benedict XV, 77 Prince
Lvov of the Provisional Russian Government, the Petrograd Soviet,
78
76. THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WoODRow WILSON, 155 (R. Baker & W. Dodd eds. 1970).
77. UMOZURIKE, supra note 73, at 14.
78. WAMBAUGH, supra note 74, at 5. On April 10, 1917, soon after the abdication of
the Czar, Prime Minister Lvov declared that Russia repudiated its domination over
other nations, proclaimed autonomy for Poland and called for "a stable peace on the
basis of the self-determination of peoples." Id. In May, the first All-Russian Conference
of Bolsheviks promised that if the revolutionary class were to gain control of the govern-
ment it would immediately and openly offer to all peoples "a democratic peace, on the
basis of complete renunciation of every kind of annexation and indemnity." Id. at 6. On
June 21, 1917, the resolutions adopted by the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets
called on the Provisional Government to "do all that it can to have a re-examination of
the treaties with the Allies with a view to abandoning the policy of conquests." Id.
On November 8, 1917, the newly formed Soviet Government issued its "Declaration
of Peace" in which the All-Russian Convention of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and
Peasants' Deputies appealed for:
[A]n immediate peace without annexation .... and without indemnities
By annexation or seizure of foreign territory, the government in accordance
with the legal concept of democracy in general and of the working class in par-
ticular, understands any incorporation of a small and weak nationality by a large
and powerful State without a clear, definite and voluntary expression of agree-
ment and desire by the weak nationality, regardless of the time when such forci-
ble incorporation took place, regardless also of how developed or how backward
is the nation forcibly attacked or forcibly detained within the frontiers of the
larger State, and finally, regardless of whether or not this large nation is located
in Europe or in distant lands beyond the seas.
If any nation whatsoever is detained by force within the boundaries of a
certain State and if that nation, contrary to its expressed desire-whether such
desire is made manifest to the press, national assemblies, in parties' decisions, or
in protest and uprisings against national oppression-is not given the right to
determine the form of its State life by free voting and completely free from the
presence of the troops of the annexing or strange State, and without the least
pressure, then the adjunction of that nation by the stronger State is annexation,
i.e. seizure by force and violence.
Reprinted in M. LASERSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SoVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE,
1917-1942, at 10 (1943).
The Declaration of Peace was followed on November 15, 1917, by the Soviet's Decla-
ration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia. In this proclamation, signed by Lenin in his
capacity as Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, and Stalin, in his ca-
pacity of Peoples' Commissar for Nationalities' Affairs, the Soviet Government declared:
The Congress of Soviets has proclaimed in June of this year the right of
Russia's nationalities for free self-determination. The Second Congress of Sovi-
ets has confirmed more categorically and determined this inalienable right of
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Prime Minister Orlando of Italy and French Foreign Minister Stephen
Pichon.79 British Prime Minister Lloyd George proclaimed the princi-
ple of self-determination to be applicable to the German colonies. In
1917, he declared that "when we come to settle who must be the future
trustees of these uncivilized lands, we must take into account the senti-
ments of the peoples themselves."80
The Central Powers also renounced the forcible seizure of territory
as incompatible with the principle of self-determination. On July 19,
1917, the German Reichstag declared that Germany was not impelled
by "lust of conquest" and demanded "peace of understanding and the
permanent reconciliation of peoples," noting that these goals would be
inconsistent with "forced requisitions of territory and political, eco-
nomic, or financial oppression."8
To a large degree, self-determination of peoples was respected by
the Peace Conference at Versailles. The Central Powers of Austria,
Hungary, Germany and Turkey were broken up to create twelve new
European and Middle Eastern States and nine plebiscites were held to
settle territorial disputes in accordance with the wishes of the
Russia's nationalities.
The Council of the People's Commissars, executing the will of those Con-
gresses, has decided to lay down as a foundation of its policy toward the problem
of Russia's nationalities, the following principles: 1. The equality and sover-
eignty of Russia's nationalities; 2. The right of Russia's nationalities to free
self-determination up to seceding and the organization of an independent
state.
Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
79. UMOZURiKE, supra note 73, at 18. Pichon, on January 11, 1918, stated three condi-
tions for a just and lasting peace. Among these was "un r~glement territorial... bast
sur le droit des peuples d disposer d'eux-mtmes." Nevertheless, he rejoiced that under
Wilson's "Fourteen Points" Alsace and Lorraine were to be returned to France by the
"restauration pure et simple du droit viol en 1871, droit suptrieur a toutes les com-
binaisons de duptrie plebiscitaire .... " Cited in WAMBAUGH, supra note 74, at 10.
France also agreed, in conjunction with Britain, to create a Confederation of Arab
States in the Middle East in exchange for an Arab uprising against the Turks. This
secret pact, known as the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, later served as the basis of
territorial change and control imposed by the Treaty of Sevres upon the Ottoman Em-
pire after the conclusion of World War I. Temperley, The Secret Agreements Affecting
the Near and Middle East (1915-1917), in 6 A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF
PARIS 1-18 (H. Temperley ed. 1924).
As a result of Franco-British guarantees, the Sherif of Mecca organized a successful
Arab revolt against the Turks which resulted in total defeat for the Turkish army. The
Turks were driven from Palestine and the Sherif of Mecca, as King Hussein, was made
ruler of the Hejaz. His eldest son Feisal was crowned as King of Iraq in Baghdad and his
son Abdullah was offered the throne of Trans-Jordan. Id. at 18.
80. UMOZURIKE, supra note 73, at 17.
81. Id. at 14.
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inhabitants."5
82. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 3, 225 Parry's T.S. 188. Plebiscites were
held in Allenstein, Marienwerder, Eupen, Malmedy, Schleswig, Burgenland, Upper Sile-
sia, Klagenfurt and the Saar Valley. Votes by the population were also held in Vilnius,
Vorarlberg, Tirol and the Aaland Islands. Wambaugh, La Pratique des Plebiscites In-
ternationaux, 18 RECUEIL DES CouRs 153, 201 (1927). Elections to the diet of Vilnius
(Vilna) on January 8, 1922, however, were conducted under military occupation and were
controlled by the interested Polish authorities, thus, according to Col. Chardigny, Presi-
dent of the Military Commission of Control of the League of Nations, "it would seem
impossible to regard the present Diet of Vilna as the real and sincere expression of the
whole population of the electoral territory." LITHUANIAN INFORMATION BUREAU, THE LITH-
UANIAN-POLISH DISPUTE 57. See also infra note 196.
Sadly, the principle of self-determination was also denied to the Austrians of the
Southern Tyrol. Despite their protests, the Sud Tirol was awarded, along with its popu-
lation of 250,000 Austrians, to Italy. DE ZAYAS, supra note 1, at 19. A parallel, but even
more blatant, denial of self-determination to an ethnic group occurred in the Sudeten-
land of Bohemia and Moravia. The three and one-half million German-Austrians of this
region fully expected the principle of self-determination to be equally applied to all the
various peoples inhabiting the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On October 6, 1918, the Ger-
man members of the Austrian Parliament made the following statement:
We recognize the right of self-determination of the slavic and romanic peo-
ples of Austria and claim the same right for the German-Austrians . . . . We
declare that the German people of the Austrian Empire will oppose a dictated
determination of the status of any of its parts. Against any such attempt the
German-Austrians will defend their right to self-determination by all means at
their disposal.
Id. at 20.
On October 21, 1918, the members of the Provisional Austrian National Assembly
passed a resolution in which the Austrian State claimed authority over all Germans in
the Empire, particularly those living in the Sudetenland, and declared its opposition to
any attempt by other states to annex territories populated predominantly by Germans.
The same day, Sudeten-German members of the Parliament in Vienna passed resolu-
tions declaring the Bohemian and Moravian districts which they represented to be part
of the German-Austrian State. Id.
Despite the clear desire of the Sudeten population to remain a part of Austria,
Czech and Slovak militia began to occupy the Sudetenland as soon as the World War
ended. Id. at 21.
Angered at what it considered to be a betrayal of trust, the German-Austrian Gov-
ernment sent a note to President Wilson on December 12, 1918:
It appears from a communication from the Czecho-Slovak Government that
the Allied Powers intend to incorporate with the Czecho-Slovak State those
large, coherent territories of Bohemia and Moravia, which are populated by
more than three million Germans. This measure, it is said, will be taken without
awaiting the results of the peace conference . . . . (Tihe Austro-German Gov-
ernment. . . feels obliged to call this fact to everybody's attention and to insist
that tendencies of this kind are not practically carried out. There can be no
doubt as to the German character of the territories in question. Their population
has on several occasions manifested their ardent desire to maintain their liberty
and their independence of the Czecho-Slovak State. This desire of the people
has been expressed especially by the unanimous vote of its representatives,
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The devastation wrought by World War I also gave impetus to a
proposal by President Wilson for "a general association of nations...
formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual
guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great
and small states alike." s The League of Nations, founded in 1920, sub-
sequently played an important role in developing international aware-
elected on basis of equal suffrage. If, however, the Allied Powers have any
doubts in this regard, the Austro-German Government proposes to make clear
without delay the situation by plebiscite superintended and guided by neutral
authorities and to give every guarantee besides, as to the liberty of vote. In such
a case, the Austro-German Government asks the Allied Powers not to decide
upon the fate of the people in question except upon the basis of the results of
this plebiscite. This way of procedure seems to be the only one in conformity
with the principles recently proclaimed by the Entente itself as expressed in
President Wilson's message of the 8th of January, 1918, in articles 2 and 4 of his
speech of the l1th of February, 1918, and in his speech of the 4th of July, 1918;
that is to say, in conformity with the principles of justice, of the world's peace
and the nations' rights of self-determination.
Id.
The French Government rejected the Austrian appeal on December 20, 1918, and
Italy and Great Britain decided against permitting a plebiscite to occur in the Sudeten-
land early the following year. Only the United States Government considered the poten-
tial repercussions of a denial of self-determination to such a large ethnic group. In a
report by Professor Archibald Cary Coolidge to the American Commission to Negotiate
Peace, dated March 10, 1919, Professor Coolidge warned: "To grant the Czechoslovaks
all the territory they demand would not only be an injustice to millions of people unwill-
ing to come under Czech rule, but it would also be dangerous and perhaps fatal to the
new state .. " Id. at 22. The Coolidge Commission's recommendations as to the west-
ern borders of the new Czech State were disregarded and the Allies awarded all of the
Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia. In article XXVII of the Treaty of St. Germain, Austria
was required to recognize the new Czech frontiers. The German Government was also
compelled to recognize the new status of the Sudetenland. In article LXXXI of the
Treaty of Versailles, Germany recognized the independence of Czechoslovakia, and in
article LXXXII, it accepted the new German-Czech frontier. Id. at 23.
In response to these developments one distinguished United States scholar
remarked:
In the case of Austria-Hungary, not only is it evident that the Peace Confer-
ence failed to define the right of self-determination, or to provide rules for its
practical application, but, worse still, it is evident that there was no united pur-
pose to mete out "a justice that knows no standard but the equal rights of the
several peoples concerned." The dominant motives of the Peace Conference
would seem to have been: first, to gratify faithful allies; secondly, to show sever-
ity to the conquered foe; and, thirdly, to establish a new balance of power.
Brown, Self-determination in Central Europe, 14 Am. J. INT'L L. 235, 237 (1920). Only
18 years later, Germany would use the discontent unleashed by the annexation of the
Sudetenland as a springboard for conquest in central Europe. See infra notes 124-31.
83. PRESIDENT WILSON'S FOREIGN POLICY: MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, PAPERS, 362 (J. Scott
ed. 1918).
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ness of the need for collective security. s With regard to the subject of
territorial change, Wilson's call for the protection of national territorial
integrity was ultimately adopted as article 10 of the League Covenant:
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and ex-
isting political independence of all the Members of the League.
In case of any such aggression or in the case of any threat or
danger of such aggression, the Council should advise upon the
means by which this obligation should be fulfilled.8
Eight years later, the principles underlying article 10 were embod-
ied in a major international agreement, the Treaty of Paris, or the Kel-
logg-Briand Pact. 86 The treaty's most important provisions were the
following:
Art. I The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in
the names of their respective peoples that they condemn re-
course to war for the solution of international controversies,
and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their
relations with one another.
Art. II The High Contracting Parties agree that the set-
tlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever na-
ture or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among
them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
Although the treaty contained no language imposing a duty not to rec-
ognize territorial changes brought about by force, the fact that all of
the world's major powers-Soviet Russia, Germany, the United States,
Great Britain, Japan and France-ratified the pact seemed to guaran-
tee universal support for such a prescription.
E. Birth of the Stimson Doctrine of Nonrecognition of Forcible
Seizure of Territory
Three years after the Treaty of Paris was signed, Japan occupied
the Chinese province of Manchuria and the League was faced with the
first major test of its ability to enforce article 10 of the Covenant.
8 7
84. See generally G. Schwarzenberger, The League of Nations and World Order
(1936).
85. LEAGUE ov NATIONS COVENANT, ART. 10.
86. Treaty of Paris, Aug. 17, 1928, 4 U.S.T. 5130.
87. LANGER, supra note 4, at 62. The Manchurian crisis had its origin in the year 1915
when the Chinese Government, in response to Japanese pressure, agreed to extend the
duration of the Japanese lease on the Kwang-tung peninsula and its railway rights in
South Manchuria. Wright, The Legal Background in the Far East, in LEGAL PROBLEMS
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On January 7, 1932, United States Secretary of State Henry L.
Stimson dispatched the following note to the governments of China
and Japan:
[1In view of the present situation and of its own rights and ob-
ligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its
duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the
Government of the Chinese Republic that it can not admit the
legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize
any treaty or agreement entered into between those Govern-
ments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of
the United States or its citizens in China, including those
which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the terri-
torial or administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or
to the international policy relative to China, commonly known
as the open-door policy; and that it does not intend to recog-
nize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought
about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of
the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both
China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties."8
The note was immediately hailed as a major development in interna-
tional law.s9 On March 11, 1932, the assembly of the League of Nations
IN THE FAR EASTERN CONFLICT 76 (Q. Wright ed. 1941). The collapse of the Imperial
Russian Government two years later provided Japan with an opportunity to move into
Manchuria in order to occupy parts of the former Russian railway zone. The United
States viewed the Japanese moves with concern and orchestrated the signing of the so-
called Nine Power Treaty of 1922 by which Japan, the United States, Belgium, Great
Britain, China, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal agreed to "respect the sover-
eignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China." LANGER,
supra note 4, at 54, 55. Between 1922 and 1931, millions of Chinese peasants migrated
from the overpopulated interior to the northeastern border provinces. As a result, anti-
Japanese sentiment in Manchuria intensified. In 1931, a minor explosion on the tracks of
the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway served as a pretext for sweeping
Japanese measures. See id. at 55-67. The cities of Mukden, Harbin and Changchun were
occupied by Japanese troops, and the former Chinese Emperor, Huang-tung, was called
upon by Japan to assume the leadership of a new state, "Manchukuo". W. CHURCHILL,
THE GATHERING STORM 87 (1948); see LANGER, supra note 4, at 55-67.
88. Identical Note to Chinese and Japanese Governments (Jan. 7, 1932), reprinted in
DEP'T ST. PRESS RELEASES, Jan.-June 1932, at 41-42 (emphasis added).
89. Wright, supra note 7,. at 342. Although the United States had sent a similar note
to China and Japan in 1915, the Stimson note was considered far more significant be-
cause of the subsequent Enactment of the Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact). Because
the Pact forbade the use of force as a means of settling disputes, the Stimson note indi-
cated that any Japanese seizure of territory would not be recognized by the United
States. Id. at 346-47. Of this declaration, Secretary Stimson later wrote:
If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the
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adopted a resolution by which the League condemned and refused to
recognize any forcible seizure of territory by one state from another."'
other Goverments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action [i.e.,
conquest, in violation of a treaty] which, we believe, will effectively bar the legal-
ity hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty
violation, and which . . . will eventually lead to the restoration to China of
rights and titles of which she may have been deprived ....
Letter from Secretary Stimson to United States Senator W.E. Borah, cited in Briggs,
supra note 5, at 73. The doctrine enunciated by Stimson was referred to as "a means of
depriving a conqueror of the fruits of his conquest," and as a means of bolstering the
determination of subjugated people to free themselves from oppression. Id. at 74. The
doctrine was criticized by some scholars, such as Edwin Borchard of Yale University, as
"the doctrine of making faces" and as "sheer intervention in the affairs of another
State." Id. at 96. See generally Borchard & Morrison, The Doctrine of Non-Recognition
in LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EASTERN CONFLICT 157-184 (Q. Wright ed. .1941).
Borchard argues:
To be logical, proponents of the doctrine of non-recognition ought to outlaw
all war, or at least all conquest and refuse to recognize the results of any con-
quest. But as conquest could only be abolished by creating conditions which re-
move all incentive to conquest and much of the matrix of power politics, non-
recognitionists are perforce driven to the revival of the old distinction between
the just and the unjust war, and admonish states to withhold recognition from
the acquisitions or results of unjust wars. Inasmuch as nations do not judge such
matters objectively, but in the light of their interests, their prior commitments
and other considerations having little or nothing to do with "justice," the di-
lemma of divided judgment and new causes for hostility arises to plague the
defenders of collective security and non-recognition. And even though non-rec-
ognition seems mild and not violent, the resentment it may arouse may be no
less provocative.
The non-recognition of facts, of irretrievable, irrevocable facts, has created a
great amount of hostility. It helped throw Mussolini into the arms of Hitler.
That is what these impractical moralistic principles often accom-
plish-bloodletting on a large scale. It is the perfectionists, desire for a theologi-
cally and logically correct world. Unhappily it cannot be that, it is not that, and
we just have to deal with it as it is.
Id. at 175.
90. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 101, at 87 (1932). The resolution declared:
The Assembly
Considering that the provisions of the Covenant are entirely applicable to
the present dispute, more particularly as regards:
(1) The principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties;
(2) The undertaking entered into by Members of the League of Nations to
respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all the Members of the League;
(3) Their obligation to submit any dispute which may arise between them
to procedure for peaceful settlement;
Adopting the principles laid down by the acting President of the Council,
M. Briand, in his declaration of December 10, 1931;
Recalling the fact that twelve Members of the Council again invoked those
principles in their appeal to the Japanese Government on February 16, 1932,
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Following the League's adoption of this resolution, sanctions were
voted against Japan, and Japan left the League."1
While much of the world's attention was riveted on the Manchu-
rian crisis, a dispute in South America produced a solemn declaration
of nonrecognition of forcible territorial annexation. On May 10, 1932,
Paraguay had ignited the so-called Chaco War by declaring war on Bo-
livia.9" Several months later, representatives of the nineteen other
American republics met to discuss ways of ending the conflict. On Au-
gust 2, 1932, the delegates issued the so-called "Chaco Declaration"
indicating their refusal to recognize any forcible seizures of territory
which might occur as a result of the war:' 8
The American nations . . . declare that they will not recognize
any territorial arrangement of this controversy which has not
been obtained by peaceful means nor the validity of territorial
acquisition which has not been obtained by peaceful means,
nor the validity of territorial acquisition which may be ob-
when they declared that no infringement of the territorial integrity and no
change in the political independence of any Member of the League brought
about in disregard of Art. 10 of the Covenant ought to be recognized as valid and
effectual by Members of the League of Nations;
Considering that the principles governing international relations and the
peaceful settlement of disputes between Members of the League above referred
to are in full harmony with the Pact of Paris, which is one of the cornerstones of
the peace organization of the world and under Art. 2 of which "the High Con-
tracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of disputes or conflicts, of
whatever nature and whatever origin they may be, which might arise among
them shall never be sought except by pacific means";
Pending the steps which it may ultimately take for the settlement of the
dispute which has been referred to it;
Proclaims the binding nature of the principles and provisions referred to
above and declares that it is incumbent upon the Members of the League of
Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be
brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or
to the Pact of Paris.
Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
Lauterpacht states that the wording of the pronouncement of the League Council
and the Assembly Resolution created a legal obligation of nonrecognition of forcible
seizure of territory which thenceforth bound the members of the League by virtue of the
Covenant. "In fact, the refusal to recognize a conquest accomplished in violation of the
Covenant [would seem to have] constituted the very minimum of the obligation to re-
spect and to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of other mem-
bers of the League." H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 416-20 (1947).
91. Wright, supra note 7, at 48.
92. Briggs, supra note 5, at 77.
93. GuTIEREEz, supra note 48, at 23. See generally L. RouT, POLrrlcs OF THE CHACO
PEACE CONFERENCE, 1935-1939 (1970).
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tained through occupation or conquest of force by arms.9"
Although the final settlement agreed to by Bolivia permitted Para-
guay to retain a major portion of its conquests, the Chaco Declaration
influenced Dr. Saavedra Lamas, Foreign Minister of Argentina, to sug-
gest to the Latin American world the writing of a formal anti-war
treaty. This treaty was to be based partly on the principles of older
Latin American draft treaties and partly on the contemporary interna-
tional legal standards embodied in the Stimson doctrine, the League
Resolution of March 11, 1932 and the Chaco Declaration."
On October 10, 1933, such a treaty was signed at Rio de Janeiro by
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Uruguay."' The Treaty
proclaimed in its first article the principle of nonrecognition of certain
territorial changes and contained detailed provisions regarding concili-
ation proceedings and instrumentalities. The preamble stated the ob-
ject of the treaty as follows:
The States designated below. . .to the end of condemning
wars of aggression and territorial acquisitions that may be ob-
tained by means of armed conquest and of making them im-
possible by sanctioning their invalidity through the positive
provisions of this treaty . . . have agreed on the following:
(1) The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that
they condemn wars of aggression in their mutual relations or
those with other states, and that the settlement of disputes
or controversies of any kind that may arise among them
shall be effected only through the pacific means established
by international law. (2) They declare that as between the
High Contracting Parties territorial questions must not be
settled by resort to violence, and that they will not recognize
any territorial arrangements [sic] which is not obtained by
pacific means, nor the validity of any occupation or acquisi-
tion of territory that may be brought about by armed
force.""
Numerous other states, American and European, subsequently rat-
94. LANGER, supra note 4, at 68.
95. BRIGGS, supra note 5, at 79.
96. Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, Oct. 10, 1933, Argen-
tina-Brazil-Chile-Mexico--Paraguay-Uruguay, 163 L.N.T.S. 393. The treaty was
subsequently signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, Cuba, Guatamala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, El Salvador,
Venezuela, the United States, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway,
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
97. Id. at 405.
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ified the Treaty. Yet, international determination to abide by conven-
tional agreements embodying the principles implicit in article 10 of the
Covenant of the League rapidly dissipated when confronted with con-
certed German and Italian aggression. Commencing in 1935, there oc-
curred a progressive breakdown of global willingness to support the
carefully constructed system of world public order established in the
1920's." Such a breakdown was first signalled by Soviet Russia's tacit
recognition of the Manchurian puppet state in 1935.99 This seemingly
innocuous event was followed by more serious breaches of international
peace, including seizures of territory by Italy, Germany, Hungary, Po-
land and eventually Soviet Russia itself."'0
On October 3, 1935, the Italian Government informed the League
that "the warlike and aggressive spirit in Ethiopia had succeeded in
imposing war against Italy."'0 1 On the same day, the Imperial Ethio-
pian Government informed the League Council that Italian planes had
attacked Ethiopian towns and that war had broken out on Ethiopian
territory. Ethiopia declared the attacks to be a violation of its frontiers
and a breach of the League Covenant.0
On October 9, the League voted to impose economic sanctions
against Italy. 0 s Sanctions, however, proved ineffective because they
failed to embargo the petroleum necessary for the Italian war effort
and, as a result, most of Ethiopia fell under Italian control by the end
of 1935.104 Oa May 2, 1936, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie fled to
Great Britain, and one week later, King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy
placed the territories and peoples of Ethiopia under the sovereignty of
the Italian crown.
10 5
On May 11, the Italian representative to the League rose in the
council hall in Geneva to make a statement opposing the placement of
98. See generally THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 87.
99. Wright, supra note 7, at 58.
100. Briggs, supra note 5, at 79.
101. LANGER, supra note 4, at 132.
102. Id.
103. Id.
Members of the League of Nations as well as the United States applied
trade restriction measures such as sanctions and embargoes, while Italy pro-
ceeded with her conquests. Italian imports did shrink from 7,790,000,000 lire in
1935 to 6,039,000,000 lire in 1936, the year in which sanctions and the United
States embargo became effective, but Italy completed her conquest, proclaimed
her title and in the next year her imports rose to 13,837,000,000 lire.
Briggs, supra note 5, at 86.
104. THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 87, at 175.
105. 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 687-88 (1978). Nonetheless, Ethiopian representa-
tives abroad were still accorded diplomatic rights and privileges. BRIGGS, supra note 5, at
86.
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the Italo-Ethiopian dispute on the agenda.10" Before speaking, he chal-
lenged the right of the Ethiopian representative to attend the meet-
ing. 1 0 7 When it became clear that the Ethiopian would not be com-
pelled to leave, he remarked: "Nothing resembling an organized
Ethiopian state exists. The only sovereignty in Ethiopia is Italian sov-
ereignty. Any discussion on a dispute between Italy and Ethiopia
would be accordingly pointless. I am bound, therefore, not to take part
in it."' ' s At that point the Italian delegation left the hall. The following
day they were recalled to Rome.
On July 4, 1936, the League Assembly adopted a resolution calling
for an end to the sanctions imposed upon Italy which had proved inef-
fectual without the support of the major powers.' Even more damag-
ing to the principles underlying article 10 of the League Covenant was
the willingness of many nations to accord de jure recognition to the
Italian annexation. On January 5, 1938, the Italian Government issued
a statement boasting that seventeen states, most of them League mem-
bers, had granted de jure recognition of the conquest, and eleven,
among them Great Britain and France, but not the Soviet Union, had
granted de facto recognition." 0 Several months later, the British Gov-
ernment signed a note with Italy which implicitly granted full recogni-
tion of the Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia."'
106. K. MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
264 (1968).
107. LANOER, supra note 4, at 133.
108. Quoted in id.
109. Id.
110. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 151, at 19 (1936).
111. THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 87, at 283. The British-Italian note was de-
fended by British Prime Minister Chamberlain as an attempt "to restore old and more
cordial relations" and to establish general confidence that peace could and would be
maintained. 347 PARL. DAB., H.C. (5th ser.) 534-35 (1934). The note was, however, subject
to much criticism in the British Parliament. Sir A. Sinclair declared:
[B]y compelling this country to recognise the Italian conquest of ,Abys-
sinia-I do not say "conquest" for ... that conquest has not been achieved ow-
ing to the splendid resistance of the Abyssinians fighting bravely for their free-
dom . . . the Prime Minister has shirked responsibilities and sacrificed
principles . . . principles on which alone peace can be established, not only for
ourselves, but for the young people who are now growing up.
Id. at 569. M.P. David Lloyd George observed:
We really ought to know whether the Prime Minister contemplates recognis-
ing an act of aggression, an act of banditry, the destruction of the independence
of a nation which Great Britain was pledged to protect, and which the Prime
Minister said at the last election it would be cowardice to abandon. Is [the
Prime Minister], through his intermediary at the League of Nations, going to say
that he proposes now to recognise this theft, this robbery, this piratical enter-
prise, and that he is doing it in the name of general appeasement?
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On May 12, the Ethiopian question was raised at a meeting of the
Council of the League. The British and French delegates took the posi-
tion during the discussion that "the question of the recognition of It-
aly's position in Ethiopia is one for each member of the League to de-
cide for itself in the light of its own situation and its own
obligation."' 12 They were followed to the rostrum by Emperor Haile
Selassie, who, in strong words, denounced those League members who
had granted recognition to the Italian conquest.113 The Ethiopian posi-
Id. at 589.
The fact of the matter is that this Agreement does not touch the real root of
our difficulties. The real root of our difficulties is that we have never stood on
any position we have taken up for the last few years.
Id. at 592. The Duchess of Atholl stated:
We know now that Signor Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia was not due to
the Wal-Wal incident in 1935 but that he had been preparing this invasion for
some years .... We also know that he has not conquered Abyssinia. The peo-
ple are bravely resisting the invader .... [I]t would be lamentable if, by
recognising Italy now as in possession of a country of which she has only a very
partial control, we gave discouragement to a very brave people who, under great
disadvantages, are striving. . . to preserve their national independence. I cannot
help fearing that to recognise Italian supremacy in Abyssinia, after all the efforts
that were made by the League in 1935 to help Abyssinia, would be a very great
discouragement to the League itself and to the principle of collective security.
Id. at 617-18.
112. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 334 (1938).
113. Id. at 336. The Emperor declared:
Since 1935, Ethiopia has observed with sorrow how one after another, the
signatures affixed to the Covenant have been denied. A number of Powers, them-
selves threatened by aggression and realizing their own weakness, have aban-
doned Ethiopia. Their cry has been "Sauve qui peut," the cry of the panic-
stricken and demoralized. They have torn up the treaties which ensured their
independence-Non-Aggression Treaties, the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions, the Pact of Paris. By what right can they ever invoke such undertakings, if
they treat the agreements they have signed as mere scraps of paper?
Id. The Emperor then proceeded to discuss the intentions of the British Government. He
asserted that the real purpose of its action was to ensure the execution of the note of
April 16, 1938, by asking the Council to set aside "the protective rule" laid down by the
Assembly on July 4, 1936. He continued:
That is how it is proposed to treat the principles of international law and
Article 10 of the Covenant ....
Yet non-recognition of a conquest by aggression is the least onerous way of
observing Article 10, since it calls for nothing more than a passive attitude re-
quiring no national sacrifice on the part of Member States, involving them in no
risk of war or reprisals.
But it would seem that even this passive attitude has become too exacting
for the Governments which, in order to resume with Rome what they describe as
normal diplomatic relations, have felt impelled to protest-in varying forms, but
always unsatisfactorily-their fidelity to the principle of non-recognition of terri-
torial gains acquired by force. Today, it is the callous abandonment of that prin-
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tion was supported by only China, New Zealand and the Soviet Union.
The Soviet representative to the League, Maxim Litvinov, denounced
Italy's aggression in Ethiopia, stressing the value of a policy of nonrec-
ognition of the forcible seizure of territory to the global community."
1 4
ciple which is contemplated and, apparently, even urged by the powerful British
Empire ....
To attenuate this flagrant violation of the Covenant, the suggestion today
before the Council is based on the de facto situation at present prevailing in
Ethiopia.
Even were it true-which it is not-that the invader has broken my people's
resistance; even if he were effectively occupying and administering the territory
of my Empire-and he does not-even in such circumstances, the proposal
before the Council should be unhesitatingly rejected. Was not the principle pro-
claimed by the United States of North America some years ago-namely, its
refusal to grant legal recognition to the results of aggression-hailed throughout
the world as one of the more important advances in the realm of international
law and as a signal contribution to the organization of peace between the
nations?...
It is unhappily true that my people cannot at present expect any material
assistance from the States Members of the League. But I am at least entitled to
ask that the rights of my people should continue to be recognized and that,
while awaiting the hour of divine justice, Ethiopia should remain in your midst
as the living symbol of violated right .... Let it not be said that the Ethiopian
would derive no benefit thereby, and that the only result would be to disturb
international relations. The surest way to disturb those relations is by sanction-
ing law breaking and sacrificing the victim . . . to the aggressor.
Id. at 337.
114. Id. at 340. Litvinov declared:
Among the means for combating aggression and defending its Members
which the League has at its disposal, non-recognition does not by any means
play a conspicuous part. It is improbable that any one would assert that the
mere threat of non-recognition may avert aggression, or that non-recognition it-
self might free the victim of aggression from the grip of the conqueror ...
It would be quite wrong, however, to assert that resolutions on non-recogni-
tion are in themselves devoid of any particular value. While such resolutions
have in every case a certain moral significance, and give satisfaction to public
opinion, they also cause the aggressor some preoccupations and inconveniences,
as is evidenced by the efforts which aggressors usually make to obtain recogni-
tion of their conquests, if only in an indirect way.
But, according to circumstances, non-recognition may be of vast importance,
not only morally, but also politically-particularly when the victim of aggression
itself continues to fight for its independence and for the integrity of its territory.
In such cases, the recognition of the results of acts of violent aggression, or the
abandonment of the policy of non-recognition, would be equivalent to abetting
the aggressor directly, and to stabbing the victim in the back by discouraging
and demoralizing him. We have to reckon, not only with the question whether
any struggle between the aggressor and his victims has come to an end, but
also-should that have occurred for the time being-whether there are chances
of the struggle being renewed, and likewise we have to reckon with other circum-
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Although many members of the League, as well as world public
stances which may bring about a change in the situation created by aggressive
acts of violence.
Id. Mr. Litvinov then addressed the legal aspects of the nonrecognition doctrine:
But whatever the decision on the question before us, whatever the conclu-
sions which individual States will think it necessary to draw, on their own re-
sponsibility, from our discussion, one thing must be clear: The League of Na-
tions has not changed its view of those actions- which resulted in an Ethiopian
problem arising within the League, and none of the condemnations of such activ-
ities adopted by the League is withdrawn. It must be made even more clear that
the League of Nations has not changed its opinion on the general principle of
non-recognition of the accomplished fact produced by aggression, and on the
appropriate resolutions adopted by the League in other cases. The latter particu-
larly applies in cases where the States which have been the victims of attack
have aroused the amazement and admiration of the world by the valiance of
their citizens who continue to fight the aggressor with unweakening energy, ob-
stinacy and fortitude. It must be clear that the League of Nations has no inten-
tion of changing its attitude, whether to the direct seizure and annexation of
other people's territory, or to those cases where such annexations are camou-
flaged by the setting up of puppet "national" governments, allegedly indepen-
dent, but in reality serving merely as a screen for, and an agency of, the foreign
invader.
I have still to remark briefly on the other aspects of the question which I
have mentioned. When the United Kingdom Government puts forward its mo-
tion to grant freedom of action to all League Members, it bases its principal
argument on the fact that many Members of the League, in violation of League
resolutions, have already taken steps toward recognizing the annexation of Ethi-
opia, and therefore the same opportunity should be afforded to others. This may
be fair from the standpoint of equality of obligations, but equality at such a low
level can hardly be an ideal of the League. If we once admit that principle, we
may expect that it will be sufficient for one or a few Members of the League to
break one of its decisions-and that may easily happen, in the present state of
international morality-for all other Members of the League, one by one, to fol-
low them.
We cannot admit that breaches of international obligations are examples to
be followed. The League of Nations and its individual Members have made mis-
takes, errors and blunders; they have not always fulfilled their obligations. We
should recognize and condemn such failures and take measures to prevent their
repetition in future, but on no account must we legalize them, or lower the col-
lective responsibility of the League of Nations to their level. Of course, the
League's decisions are not eternal, and can always be reviewed and corrected by
the League, at the request of individual League Members, but it is the League
collectively which has to recognize such decisions as being out of date and inva-
lid, not the individual Members, when they think it requires, or when it seems to
be required, by their national interests at the time. The League Council should
leave no room for doubt that it not only does not approve such anarchic activi-
ties, or errect them into a virtue, but severely condemns those of its Members
who are the first to set the example of engaging in them.
Id. at 341 (emphasis added). Mr. Litvinov concluded:
If we had before us any resolution or resume of our discussion, I should
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opinion, sympathized with Ethiopia's plight, most of the Council mem-
bers subsequently joined the British and French Governments in em-
phasizing the right of sovereign states to act without restrictions when
dealing with such matters. " The Polish delegate, Titus Komarnicki,
declared:
My Government believes that all the activities of the League of
Nations should be animated by a just appreciation of political
realities, a condition indispensable to all effective international
collaboration. If the League continues to confine itself to rigid
procedure, serving only to perpetuate sources of conflict-as
was the case, for instance, in the "Manchukuo" affair-it is to
be feared that its role as an organ of international co-operation
will inevitably be diminished. " '
The imbroglio over the Ethiopian crisis was repeated on March 11,
1938, when Germany annexed Austria.1 1 7 The Soviet Government was
quick to denounce the German aggression 18 and Mexico condemned
the annexation in strong terms. " " Once again, Great Britain and
insist on its reflecting the considerations I have laid before you. To neglect them
will not allow the League to remain in existence much longer, and I should like
to think that its preservation answers to the interests of peace and to the wishes
of the vast majority of States.
Id.
115. LANGER, supra note 4, at 147.
116. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 343 (1938).
117. THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 87, at 269.
118. LANGER, supra note 4, at 158. Foreign Affairs Commissar Litvinov declared:
The violations of international undertakings ensuing from the League Cove-
nant and from the Paris [Briand-Kellogg] Pact. . . have provided occasions for
the Soviet Government to demonstrate not only its negative attitude toward
these international crimes, but also its readiness to take an active part in all
measures aiming to organize a collective rebuff to the aggressor, even disregard-
ing the inevitable aggravation of its relations with the aggressor. At the same
time, the Soviet Government voiced the warning that international inaction and
the impunity of aggression in one case would inexorably lead to the repetition
and multiplication of similar cases.
Unfortunately, international developments have justified these warnings.
They received a new confirmation in the armed invasion of Austria and in the
forcible deprivation of the Austrian people of their political, economic and cul-
tural independence.
Id.
119. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 239 (1938). The Mexican statement read:
In view of the suppression of Austria as an independent State as the result
of armed foreign intervention, and since the Council of the League has not as yet
been convened with a view to the application of Article 10 of the Covenant,
which requires the members of the League to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and political independence of all
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France adopted positions consistent with an appeasment oriented for-
eign policy and agreed to recognize the fruits of armed aggression, thus




members, I have the honour, acting on the instructions of the Mexican Govern-
ment, to transmit to you the following declarations, and to request you to be
good enough to bring them to the knowledge of the States Members of the
League.
The political extinction of Austria, in the form and circumstances in which
it has taken place, constitutes a serious infringement of the League Covenant
and the established principles of international law ....
The fact that the Vienna authorities handed over their powers to the in-
vader is no excuse for the aggressor's action, and the League should not accept
the fait accompli without the most vigorous protests or without taking the ac-
tion provided for by the articles of the Covenant.
Moreover, the authorities who relinquished executive power are in no sense
representative of the Austrian people, who undoubtedly regard the death of
their country as a tragedy of evil omen; the very authorities who were obligated
to "yield to force" were not acting of their own free will, since voluntas coacta
voluntas non est. Consequently, the States Members of the League should not
regard the action and words of these authorities as the free and lawful expres-
sion of the will of the nation subjected to military force.
The Mexican Government, which has always upheld the principles of the
Covenant and in accordance with its consistent international policy refuses to
recognize any conquest made by force, enters the most emphatic protest against
the external aggression of which the Austrian Republic has just been the victim.
It informs the public opinion of the world that in its view the only means of
securing peace, and preventing further international outrages such as those that
have been committed against Ethiopia, Spain, China, and Austria, is for the na-
tions to carry out the obligations laid upon them by the Covenant, the treaties
they have concluded and the principles of international law. Otherwise it will
not be long before the world is overwhelmed by a far worse conflagration than
that which it is sought to avoid by attempted action outside the League system.
Id.
120. THE GATHERUNG STORM, supra note 87, at 274. On March 16, 1938, the British
Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, made the following statement in Parliament:
The problem of Austria . . . has been with us always ever since the war
ended with the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. . . . I assert that,
faced with it, the attitude of successive British Governments has been quite con-
sistent. They have never supposed that the status quo in Austria could necessa-
rily be maintained for all time. They have been perfectly willing to recognize the
special interest of the German government in the relations between Germany
and Austria. Therefore, they have been perfectly willing to contemplate revision
of the Peace Treaties.
The framers of the Treaties . . . stipulated . . . that the change, if desired,
should only be brought about after the Council of the League had carefully con-
sidered the difficulties and the dangers that were involved, and had decided that
those could be surmounted without endangering the paramount interest of Euro-
pean peace and European stability. Events have, of course, moved very differ-
ently. ...
It was suggested by Lord Snell that the matter might usefully be referred to
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The United States, as in the Ethiopian conflict, refused to grant
de jure recognition to the annexation, although it did accede to the
German Government's request that it close its Embassy in Vienna and
the Austrian Legation in the United States.121
Encouraged by the reluctance of the major powers to enforce arti-
cles 10 and 16 of the Covenant of the League, and by political and
military conditions in Britain and France, the German Government
soon decided to make a second attack on the territorial order estab-
lished by the Treaty of Versailles. 2 ' Using the grievances of the Sude-
ten Germans of Czechoslovakia as a "smoke screen," German Chancel-
lor Adolph Hitler demanded self-government for the German-speaking
areas of the Czech Republic.12 3 Hitler intimated that unless the Czech
Republic's Western allies were willing to pressure it into an agreement
the League of Nations. I have, of course, had to give some thought before this
debate to that suggestion. The juridical position of Austria as she existed up to a
few days ago was, that of an independent State which was bound by treaty not
to alienate that independence without the consent of the Council of the League.
That independence, in complete disregard of treaty provisions, has disappeared
overnight, and the world, therefore, has been presented with a fait accompli in a
fashion and in a setting of accompanying circumstances for which I can recall no
parallel in history. But nonetheless . . . nothing that the League can do can
undo what has been done and. .. I confess that I can see no good to be gained
at this juncture for the League or for any of the great purposes of the League, by
bringing this matter before the League tribunal. Nothing short of war can put
back the clock, and States Members of the League are not prepared to go to war
on this issue.
Those facts, I suggest, must be perfectly squarely faced, and the conclusion
that I reach is that the League, though it has a perfect legal right to interest
itself in the question, cannot conceivably do anything at this moment which
would compel Nazi Germany to turn back from the course on which she has now
embarked. His Majesty's Government are therefore bound to recognize that the
Austrian State has now been abolished as an international entity and is in the
process of being entirely absorbed into the German Reich, and that is happening
indeed without waiting for the plebiscite, the result of which is a foregone
conclusion.
108 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 177-80 (1938).
121. MAREK, supra note 106, at 344.
122. THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 87, at 281, 290. See generally Z. MUNZER, WE
WERE AND WE SHALL BE: THE CZECHOSLOVAK SPIRIT THROUGH THE CENTURIES (1941); G.
GEDYE, BETRAYAL IN CENTRAL EUROPE: AUSTRIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE FALLEN BAS-
TIONS (1939); S. GRANT DUFF, A GERMAN PROTECTORATE. THE CZECHS UNDER NAZI RULE
(1942); E. ERDELY, GERMANY'S FIRST EUROPEAN PROTECTORATE; THE FATE OF THE CZECHS
AND SLOVAKS (1942); E. TABORSKY, THE CZECHOSLOVAK CAUSE, AN ACCOUNT OF THE
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1944); H.
RASCHHOFER, DIE SUDETENFRAGE: IHRE VOLKERRECHTLICHE ENTWICKLUNG vOM ERSTEN
WELTKRIEG BIS ZUR GEGENWART (1953); K. ROBBINS, MUNICH (1968).
123. THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 87, at 285. See also supra note 83 for an
account of the origins of the Sudeten German-Czech conflict.
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satisfactory to the Reich, direct military force would be used to settle
the dispute.12 4
In the early fall of 1938, an atmosphere of crisis gripped Europe. A
series of hastily scheduled meetings were held between Hitler, French
Premier Daladier and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
with a view to the prevention of a second European conflagration.12
On September 18, an accord was reached calling for major cessions of
Czech territory to Germany. The terms of the agreement were deliv-
ered the following day to the Czech Government by the British and
French Ambassadors to Prague. 2" On September 21, Czechoslovakia
accepted the Western demands.-2 "
124. Id. at 286.
125. Id. at 298-301.
126. Id. at 301-02. The Anglo-French note stated:
We are both convinced that, after recent events, the point has now been
reached where the further maintenance within the boundaries of the Czechoslo-
vak State of the districts mainly inhabited by Sudetan Deutsch cannot, in fact,
continue any longer without imperilling the interest of Czechoslovakia herself
and of European peace. In the light of these considerations, both Governments
have been compelled to the conclusion that the maintenance of peace and the
safety of Czechoslovakia's vital interests cannot effectively be assured unless
these areas are now transferred to the Reich ....
The Prime Minister must resume conversations with Herr Hitler not later
than Wednesday, and earlier if possible. We therefore feel we must ask for your
reply at the earliest possible moment.
The Anglo-French Proposals Presented to the Czechoslovak Government (Sept. 19,
1938), Miscellaneous No. 7 (1938), Correspondence Respecting Czechoslovakia, reprinted
in GREAT BRITAIN, PAPERS RELATING TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT 8-9
(1938).
127. THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 87, at 303. The Czech acceptance note
declared:
The Czechoslovak Government, forced by circumstances, yielding to un-
heard-of pressure and drawing the consequences from the communication of the
French and British Governments of September 21, 1938, in which both Govern-
ments expressed their point of view as to help for Czechoslovakia in case she
should refuse to accept the Franco-British proposals with feelings of pain ....
It notes with regret that these proposals were elaborated without previous con-
sultation with the Czechoslovak Government ....
Quoted in LANGER, supra note 4, at 213-14. In a broadcast to the nation, delivered at
7:00 p.m., the Czech Government was more explicit than it had been in the aforemen-
tioned diplomatic note:
The British and French Governments, during a common demarche made
last night before the President of the Republic by their diplomatic representa-
tives, intimated to the Czechoslovak Government that this solution [i.e., negotia-
tions regarding arbitration] would not prevent a conflict, and that Great Britain
and France would be unable to afford any help to Czechoslovakia in the event of
her being attacked by Germany, which would happen if Czechoslovakia did not
immediately agree in principle to the cession of the territories with German pop-
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In the face of such blatant aggression, a majority of the members
of the League, including the Soviet Union, were utterly silent. The
most the League could do was adopt a weakly worded resolution pray-
ing for cooperation and a peaceful settlement of the conflict.12 8
On the evening of September 29, Great Britain, France, Italy and
Germany, meeting at Munich, agreed on the new boundaries of the
Czech nation.129 Several days thereafter, President Beneg and his gov-
ernment in Prague resigned,8 0 and in late November the so-called Ger-
man-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia were absorbed into the Reich.1
3 1
Less than four months later, on March 14, 1939, Europe was star-
tled by Germany's invasion and annexation of the remaining Czech ter-
ritories of Bohemia and Moravia. This final, unilateral dismemberment
of the Czech State caused great concern in Paris, London, Moscow and
Washington. The French, Soviet' 8 ' and United States Governments'
ulation to the Reich.
Since the Soviet Union could afford us military help only in company with
France, or, alternatively, if France would not act, until Germany had been de-
clared an aggressor by the League of Nations, we found ourselves faced with a
threat of war, which would endanger, not merely the present boundaries of our
state, but even the very existence of the Czechs and Slovaks as one indivisible
nation .... The President of the Republic, therefore, together with the Gov-
ernment, could not do anything but accept the plan of the two Great Powers as
the basis of further negotiations. We had no other choice, because we were left
alone.
Id.
128. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 183, at 78 (1938). The League statement
declared:
Representatives of forty-nine States meeting as delegates to the Assembly of
the League of Nations have watched with deep and growing anxiety the develop-
ment of the present grave situation in Europe.
The Assembly is convinced that the existing differences are capable of being
solved by peaceful means ....
The Assembly, therefore . . . expresses the earnest hope that no Govern-
ment will attempt to impose a settlement by force ....
Id.
129. THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 87, at 316-17.
130. Id. at 322.
131. See LANGER, supra note 4, at 216. Mention must also be made of Poland's Sep-
tember 30, 1938 demand for the immediate cession of the frontier district of Teschen. As
the Czech Government had no means of resisting this harsh demand, the district was
handed over to the Polish Government the following day. THE GATHERING STORM, supra
note 87, at 322. The Hungarian Government also pressed territorial demands upon the
moribund Czech Government. On November 2, 1938, Hungary received considerable sec-
tions of Slovakia and Ruthenia, including the cities of Kosice and Uzhorod. LANGER,
supra note 4, at 216.
132. MAREK, supra note 106, at 287. On March 17, the French Ambassador to Berlin
handed German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop the following note:
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immediately declared that they would refuse to recognize the legality
of the German tour de force. The British Government's response was,
The Government of the [French] Republic considers itself, through the ac-
tion taken against Czechoslovakia by the German Government, confronted with
a flagrant violation of both the letter and the spirit of the Agreement signed in
Munich on September 29, 1938.
The circumstances in which the agreement of March 15 was imposed on the
leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic could not, in view of the Government of
the French Republic, legalize the state of affairs registered in this Agreement.
The French Ambassador has the honour to inform His Excellency the Reich
Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Government of the Republic cannot in the
circumstances recognize the legality of the new situation brought about in
Czechoslovakia by the action of the Reich.
Reprinted in 2 CZECHOSLOVAK SOURCES AND DocumENrs 22-23 (1943).
The Soviet Government also dispatched a communication to Germany through the
German Ambassador to Moscow:
In the absence of any expression of the will of the Czech people, the occupa-
tion of the Czech provinces by German troops and the subsequent actions of the
German Government cannot but be considered as arbitrary, violent and
aggressive.
The above remarks also refer in their entirety to the change in the status of
Slovakia, subordinating the latter to the German Empire, which was not justified
by any expression of the will of the Slovak people.
The actions of the German Government served as a signal for the gross in-
vasion of Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) by Hungarian troops and for the viola-
tion of the elementary rights of its population.
In view of the above, the Soviet Government cannot recognize the inclusion
of the Czech provinces and also, in one form or another, of Slovakia in the Ger-
man Empire to be legitimate and in conformity with the generally accepted rules
of international law and justice or the principle of self-determination of nations.
Reprinted in id. at 25.
133. MAREK, supra note 106, at 288. On March 17, 1939, the acting Secretary of
State, Sumner Welles, released the following statement:
This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the principles of human
liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain from making known this country's con-
demnation of the acts which have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of
the liberties of a free and independent people with whom, from the day when
the Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its independence, the people of the
United States have maintained specially close and friendly relations ....
20 DEfT ST. PRESS RELEASES 199 (1939).
The United States Government's position was confirmed in a letter sent by Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt to Dr. Benei on March 27:
My Dear Dr. Benei:
I have received your telegram of March 16, 1939, regarding the tragic events
of last week in Central Europe. I have followed these happenings with deep con-
cern. While the United States Government has observed that the provinces of
Bohemia and Moravia have been occupied by German military authorities and
are now under the de facto administration of the German authorities, it has not
recognized the legal status of that situation . . ..
Reprinted in 2 CZECHOSLOVAK SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS 38-39 (1943).
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however, ambiguous.18 Prime Minister Chamberlain declared that the
German action was devoid of any basis of legality but refused to com-
mit His Majesty's Government to a policy of nonrecognition."'
134. MAREK, supra note 106, at 289. The Czechoslovak Republic was destined to suf-
fer another territorial amputation before the end of World War II. This last annexation
of Czech territory involved the eastern province of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia which bor-
dered Poland, Hungary, Romania and the U.S.S.R. See generally P. MAGOCSi, THE SHAP-
ING OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY: SUB CARPATHIAN Rus', 1848-1948. (1978).
In October 1944, the Red Army approached the borders of Ruthenia and within ten
days occupied the entire province. On October 27, 1944, a Czechoslovak delegation
headed by Social Democrat Frantisek Nemec arrived in the city of Khust to restore
Czech administration in the province. Real power, however, remained in the hands of the
Red Army, which used its influence to pack the local national committees, which were
organized in the Ruthenian villages, with Communists. Id. at 253.
On November 19, 1944, the reorganized SubCarpathian Communist Party held its
first conference in Mukachevo. Claiming that the people of Ruthenia "belong to the
Ukranian nation," the conference adopted a resolution which "demanded that historical
injustice be removed and that the Transcarpathian Ukraine be re-united with the Soviet
Union." Id.
A Communist-dominated National Council was organized at Mukachevo on Novem-
ber 25-26, 1944. Its six hundred delegates, chosen by the local national committees,
adopted a "Manifesto . . . for the Reunification of Transcarpathian Ukraine with the
Soviet Ukraine." Id. The Manifesto went on to call for a reunion of "the Trans-
carpathian Ukraine with its great mother, the Soviet Ukraine, and to leave the frame-
work of Czechoslavakia." Id. at 254. It also asked for entry into the Soviet Union and
called for the election of a national council to represent the "will of the people." Id.
Nemec and his delegation were later asked to leave the. province. Id. On Feb. 2, 1945, the
Czech delegation left for Slovakia. Id. In doing so, it belatedly recognized that Ruthenia
was already a de facto Soviet province. Id. Indeed, on Nov. 5, 1944, the principal city in
Ruthenia, Uzhhorod, had been put on Moscow time, and within the first months of its
rule, the Mukachevo Council nationalized banks, some industries, and large landhold-
ings. Id.
The Benei government, exiled in London, failed to oppose these developments.
Large areas of Czechoslovakia remained under German occupation, and the Czech Gov-
ernment was consequently dependent on Soviet military power. Id. Moreover, several
Czechoslovak leaders feared that any dispute with Moscow could lead to the loss of
Slovakia. Id. In January 1945, Stalin had informed Benei that the "Soviet government
has not forbidden nor could it forbid the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine
from expressing its national will. . . although the issue can only be settled by a treaty
. . . just before or after the end of the war with Germany." Id. at 255. Recognizing his
nation's weak bargaining position, Benei acceded to Stalin's demands, and on June 29,
1945, a treaty was signed between Prague and Moscow recognizing the cession of the
Transcarpathian Ukraine to the Ukranian S.S.R. Id.
135. LANGER, supra note 4, at 224. By early 1939 many members of the British Par-
liament had become increasingly disturbed by a foreign policy based upon the appease-
ment of aggressors. Such displeasure with the Government's policy was expressed in an
important speech on the value of nonrecognition of forcible seizure of territory, given in
Parliament by Mr. A.V. Alexander on May 26, 1939. Mr. Alexander declared:
We submit today that not only should the Government not give actual rec-
ognition to the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia, but ought not even to consider it
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The annexation of Czechoslovakia alarmed Britain and France to
such an extent that soon thereafter they agreed to guarantee the fron-
tiers of Poland and Romania against further aggression.13 0 The Soviet
I would go further and say that even from the point of view of his own self-
respect I should have thought the Prime Minister would not have considered it.
But after all, there is something at stake far more important than the self-re-
spect of the Prime Minister. Such recognition, if it would be given, would be in
our view, entirely contrary to the principles of the League of Nations ....
The more one considers the actions of the Prime Minister in these matters,
the more they give ground for the gravest suspicion.
The right honourable Gentlemen now seems to hanker after recognition of
the Czecho-Slovak conquest ....
I ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he replies to this debate to
consider also the actual legal position. . . . It is plain from such evidence as is
available that if de facto recognition takes place, the British courts thereafter
will have to give recognition to the validity of the action of the German authori-
ties in Czecho-Slovakia. For no other reason than that this House ought immedi-
ately to persuade the Government to refuse to consider de facto recognition.
The other point I would bring to the notice of the Prime Minister is that
there has grown up in the last few years in international law a clew recognition
of a principle which has to be observed in these matters, which is that in this so-
called non-recognition there must be a definite act taken by way of resolving not
to recognize. This is of fundamental importance in the post-war legal position of
international relations. The statement that was made by Mr. Stimson over the
invasion of Manchuria by Japan was one of the precedents which will no doubt
be followed by other nations in such questions where aggression has taken place.
The effect of the principle will be that nations who are signatories to the
Covenant of the League, or signatories of the Pact of Paris with the principles
there laid down, must refrain from giving de facto or de jure recognition.
347 PARL. Dm., H.C. (5th ser.) 2704 (1939).
After referring to the Argentine Anti-War Treaty, Mr. Alexander turned to the
question of how long nonrecognition could, and should, be applied in a given case Alex-
ander delcared:
It may be admitted that in the course of time international law may have to
develop a rule corresponding to prescription in order to validate a position which
may have been wrong at its inception, but which has been de facto accepted for
a long time . ...
In conclusion I would say that if the British Government were to grant rec-
ognition to Germany over the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia at this time, such
an action would be inconsistent with the Covenant of the League . . . . Sec-
ondly, it would be impossible for such an action to be reconciled with the previ-
ous decisions of Council and Assembly. Thirdly, it is contrary to international
law as accepted by the American States; and fourthly, it is impossible to justify
on grounds of prescription. Such action will strike a very heavy blow indeed at
the hopes we have of beginning to rebuild a proper recognition of international
law ....
Id.
136. THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 87, at 379.
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Union feared further Nazi moves and proposed to both Britain and
France the establishment of a united "peace front" designed to encircle
the Reich and secure the frontiers of the remaining independent states
in Central Europe. Pursuant to the Soviet diplomatic initiative, negoti-
ations between the three powers began in Moscow in April 1939.137
On April 7, 1939, the Kingdom of Albania, a member of the
League of Nations, was invaded by the Italian Army without any dec-
laration of war or prior warning."3 8 The Albanian ruler, King Zog I,
urged his people to resist the invaders, but as a result of the careful
preparation and the crushing superiority of the Italian Army, Albania's
forces were decisively defeated.' The King fled the country, and on
April 12, the Italian authorities convened a body styled "the Constitu-
ent Assembly" which duly offered the Albanian crown to Victor Em-
manuel 111.140
Immediately after the Italian invasion, King Zog sent a protest to
Secretary General Avenol of the League of Nations. In his letter of
April 9, the King declared:
While protesting . . . against this violence on the part of Italy
and against the disappearance of the independence of Albania,
a Member of the League of Nations, I request Your Excellency
to bring these facts to the knowledge of the members of the
League. . . .at the same time inviting them not to recognize a
state of things accomplished by Italy with blood and iron, and
to take steps for the reestablishment of the Albanian people in
the possession of their former rights.'
4
1
Another protest by the Albanian Charg6 d'Affaires in Paris fol-
lowed. The Secretary-General, possibly influenced by the appease-
ment-oriented foreign policies of Britain and France, adopted an unco-
operative attitude. The Albanian question was not placed on the
agenda of the meeting of the League Council scheduled for May
1939.1 2 As a result, the League never considered the Albanian case.1
4 3
Economic and foreign affairs "treaties" between Italy and its client
state were concluded in April and June of 1939, and Albania's foreign
relations were brought under the direction of Rome. Foreign represent-
atives in Albania were informed that henceforth they would not be ac-
137. Id. at 362.
138. MAREK, supra note 106, at 331.
139. LANGER, supra note 4, at 245.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 246.




corded diplomatic privileges and protection. Albanian embassies
abroad were closed. As a result, foreign states began to wind up the




In Great Britain, several Members of Parliament raised the Alba-
nian issue and attempted to commit the Government to a policy of
nonrecognition, but their efforts were no more successful than those on
behalf of Czechoslovakia. In November 1939, the British Government
granted de facto recognition of the changed status of Albania by apply-
ing to the Italian Government for an exequatur for the British consul
in Durazzo.
145
The United States, on the other hand, steadfastly refused to rec-
ognize the Italian annexation. On April 8, 1939, the Department of
State condemned the Italian invasion. This position was reiterated in
the Department's statement of December 10, 1942: "Consistent with its
well-established policy not to recognize territorial conquest by force,
the Government of the United States has never recognized the annexa-
tion of Albania by the Italian crown . . . .The restoration of a free
Albania is inherent in that statement of principles.' 46 The Albanian
Legation continued to function in Washington until 1942 when the Al-
banian Minister died. An identical attitude had been adopted by Tur-
key and Egypt where Albanian missions were also permitted to re-
main. 4" Despite the support shown for Albania by some members of
the League, the Albanian crisis failed to have any major international
repercussions. This was largely due to the global preoccupation with
the continuing talks in Moscow between Britain, France and Soviet
Russia which, it was hoped, would prevent the outbreak of war. 4"
While the Moscow talks continued, the Germans resumed a series
of trade discussions with the Soviets in Berlin.' 4 ' These discussions
were soon transformed into highly confidential talks on mutual secur-
ity, and on August 23, 1939, a treaty of nonaggression was concluded
144. LANGER, supra note 4, at 247.
145. MAREK, supra note 106, at 333. In international law, an exequatur is a "certifi-
cate issued by the foreign department of a state to a consul or commercial agent of an-
other state, recognizing his official character, and authorizing him to fulfill his duties."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 682 (4th ed. 1968).
146. Statement by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on the Continued Resistance of
Albania to Italian Occupation (Dec. 10, 1942), reprinted in 7 DEP'T ST. BULL. 998 (1942).
147. MAREK, supra note 106, at 333.
148. Id.
149. HousE COMM. ON COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, THIRD INTERIM REPORT, BALTIC
STATES: A STUDY OF THEIR ORIGIN AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; THEIR SEIZURE AND IN-
CORPORATION INTO THE U.S.S.R. 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1954) [hereinafter cited as BAL-
TIC STATES].
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between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. 150 In a secret protocol
affixed to this pact, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, a lead-
ing advocate of Soviet-German rapprochement, and Soviet Foreign
Commissar Molotov, agreed to the boundaries of their respective
"spheres of influence" in Eastern Europe. Germany was to receive
western Poland and Lithuania while the Soviet Union was to be given
a free hand in eastern Poland, Bessarabia, Bukovina, Latvia, Estonia
and Finland. 15 1
On September 1, Germany invaded Poland and ignited the Second
World War. Two weeks later, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
Molotov delivered a note to the Polish Embassy in Moscow declaring:
The Polish Government has disintegrated; the Polish State and
its Government have ceased to exist; in the same way the
agreements between the Soviet Union and Poland have come
to an end. Poland has become a suitable field for all manner of
hazards and surprises which might constitute a threat to the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union can, therefore, no longer pre-
serve a neutral attitude, and the Soviet Government has or-
dered their troops to cross the frontier and take under their
protection the life and property of the population of the West-
ern Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.5 2
On September 17, 1939, the Red Army crossed the Polish frontier
and within a few days occupied the eastern part of the country. On
September 28, representatives of Germany and the Soviet Union,
meeting at Moscow, agreed to a division of the Polish State. 53 The
150. LES ARCHIVES SECRATES DE LA WILHELMSTRASSE, LES ANNtES DE GEURRE 1939-
40, at 144 (J. Weiland ed. 1950).
151. 7 DEP'T ST. DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1918-1945, SERIES D. (1937-
1945) 245-47 (1956). See also J. SWETTENHAM, THE TRAGEDY OF THE BALTIC STATES 24
(1952).
152. LANGER, supra note 4, at 254. See generally B. MONTANUS, POLISH-SovIET RELA-
TIONS IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1944); M. SUPER, POLAND AND RUSSIA: THE
LAST QUARTER CENTURY (1944); L. KIRKIEN. RUSSIA, POLAND AND THE CURZON LINE (1945);
B. BUDUROWYCZ, POLISH-SOvIET RELATIONS 1932-1939 (1963).
153. German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, Sept. 28, 1939, reprinted in
NAzr-SoviET RELATIONS, 1939-1941, at 105-06 (R. Sontag & J. Beddie eds. 1948). The
agreement's preamble declared:
The Government of the German Reich and Government of the U.S.S.R.
consider it as exclusively their task, after the collapse of the former Polish state,
to re-establish peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples
living there a peaceful life in keeping with their national character.
Id. at 105. The territorial settlement was detailed as follows:
Article I.
The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R.
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Polish Government, which had fled to Rumania, delivered energetic
protests to all members of the League. The protests declared that the
German-Soviet agreement had "no legal effect whatever" because it
was "contrary to the fundamental principles of law in force" and in-
sisted that it would "be regarded by the Polish nation and by the Po-
lish Government as null and void."1
determine as the boundary of their respective national interests in the territory
of the former Polish state the line marked on the attached map, which shall be
described in more detail in a supplementary protocol.
Article II.
Both parties recognize the boundary of the respective national interests es-
tablished in article I as definitive and shall reject any interference of third pow-
ers in this settlement.
Article III.
The necessary reorganization of public administration will be effected in the
areas west of the line specified in article I by the Government of the German
Reich, in the areas east of this line by the Government of the U.S.S.R.
Id. at 105-06. In yet another secret protocol the Nazi-Soviet spheres of influence were
amended by transferring Lithuania (excluding its small southwest section) to the Soviet
sphere in exchange for Poland's province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw
which were transferred to Germany. Id. at 105.
154. Id. at 257. The Nazi-Soviet line of demarcation transferred 72.866 square miles
of Polish territory and 22 million inhabitants to Germany and 77.620 square miles of
territory and 13 million Polish inhabitants to Soviet Union. In Northern and Central
Poland, the Soviet Union gained the territory which it had forcibly annexed during the
third partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1795. The Soviet Union also gained Eastern Gali-
cia and the important Polish city of Lvov-neither of which had ever been Russian at
any previous time in history. S. GRABSKI, THE POLISH-SovIET FRONTIER 3 (1943). See also
Ginsburgs, A Case Study In the Soviet Use of International Law: Eastern Poland in
1939, 52 AM. J. INT'L. L. 69-84 (1958).
Upon entering Eastern Poland, the Red Army and Soviet administrative authorities,
including the NKVD, immediately subjected the population to Soviet control. Existing
Polish administration was suppressed; land and private enterprises nationalized; mayors,
parish heads, priests and local officials were arrested and deported. Some notable Polish
leaders, such as Count Janusz Radziwil, were murdered. See generally POLISH EMBASSY
IN WASHINGTON, D.C., POLISH-SovIET RELATIONS, 1918-1943, OFFIcIAL DOCUMENTS (1943).
Eastern Poland was subsequently divided into two parts: a northern part called
Western Byelorussia with its capital first in Vilnius and later in Bialystok; and a south-
ern part called Western Ukraine, with its capital at Lvov. Soviet authorities then decreed
the holding of elections to new "National Assemblies." No freedom of choice as to candi-
dates was offered-there being only one official list of potential deputies. Among the
candidates were Molotov, Marshal Voroshilov and General Kovalev, Commander of the
White Russian Front. Those who attempted to oppose the elections were arrested and
deported. Id. at 6-11.
According to Soviet sources, 96.71% of the electorate voted for the Assembly of
Lvov and 92.83% for that in Bialystok. Id. at 10. These assemblies met on October 26
and 28, 1939, respectively. Stalin was elected honorary President of both assemblies, and
identical resolutions were passed requesting admission to the U.S.S.R. This request was
granted by the Supreme Soviet on November 1 and 2, 1939. Id. at 102-04. One Soviet
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Once again the United States announced its adherence to the prin-
ciples of the Stimson doctrine. In a statement to the Polish Govern-
ment-in-exile Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared:
More than 20 years ago the United States recognized and has
since maintained diplomatic relations with the Polish Govern-
ment. Poland is now the victim of force used as an instrument
of national policy. Its territory has been taken over and its
Government has had to seek refuge abroad. Mere seizure of
territory, however, does not extinguish the legal existence of a
government. The United States therefore continues to regard
the Government of Poland as in existence . . . and continues
to recognize Count Jerzy Potocki as its Ambassador in
Washington. s
On October 5, 1939, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin requested the
Government of Finland to send a representative to Moscow for a con-
ference so that "issues of mutual concern" could be discussed. The
Finnish Government sent a delegation which, instead of finding a con-
ference, was confronted with the following demands: Lease of the Port
of Hankoe, cession of part of the Petsamo District on the Arctic Ocean,
cession of five islands in the Gulf of Finland and 2761 square kilome-
scholar has described the "election" as follows: "In 1939, in accordance with the will of
the population expressed in the form of a nation-wide balloting, Western Ukraine and
Western Byelorussia, illegally torn away at an earlier date by feudal Poland, were once
again re-united with the Ukrainian and White Russian S.S.R.'s." S. MoLoiyrsov, SoME
QUESTIONS OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (1954), cited in Ginsburgs, supra, at
80.
On November 29, 1939, a Soviet decree imposed Soviet nationality on all Polish
citizens of the incorporated regions and the Soviet authorities conscripted certain classes
of the Polish population into the Red Army. POLISH-Sovirr RELATIONS, supra, at 105.
Shortly thereafter, a massive wave of deportations began. Over one million Poles
were transported to Siberia and central Asia in February, April and June 1940, and in
June 1941. Id. at 17-21. See also S. GRABSKI, THE POLISH-SovIET FRONTIER 35 (1943).
155. Statement by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on The Continuance of Diplomatic
Relations with the Polish Government (Oct. 2, 1939), reprinted in 1 DEP'T ST. BULL. 342
(1939).In 1941, British Foreign secretary Anthony Eden confirmed British nonrecogni-
tion of the annexation of Eastern Poland in a note to Polish Prime Minister Sikorski:
I desire to take the opportunity of informing. you that in conformity with
the provisions of the agreement of mutual assistance between the United King-
dom and Poland of the 25 August 1939, His Majesty's Government . .. have
entered into no understanding towards the U.S.S.R. which affect the relations
between that country and Poland. I also desire to inform you that His Majesty's
Government do not recognize any territorial changes which have been effected in
Poland since August 1939.
Diplomatic Note from Anthony Eden to Prime Minister Wladyslaw Sikorski (July 30,
1941), reprinted in S. GRusKI, supra note 154, at 3 (1943).
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ters of territory in the Karelian Isthmus, demilitarization of the Finn-
ish-Soviet border, and a pledge not to enter into any alliance hostile to
the Soviet Union. 150 Although the Finns were willing to cede some ter-
ritory, they refused to lease Hankoe or to demilitarize their border, and
negotiations collapsed. On November 13, the Finnish delegation left
Moscow. 15 On November 26, Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov
claimed that Finland had violated Soviet territory by shelling a Rus-
sian village. Finnish denials that their artillery could have fired on the
village as well as Finnish suggestions that the matter be submitted to
arbitration were rejected by the U.S.S.R.
On November 29, Soviet forces crossed the Finnish frontier and
Helsinki was bombed from the air. Moscow radio subsequently an-
nounced the formation by the Finnish Communist Party of a "Demo-
cratic Government of Finland" in the village of Terijoki on the Soviet
frontier. Shortly afterwards, the Soviet Union recognized the new "gov-
ernment" whose titular leader, Otto W. Kuusinen, had been a Finnish
Communist and had fled to Russia after the defeat of the Finnish Bol-
sheviks in the Finnish Civil War. Kuusinen's "government" at once
proceeded to justify the Soviet invasion by announcing that the Red
Army had crossed the Finnish frontier "at the request" of the
Kuusinen government. "It will depart" Kuusinen announced, "as soon
as the People's Government asks it to leave.'
'15 8
Four days later, Finland's representative to the League, Rodolphe
Holsti, requested the Secretary General to convoke the Assembly and
the Council so that the necessary steps might be taken to end the So-
viet invasion. On December 5, the Soviet Government sent a telegram
to the Secretary General announcing the Soviet Union's refusal to at-
tend the scheduled special session. The telegram declared that "Demo-
cratic" Finland had requested Russian military assistance and denied
that a state of war existed between the two nations.
59
156. J. WUORINEN, A HISTORY OF FINLAND 347 (1965). See also H. KROSBY, FINLAND,
GERMANY, AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1940-1941: THE PETSAMO DISPUTE (1968); and M. JA-
KOBSON, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WINTER WAR, 1939-1940 (1961).
157. WUORINEN, supra note 156, at 348 (1965).
158. Id. at 348-53. Pravda declared on December 4, 1939: "Only the Soviet Union,
which rejects in principle the seizure by force of territory and the enslavement of nations
could agree to use its armed might not for the purpose of attacking Finland or enslaving
its people, but for securing its independence." Id. at 353.
159. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 509 (1939). The text of the telegram reads:
In accordance with instructions from the U.S.S.R. Government, I have the
honor to inform you that Government considers unjustified proposal to convene
December 9 Council League of Nations and December 11 Assembly League of
Nations on the initiative of M. Rodolphe Holsti and in virtue of Article II, para-
graph 1, of the League Covenant.
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This pretext for blatant Soviet aggression was not regarded as
credible by most League members and on December 12, 1939, the As-
sembly adopted a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion. 60 Late
The U.S.S.R. is not at war with Finland and does not threaten the Finnish
nation with war. Consequently, reference to Article II, paragraph 1, is unjusti-
fied. The Soviet Union maintains peaceful relations with the Democratic Repub-
lic of Finland, whose Government signed with the U.S.S.R. on December 2nd
Pact of Assistance and Friendship. This Pact settled all questions which the So-
viet Government has fruitlessly discussed with delegates of former Finnish Gov-
ernment now divested of its power.
By its declaration of December 1st, the Government of the Democratic Re-
public of Finland requested the Soviet Government to lend assistance to that
Republic by armed forces with a view to the joint liquidation at the earliest
possible moment of the very dangerous seat of war created in Finland by its
former rulers. In these circumstances, appeal by M. Rodolphe Holsti to the
League cannot justify convocation of the Council and the Assembly, especially as
the persons on whose behalf M. Rodolphe Holsti has approached the League
cannot be regarded as mandatories of the Finnish people.
If, notwithstanding considerations set out above, Council and Assembly are
convened to consider the appeal of M. Rodolphe Holsti, U.S.S.R. Government
would be unable to take part in these meetings. This decision is also based on
the fact that the communication from the Secretary-General of the League con-
cerning convocation Council and Assembly reproduces the text of the letter from
M. Rodolphe Holsti, which is full of insults and calumnies against the Soviet
Government, this being incompatible with the respect due to the U.S.S.R.
Id. at 512.
160. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OJ. 540 (1939).
The Assembly
I
Solemnly condemns the action taken by the U.S.S.R. against the State of
Finland;
Urgently appeals to every Member of the League to provide Finland with
such material and humanitarian assistance as may be in its power and to refrain
from any action which might weaken Finland's power of resistance;
Authorizes the Secretary-General to lend the aid of his technical services on
the organization of the aforesaid assistance to Finland;
And likewise authorizes the Secretary-General, in view of the Assembly res-
olution of October 4, 1931, to consult non-member States with a view to possible
co-operation.
II
Whereas, notwithstanding an invitation extended to it on two occasions, the
U.S.S.R. has refused to be present at the examination of its dispute with Finland
before the Council and the Assembly;
And whereas, by thus refusing to recognize the duty of the Council and the
Assembly as regards the execution of Article 15 of the Covenant, it has failed to
observe one of the League's most essential covenants for the safeguarding of
peace and the security of nations;
And whereas it has vainly attempted to justify its refusal on the ground of
the relations which it has established with an alleged Government which is
neither de jure nor de facto the Government recognized by the people of Finland
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that day, the League Council met and decided to expel the Soviet
Union from the League in accordance with article 16, paragraph 4 of
the Covenant.'
The League's action ended the Soviet presence at Geneva but it
did not end the war. The Finns were defeated and peace was concluded
at Moscow on March 12, 1940.162 Under the treaty, Finland lost large
areas of territory, the city of Viipori (Viborg), and control of its impor-
tant naval base at Hankoe. In addition, upwards of 25,000 Finns per-
ished fighting the Russians and over 45,000 were disabled-a massive
loss of life for a country of only 3.7 million inhabitants.
16 3
in accordance with the free working of their institutions;
And whereas the U.S.S.R. has not merely violated the Covenant of the
League, but has by its own action placed inself outside the Covenant;
And whereas the Council is competent under Article 16 of the Covenant to
consider what consequences should follow from this situation;
Recommends the Council to pronounce upon the question.
Id.
161. Id. at 506. Voting in favor of the expulsion was the Union of South Africa,
Belgium, Bolivia, Great Britain, the Dominican Republic, Egypt and France. China, Fin-
land, Greece and Yugoslavia abstained from voting, and two Council members, Iran and
Peru, were absent from the meeting.
162. JAKOBSON, supra note 156, at 253. The pressure on the Finnish peace commis-
sion at Moscow was intense. Finland alone had held off the Red Army for three months
and the battle still raged in the suburbs of the Karelian capital of Viipuri. Every twelve
hours cost Finland several hundred casualties. In addition, all communications to Hel-
sinki had to travel via Stockholm, thus delaying the arrival of news reports by up to
twelve hours. Id. at 251.
163. Id. at 254. See also 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA FENNICA 499 (1964). The firing ceased at
11:00 a.m. on March 13, 1940. "It was a day of quiet, bitter mourning in Finland. Many
newspapers framed the news of the peace terms with black margins. Throughout the
country flags flew at half mast." JAKOBSON, supra note 156, at 254. The defenders of
Viipuri marched north out of the devastated city, and Finnish troops on Lake Ladoga
surrendered the positions which they had held for over 105 days as they began to with-
draw westward. Id.
Alongside the army marched the people of Karelia. Over 450,000 Finns began to
leave their homes and farms since Moscow had ordered them to complete their evacua-
tion in twelve days. This was scarcely enough time to carry out movable property. In-
deed, caravans of volunteers came from as far away as Sweden to help Karelians rescue
what they could. Nevertheless, most valuable property had to be left behind. Id.
"The exodus of the Karelians, a civilian Dunkerque, was a human tragedy as vast as
had been the war itself. By a stroke of Molotov's pen every eighth inhabitant of Finland
had been deprived of home and livelihood." Id.
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III. THE ANNEXATION OF THE BALTIC STATES
A. Origins of the Baltic States
The Baltic peoples-Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians-have
inhabited the northeastern edge of the Baltic Sea since at least 1500
B.C.' " As such they can truly be considered autochthonous. Ethnically
they belong to neither the Germanic nor Slavic groups of peoples, but
instead stem from the Finno-Ugric tribes that once lived along the
Volga and Kama Rivers (Estonians) and from a separate and distinct
branch of those Indo-European tribes whose origins are in central Asia
(Latvians and Lithuanians). The Estonians speak a language classified
as a Finno-Ugric tongue whereas the Latvians and Lithuanians speak
related languages which are probably more ancient than Sanskrit.16
The first recorded mention of the Baltic tribes is contained in the
chronicles of the Roman geographer Tacitus, who praised them as suc-
cessful farmers, cattle breeders, hunters and fishermen centuries before
Slavic tribes settled in the region.1"6 As early as the first century A.D.,
all three Baltic peoples possessed a highly sophisticated cosmology, so-
cial structure and folklore. Commercial relations were maintained by
them with the Nordic tribes of Scandinavia, Iceland, England', Flan-
ders, Holland and Denmark. 
6 7
Although the Slavic tribes established themselves in the vast plain
between the Ural Mountains and the Black Sea between the fifth and
ninth centuries, they failed to settle the Baltic region, most probably
because it was already densely populated by the Baltic peoples.
168
There were some Russian military incursions into the area from the
ninth to the twelfth centuries, but these expeditions were successfully
repelled by the Estonians and Lithuanians.' 69 The subsequent Tartar
invasions of the thirteenth century devastated the Russian principali-
ties, putting an end to any attacks from the east for nearly 250 years.
1 70
Baltic kingdoms began to emerge in the ninth century but their
development was cut short by the thirteenth century Crusades of the
Teutonic Order. Acting in response to a Papal proclamation, German
knights invaded Estonia and Latvia and defeated the peasant armies of
the heathen Balts. Repeated revolts by the population were crushed
164. A. BILMANIS, A HIsToRY OF LATVIA 30 (1951) [hereinafter cited as A HISTORY OF
LATVIA].
165. Id. at 28.
166. Id. at 31.
167. Id. at 32-34.
168. REi, supra note 75, at 17.




and the subjugated peoples gradually became the bondsmen of their
foreign rulers. The territories of the vanquished Estonians and Latvi-
ans eventually became the State Confederation of Livonia, a constitu-
ent part of the Holy Roman Empire.
7 1
The Teutonic knights were, however, unable to subdue the Lithua-
nian tribes. Under the rule of King Mindaugas (1217-1263), a central-
ized Lithuanian kingdom was established.172 From the fourteenth to
fifteenth centuries, Lithuania grew to be one of the largest states in
Europe. The marriage, in 1386, of the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jogaila
(Jagiello) to the daughter of King Louis of Poland and Jogaila's con-
version to Christianity, resulted in an enduring close relationship be-
tween Lithuania and Poland which led to the creation of a Polish-Lith-
uanian Commonwealth in the Union of Lublin in 1569. The
Commonwealth survived until the Austrian, Prussian and Russian an-
nexations of 1772, 1793 and 1795.173
The end of Tartar rule in 1480 encouraged Muscovite princes to
expand the territory which they controlled. In 1558, Tsar Ivan IV in-
vaded Livonia and defeated the Livonian Confederation. " At this
point, Sweden and Poland-Lithuania intervened militarily, and com-
pelled Russia to surrender all territory seized from the German
knights. 7 5 Sweden incorporated most of Estonia and Poland-Lithuania
received what is today Latvia. By 1629, Sweden had extended its rule
to that portion of Latvia north of the Daugava River.'7" Although the
Swedes, like the Teutonic knights, were foreigners, they ruled in a be-
nevolent fashion and early on took a series of important steps to ame-
liorate the lot of the peasant population and promote education.' 7
As a result of the Great Northern War of 1700-1721, Sweden was
forced to cede Livonia (Estonia and northern Latvia) to Russia. South
Western Latvia, the Duchy of Kurland, remained a Polish vassal. After
the third partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1795, Kurland too was for-
mally annexed by Russia. 817 Thus, by 1795, all three Baltic peoples had
come under Russian rule.
179
Life in the "Baltic provinces" became increasingly harsh. At the
behest of German landowners, Swedish reforms were abrogated in Es-
171. Id. at 20. See generally W. URBAN, THE BALIc CRUSADE (1975).
172. REI, supra note 75, at 23.
173. Lithuania: 700 Years 79-81 (A. Gerutis ed. 1984).
174. REi, supra note 75, at 21.
175. Id.
176. Id.




N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
tonia and Latvia, and the peasantry lost all remnants of human rights
and personal freedom.180 The Lithuanian peasants lost their rights as
well, and were firmly bound to the soil as serfs. The grinding poverty
which accompanied Russian rule served as the impetus for a series of
revolts between 1721 and 1863 by the peasantry against the Baltic-Ger-
man landowners and the Russian forces. Such revolts, however, were
quickly crushed. 1 '
After the abolition of serfdom by Tsar Alexander II in 1861, a
number of laws were enacted to protect the peasantry throughout the
Russian Empire. As a result, rural Baltic living conditions gradually
improved as former serfs obtained control of their farms by purchasing
them from the nobility.'8 s The latter part of the nineteenth century
also witnessed the arrival of industrial enterprises in the Baltic re-
gion-primarily in Estonia and Latvia."' This industrial development
was aided by high import duties on manufactured goods, an abundance
of cheap labor, and railroads built to connect Riga and Tallinn with
the rest of the Russian Empire.'"
On the eve of World War I, a strong national consciousness was
present in the Baltic provinces and Lithuania. 8 5 Over ninety percent
of the population above the age of nine was literate, 8 6 and interest had
180. Id. at 24. The Lutheran clergyman, A.W. Hupel, described the condition of the
peasants in 1777: "The Estonians and Latvians are not persons, but slaves, merchandise
and objects which are sold or bartered against horses, dogs, pipe-bowls etc. Men are
cheaper in Livonia than negroes in the colonies." Id.
181. A HISTORY OF LATVA, supra note 164, at 216. Bilmanis states:
The Tsars of the eighteenth century showed little concern for the welfare of
Baltic peoples, and had no intention of observing either Article IX of the treaty
of Nystad, wherein Peter I had promised to "maintain all the inhabitants of the
provinces of Livonia, Estonia, and Oesal, nobles and commoners, cities and mag-
istrates, and the guilds of artisans in all their privileges, customs and perogatives
which they enjoyed under the dominion of the Kings of Sweden"; or Article X,
which stipulated that churches and schools should be supported on the same
basis as during the final reign of the Swedish regime. None of the parish and
normal schools established by Charles XI in 1687 was [sic] reopened. The peas-
ants were surrendered to the newly invigorated despotism of their squires, who
considered all the Swedish agrarian reforms, including the abolishment of serf-
dom, as annulled. Once more the [Baltic] farmer was looked upon as an outright
pariah, to be punished, transported, dispossessed, or sold at the discretion of his
owner.
Id.
182. REi, supra note 75, at 26.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 26.
185. See generally A HISTORY OF LATVIA. supra note 164, at 258-82.
186. Rai, supra note 75, at 27.
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awakened in literature, music and fine arts."s' A large number of Balts
were employed in the liberal professions, civil service, industry, bank-
ing and commerce throughout the Empire and a sizeable population of
industrial workers, entrepreneurs and merchants were situated in Riga
and Tallinn." Economic expansion had also come to the Baltic coun-
tryside. The establishment of a wide network of rural credit unions and
cooperatives, and a concentration on livestock breeding, had created an
increasingly prosperous peasant class.
B. Independence of the Baltic States
As a result of the collapse of the Russian Empire during World
War I, a Russian Army no longer existed to protect the Baltic prov-
inces and anarchy threatened to overwhelm the region. "' In response
to the November 15, 1917, declaration by the Soviet government that
all nationalities of the Empire had the right to establish independent
states, 190 an Estonian National Council proclaimed elections to a Con-
stituent Assembly. A Soviet invasion of Estonia interupted the election
count and, on February 24, 1918, a three person emergency committee
met and proclaimed Estonia a sovereign democratic republic deter-
mined to observe strict neutrality in its relations with other states.''
On February 16, 1918, a Lithuanian Council elected by a National
Assembly, which convened at Vilnius in September 1917, proclaimed
Lithuania an independent nation."' Latvia's territory had been effec-
tively split by the German and Russian Armies since the summer of
1915. It was, therefore, not until November of 1918 that a Council of
Representatives from all Latvian political parties (with the exception
of the Bolsheviks) could meet in their capital of Riga. On November
18, the Council proclaimed Latvia a sovereign and independent
state.193
The period from 1918 to 1920 was extremely difficult for the three
small Baltic States. Each was forced to fight off invasions by the Soviet
and German Armies, cope with massive displacements of their inhabi-
tants, and create an effective domestic political and administrative ap-
paratus." 4 All three nations' economies were shattered by war and oc-
187. Id. at 29.
188. Id. at 27.
189. Id. at 45.
190. UMOZURIKE, supra note 73, at 15. For a discussion and text of the relevant Soviet
declaration see supra note 78.
191. Rm, supra note 75, at 47.
192. Id. at 47-48.
193. Id. at 48.
194. Vesilind, Return to Estonia, 157 NAT. GEOGRAPHIC 485 (1980). See generally M.
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cupation. Major economic adjustments had to be made as a result of
their severance from the Russian Empire. 9 ' In addition to these catas-
trophies, Lithuania had to contend with Polish claims to, and seizure
of, the ancient Lithuanian capital of Vilnius.19s
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HAVE THE BALTIC COUNTRIES VOLUNTARILY RENOUNCED THEIR FREEDOM? (1944); A.
BILMANIS, THE BALTIC PROBLEM AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1947); H. CHAMBON, LA
TRAGEDIE DES NATIONS BALTIQUES (1946); M. GRAHAM, THE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF
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195. REI, supra note 75, at 123-30.
196. In January 1919, the Bolshevik Army seized Vilnius [Vilna] and the Lithuanian
State Council was forced to retire to Kaunas [Kovno]. In April of that year, Polish troops
captured Vilnius only to lose it to a Bolshevik counterattack in July of 1920. As a result
of the Treaty of Moscow, signed on July 12, the Soviet Union agreed to return the city to
Lithuania. Fighting then erupted between Polish troops approaching the city and Lithu-
anian forces which had occupied Vilnius subsequent to the July 12, Soviet-Lithuanian
accords. The League of Nations sent a commission to the Polish town of Suwalki where
an agreement was signed in which both parties accepted the Curzon line as a provisional
demarcation of their boundaries and Vilnius was left to Lithuania. The ink was scarcely
dry on the paper when Polish General Zeligowski attacked Lithuanian troops and cap-
tured Vilnius. Thereafter, Poland refused to relinquish its hold on the city or its sur-
roundings. As a result, Lithuania refused to maintain diplomatic relations with Poland
and the League refused to recognize the Polish fait-accompli. See generally Brock-
elbank, The Vilna Dispute, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 483 (1926); A. SENN, THE GREAT POWERS,
LITHUANIA AND THE VILNA QUESTION 1920-1928 (1966).
From 1920 to 1938, the 300 mile-long Lithuanian-Polish frontier was sealed. Road
and rail tracks ended abruptly a few yards from the frontier posts on the Polish side.
Inside Lithuania, tracks were torn up for a distance of 12 miles from the Polish border.
Trade and travel between villages only a few miles apart were nonexistent. Sturdy gates
and barbed wire separated the armed border guards of each country. On March 11, 1938,
Private Stanislaw Serafim of the Polish frontier guard was killed by Lithuanian police
inside Lithuania. The Polish Government decided to end the long-standing border dis-
pute by massing its troops along the Lithuanian frontier. Frontier Open, but Hearts Not,
News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 17, 1938. Poland gave Lithuania a 48-hour
ultimatum on March 17, 1938, calling for the restoration of normal diplomatic relations
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On August 31, 1919, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
George V. Chicherin, proposed negotiations to the Estonian Govern-
ment which would lead to the cessation of hostilities, establishment of
boundaries, and recognition of Estonia's independence and sover-
eignty. These negotiations began on September 17 at Pskov, Russia,
and an armistice was concluded on December 31, 1919. A treaty of
peace was signed on February 2, 1920, at Tartu, Estonia. 9 7 The
treaty's second article stated:
On the basis of the right of all peoples freely to decide their
own destinies, and even to separate themselves completely
from the State of which they form part, a right proclaimed by
the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia, Russia unre-
servedly recognizes the independence and autonomy of the
State of Estonia, and renounces voluntarily and forever all
rights of sovereignty formerly held by Russia over the Estonian
people and territory by virtue of the former legal situation, and
by virtue of international treaties, which, in respect of such
rights, shall henceforth lose their force.'
Lithuania had to contend for a longer period than Estonia with
the presence of foreign armies on its territory. It was not until July 12,
1920, that it was able to obtain a treaty of peace with Russia.'" Latvia
signed a similar peace treaty on August 11.2'0 As in the Russo-Estonian
treaty, the Soviet Government unreservedly recognized the indepen-
and an opening of the frontier. Unable to secure support from Germany, Russia, France
or Britain, Lithuania bowed to the Polish demands. Diplomatic ties were initiated; rail
and postal connections re-established; and the Nemunas (Memel) river opened for the
transport of Polish timber. G. VON RAUCH, THE BALTIC STATES: THE YEARS OF INDEPEN-
DENCE 195-96 (1974).
197. Treaty of Peace, Feb. 2, 1920, Estonia-Russia, 11 L.N.T.S. 50. The treaty was
consistent with the principles expressed by the November 15, 1917, Declaration of the
Rights of the Peoples of Russia, supra note 78, which proclaimed the equality and sover-
eignty of the peoples of the empire, including the right of complete secession and of the
establishment of free and independent states. As has already been noted, the declaration
was signed by Lenin in his capacity as Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars
and by Stalin in his capacity as Peoples Commissar for National Affairs. MAREK, supra
note 106. at 370. The right of secession has been retained in article 72 of the U.S.S.R.
Constitution of 1977. See B. Meissner, Self-Determination After Helsinki and its Signif-
icance for the Baltic Nations, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 375, 382-83 (1981).
198. Treaty of Peace, Feb. 2, 1920, Estonia-Russia, 11 L.N.T.S. 50. Article 7 prohib-
ited the use of either nation's territory as a base for armed aggression against the other,
and article 5 stated that Soviet Russia agreed to join in an international recognition of
Estonia's neutrality. Id. at 57.
199. Treaty of Peace, July 12, 1920, Lithuania-Russia, 3 L.N.T.S. 122.
200. Treaty of Peace, Aug. 11, 1920, Latvia-Russia, 2 L.N.T.S. 122,
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dent self-subsistence and sovereignty of the Lithuanian and Latvian
Republics, and voluntarily and forever renounced all sovereign rights
over the Lithuanian and Latvian peoples and territories."0 '
On January 26, 1921, the question of recognition of the Baltic
States was brought before the Council of the League of Nations in Ge-
neva. The Council decided to recognize Latvia and Estonia but with-
held its recognition of Lithuania until the issue of Vilnius was settled
with Poland. Within a year of the League's recognition of Latvia and
Estonia, de jure recognition was extended by many individual states to
those nations.
20 2
On September 22, 1921, Lithuania was accepted as a member by
the League,'" and on July 28, 1922, the United States recognized the
Lithuanian Republic0 4 by simultaneously extending de jure recogni-
tion to Estonia and Latvia 206 Britain, France and Italy granted full
recognition to the Lithuanian state on December 20.206
By 1922, the Baltic States had been "invested full and complete
with the raiment of legitimacy. '20 7 Treaties with Soviet Russia had af-
firmed their status as sovereign independent states, and international
de jure recognition had permitted them to enter the League of Na-
tions. Such was the juridical basis of the Baltic republics. "Signifi-
cantly, this juridical basis did not have its roots in the Treaty of Ver-
sailles . . . rather the foundation of Baltic legitimacy was firmly
established by international arrangements negotiated and fulfilled by
the exercise of the free will of nations.
2 0 8
The inter-war years were a period of relatively high stability in the
Baltic States. Major advances were made in all areas of national life.
By 1939, all three Baltic States were economically vigorous after sev-
eral lean years in the mid-1930's. No landless agrarian peasantry ex-
isted in any strength since land reform in the 1920's had succeeded in
creating broad economic and social democracies. Poverty by United
States standards existed in some sections, but when compared with life
in the Soviet Union, conditions in 1939 appeared affluent."0 9
201. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 2.
202. LANGER, supra note 4, at 23.
203. Id.
204. Simpson, The Recognition of the Baltic States, in 6 A HISTORY OF THE PEACE
CONFERENCE OF PARIS 309 (H. Temperley ed. 1924).
205. Laserson, The Recognition of Latvia, 37 Am. J. INT'L L. 233 (1943).
206. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 173.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 164. All three Baltic nations made a major economic effort to create an
export economy based on agricultural produce; specializing in poultry, dairy products
and meat. Germany and Britain became the two most important export markets. These
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Agricultural productivity had vastly increased between the wars.
There was a widespread network of cooperatives which exported large
quantities of food to Western Europe. Equally advanced was Baltic in-
dustrialization. Organized and developed with state assistance, indus-
try had expanded greatly by 1939, contributing to a steady increase in
overall economic growth.2 '
moves were designed to benefit the new independent farming class which had developed
as a result of land redistribution and which became the largest component in the socio-
economic structure of the three young states. R. MISIUNAS & R. TAAGEPERA, THE BALTIC
STATES: YEARS OF DEPENDENCE, 1940-1980, at 10 (1983).
Land reform in the Baltic states was spectacular in its scope. In Lithuania, over one
and a half million acres was taken from large landholders and distributed to landless
rural farmers. As a result, 89% of Lithuania's rural population became landowners. J.
PRUNSKIS, LITHUANIA 14 (1982). In Estonia, as late as 1919, 58% of the agricultural land
belonged to approximately 1200 large estates. This situation was eliminated with the
passage of the Land Reform Law of 1919. As a result of this act, 97% of the total area of
the feudal manors was nationalized and the owners compensated. The land was then
distributed to the Estonian peasantry. By 1939, Estonia had almost 140,000 farms with
an average size of 56 acres as compared to some 52,000 independent farms in 1919. A.
Roos, ESTONIA: A NATION UNCONQUERED 28-29 (1985). In Latvia, the new state Assembly
(Saiema) passed the Agrarian Reform Bill on September 16, 1920. It created a state land
fund of over 7 million acres from governmental, church and private estates exceeding 250
acres in size. Owners of confiscated estates were permitted to retain up to 110 acres
together with their property (houses and farm buildings). The land fund then made dis-
tributions of up to 65 acres to nearly 100,000 newly created farms and to the same num-
ber of enlarged holdings. A HISTORY OF LATVIA, supra note 164, at 334.
210. SWEMrENHAM, supra note 151, at 52-60. The efficacy and prudence of the agra-
rian reform acts in the three Baltic States were shown by post World War I productivity
increases in all aspects of Baltic agricultural output. While the large landed estates had
concentrated on the production of grain, the new independent farms turned their efforts
towards more remunerative dairy farming so as to provide sorely needed dairy products
to Western Europe. New types of cattle were brought into the Baltic region to improve
milk production. Dairy co-operatives were organized on the Danish system. Skimmed
milk was returned to the farmers who used it as protein-feed for pigs. As a result, hog
production soared. Poultry-keeping was also developed with large quantities of eggs be-
ing exported to Britain. Lithuania became the most fertile and productive agricultural
state in Europe, producing 110% of the food products necessary for the feeding of its
population. Id. at 55. In Estonia, the output of pork between 1919 and 1939 increased
200%; the output of eggs increased 232%; the output of butter 369%; the average yield
of milk per cow 98%; and the output of grain 26%. Id. at 56. Similar progress occurred
in Latvia. Between 1918 and 1928, Latvia's rye and wheat output soared by 78%; potato
production increased almost 400%. The average Latvian consumed 170 pounds of meat a
year compared to 124 pounds in the United States. The average annual Latvian milk
consumption was 566 liters; compared to 402 liters in Great Britain and 368 liters in the
United States. Id. at 57.
Industry in the Baltic States was at first primarily based on the preparation of agri-
cultural products for export. Soon, however, industries began to serve domestic needs.
Sugar refineries were built to process beets; distilleries produced alcohol from potatoes.
In Lithuania, alcohol was mixed with gasoline to reduce dependence on oil imports.
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The Baltic governments were also well aware of their social obliga-
tions. Laws, regulations, unemployment relief and social security plans
were introduced so as to better the social fabric of all three States.
Specific protections were guaranteed to national and religious
minorities.2 '
Breweries, tanneries, and textile plants grew up to take advantage of local hops, hog, and
flax production. Timber industries served both domestic and foreign markets. Id. In
1920, Latvia had 1430 industrial enterprises with 61,000 workers. By 1937, 5717 enter-
prises employed 205,000 people. In Estonia, entirely new industries, such as shale-oil and
phosphate mining, were created. Id. at 58. Even the world depression of the 1930's failed
to have a serious impact on long-term Baltic industrial production. Lithuania's industrial
output increased 354.3% from 1929 to 1939. In Estonia, during this same period, indus-
trial production increased by 81% and the number of employed workers increased by
63%. PRUNSKIS, supra note 209, at 14 (1982), and SWETTENHAM, supra note 151, at 59.
The Baltic States also encouraged the development of economic ties with the Soviet
Union. All three States granted the U.S.S.R. free transit over their harbors, rail, water,
and air-ways. A free port was opened at Liepaja, Latvia. In the port of Tallinn, Estonia,
the Soviet Union had its own port-territory. Latvia and Estonia also preserved the wide-
gauge Russian railways from the Soviet frontier to their harbors, and reduced railway
tariffs 10-70% for Soviet export goods. Railway agreements providing for direct passen-
ger traffic and dispatch of goods in transit to foreign ports were signed with the Soviet
Union, as well as trade agreements granting the U.S.S.R. a minimum import tax tariff. A.
BILMANIS, BALTIC STATES AND WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION 24 (1945). Most impor-
tantly, a stable currency prevailed in all Baltic States and Baltic national budgets were
for the most part balanced. Indeed, budgetary surpluses often occurred. Consequently,
the Baltic currencies were so stable that the economic crises of 1931 were overcome with-
out a devaluation. SWETTENHAM, supra note 151, at 55.
211. VON RAUCH, supra note 196, at 123-46 (1974). In Latvia, labor unions were pro-
tected and the government ratified four conventions of the International Labor Organi-
zation pertaining to workmen's compensation. The creation of the Accident Insurance
Board in 1939 further enlarged accident and occupational disease benefits. Industrial
inspection was required by law, and working hours and conditions, pensions, medical
care, leaves, wages and child labor were all governed by progressive codes. A HISTORY OF
LATVIA, supra note 164, at 370. Imitating the British system, all invalid or indigent Lat-
vian citizens were entitled to welfare -assistance from the central government or the mu-
nicipalities. Numerous private organizations cooperated with the Ministry of Public Wel-
fare and the municipalities to provide an extensive cradle-to-the-grave health service;
with medical, pharmaceutical and dental service reaching all sections of the population.
Hospitals, health resorts and rest homes were widespread, and by 1938 the country had
1566 physicians-474 of them women. Id. at 370-71.
Minority rights in Latvia were protected by the law on cultural autonomy of Decem-
ber 18, 1919. The law gave equal cultural, political and economic rights to the national
minorities-the largest groups being Russians, Jews, Germans and Poles. These groups
were admitted to all spheres of national activity and accorded full democratic rights.
They were permitted to establish their own school departments within the National
Ministry of Education, and their children were granted free and compulsory elementary
education. Id.
In Estonia, the new national government moved quickly to introduce laws to protect
workers. The eight-hour day, six days a week, was introduced in 1918, while office em-
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Culturally, all three Baltic States had made great progress. Art,
literature and music flourished. Elementary education had been em-
phasized since the early days of independence and was compulsory and
free. Universities in Tartu, Riga and Kaunas were among the finest in
the world. Religious freedom was strictly protected and a strong reli-
gious ethic permeated all levels of Baltic society.
212
ployees had a seven-hour day. Overtime was paid at time-and-a-half. The right to strike,
to conclude collective bargaining agreements and to organize trade unions was guaran-
teed. Annual paid vacations were usually one or two weeks for industrial workers. Roos,
supra note 209, at 31-33.
Health insurance was established and administered by the Estonian workers them-
selves. Membership in the Sickness Fund was compulsory for all industrial enterprises
employing five or more workers. The benefits consisted of free medical treatment (wholly
or partially) for members and their families, as well as sickness relief, maternity al-
lowances, etc. Workers' contributions to the fund averaged between 1 and 2 % of their
wages. Industrial accident insurance for the workers was paid by the employers alone.
Labor codes were enforced by special labor inspectors and Estonia signed the most im-
portant international labor conventions. Preparations for an old age and disability insur-
ance plan were interrupted by the Soviet invasion of 1940. Roos, supra note 209 at 31-
33. Estonia also had a high employment rate. During the economic crises of 1932-33 the
number of registered unemployed was less than 2% of the total labor force. Id. at 33.
Estonian legislation dealing with minorities was considered to be the most liberal in
the world. Id. at 27. The largest minority group, Russians, amounted to 8.2% of the
population. Germans constituted 1.7%; Swedes, 0.7%; and Jews, 0.4%. Under the Esto-
nian minority law, a minority needed to number more than 3000 persons to be desig-
nated an official minority group. This number had been originally set somewhat higher,
but was reduced to make it possible for Estonian Jews to obtain its benefits. All minority
groups were permitted to maintain schools in their native languages, the cost of such
schools being borne by the central government. Id. at 27-28. See Riigi Teataja 31/32, 21
Veebruar, 1925, Vahemusrahvuste Kultuuromavalitsuse Seadus [State Gazette-Law of
the Self Government of Ethnic Minorities].
212. Von Rauch, supra note 196, at 123-46. Lithuania made great strides in educa-
tion. The number of primary schools increased from 1036 in 1919 to 2956 in 1939. The
number of teachers increased from 1232 to 10,024 and the number of students from
45,540 to 379,233. In addition, Lithuania had two universities and eight institutions of
higher education with 447 professors and 6000 students. Two opera houses, several pro-
fessional theatres, and 2120 libraries are evidence of vital cultural activity. An average of
1200 new books of poetry, novels and non-fiction literature appeared each year during
the independence period. PRUNSKIS, supra note 209, at 15.
In Estonia, the six-year elementary education was compulsory and free. At higher
educational levels, students paid small tuition fees. Higher education at the University of
Tartu and the Technical University of Tallinn became so popular that Estonia, along
with Latvia, had one of the world's highest percentages of inhabitants with university
degrees. Roos, supra note 209, at 33.
All citizens were guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion, and religion was
offered as an elective course in schools. Libraries and theatres were subsidized by the
State and a Cultural Fund was established to promote cultural development by provid-
ing grants to artists and writers. Id.
In Latvia, education was free and compulsory for all children between ages 6 and 14.
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By 1939, the Baltic States had also achieved a measure of political
and constitutional stability. Estonia had a new constitution and elected
government, and Lithuania had made progress toward a return to full
democracy.
2 's
On the secondary school level, tuition was required, but numerous scholarships were of-
fered. In 1914, only 67 Latvian pupils out of 1000 inhabitants were attending some sort
of school. By 1939, that number reached 137 for every 1000 inhabitants. Illiteracy, at
22% in 1920, had dropped to 10% in 1937. At the secondary level, Latvia established a
broad range of technical, agricultural, commercial, navigational, and other vocational and
educational institutions. The leading institution of higher learning was the State Univer-
sity at Riga, opened in 1919. Also at Riga was the State Academy of the Arts and the.
State Conservatory of Music. The Latvian Academy of Agriculture was founded at Jel-
gava. A HISTORY OF LATVIA, supra note 164, at 372.
As in Estonia, a cultural fund was established to promote the creation of works and
monuments of national culture; to award prizes for distinguished cultural achievements;
to support science, literature, and the arts, and to grant sums for scholarships, research,
extension of libraries, lectureships and orchestras. The fund was supported by special
taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and imported motion pictures. Id. at 373. During the indepen-
dence period, over 26,754 books were published; most of them in Latvian. By 1937, there
existed 154 magazines, 34 weekly papers and 13 daily newspapers. In Riga, a national
theatre of arts and a national opera were all state-supported. Id.
In the sphere of religion, Church and State were separated. The Church Law of
December 13, 1934, recognized full freedom of religion. Any group of 50 citizens was
entitled to register as a denomination. All denominations were accorded the right to levy
dues, own buildings, and open seminaries and schools. Id. at 376.
213. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 164. The Baltic States adopted liberal demo-
cratic constitutions after independence. Single chamber parliaments (Seimas in Lithua-
nia; Saeima in Latvia and Riigikogu in Estonia) emerged in all three nations:
Such assembly structures are perhaps the most difficult of all to operate,
and none of the three societies possessed a proper social, economic, or political
culture, or tradition necessary to support their functioning. The radical parlia-
mentary constitutions and electoral rules hampered the creation of stable gov-
ernments. The pressures of radical interests and ideologies soon led, as it did
throughout the rest of Eastern Europe, to the emergence of some sort of authori-
tarian systems.
MISUNAS & TAAOEPERA, supra note 209, at 100. Lithuania experienced the earliest politi-
cal upheaval. On Dec. 17, 1926, a group of officers opposed to the center-left government
of Prime Minister Slezevicius forced their way into Parliament, broke up the Assembly,
and staged a coup d'6tat. A state of emergency was declared and a minority Nationalist
(Tautininke) Government headed by the new President, Antanas Smetona, took office.
The Christian Democrats, who had in 1926 controlled 35 of the 85 Seimas seats, with-
drew from the Government in 1927. At that point, Smetona dissolved Parliament, pro-
claimed a new constitution which enlarged his own powers, and ruled by decree until
1940. VON RAUCH, supra note 196, at 120. Estonian President Constantine Pats used the
powers of his office to dissolve Parliament, declare a State of Emergency and abolish
right-wing Nazi groups in 1934. Pats, however, steered his nation quickly back to democ-
racy. On July 30, 1937, the Estonian Assembly passed a law for constitutional reform
which provided for a two chamber parliament and a six year presidency. The lower
chamber, with 80 delegates, was elected by the population at large. The upper chamber,
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This determination of the Baltic countries to rebuild healthy par-
liamentary democracies was matched by their dynamic participation in
the international arena.2 14 Unlike the United States, which had with-
drawn into itself after President Wilson's retirement in 1921, the Baltic
States could not afford the luxury of detachment from world affairs.2 1 5
Indeed, their very geographical location on the border dividing East
and West compelled the three States to take an active part in interna-
tional relations.
2 1
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, perhaps more than other nations,
with 40 delegates, was composed of deputies elected by professional corporations or ap-
pointed by the President and the administrative departments of Estonia's parishes. Es-
tonia Passes Law For Popular Reform, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1937. See also Estonia
Turns from Dictator to Democracy, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 25, 1938. The ensu-
ing elections of 1938 were basically fair. Opposition groups won 17 of the 80 seats in the
lower house and Pats was again elected President. MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA, supra note
209, at 11.
In Latvia, an extreme polarization between right and left-wing forces in early 1934
caused Prime Minister Karlis Ulmanis to declare a state of emergency, form a govern-
ment of national unity and dissolve all political parties. No attempt was made to legalize
the regime by means of referendum and Ulmanis failed to organize his supporters into
an official party. Id. Although there were many who deplored the introduction of a cor-
porate Latvian State, there was little organized opposition to the Cabinet of National
Unity. Perhaps this was due to the fact that Ulmanis had served as a founder of the
modern Latvian republic and his commitment to the welfare and independence of Latvia
were generally considered beyond question. A HISTORY OF LATVA, supra note 164, at 361.
Similarly, in Lithuania and Estonia, no significant opposition to the suppression of
parliamentary government occurred. Many former politicians cooperated with the new
regimes and the continued support of the professional officer corps guaranteed their sta-
bility. While the liberal intelligentsia was discontent with the "relatively mild" restraints
on political expression, the rural population and business communities welcomed the
overall prosperity which accompanied the political stability of the late 1930's. MisluNAs
& TAAGEPERA, supra.
The German seizure of Memel in 1939 had the indirect effect of moving Lithuania
toward democracy. The opposition parties which had been proscribed by President
Smetona pressed for the formation of a broad-based coalition government capable of
uniting the nation. As a result of this pressure, a new cabinet was formed in March 1939.
Included in the government were representatives of the army, the Socialist Democratic
Party and the Christian Democrats. VON RAUCH, supra note 196, at 199. With the coali-
tion government in power and the recission of the state of emergency in October 1938,
there was a substantial probability that Lithuania would have returned to democracy
had such progress not been prevented by the outbreak of war in September 1939. Id.
214. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 170. The four broad policy objectives of Baltic
diplomacy were: 1) To acquire recognition of statehood; 2) To join the family of nations
as independent states; 3) To maintain the status quo of the peace settlement of Ver-
sailles, and 4) To create a community of interests in the Baltic area based on concepts of
neutrality and friendship with all nations as the best assurance for national security. Id.
215. REX, supra note 75, at 143.
216. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 168.
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were committed to the solidification of the territorial settlements made
at Versailles. During the next twenty years, the three States worked
within the League of Nations to bring peace to the world through sys-
tems and formulas of universal disarmament, collective security, and
international cooperation."' 7
The Baltic nations' fear of a resurgence of militarism and their
desire to thwart it was indicated as early as 1921. Acting pursuant to a
recommendation of the Council of the League, Estonia and Latvia
joined Germany, Finland, Great Britain, Italy, Poland and Sweden in
signing the Aaland Convention.'" The Convention provided for the
permanent neutralization of the Aaland Islands in the Baltic Sea so
that they might never become "a cause of danger from the military
point of view."2 19
In 1923, Latvia and Estonia concluded a political and military
treaty in which they undertook to achieve a peaceful policy towards all
nations (especially their neighbors); to pursue a mutual and concerted
course in international relations; to provide armed aid in the event of
attack; and finally, not to conclude an alliance with a third party with-
out consent from the other.2 20 That same year, representatives of Fin-
land, Poland, Estonia and Latvia met at Riga to consider the applica-
tion of the principles of the Washington Naval Conference to the
eastern coast of the Baltic. 2 2 1 The four countries agreed to support pro-
posals at Geneva for armament reduction, together with a treaty of
mutual guaranty. In May 1924, Lithuania agreed to join its two Baltic
neighbors in forming a common foreign policy.
22 2
Throughout the early 1920's, all three Baltic States evinced a fear
of the Soviet Union.2 The revolutionary nature of the Soviet Govern-
ment and its professed claim of spreading revolution abroad affected
the geopolitics of the new East European States. 224 These fears were
heightened by an attempted Communist coup in Tallinn, Estonia, in
1924.225 "As the decade of the 1920's moved on, however, there was a
shift in emphasis in Soviet policy from the advocacy of immediate
217. Id. at 183.
218. A. BILMANIS, LATVIAN-RuSsIAN RELATIONS 110 (1944) [hereinafter cited as LAT-
VIAN-RussiAN RnLATIONS].
219. Id.
220. Treaty of Alliance, Nov. 1, 1923, Estonia-Latvia, 23 L.N.T.S. 82.
221. The Washington Naval Conference of 1922 required the major maritime powers
to restrict the size and power of their warships. THE GATHERING STORM, supra note 87, at
13-14.
222. BALTIc STATES, supra note 149, at 176.
223. Id. at 169.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 180.
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world revolution to an orientation centered upon the development of
Soviet Russia as a socialist state. 2 2' The expulsion of Leon Trotsky in
1927, and Stalin's emphasis on the success of the first five-year eco-
nomic plan, led Russia to gradually revert to a policy of greater engage-
ment in European affairs and reliance on traditional diplomacy to
achieve the peace and security necessary for the consolidation of Com-
munist rule.?2
In August 1928, the Kremlin responded to a French invitation to
sign the Treaty of Paris.22 8 Apparently not willing to rely solely upon
Western guarantees, the Soviet Government, before final ratification of
the pact, moved to promote a protocol in which its border states would
agree to regional application of the treaty's principles. The Lithuanian
Government accepted the protocol's language, and recommended to
the Estonian and Latvian Governments that they also adhere. Poland
and Romania, suspicious at first, later announced their acceptance. Es-
tonia and Latvia signed the protocol in February 1929 after their re-
spective Parliaments had given approval.2 '"
The Soviet Union also had concerns about the stability and secur-
ity of its western borders. This caused the Soviet Government to pur-
sue a diplomatic course designed to strengthen those states along its
frontier. Treaties with its neighbors were signed embodying three ma-
jor principles: nonintervention, nonaggression and neutrality. On Sep-
tember 28, 1926, such a Lithuanian-Soviet treaty of nonaggression was
signed at Moscow.2 0
226. Id. at 179.
227. Id. at 179-80. See also VON RAUCH, supra note 196, at 171-74.
228. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 182.
229. Id.
230. VoN RAUCH, supra note 196, at 119. The treaty declared:
The President of the Lithuanian Republic, of the one part, and the Central
Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., of the other part, being convinced that the
interests of the Lithuanian people and the peoples of the U.S.S.R. demand con-
stant cooperation based on mutual confidence, have agreed, in order to contrib-
ute to the best of their ability to the maintenance of universal peace, to conclude
a treaty with a view to strengthening the friendly relations existing between
them ....
Article 1.
The relations between the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Lith-
uanian Republic shall continue to be based on the Treaty of Peace between
Lithuania and Russia, concluded at Moscow on July 12, 1920, all the provisions
of which shall retain their force and inviolability.
Article 2.
The Lithuanian Republic and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics un-
dertake to respect in all circumstances each other's sovereignty and territorial
integrity and inviolability.
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Estonia and Latvia were not enthusiastic about the Lithuanian-
Soviet treaty, but nevertheless continued their negotiations with Mos-
cow. 231 It was not until 1932 that Baltic confidence in Soviet good faith
was sufficient to place complete reliance upon instruments of nonag-
gression.28 2 On February 5, 1932, Latvian and Soviet representatives
signed a treaty of nonaggression at Riga which was to remain in force
until December 31, 1945.211 On May 4, 1932, Estonia signed a similar
Article 3.
Each of the two Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from any act of
aggression whatsoever against the other Party.
Should one of the Contracting Parties, despite its peaceful attitude, be at-
tacked by one of several third Powers, the other Contracting Party undertakes
not to support the said third Power or Powers against the Contracting Party
attacked.
Treaty of Non-Aggression, September 28, 1926, Lithuania-U.S.S.R., 60 L.N.T.S. 145.
In light of events occurring in 1939-40, this pact of nonaggression has particular
importance. By the terms of the treaty it is clear that Lithuanian independence was
reaffirmed and that both contracting parties undertook engagements of non-aggression
against the other. Lithuanian sovereignty was, therefore, given further support, both
moral and legal, and Lithuanian security against a Soviet attack became fixed in interna-
tional law. On April 4, 1934, the Lithuanian and Soviet Governments agreed to extend
their 1926 nonaggression treaty until December 31, 1945. Protocol Renewing the Treaty
of Non-Aggression of Sept. 28, 1926, Apr. 4, 1934, Lithuania-U.S.S.R., 186 L.N.T.S. 267.
231. BALTIc STATES, supra note 149, at 181.
232. Id.
233. Treaty of Non-Aggression, Feb. 5, 1932, Latvia-U.S.S.R., 148 L.N.T.S. 123. The
treaty read:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE LATVIAN REPUBLIC AND THE
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS;
Having in view the Peace Treaty concluded on August 11th, 1920, between
Latvia and the Russian Socialist Republic, the effect of which extends to the
entire territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and all the provisions
of which remain invariably and permanently the firm foundation of the relations
between the High Contracting Parties;
Being convinced that it is in the interests of both High Contracting Parties
to adopt certain provisions which may contribute to the development and con-
solidation of the friendly relations between the two States;
Being firmly resolved to respect mutually and unreservedly each other's sov-
ereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and inviolability;
Being guided by the desire to contribute to the consolidation of world peace;
Declaring that none of the obligations so far assumed by either of the Par-
ties hinders the peaceful development of their mutual relations or is incompati-
ble with the present Treaty ....
Article 1
Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from any action
of aggression directed against the other, and also from any acts of violence di-
rected against the territorial integrity and inviolability or the political indepen-
dence of the other Contracting Party, regardless of whether such aggression or
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treaty of nonaggression with Moscow. 234 Both Baltic nations now re-
ceived the same basic international legal guarantees of their frontiers
as Lithuania had received in 1926.ss" In addition, both Estonia and
Latvia signed a Convention for Conciliation of Disputes with the Rus-
sians later that year.2 6 The conventions were adopted pursuant to arti-
cle 4 of the nonaggression treaties and called for a bilateral commission
designed to "elucidate disputed questions and to propose to both gov-
ernments the interpretation or the bases of conciliation which it shall
deem to be equitable and on which it shall recommend them to reach
an agreement by the diplomatic channel.
'2 3 7
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also agreed to sign the so-called
"Litvinov Conventions." These "Conventions for the Definition of Ag-
gression" were successfully concluded on behalf of the Soviet Govern-
ment by Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov in 1933 after months of
negotiations. The first convention was signed on July 3, 1933, by Af-
ghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, the U.S.S.R., Romania and Turkey.
The second was signed the following day by Czechoslovakia, Yugosla-
via and, again, by Romania and Turkey. On July 5, 1933 Lithuania
signed the convention with the U.S.S.R.
2 3 8
such acts are committed separately or together with the other Powers, with or
without a declaration of war.
Article 2
Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to be a party to any
military or political treaties, conventions or agreements directed against the in-
dependence, territorial integrity or political security of the other Party, or to any
treaties, conventions, or agreements aiming at any economic or financial boycott
of either of the Contracting Parties.
Article 4
In view of the obligations assumed in the present Treaty, the High Con-
tracting Parties undertake to submit all disputes, whatever their kind or origin,
which may arise between them after the signature of the present Treaty and
which cannot be settled within a reasonable period by ordinary diplomatic pro-
cedure of conciliation in a joint conciliation commission of which the composi-
tion, powers, and procedure are to be fixed by a special Convention which the
two Parties undertake to conclude as early as possible, and which shall come
into force at the same time as the present Treaty.
Id. at 123-24.
234. Treaty of Nonaggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between Estonia
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 4, 1932, 131 L.N.T.S. 305.
235. MAREK, supra note 106, at 371.
236. Conciliation Convention, June 16, 1932, Estonia-U.S.S.R., 131 L.N.T.S. 309;
Conciliation Convention, June 18, 1932, Latvia-U.S.S.R., 148 L.N.T.S. 129.
237. Id.
238. LANGER, supra note 4, at 73. Convention of July 3, 1933, 147 L.N.T.S. 69. The
texts are almost identical. In light of subsequent events their words have special signifi-
cance for the Baltic States:
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The rejection by Germany of a Soviet offer to guarantee Baltic
sovereignty and independence, and rising European tensions in the
mid-1930's, brought the three Baltic nations even closer together eco-
nomically, militarily and politically.' 9 On September 12, 1934, a treaty
of understanding and cooperation was signed at Geneva which created
a Baltic entente dedicated to economic interdependence and a united
Art. I. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its
relations with each of the other Parties, from the date of the entry into force of
the present Convention, the definition of aggression as explained in the report,
dated May 24, 1933, of the [League of Nations] Committee on Security Ques-
tions (Politis Report) to the Conference for Reduction and Limitation of Arma-
ments, which report was made in consequence of the Soviet delegation's
proposal.
Art. II. Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject
to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to
be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:
1. Declaration of war upon another State;
2. Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the
territory of another State;
3. Attacks by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of
war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
5. Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have
invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of
the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to
deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.
Art. III. No political, military, economic or other consideration may serve
as an excuse or justification for the aggression referred to in Article II.
The Annex to Article III of the Conventions was worded as follows:
The High Contracting Parties...
Desiring, subject to the express reservation that the absolute validity of the
rule laid down in Article III of that Convention shall be in no way restricted, to
furnish certain indications for determining the aggressor,
Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article II of that
Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:
A. The internal condition of a State:
E.g., its political, economic or social structure; alleged defects in its adminis-
tration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions or civil war.
B. The international conduct of a State:
E.g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights of
interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or eco-
nomic relations; economic or financial boycotts; disputes relating to economic,
financial or other obligations towards foreign States; frontier incidents not form-
ing any of the cases of aggression specified in Article II.
The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognize that the present
Convention can never legitimate any violation of international law that may be
implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.
LANGER, supra note 4, at 73-74.
239. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 187.
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foreign policy of absolute neutrality.2 40 Baltic fears of a second Euro-
pean conflagration were exacerbated by the Italian invasion of Ethio-
pia, the Austrian Anschluss, and Hitler's annexation of Czecho-
slovakia.
24 1
At the Fourth Annual Conference of the Baltic Entente, the Esto-
nian Foreign Minister declared:
The chief object of our meetings is the consolidation of peace,
but today peace seems farther off than at the time of our first
conference. During the recent international conflicts, the
League of Nations has shown itself powerless and has thus lost
the best part of its prestige and influence. The armaments race
has begun again in all countries, the pre-war system of alli-
ances is growing up, and mutual distrust between the nations is
increasing day by day.
2 4 2
Despite these concerns, the Baltic States continued to reaffirm their
faith in the League, demanded equality of guarantees of security for all
parts of Europe, and offered their cooperation in the construction of a
general system of security.2 s Throughout this period, Soviet-Baltic re-
lations remained reasonably good.2" In June 1937, Foreign Commissar
Litvinov used the Moscow visit of Latvian statesman Wilhelms
Munters as an occasion to reassure the Baltic States of continued So-
viet friendship. Alluding to seventeen years of good relations between
Soviet Russia and Latvia, Litvinov stated: "Latvia's geographical posi-
tion is such that the U.S.S.R. cannot help being interested in the main-
tenance of her complete independence.'
4 5
240. Id. at 188. The treaty did not create a full alliance of the Baltic States. The
three governments undertook only to confer on questions of foreign policy of common
concern and to afford one another mutual political and diplomatic assistance in their
international relations. Article 3 excluded some specific problems, including the status of
the Lithuanian cities of Klaipeda (Memel) and Vilnius, from the category of questions of
common interest. The treaty provided for semiannual conferences of the Baltic ministers
of foreign affairs, and the three governments were also to instruct their diplomatic and
consular representatives and their delegates to international conferences to establish ap-
propriate contact. The texts of treaties concluded between one party and a third state
were to be communicated to the other parties, and the Baltic treaty was to be open for
accession by others with the consent of the contracting parties. The treaty did not cover
military cooperation and the question of a common customs union was left hanging. The
purely defensive Estonian-Latvian alliance remained in force. See Anderson, The Baltic
Entente-Phantom or Reality?, in THE BALTIC STATES IN PEACE AND WAR, 129 (V.S.
Vardys & R. Misiunas eds. 1978).
241. BALTC STATES, supra note 149, at 198.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 199.
245. Id.
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C. Soviet Invasion and Incorporation of the Baltic States
In March 1939, Germany seized not only the rump of the former
Czech Republic, but also the Lithuanian port of Memel." The Ger-
man aggression prompted the Western democracies to intiate talks
with the Soviet Union in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory se-
curity agreement. An agreement was also sought with Poland so as to
guarantee its frontiers. The ensuing Nazi-Soviet talks, and the respec-
tive spheres of influence established in the confidential annex to the
Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, have already been mentioned.
47
With reference to the Baltic States, paragraph one of the Nazi-Soviet
protocol stated: "In the event of a territorial and political rearrange-
ment in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent
the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the
U.S.S.R."24 For the Soviet Union, this Pact represented a disavowal of
the principles underlying every major international agreement it had
made since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.2,9 "If the Baltic States
had any illusions of maintaining 'absolute neutrality,' they would have
been quickly dispelled had they been witnesses to the Ribbentrop-Mo-
lotov conversations. By the terms of the protocol all obstacles, save
one, had now been removed to make clear the way for final Soviet con-




The invasion of Poland occurred on September 1, 1939, and on
September 18, the Soviet Union began its diplomatic offensive against
Estonia. The Soviet news agency Tass alleged that a Polish submarine
had taken refuge in Estonian naval bases. According to Tass, the Po-
246. See, e.g., M. FLORINSKY, RUSSIA 530 (1969). The news of Hitler's tour de force in
Czechoslovakia reached Lithuanian Foreign Minister Urbiys in Rome where he was at-
tending, along with other Eurpean statesmen, ceremonies related to the consecration of a
new Pope. On his way back to Kaunas, Urbiys stopped in Berlin for conversations with
the German Foreign Minister. During the visit, Von Ribbentrop unexpectedly presented
Urbiys with an ultimatum from Hitler: the cession of the Lithuanian deep-water port of
Klaipeda (Memel). If Lithuania failed to comply, Von Ribbentrop indicated that Ger-
man troops would seize the port by force. Neither Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Russia nor
Britain were willing to help the Lithuanian Government, and on March 21, 1939, the
Lithuanian Cabinet decided to accept the ultimatum and cede Klaipeda to Germany.
The same day, the Seimas ratified the Cabinet's decision. On March 22, a formal agree-
ment was signed in Berlin and the German fleet, with Hitler on board the flagship, ar-
rived off Klaipeda to take possession of the territory. VON RAUCH, supra note 196, at
198-99.
247. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 208-09. See also supra note 151.
248. SwE'rTENHAM, supra note 151, at 24.
249. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 208.
250. Id. at 208-09.
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lish submarine had done so "with the connivance of the ruling circles";
an allegation Estonia quickly denied.2 On September 25, Stalin in-
formed Berlin that with German consent-which was forthwith
granted-he would proceed to "solve the problem of the Baltic coun-
tries." 252 By September 23, increased detachments of Red Army troops
had been concentrated along the Estonian border. On September 27,
Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter went to Moscow where he was
presented with Soviet demands for a Soviet-Estonian "mutual assis-
tance" pact.258 In a meeting at the foreign office, Selter was curtly told:
"There will be no preliminary conversations. You have the Soviet pro-
posal and there can be only one answer: Yes or no. Molotov will receive
you this evening and you must be ready with the answer."' 54 Molotov
received the Estonian Foreign Minister and in the presence of Stalin
confirmed the Soviet demands. The following day, September 28, the
pact was signed by Molotov and Foreign Minister Selter. "
By the terms of this agreement, Estonia was compelled to hand
over to the Soviet Union naval and air bases on Estonian territory and
to provide for a garrison of some 25,000 Soviet troops.25 6 In article 5,
the Soviet Government renounced any intention of compromising Es-
tonian sovereignty, stating specifically that "[t]he enforcement of the
present Pact shall in no way impair the sovereign rights of the Con-
tracting Parties nor, more especially, their economic system or political
structure."2
57
The Soviet press gave wide coverage to this alleged self-denying
clause, pointing to it as proof of Soviet belief in the principles of inde-
pendence and national self-determination. On this point, Bolshevik,
the leading Soviet party journal, commented:
Aggression and the desire to oppress smaller nations are alien
to the spirit of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet people is [sic] inter-
ested in lasting peace and in fraternal collaboration. This can
be realized only if it is based on mutual trust and the principle
of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. Because it
respects the sovereignty of other states, the Soviet Union does
not interfere in their internal affairs. " s
251. Id. at 217.
252. Id. at 210.
253. REI, supra note 75, at 264. For excerpts from the meeting between Selter and
Molotov, see A. REI, NAzI-SovERT CONSPIRACY AND THE BALTIC STATES 41 (1948).
254. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 210.
255. Pact of Mutual Assistance, Sept. 28, 1939, Estonia-U.S.S.R., 198 L.N.T.S. 227.
256. REI, supra note 75, at 267.
257. Id.
258. A. BILMANIS, supra note 210, at 210.
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The Kremlin turned next to Latvia after exercising hegemony over Es-
tonia. Although Latvian Foreign Minister Vilhelms Munters was re-
ceived more warmly than his Estonian counterpart, the results of his
talks with Molotov and Stalin were the same. On October 5, a Latvian-
Soviet agreement was signed which repeated word-for-word the terms
of the Estonian-Soviet pact.2" On October 30, 30,000 Soviet troops en-
tered Latvia and occupied army bases in Liepaja and Ventspils, naval
facilities and several airfields.260
On October 10, a pact was signed between the U.S.S.R. and Lithu-
ania. Although the treaty was similar to the arrangements imposed on
Lithuania's neighbors, it did have one striking difference-the Soviets
agreed to detach the city of Vilnius from their section of the prostrate
Polish state and convey it to Lithuania.
2 6 '
259. Mutual Assistance Pact, Oct. 5, 1939, Latvia-U.S.S.R. 198 L.N.T.S. 381.
Munters gave particular emphasis to the preservation of Latvian territorial integrity in
his conversations with Stalin and Molotov prior to the signing of the treaty. Of his meet-
ing, Munters reported:
Most essential, however, we consider the principle already analyzed by me
yesterday and emphasized several times to the effect that the conclusion of this
treaty must not appear in the eyes of the Latvian people to be an imposed heavy
yoke in which public opinion might see the restriction of their military and con-
sequently the political independence of the State, and a menace to the free exis-
tence and development of the people in the future. Under the military measures
mentioned by you yesterday, even after decreasing them by excluding the capital
of Latvia from the treaty and reducing the total number of garrisons, there can-
not be the slightest doubt that the treaty will be interpreted as the creation of
something similar to a protectorate -a situation unacceptable to a liberty-loving
nation, particularly since the strength of the Latvian army under the possibili-
ties opened up by Article II of the project at the present time is sufficient to
ensure the safety of Latvia and indirectly of the U.S.S.R.
LATVAN-RuSSIAN RELATIONS, supra note 218, at 195.
260. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 212.
261. Pact of Mutual Assistance, Oct. 10, 1939, Lithuania-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 3 So-
viET DocuMENTs ON FOREIGN POLICY, 1933-1941, at 380 (1953). See also Kaslas, The Lith-
uanian Strip in Soviet-German Secret Diplomacy, 1939-1941, 4 J. BALTIC STUD. 211, 216
(1973). Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov referred to this transfer in his remarks before
the Supreme Soviet in October 1939:
The principle of Soviet policy towards small countries has been demon-
strated with particular force by the treaty providing for the transfer of the city
of Vilna and the Vilna region to the Lithuanian republic. Thereby, the Lithua-
nian State, with its population of 2,500,000, considerably expands its territory,
increases its population by 550,000 and receives the city of Vilna. The Soviet
Union agreed to transfer the city of Vilna to the Lithuanian Republic not be-
cause Vilna has a predominantly Lithuanian population. No, the majority of the
population is non-Lithuanian. But, the Soviet Government took into considera-
tion the fact that the city of Vilna, which was forcibly wrested from Lithuania
by Poland, ought to belong to Lithuania as a city with which are associated on
one hand the historical past of the Lithuanian State and on the other hand the
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Although these pacts of "mutual" assistance were proclaimed by
the Soviet Government as agreements between equals, and therefore
legal under international law, their lack of legitimacy was clearly
demonstrated by the force and intimidation which had been used and
the obvious disregard of the free will of the Baltic peoples.2 Notwith-
standing this demonstration of compulsion, the Soviet Government
gave continued assurances that Baltic independence would not be im-
paired.113 In a speech delivered before an extraordinary session of the
Supreme Soviet in October 1939, Foreign Commissar Molotov
declared:
The pact with the Baltic States in no way imply the intrusion
of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania, as some foreign interests are trying to make be-
lieve . . . . These pacts are inspired by mutual respect for the
political, social, and economic structure of the contracting par-
ties and are designed to strengthen the basis for peaceful
neighborly cooperation between our peoples. We stand for
scrupulous and punctilious observance of pacts on a basis of
complete reciprocity, and we declare that all nonsense about
sovietizing the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our
common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.
2
"
Six months later, Molotov offered further Soviet assurances:
On the basis of a half year's experience, one can draw a com-
pletely definite positive deduction about the treaties with the
Baltic States. These treaties [have] contributed to the
strengthening of the international position of the U.S.S.R., as
well as of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Contrary to the fears
of imperialistic circles inimical to the U.S.S.R. the political in-
dependence and independent policy of Estonia, Latvia, and
national aspirations of the Lithuanian people.
Text of Molotov's Report on Foreign Affairs to the Supreme Soviet, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1,
1939, at 8, col. 1.
262. The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. has declared that treaties that are
concluded between unequal parties are not legally binding. As an example of such trea-
ties, the Academy has cited the "unequal" treaties imposed by the colonial powers upon
the countries of Africa. Indeed, article 51 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties states that "[a] treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use
of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations." McDOUGAL & REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTIvE 1177-80 (1981).
263. Id. See also, BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 213.
264. Text of Premier-Foreign Commissar Molotov's Report on Foreign Affairs to the
Supreme Soviet, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1939, at 8, col. 1.
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Lithuania has not suffered [and] on the basis of these treaties
one can expect the further amelioration of relations between
the U.S.S.R. and the Baltic Republics. "
Despite these assurances, Soviet pressure on the Baltic States be-
gan to increase. The Soviet Legation in Riga began to distribute propa-
ganda films, and a series of sporadic strikes were initiated by Com-
munist trade union members in Riga and Liepaja. These were
unsuccessful in disrupting Latvia's economic and political life because
Latvian workers withheld their support. On December 10, 1939, a Rus-
sian warship sunk an Estonian freighter in the Gulf of Finland. Soviet
warships fired upon an Estonian airplane at Tallinn on February 2,
1940.266 On May 28, 1940, an article sharply critical of Estonia ap-
peared in the Soviet paper Pravda:
A certain part of the Estonian intelligentsia regards the occu-
pation of Norway and Denmark by the Germans as an aggres-
sion, as an enslavement of small nations. This part of the intel-
ligentsia preaches a loyal attitude towards England and
expresses its hatred of Germany and everything German. In
commercial circles the opinion predominates that it was more
profitable to trade with England than with Germany and that
English goods are better than German: The newspaper Tal-
linna Post published a feuilleton on May 10 in which the bad
quality of German goods was ridiculed. That section of the Es-
tonian intelligentsia which is hostile to Germany spread
rumours alleging that the friendship between Germany and the
U.S.S.R. is unstable and will not last and that a war between
the two States is inevitable. Some of the persons preaching
such feelings are connected by various threads with the British
and American Legations. The University of Tartu is also a
place where pro-British propaganda is being carried on. The
ruling circles of Estonia are trying to remain neutral with re-
gard to the events in the west. The political figures neither
condemn nor approve Germany's actions in their speeches.
They try not to refer at all to the Soviet Union. No facts con-
cerning the trade between Estonia and the U.S.S.R. are pub-
lished. In all these precautions there transpires the endeavour
to tone down and conceal from public opinion the role of the
U.S.S.R. with regard to Estonia and Estonia's fear of England
for her relations with the U.S.S.R. The Estonian Press likewise
265. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 288-89.
266. Id. at 241.
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tries to avoid awkward problems and emphasizes its loyalty to-
wards England."6 7
Lithuania also felt increasing pressures from the East. On May 16,
the Soviet paper Izvestia accused the Lithuanian Government of in-
volvement in the disappearance of three Russian soldiers stationed in
Lithuania.26 The Lithuanian Government presented a note to the So-
viet Government three days later stating that two of the soldiers had
returned to their bases and offering to set up a commission to investi-
gate the whereabouts of the third.2 9 The Soviets offered no response to
the note. On May 30, the Soviets repeated their charges of Lithuanian
involvement in the soldiers' disappearance and accused the govern-
ment of kidnapping and torturing the men. On June 6, Prime Minister
Antanas Merkys traveled to Moscow to meet with Molotov. During the
course of their meeting the following day, Molotov requested the resig-
nations of the Lithuanian Minister of the Interior and the Director of
the Security Department. 7 0 On June 9, a second meeting was held at
which Molotov denounced Lithuania for its participation in the Baltic
entente and accused the Lithuanian Government of organizing a Baltic
military alliance against the U.S.S.R. The Prime Minister denied that
the purpose of the 1934 tripartite Baltic convention was anti-Soviet.
He stated that there was no harm in such regional rapprochement. The
following day, Molotov accused the Prime Minister himself of complic-
ity in the "kidnappings" and it became clear that further Lithuanian
concessions would only increase Moscow's demands.
27 1
On June 14, Molotov presented to the Lithuanian Minister of For-
eign Affairs, at that time in Moscow, an ultimatum on the pretext that
the Lithuanian police had kidnapped the three Soviet soldiers.27 The
267. SWETrENHAM, supra note 151, at 40.
268. BALTic STrATs, supra note 149, at 319.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 323.
271. Shtromas, Political and Legal Aspects of the Soviet Occupation and Incorpora-
tion of the Baltic States, 1 BALTic F. 26 (1984).
272. MAREK, supra note 106, at 379. The ultimatum declared:
The Soviet Union considers that the present situation cannot be continued.
The Soviet Government considers it necessary and urgent:
1. That the Minister of the Interior, Skucas, and the Director of the De-
partment of the Security, Povilaitis, be immediately delivered to the judicial au-
thorities and tried as directly guilty of acts of provocation committed against the
garrisons of the Soviet Union in Lithuania.
2. That a Government be immediately formed in Lithuania capable of as-
suring and determined to assure the proper fulfilment of the Treaty of Mutual
Assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania and to suppress firmly the
enemies of this Treaty.
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ultimatum accused the Lithuanian Government of entering into a se-
cret military alliance with Estonia and Latvia in violation of article 4
of the Soviet-Lithuanian pact of Mutual Assistance which had forbid-
den either nation to conclude "any alliance or to take part in coalitions
directed against Contracting Parties.
27 3
An immediate emergency meeting of the Lithuanian Cabinet was
held later that day. At 9 a.m. on June 15, 1940, Foreign Minister
Urbiys transmitted the Lithuanian Government's acceptance of the
demands to the Soviet Government. President Smetona left the coun-
try that morning and by evening huge military formations of Red
Army troops had occupied Lithuania.
2 74
The following day, hundreds of Soviet tanks with strong artillery
and mechanized infantry support began assembling on the Latvian
frontier. At 2 p.m. Molotov summoned the Latvian Minister to Mos-
cow and handed him an ultimatum that required an answer by 8 p.m.
Molotov stated that if a reply was not received by that hour Soviet
troops would march into Latvia and put down all resistance. The So-
viet Government made five principal charges against Latvia: (1) con-
clusion of a secret military alliance with Estonia and Lithuania; (2)
failure to denounce the military alliance treaty with Estonia of Novem-
ber 1, 1923; (3) participation during 1939 and 1940 in two secret con-
ferences of the foreign ministers of the Baltic States; (4) improvement
3. That a free entry into the territory of Lithuania be immediately assured
for units of the army of the Soviet Union which will be stationed in the most
important centers of Lithuania and which will be sufficiently numerous to assure
the enforcement of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union
and Lithuania and to put an end to acts of provocation directed against the
garrisons of the Soviet Union in Lithuania.
The Soviet Government considers that the fulfilment of these demands is a
basic condition without which the Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty of Mutual Assis-
tance cannot be carried out honestly and in good faith.
The Soviet Government will wait for the answer of the Lithuanian Govern-
ment until 10 a.m. of June 15. The failure to respond at the established time will
be considered as a refusal to carry out the above mentioned demands of the
Soviet Union.
BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 332.
273. BALTIc STATES, supra note 149, at 33. Treaty on the Transfer of Vilnius and
Soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance, reprinted in 3 SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN
POLICY, 1933-1941 (J. Degras ed. 1953) and in Vyriausybes Zinios [Government Gazette
of Lithuania] No. 699 (1939).
274. VON RAUCH, supra note 196, at 220. President Smetona initially urged the organ-
ization of military resistance against the Soviet aggression. The majority of the Cabinet,
however, advised the President to comply with the Soviet demands in order to prevent
great loss of life and destruction of the country. In addition, it was felt that it would be
impossible to organize any substantial resistance to the Russians in the few hours re-
maining before the deadline. Id.
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of relations between the general staffs of Estonia and Lithuania, and
(5) establishment of a special press organ of the Military Baltic En-
tente, La Revue Baltique.
76
An emergency session of the Latvian Cabinet was held to consider
the ultimatum. As in Lithuania, there was sharp disagreement among
the members of the Cabinet whether the Government should resist the
Soviet demands with armed force or accept the ultimatum. The Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs took the position that the ultimatum should be
accepted because of Soviet threats to bomb all Latvian cities and the
terrible loss of life which would ensue. His argument prevailed and the
Latvian Cabinet accepted the Soviet ultimatum. The following day, the
first Red tank columns appeared at Riga. By nightfall, two hundred
thousand Soviet troops had occupied the country.
2 76
On June 15, 1940, a commercial Estonian airliner on its way from
Tallinn to Helsinki, Finland, was shot down without warning by two
Soviet fighter planes over the sea north of Tallinn. Its crew and pas-
sengers were killed and the presence of a Soviet submarine at the scene




275. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 291.
276. Id. at 295-97.
277. Id. at 242. Estonian fishing boats went to the scene and picked up mailbags and
other items from the plane. The Soviet submarine stopped the fishermen and seized
what the fishermen had found. The submarine officers reportedly showed particular in-
terest in the mailbags which may have contained some diplomatic correspondence. Id.
Soviet historiography has a unique perspective on the events of June and July 1940.
The Baltic peoples are deemed to have overthrown their "semi-fascist regimes" and to
have restored Soviet power which in 1918-1920 was, Soviet historians assert, suppressed
by foreign intervention. See, e.g., Rubanov, Application of the Inheritance Law of the
Soviet Baltic Republics Abroad, 1963 Sovrrr Y.B. INT'L L. 458. A case in point is the
Soviet history of Lithuania. The Lithuanian Government is accused of having secretly
planned an anti-Soviet pact with Nazi Germany in order to subvert the Lithuanian-So-
viet Mutual Assistance Treaty. As a result of the Government's intrigues, the bourgeoi-
sie's exploitation of the people and overall oppression:
A revolutionary situation was created .... The communist party appealed to
the workers and peasants, who formed the population of Lithuania, to demand
the resignation of the bourgeois government so as to faithfully carry out the
terms of the Mutual Assistance Pact with the U.S.S.R. Faced with such powerful
forces, dictator Smetona fled to Germany on June 15, 1940. The State apparatus
crumbled and the army passed over to join the people. During the course of
meetings and assemblies, the workers demanded the formation of a popular gov-
ernment similar to the one in the U.S.S.R. It was clear that Soviet ideas had not
lost their appeal to the people during the somber years of bourgeois domination.
GRIsKEVIcius, La Lituanie 28 (Moscow 1980) (author's trans.). The Lithuanian "revolu-
tion" is described as a peaceful transfer of power because of the bourgeoisie's inability to
oppose the powerful and popular movement with which they were faced. Id. at 29. The
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On June 16, the Soviet press agency Tass reported that the three
Baltic nations had concluded a military alliance. At 2:30 p.m. Molotov
handed to Estonian Ambassador Rei a demand for the replacement of
the Estonian Cabinet and for admission of additional Soviet troops
into Estonia. The Estonians were given eight and one-half hours to ac-
cept or reject the Kremlin's demands. That same afternoon, the Esto-
nian Cabinet hurriedly gathered to consider the text of the ultimatum.
As in Latvia and Lithuania, resistance was viewed as futile and Ambas-
sador Rei transmitted the Government's compliance with Moscow's de-
mands that evening. Soviet troops crossed the Estonian border in the
early hours of June 17.278
"revolution," Soviet history declares, was determined by both socio-economic and politi-
cal conditions. Id. Nevertheless, emphasis is placed on the fact that the new "popular
government" was formed according to the constitution and the Lithuanian laws in force
at the time. Id. The elections of July 15, 1940, are described as taking place in the con-
text of a "new democracy." Soviet histories state that workers submitted lists of candi-
dates to the Union of Working People of Lithuania; that suffrage was equal and univer-
sal; and that voting was direct and secret. Great emphasis is put on the fact that 95.5%
of all registered voters participated. Id. at 30. No mention is made of the presence of
Soviet armed forces in Lithuania at the time.
278. VON RAUcH, supra note 196, at 220. While the Soviet tour de force in the Baltic
proceeded according to schedule, Moscow turned its attention to its southern neighbor
Romania, and in particular, to the Romanian provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina. In
June 1940, Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov informed Berlin of the Soviet intention to
"solve" the question of Bessarabia. N. DIMA, BESSARABIA AND BUKOVINA 27 (1982). There
was, of course, no Bessarabian "question," except in Soviet propaganda. Bessarabia had
been an integral part of Romania since the 14th century. It had been illegally ceded by
the Ottoman Empire to Russia in 1812, but returned to Romania in 1856 following the
Crimean War. Although the Congress of Berlin, over Romania's strong protests, awarded
Bessarabia to Russia in 1878, it was re-united with the Romanian Kingdom in 1918 on
the basis of a popular referendum. Id. at 156. By 1930, the territory's population was
comprised overwhelmingly of ethnic Romanians. Indeed, ethnic Russians and Ukranians
constituted only 23.3% of the total population. Id. at 29.
On June 26, 1940, with Soviet troops massed on the border, Moscow sent a diplo-
matic note to Bucharest demanding that Romanian authorities withdraw from the two
provinces within four days starting on June 28. In spite of the ultimatum's timetable, the
Red Army invaded the provinces before the Romanian troops were to begin withdrawal.
Within a matter of hours, the Soviet Union had annexed 50,726 square kilometers of
territory inhabited by 3.9 million people. Id. at 30. According to Soviet histories, in late
July 1940, a delegation of "the working people of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina"
arrived in Moscow to present their desire for inclusion in the U.S.S.R. to the Supreme
Soviet. Later, the delegation was received by Stalin and Molotov. On August 12, 1940,
the Supreme Soviet passed a law creating the new Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.
Id. at 32. The northern Bukovina, as well as the Bessarabian districts of Hotin,
Acherman and the port of Ismail, were conveyed to the Ukraine, thereby creating a
double annexation. Id. This internal boundary change was effectuated by Moscow in
such a way as to ensure that, if in the future, the Soviet Union were forced to return
Bessarabia, Moscow would still be able to retain Bessarabia's strategic northern and
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On June 21, 1940, according to Tass, "a spontaneous uprising of
the working people," took place in every large borough of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania:
The slogans, distributed from the Soviet legations, were pre-
cisely identical everywhere. The processions, which nowhere
had many participants, were invariably protected by Russian
armoured cars and infantry on trucks with machine guns at the
ready, following one another at intervals of 100 yards. Soldiers
of the Russian engineering forces installed loud speakers and
uniformed politruks (political instructors) of the Red Army
stood beside the operators on the platforms.
7 9
New governments were installed in each of the Baltic States that
southern regions and its direct access to the Danube. Id. at 36.
The Soviet regime immediately nationalized all large enterprises in the annexed
Romanian provinces. In time for the new school year, nearly 900 Soviet teachers were
brought into the region and 100,000 Bessarabians were "convinced" to "voluntarily" de-
part for Soviet industrial sites in 1940 and 1941. During the early months of 1941, hun-
dreds of thousands of Bessarabians were drafted into the Red Army. Id. at 44.
From July 1940 to June 1941, Soviet authorities carried out massive arrests and
deportations. As many as 150,000 people were deported to Siberia and Central Asia. Id.
These deportations were evidently carried out in accordance with a previously estab-
lished plan. Id.
After the German attack on Russia in June 1941 and the re-occupation of Bessara-
bia by the Romanian Army, evidence of Soviet atrocities came to light. "Mass graves of
summarily executed people, thousands of unidentified bodies, corpses of people executed
and buried with their hands cuffed or their mouths bound, whole families deported or
split ..." were discovered by the authorities. In addition, the Red Army had dyna-
mited most of the industrial plants, transport networks and administrative facilities. Id.
at 45.
The ease with which the Soviet Union annexed Bukovina and Bessarabia caused the
Hungarian and Bulgarian Governments to put forward their own revisionist claims to
Transylvania and southern Dobruja. Hungary informed the German and Italian foreign
offices that if they could not peacefully satisfy the Hungarian demands regarding Tran-
sylvania, the Hungarians would take the territory by force. On August 23, 1940, Hun-
garian and Romanian delegations meeting at Vienna, were forced by Von Ribbentrop
and Italian Foreign Minister Ciano to accept an arbitral award which retroceded to Hun-
gary two-fifths of the Transylvanian territory which it had lost to Romania as a result of
the Treaty of Trianon. A. PALMER, THE LANDS BETWEN 248 (1970). The line of demarca-
tion gave Hungary the important cities of Cluj and Oradea, and a population of two and
one-half million, of which 52% were ethnically Magyar. Id.
Bulgaria also used Axis pressure to enforce its demands for the southern Dobruja
and its overwhelmingly Bulgar population. Several days after the Romanians signed the
Vienna accord with Hungary, another Romanian delegation, meeting at Craiova, agreed
to the cession of southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. Id.
279. SwETrENHAM, supra note 151, at 73.
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evening and elections were announced for July 14 and July 15.280 The
new regimes immediately proceeded to prohibit civil rights guaranteed
to the citizens of the Baltic States by their constitutions.8 1 Free as-
sociations and labor unions were dissolved, newspapers closed, radio
stations nationalized, police and soldiers disarmed, and mass meetings
banned. The new directors of state security ordered the arrests of the
leaders and active members of all non-Communist political parties.282
280. Id. at 73-74. The transformation of the Baltic States into Soviet Socialist Re-
publics was undertaken in Tallinn by Communist Party Secretary Andrei Zhdanov, one
of Stalin's closest associates. He was assisted in Riga by Andrei Vyshinski, one of Molo-
toy's assistants, and in Kaunas by Vladimir G. Dekanozov, a trusted aide to Lavrenti
Beria, head of the Soviet secret police. This combination indicated that among the mem-
bers of the Politburo, Zhdanov, Molotov and Beria, along with Stalin, were considered to
be the chief advocates of an expansionist Soviet policy towards the Baltic area and of
closer collaboration with Nazi Germany. See Meissner, The Baltic Question in World
Politics, in THE BALTIC STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 142-43 (V.S. Vardys and R. Misiunas
eds. 1978).
The Lithuanian legal scholar, Alexander Shtromas, states that the Lithuanian Con-
stitution was violated by the removal from office of Acting Lithuanian President Merkys
and the subsequent assumption of that post by Justas Paleckis, the Prime Minister of
the new "people's" regime. According to the Lithuanian Constitution, only President
Smetona had the authority to appoint an individual to the post of Acting President.
Shtromas declares that the illegal and unconstitutional nature of Paleckis' acts "nullified
the validity of all subsequent acts of the 'peoples' government, including the series of
measures taken to transform Lithuania into a Soviet Socialist Republic and member
state of the USSR." Shtromas, supra note 271, at 34.
The Soviet attempt to create an impression of legally valid political change also
failed in Latvia. President Ulmanis neither approved the appointment of Augustus
Kirhensteins as the new Latvian Prime Minister nor the decree which installed Kirhen-
steins' "people's" government. Absent Ulmanis' signed approval, the new regime re-
mained an illegal body. The illegality of the situation was compounded by the Kirhen-
steins government's abrogation of the law by which Ulmanis had assumed the Presidency
and the forcible removal of Ulmanis from office. Id. Consequently, subsequent acts of the
new regime were void ab initio.
Only in Estonia was the new Government installed in accordance with constitutional
requirements. Nevertheless, President Pats' signature approving the Cabinet of left-wing
writer Johannes Vares was obtained under duress, as a result of a Soviet-staged "popular
uprising." Id. at 35. All subsequent acts of the new regime were carried out without Pats'
signature or consent. Instead, these acts were based upon the sole authority of Vares,
who had assumed the post of Acting President of Estonia after having announced Pats'
resignation. Id. This resignation was never proved and letters have recently reached the
West indicating that Pats never agreed to the acts of the Vares government, thus voiding
the legality of any of its acts during the critical months of June and July 1940. See
Appendix VI.
281. LA TRAGADIE DES ETATS BALTEs 17 (1952).
282. Id. at 18. Documents discovered after German troops pushed the Red Army out
of the Baltic region in the summer of 1941 indicate that the Soviet invasion of 1940 and
subsequent arrests and deportations had been planned far in advance. Most incriminat-
ing of these documents is the infamous "Serov Order" entitled "Procedure for Carrying
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On the night of July 11, over 2000 people were arrested in Lithuania
alone. 3 The President of Estonia, Konstantin Pats; the Chief of the
Estonian General Staff, Johan Laidoner; ten of the eleven Estonian
Cabinet members; sixty-eight of the ninety-six members of Parliament
and seven of the members of the Estonian Supreme Court were ar-
rested and deported. In Lithuania, the Prime Minister, Antanas
Merkys; the Foreign Minister, Juozas Urbsys; twelve cabinet members
and twenty-two other members of political parties were arrested and
Out the Deportation of Anti-Soviet Elements from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia." This
order was signed on October 11, 1939, by General Ivan Serov, then Soviet Deputy Com-
missar for State Security. LATVIAN LEGATION, WASHINGTON, D.C., LATVIA 37 (1976). The
order declares:
The deportation of anti-Soviet elements from the Baltic States is a task of
great political importance. . . .[O]perations should be conducted without noise
and panic, so as not to permit any demonstrations and other excesses not only
by deportees, but also by a certain part of the surrounding population inimically
inclined toward the Soviet administration .... The operation should be com-
menced at daybreak. Upon entering the home of the person to be deported, the
senior member of the operative group should gather the entire family of the
deportee into one room, taking all necessary precautionary measures against any
possible excesses . . . .After having been subjected to a search the deportees
should be notified that upon decision of the Government they are being de-
ported to other regions of the Union. The deportees are permitted to take with
them household necessities of a weight of not more than 100 kilograms ....
When loading these articles into the carts, measures should be taken so that the
deportee cannot use them as means of resistance while the column is moving
along the highway. . . .Should the inhabitants of the village. . . gather around
the home of the deportee while the operations are going on, they should be
called upon to disperse to their homes .... Should the deportee refuse to open
the door of his home in spite of the fact that he is aware that members of the
People's Commissariat of Public Security are there, the door should be broken
down . . . . In view of the fact that a large number of deportees must be ar-
rested and placed in special camps and their families settled at special points in
distant regions, it is necessary to execute the operation of deporting both the
members of his family as well as the deportee simultaneously, without informing
them of the separation confronting them . . . .The moving of the entire family,
however, to the station should be done in one vehicle, and only at the station
should the head of the family be placed separately from his family in a railway
car specially intended for heads of families. . . . The convoy must act particu-
larly carefully in conducting the column of deportees through inhabited spots as
well as in meeting passers-by; they should see that there are no attempts made
to escape, and no exchange of words should be permitted between the deportees
and passers-by. . . .The deportees shall be loaded into railway cars by families
.... After the railway car has been filled . . . it should be locked.
Instructions Regarding the Manner of Conducting the Deportation of the Anti-Soviet
Element from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, reprinted in LATVIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS,
supra note 218, at 227-31.
283. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 347.
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sent east in sealed railway cars. In Latvia, a similar fate befell the
President, Karlis Ulmanis; General Janis Balodis of the Latvian Gen-
eral Staff; twenty cabinet members and thirty-one members of
Parliament.284
On July 14 and 15, elections were held in all three Baltic States for
284. ESTONIAN INFORMATION CENTER, MASS DEPORTATIONS OF POPULATION FROM THE
SoviET OCCUPIED BALTIC STATES 33 (1981). The Russians moved quickly to consolidate
their power by liquidating all opposition to their seizure of the Baltic States. The loss of
life in the next several years was immense. Albert Kalme states that 12,000 Latvians,
9000 Lithuanians and 2000 Estonians were executed by the Soviet occupation forces.
KALME, TOTAL TERROR 73 (1948). Mass graves throughout the Baltic States were found
after the Russian withdrawal in the summer of 1941. The grave at Riga Central Prison
contained nearly 100 corpses and another near Lake Baltezers, Latvia, contained 111
bodies. Id. at 61. In all, over 1488 corpses were found in Latvia. Id. On June 16, 1941, the
Russians machine-gunned to death over 500 men, women and children in the Pravienis-
kis concentration camp near Kaunas. The camp held farmers who had been imprisoned
for their delinquency in delivering grain to the State. Id. at 70. That same month, 76
political prisoners, mostly high school students, were massacred by the Soviet Secret
Police (NKVD) in the Rainiai Forest near Telsiai, Lithuania. Id. at 68. In July 1941,
thousands of Poles and Lithuanians were murdered by the NKVD in the Cherven Forest
near Bobruisk in Byelorussia. Id. at 67. Another major massacre occurred at Una, Russia,
60 miles from the Latvian border; 2000 people, including many Latvians, were executed
by Soviet troops. Perandi, Soviet Acts of Genocide Against the Baltic Nations, 2/3 BAL-
TIC REV. 25 (1954). The purges and executions in the Baltic States "climaxed on June 14,
1941, when tens of thousands of Balts-teachers, intellectuals, the wealthy, anyone who
might influence public opinion-were rounded up in a single night, dragged from houses
and farms to railway stations. Fathers were separated from their families, and all were
shipped in freight cars to labor camps east of the Urals." Vesilind, Return to Estonia,
157 NAT. GEOGRAPHIC 489 (1980). The number deported from Estonia in 1941 is esti-
mated at about 50,940 persons. Mass deportation also occurred in 1946 and 1949. The
1949 deportation is known to have victimized roughly 50,000 people. MISIUNAS &
TAAGEPERA, supra note 209, at 96. Perandi, supra at 36. Large-scale mass deportations
occurred in Latvia in 1941, 1945 and 1949. In 1941, 22,831 men and women were de-
ported from Latvia and an estimated 140,000 people were deported in 1945. The depor-
tations in 1949 affected the peasantry more harshly than the middle classes and were
designed to speed up the collectivization of agriculture. Id. at 36. Mass deportations from
Lithuania occurred on June 14, 1941, July-September 1945, February 18, 1946, July-De-
cember 1947, May 22, 1948, March 24-27, 1949, June 1949 and March 1950. In 1941,
34,260 persons were deported to Soviet Russia from Lithuania. Many of these deportees
were sent to do slave labor in remote areas of Russia where the harsh conditions of life
brought about their death in .a short time due to lack of adequate housing, clothing,
footwear, medical aid and food. Id. at 44. In 1956, the total number of deportees for the
first fifteen years of Soviet occupation was estimated to number 350,000 Lithuanians,
208,900 Latvians and 100,000 Estonians-over 600,000 people or one out of every ten
Baltic citizens. Trimakas, Satellite Status for the Baltic States-A Possible Opening for
Freedom, 7 BALTIC REV. 5 (1956). Arveds Svabe notes that during the Latvian indepen-
dence period, the total number of political prisoners did not exceed three to four hun-
dred, and of these, none were sentenced to death because capital punishment had been
abolished. A. SvABE, GENOCIDE IN THE BALTIC STATES, 28 (1952).
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"People's Assemblies." Voting was obligatory and only members of the
"progressive" political parties were selected to run for office. 5
The new Estonian Assembly convened in Tallinn and proclaimed
Estonia a Soviet Socialist Republic on July 21.286 The following day,
the Chamber of Deputies agreed to "petition the Supreme Soviet of
285. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 270-72, 306, 348-54. Through an error the
official election results from a Soviet agency were published in a London newspaper
hours before the polls had closed, thus illustrating the fraudulent nature of the elections.
BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 306. From a constitutional point of view, the elections
were illegal and invalid. They were held under the occupation of the country by foreign
troops. The candidates were selected by a single party, the only one allowed and ap-
proved by the Russian occupation authorities. The district electoral commissions submit-
ted the list of candidates to the Supreme Electoral Commission which was, in fact, se-
lected and approved by the Soviet emissaries and should therefore be considered as an
organ of the occupation forces operating in the interest of the Soviet Union. As for the
Soviet thesis that the "People's" Parliaments expressed the will of the people, the unde-
niable fact is that they were elected as a regular legislative house but not as a constituent
body to change the form of government of the republic and even less to change sover-
eignty. B. KASLAS, THE LITHUANIAN STRIP IN SOVIET-GERMAN SECRET DIPLOMACY, 1939-41,
reprinted in 4 J. BALTIC STUD. 211, 217-18 (1973). In the case of Estonia, it was forgotten
by the new regime that the Estonian Constitution provided for two chambers of Parlia-
ment: the Chamber of Deputies and the National Council. As a result, only a Chamber of
Deputies was elected on July 14. According to the Constitution, nothing this body did
could have any legal validity, and the Estonian courts would have been bound to declare,
if the matter had come before them, that any legislation passed by such a body was null
and void. MAREK, supra note 106, at 386. The election results were as follows: The Union
of the Working People of Latvia received 97.8% of the vote; the Working Union of Lith-
uania, 99.19% and the Union of the Working People of Estonia, 92.8%. RUBANOV, supra
note 277, at 458. After observing the Baltic "elections" one press correspondent wrote:
Under the protection of the Red Army, whose overwhelming numbers as-
sured order but in a visibly grim spirit, the populations of the three Baltic States
. . . went to the polls today to elect new Parliaments whose preordained task is
to vote for the "closer union" of these countries with Soviet Russia. The election
has . . . been conducted under totalitarian auspices on the basis of a one-party
ticket which assured a Communist majority in the new Parliament.
Tolischus, Baltic States Pick Red Parliaments, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1940, at 1, col. 7.
See also Tolischus, Baltic States Vote Today on Soviet Tie, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1940,
at 26, col. 1. For a careful analysis of the July 1940 elections in Estonia see Taagepera,
De-choicing of Elections: July 1940 in Estonia, 14 J. BALTIC STUD. 215-46 (1983).
286. MAREK, supra note 106, at 386. The meeting of the Estonian Assembly was in-
terrupted on the 21st and resumed on the 22nd. Apparently, the Estonian Government
tried unsuccessfully at the last moment to obtain for their country some sort of autono-
mous status similar to that of Outer Mongolia. Id. Chicago Tribune correspondent Don-
ald Day described the events of July 21 as follows: "The three Baltic parliaments met in
halls plastered with portraits of Stalin and draped with red flags. They followed identical
procedures. There were long speeches bemoaning workers' unemployment and farmers'
hard times under previous governments. At 3 p.m., they gave great shouts in favor of the
petitions for union with Russia. ... Day, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Vote to Join
Russia, Chicago Tribune, July 22, 1940.
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the U.S.S.R. to admit the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic into the
Soviet Union as a constituent republic . ". .. , Similar resolutions
were passed in the new Lithuanian and Latvian Parliaments. All pri-
vate land, industrial enterprises, banks, mines and means of transpor-
tation were declared public property.
88
On August 3, 1940, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union de-
cided to "receive favorably the demand of the Lithuanian Diet and to
admit the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania into the Union." On
August 5, Latvia was admitted as the fifteenth constituent Soviet Re-
public, and on August 6 Estonia became the sixteenth."'
287. BALTIC STATES, supra, note 149, at 281. The great Polish poet, Czeslaw Milosz,
has recounted one story related to the elections in the Baltic republics which sheds some
light on their validity:
One of the delegates to the [new] Lithuanian parliament was a friend from
my early youth. Together we had travelled many kilometers down various Euro-
pean rivers in a canoe, escaped drowning in rapids, wandered over mountain
trails, seen the sun rise over the valleys of the Black Forest and the castles of the
Rhineland. A few years before the Second World War he became a Stalinist. He
was from Warsaw, and his presence in Lithuania at the outbreak of the War was
more or less accidental. Nevertheless, he was proposed as a candidate (there
were so few Communists in these countries that every one was put to use); and
since candidacy was tantamount to election, he became a delegate. It must have
been quite an experience of power for him; he could vote the incorporation of a
country he had nothing to do with into another country which he knew only
from its propaganda literature and official statistics.
C. Milosz, The Lesson of the Baltics, BALTIC F., Fall 1984, at 5. Milosz notes that there
was a heavy turnout on election day: "They had to vote; for when one turned in one's
ballot, one's passport was stamped. The absence of this stamp meant that the owner of
the passport was an enemy of the people who had revealed his ill will by refusing to
vote." Id. See also Baltic States Pick Red Parliaments, supra note 285.
288. SWETrENHAM, supra note 151, at 75-79. The new Estonian and Latvian regimes
also relinquished control of large areas of territory and ceded them to the Russian Soviet
Socialist Republic in January 1945. Tallinn lost the Petseri and Trans-Narva districts
(2449 sq. km. with a population of 63,000), while Riga ceded the district of Pytalovo in
the Latvian province of Latgale. von Rauch, supra note 196, at 227.
289. BALTIc STATES, supra note 149, at 362. The first Soviet occupation of the Baltic
States lasted from June 1940 until June 1941 when Germany launched its massive attack
on Russia. Although the German attacks swept through Lithuania and Latvia in only
two weeks, German troops took two months to occupy all of Estonia because their ad-
vance was slowed by overextended supply lines. As a result, Estonia suffered destruction
much greater than that of her two southern Baltic neighbors. The Soviets were able to
press Estonian youths into the Red Army and work brigades and nearly 10,000 young
Estonian men were sent to their deaths in northern Russian lumber camps. Taagepera,
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 1940-1980: Similarities and Differences, BALTIC F. Fall
1984, at 41-42.
When German troops marched into the villages and towns of the Baltic region they
were hailed by the majority of the populace as liberators. In all three States, popular
uprisings against Soviet forces occurred. In Lithuania, politicians and underground lead-
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IV. AN APPRAISAL OF THE LEGALITY OF SovIET RUSSIA'S ANNEXATION
OF THE BALTIC STATES
The Soviet Union advanced five reasons for its occupation of the
Baltic nations: (1) the Baltic States had entered into a secret anti-So-
ers set up a provisional government, and in Estonia and Latvia, politicians requested
German authorities to support the re-establishment of national independence. von
Rauch, supra note 196, at 229.
These hopes were soon dashed by the realities of Hitler's plans for the Baltic region.
These plans called for the conversion of the Baltic States and Byelorussia into a German
settlement area. A Nazi memorandum dated April 2, 1941, states that this goal would be
achieved by a transfer of the bulk of the population to Russia and their replacement by
educated, racially suitable German, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch, and even British, farm-
ers. LATVIA: COUNTRY AND PEOPLE 253 (J. Rutkis ed. 1967). Alfred Rosenberg was ap-
pointed Reichskommissar for all occupied territories in the east to implement Hitler's
policies.
The Baltic peoples soon became disillusioned with German rule. Germany refused to
permit any measure of political autonomy in the region and intended to exploit the eco-
nomic resources of the occupied Baltic states for its own ends. VON RAUCH, supra note
196, at 229. One such resource which the Germans relentlessly exploited was Baltic man-
power. Baltic youths were often given an unappealing choice: service in the German mili-
tary service or deportation to Germany as forced laborers. By July 1944, 70,000 Estoni-
ans, 150,000 Latvians, and 50,000 Lithuanians were serving in the German armed forces,
and 15,000 Estonians, 35,000 Latvians, and 75,000 Lithuanians were serving as laborers
in Germany. Taagepera, supra, at 43. Forced labor roundups occurred in eastern Latvia
(Latgale) and in Lithuania. Id.
As German troops suffered increasing losses in the east, Reich Minister Rosenberg
ordered a compulsory draft of those Latvian men eligible for armed service by virtue of
their birth between the years 1919 and 1924. Because international law proscribed the
compulsory draft of inhabitants of occupied territory, the draftees were designated
"Hilfswillige" (voluntary assistants) to the Wehrmacht. Over 23,000 Latvians were mo-
bilized under this decree and sent to German military units. LATVIA: COUNTRY AND PEO-
PLE, supra, at 255.
On February 10, 1943, Hitler issued an order which called for the establishment of a
Latvian SS Volunteer legion. Eighteen more classes of Latvian men eligible for military
service were drafted into the legion-34,000 for combat service and 20,000 for service in
labor companies. The two Baltic combat divisions suffered heavy losses on the Eastern
front. Those who survived the war faced a harsh fate. Despite the fact that they had
been pressed illegally into German service and had fought for their nation's freedom
against a predatory Soviet regime, the Soviet Government treated them not as prisoners
of war but as traitors to the Soviet Union. Those who managed to escape to the West
were at first considered voluntary fighters for Hilter's Germany until they were able to
convince the Allies that the Waffen-SS badges were in no way an affirmation of their
adherence to the Nazi cause. Id. at 256.
The Baltic Jewish community, which had grown in size as a result of an influx of
refugees from Poland and Germany, was quickly subjected to the Nazi's racist policies.
"The Final Solution" was initiated in Riga as early as November 1941, at which time
27,000 Jews were slaughtered. In the following months, 32,000 Jews were massacred in
Vilnius. Those who survived the initial pogroms were sent to work camps or sealed into
ghettos. Of the 250,000 Baltic Jews in 1939, less than 50,000 survived the war. VON
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viet military alliance; (2) Estonia and Latvia had failed to denounce
their military alliance of 1923; (3) the Baltic foreign ministers had par-
ticipated in two secret conferences in 1939 and 1940; (4) the general
staffs of the Baltic States had improved their relations, and (5) a press
organ of the Military Baltic Entente, La Revue Baltique, was estab-
lished.2 s0 None of these reasons have withstood the test of history.
2 9'
RAUCH, supra note 196, at 230. Although Baltic resistance groups were formed during the
German occupation, they did not use guerilla tactics so as to avoid helping the Soviets
whom the Balts feared more than the Germans. Taagepera, supra at 44.
Many Baits fled to the West as Soviet armies approached the German-occupied Bal-
tic States in 1944. Emigration from Lithuania (50,000) was less than from Estonia
(60,000) or Latvia (100,000). This is a result of the fact that Lithuania was re-occupied
by the Red Army more quickly than her northern neighbors. Many Estonians were able
to sail to Sweden in small boats and Latvians managed to escape to Germany due to the
German Army's presence in the Courland Peninsula until the war's end in May 1945. Id.
at 45.
In March 1944, Estonians formed a National Committee which issued an appeal for
support from the population on June 23. On September 17, the Wehrmacht announced
its intention of withdrawing from Estonian territory. As a result, an Estonian Provisional
Government was formed with Professor Jui Uluots as President and former Minister of
Justice Otto Tief as Premier. On September 20, Tief issued a proclamation calling for
the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the restoration of Estonian sovereignty. Two
days later, advance units of the Red Army reached Tallinn, and by the end of November
1944, Soviet troops had occupied the entire country. Uluots and other members of the
National Committee fled to Sweden and Premier Tief was imprisoned. VON RAUCH,
supra note 196, at 231.
In Latvia, resistance movements formed a Central Committee in 1943. Its leaders
issued a proclamation in February 1944, calling for the restoration of independence. Lat-
vians were encouraged by the fact that Courland remained in German hands until the
surrender of May 9, 1945. It was hoped that the western Allies would send troops to be
deployed in Courland and subsequently occupy all of Latvia. These hopes proved illusory
upon the Red Army's subsequent reoccupation of the entire country, including Courland.
Id.
Although the Lithuanian Provisional Government was disbanded by the Germans in
August 1941, Lithuanian resistance groups announced in 1943 the establishment of the
Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania to coordinate their actions. On Feb-
ruary 16, 1944, the Committee issued an appeal to the Lithuanian nation in which it (the
committee) stated: "A Provisional Government of the Republic will be organized when
the proper time comes .... " This government was never formed because the German
security forces arrested most of the committee's members soon afterwards, and the re-
maining officials went underground. Leaders of the underground resistance later served
as the spearhead of opposition to the second Soviet occupation. Id. at 232. See infra note
554 for a description of post-war Baltic national resistance movements.
290. BALTic STATES, supra note 149, at 292.
291. See generally Loeber, Soviet Attitude Toward Political Unions of States: The
Case of the Baltic Republics, 1918-1940, 7 KOREAN J. INT'L STUDiEs 33 (1976). On July
25 and 26, 1985, an International Baltic Tribunal met in Copenhagen, Denmark, on the
40th anniversary of the second Soviet occupation of the Baltic States. The Tribunal was
composed of Dr. Theodore Veiter, an Austrian legal scholar; Per Ahlmark, former leader
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The Soviet charge that the three nations had entered into a secret
military alliance was untrue.2 2 There was no alliance, secret or other-
wise.2 9 3 The allegation could not be proven even after the Soviets had
obtained access to the secret archives of the Baltic States after their
complete subjugation.29 4 The Soviet Union must have known that the
allegation was false because it had available, in addition to its own in-
telligence, all information known to the German authorities. A teletype
memo sent by Dr. von Grundherr of the Political Division in Charge of
of the Swedish Liberal Party and former Deputy Prime Minister; Michael Bordeaux,
President of Keston College in Great Britain; Jean-Marie Daillet, a member of the
French National Assembly and Vice-President of the European Christian Democratic
Union and Sir James Fawcett, a British lawyer and former member of the European
Commission on Human Rights. After two days of testimony by Baits and other East
Europeans regarding the Soviet Union's policies in the Baltic States, the Tribunal issued
a Manifesto which declared that "the occupation and annexation of the once-indepen-
dent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania serves as a prime example of the violation of interna-
tional public law and treaties ratified by the Soviet Union." Copenhagen Manifesto, July
26, 1985, reprinted in ELTA, Aug. 1985, at 6. For a text of the Manifesto see Appendix
XI. See also Lipsky, Baltic Witness Against the Soviet Tyranny, Wall St. J., July 31,
1985, at 19, col. 4. For a Soviet perspective on the Tribunal, see A. Popov, The Curtain
Rises on the Terrorist Gathering in Copenhagen, Radio Moscow broadcast, July 23,
1985, reprinted in BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, SUMMARY OF WORLD BROAD-
CASTS, July 25, 1985 (available on NEXIS).
292. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 292-93.
293. Id.
294. 9 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1918-1945, at 593 (1949). There was
little reason for the Soviet Union to fear the Baltic States militarily. The 1934 Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation between the three countries did not cover military coopera-
tion, and only once, in 1931, were joint maneuvers (between the Estonian and Latvian
navies and armies) ever held. Even during the Wars of Liberation following the Russian
Revolution, there was little cooperation between the Baltic armies. There had never been
an agreement concerning unified command, unified weapons systems, common arma-
ments industries or even a common command language. The Latvian weapons were
mostly of British origin; the Estonian weapons were mostly of Russian and German ori-
gin and the Lithuanians used either German or French weaponry. In practice, the Baltic
States were able to arm only 360,000 men and such a mobilization would have taken 72
hours. Anderson, The Baltic Entente-Phantom or Reality?, in THE BALTIC STATES IN
PEACE AND WAR 129, 129-130 (V.S. Vardys & R. Misiunas eds. 1978). Besides their obvi-
ous military shortcomings, the Baltic States were not protected by any major geographi-
cal barriers-most of the border runs through flat, forrested terrain. Most damaging to
any Russian claim is the fact that Latvia, the keystone in any Baltic defense, had fa-
vored a policy of neutrality to such an extent that both its eastern and southern frontiers
were unfortified and its extremely long coastline was unarmed. Id. at 131-132. Without a
serious Latvian defensive capability, Estonia and Lithuania would have had little chance
to deflect a potential Russian invasion. "For this and other reasons Western and Soviet
military observers and political planners showed no respect for the Baltic Entente and
its armed forces. They agreed that the Baltic armed forces, being divided and uncoopera-
tive, had no military value whatsoever and could not be considered as a power factor."
Id. at 134.
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Baltic Affairs in the German Foreign Office to German Foreign Minis-
ter von Ribbentrop on June 17, 1940, stated:
The assertion, now made by Russia, that Lithuania had joined
the Estonian-Latvian military pact, is, according to informa-
tion available here, without any foundation . . . . Since the
conclusion of the Soviet Mutual Assistance pacts with the Bal-
tic countries in September-October 1939, there has been no
closer cooperation in an anti-Russian sense among the Baltic
States. In view of the occupation of their countries by Soviet
Russian troops, the three Baltic Governments were aware of
the danger of such policy. 95
The Soviet charge that Latvia and Estonia did not denounce their
mutual defensive alliance is curious. The Treaty was registered with
the League of Nations and, therefore, universally known. 9 The Soviet
Union did not protest when the Treaty was ratified in 1924, and did
not demand abrogation of the Treaty when Latvia and Estonia signed
the Pact for Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in the Autumn
of 1939.297
The charge by the Soviets that secret conferences had occurred
among the Foreign Ministers of the Baltic States was also untrue. Two
conferences were held, one in December 1939 and another in March
1940, but they were part of a series of routine conferences among the
Foreign Ministers and were not secret.2 98 On June 17, 1940, the Ger-
man Foreign Office, in an internal memo, rejected the Soviet charge:
"The cooperation between the Baltic States. .. is based on the Treaty
of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation concluded for ten years by
these three states on September 12, 1934 . . . .In practice, the politi-
cal cooperation consisted mainly of semiannual conferences of Foreign
Ministers and joint press conferences . "... 299
The Soviet Union's allegation that there had been an "improve-
ment of relations between the general staffs of the Baltic countries"
was never substantiated by the Soviets."'0
The flimsiest Soviet charge was that the Baltic States had jointly
established a special press organ of their alleged joint military com-
mand, called the "Revue Baltique." The "press organ" was in reality a
publication of the Societies of Friendship of the Baltic Peoples. It was
295. BALTIC STATES, supra note 149, at 292.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 292-93.




dedicated exclusively to economic, social and cultural affairs. The few
articles which mentioned the Soviet Union were complimentary. In the
June 1940 issue, Latvian Foreign Minister Munters declared: "We can
describe our relations with the Soviet Union as very satisfactory both
from the political and economic points of view."301
Clearly, the Soviet Union could not advance any substantive rea-
son for breaching its legal obligations pursuant to the Pacts of Mutual
Assistance of 1939. Furthermore, the occupation of the three Baltic na-
tions was a breach of every major treaty signed between the Soviet
Union and the Baltic States subsequent to the USSR's recognition of
the Baltic States' perpetual right to sovereignty and independence in
the early 1920's.302 The use of force had been outlawed in Soviet-Baltic
relations by the treaties of nonaggression and peaceful settlement of
disputes of 1926 and 1932.s0s Moreover, "aggression" had been clearly
defined in the Conventions for the Definition of Aggression of July 3,
1933.304 The Soviet invasion was an "aggressive act" as defined by
those agreements. Article 3 declared that "no political, military, eco-
nomic, or other considerations may serve as an excuse or justification
for aggression."30 5
The Baltic States had also agreed with the U.S.S.R. to "submit all
disputes, whatever their origin, which may arise between them subse-
quent to the coming into force of the present treaty, and which may
not have been possible to settle within a reasonable time through the
ordinary diplomatic channel, to a procedure of conciliation in a mixed
Conciliation Commission." s" The Soviet Union never attempted to use
301. Id. at 293-94.
302. It violated articles 2, 5, 7, and 14 of the Treaty of Peace, Feb. 2, 1920, Estonia-
Russia, 11 L.N.T.S. 50; articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty of Peace, Aug. 11, 1920, Latvia-
Russia, 2 L.N.T.S. 122; articles 1,4 and 5 of the Treaty of Peace, July 12, 1920, Lithua-
nia-Russia, 3 L.N.T.S. 122; articles 2,3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty of Non-Aggression, Sept.
28, 1926, Lithuania-U.S.S.R., 60 L.N.T.S. 145; the Conciliation Convention, June 16,
1932, Estonia-U.S.S.R., 131 L.N.T.S. 309; the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes Between Estonia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
May 4, 1932, 131 L.N.T.S. 305; the Conciliation Convention, June 18, 1932, Latvia-
U.S.S.R., 148 L.N.T.S. 129; the Protocol Renewing the Treaty of Non-Aggression of Sep-
tember 28, 1926, Apr. 4, 1934, Lithuania-U.S.S.R., 186 L.N.T.S. 267; article 5 of the three
Mutual Assistance Pacts of 1939: Pact of Mutual Assistance, Sept. 28, 1939, Estonia-
U.S.S.R., 198 L.N.T.S. 227; Mutual Assistance Pact, Oct. 5, 1939, Latvia-U.S.S.R., 198
L.N.T.S. 381; and the Pact of Mutual Assistance, Oct. 10, 1939, Lithuania-U.S.S.R., re-
printed in SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY, 1933-1941, at 380 (1953).
303. For the text of these agreements, see supra, notes 230, 233 and 234.
304. See supra note 238 for the text of the convention.
305. Convention for the Definition of Aggression, July 3, 1933, 147 L.N.T.S. 69.
306. Conciliation Convention, June 18, 1932, Latvia-U.S.S.R., 148 L.N.T.S. 129; Con-
ciliation Convention, June 16, 1932, Estonia-U.S.S.R., 131 L.N.T.S. 309; Treaty of Non-
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this mechanism to settle its disputes with the Baltic States.3 07
The mutual assistance pacts had confirmed the principle of nonin-
terference in the internal affairs of each party. Article V of the Esto-
nian pact held that "[t]he enforcement of the present pact may in no
way impair the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, or, more
especially, their economic system or political structure."3 Yet, in spite
of this treaty having been concluded less than a year before, the Soviet
Union demanded that the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Govern-
ments resign and establish new governments which "would be capable
and willing to warrant the honest execution" of the Mutual Assistance
Pacts.309
Besides being a clear breach of the bilateral agreements between
the Baltic States and Soviet Russia, the invasion and incorporation fla-
grantly disregarded the major multilateral agreements signed by the
Soviet Union, particularly article 10 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations and the Treaty of Paris of 1928.
Indeed, only two years before the seizure of the Baltic States, the
Soviet delegate to the League of Nations had strongly defended the
principle of mutual respect for territorial integrity in a speech before
the League Assembly. The Soviet delegate declared:
It must be clear that the League of Nations has no intention of
changing its attitude, whether to the direct seizures and annex-
ations of other people's territory, or to those cases where such
annexations are camouflaged by the setting-up of puppet "na-
tional" governments, allegedly independent, but in reality serv-
ing merely as a screen for, and an agency of, the foreign
invader.310
Aggression, Sept. 28, 1926, Lithuania-U.S.S.R., 60 L.N.T.S. 145.
307. Kaslas, supra note 261, at 217. The Lithuanian Government carefully selected a
special commission of jurists under the supervision of the Minister of Justice, Antanas
Tamosaitis, a professor of law known for his socialist leanings, to investigate the Soviet
charge that the Lithuanian Government had kidnapped Soviet soldiers from their mili-
tary bases inside Lithuania. Id. at 216-17. The Soviet Government refused to permit
even minimal cooperation by its officials with the investigative efforts of the Lithuanian
Government. Id. at 217. The commission found no evidence to support the Soviet accu-
sations, on the contrary, there was every indication that the Soviet soldiers had deserted
of their own volition. Id. at 217. Professor Tamosaitis was arrested by the Red Army in
July 1940 and tortured to death in a Kaunas prison. Id.
308. Pact of Mutual Assistance, Sept. 28, 1939, Estonia-U.S.S.R., 198 L.N.T.S. 227.
309. BALTIc STATES, supra note 149, at 244, 292, 333.
310. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 340 (1938). The Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal held
that an act of annexation is an illegal act and an act of violence:
It was contended before the tribunal that the annexation of Austria was
justified by the strong desire expressed in many quarters for the union of Aus-
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V. WORLD COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO THE ANNEXATION
A. The United States of America
The reaction of the world community to the Russian seizure of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was swift and severe. It thus reflected
the growing acceptance of the prescriptive value of the doctrine of non-
recognition of forcible seizure of territory. On July 23, 1940, the acting
United States Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, declared that his
country would continue to support the Stimson doctrine. Secretary
Welles indicated that nonrecognition would be applied to Soviet Rus-
sia as it had been applied to Japan, Germany and Italy:
During these past few days the devious processes whereunder
the political independence and territorial integrity of the three
small Baltic republics-Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-were
to be deliberately annihilated by one of their more powerful
neighbors, have been rapidly drawing to their conclusion ...
The policy of this Government is universally known. The peo-
ple of the United States are opposed to predatory activities no
matter whether they are carried on by the use of force or by
the threat of force. They are likewise opposed to any form of
intervention, on the part of one state, however powerful, in the
domestic concerns of any other sovereign state, however weak.
These principles constitute the very foundations upon which
the relationship between the 21 sovereign existing republics of
the New World rests. The United States will continue to stand
by these principles, because of the conviction of the American
people that unless the doctrine in which these principles are
inherent once again governs the relations between nations, the
rule of reason, of justice and of law-in other words, the basis
tria and Germany, that there were many matters in common between the two
peoples that made this union desirable; and that in the result the object was
achieved without bloodshed.
These matters, even if true, are really immaterial, for the facts plainly prove
that the methods employed to achieve the object were those of an aggressor. The
ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany ready to be used if any resis-
tance was encountered.
Trial of the Major War Criminals, 22 INT'L MIL. TRmUNAL 435 (1948).
Although the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal referred to Estonia, Latvia and Lith-
uania as constituting territory of the U.S.S.R., the chief United States prosecutor, Rob-
ert H. Jackson, and the British Government, specifically declared that their agreement to
such a Soviet reference was made only to prevent delay and did not signify United States
or Great Britain's recognition of Soviet sovereignty in the Baltic region. Krivickas, The
International Status of Lithuania, 4 LITUANUS 99, 100-01 (1958). See also supra INT'L
MIL. TRIBUNAL, at 95.
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of modern civilization itself-cannot be preserved."'
The practical measures taken by the United States were consistent
with this interpretation. The diplomatic and consular agencies of the
Baltic Republics were allowed to continue their activities as represent-
atives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania," 2 and steps were taken to pro-
tect Baltic assets in the United States.
3 13
On July 15, the United States Treasury Department was asked to
quickly investigate the holdings in domestic banks of Latvia, Lithuania
and Estonia for fear that endeavors would soon be made by the Soviets
to withdraw these funds.3 " The same day, an Executive order was is-
sued which "forbade, without the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury, the transfer or disposition of property in which Latvia, Esto-
nia, or Lithuania or any national thereof has at any time on or since
July 10, 1940, had any interest of any nature whatsoever . "... ,315
The effect of this action was to freeze Baltic assets in the United
States. The Soviet Government soon thereafter issued a demand to the
Charg6 d'Affaires of the United States Embassy in Moscow calling for
the return of all Baltic assets held by United States banks.1 ' On Au-
311, Statement by the Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles on Baltic Republics
(July 23, 1940), reprinted in 3 DEP'T ST. BULL. 48 (1940). The United States press also
condemned the Soviet annexation. On July 24 the New York Times declared:
Under-Secretary of State Welles did not overstate the case yesterday when
he spoke of the "predatory" manner in which Soviet Russia has absorbed the
three small Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The spokesmen of the
workers' paradise whose capital is Moscow are tireless in announcing their dis-
covery of new and higher standards of international morality. Their methods
remain the methods of the gunman.
N.Y. Times, July 24, 1940, at 20, col. 3 (Editorial). For another major New York Times
editorial on the Baltic annexation, see Appendix III, infra at 494.
312. LANGER, supra note 4, at 264. This was consistent with United States policy
towards Czechoslovakia, Albania and Poland. These nations' embassies remained open
and their governments continued to receive recognition from the United States. Id.
313. 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 391 (1940).
314. Id.
315. 5 Fed. Reg. 2586 (1940). It is estimated that the Baltic assets in the United
States amounted to '$12 million. Juda, United States Non-recognition of the Soviet
Union's Annexation of the Baltic States: Politics and Law, 6 J. BALTIC STUD. 272, 273
(1975).
316. 3 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 395 (1940). The Soviet note stated: "The Soviet Govern-
ment considers the actions of the American institutions to be directed against the Soviet
Union's realization of its legal property rights to the said gold as undermining the foun-
dations of normal commercial relations and as contrary to the elementary principles of
international law." Id.
On July 21, the United States Ambassador to Lithuania was called to the Foreign
Ministry to receive a formal protest against the freezing of Lithuanian assets in the
United States. After receiving the official version from an official of the Foreign Ministry,
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gust 9, 1940, Acting Secretary of State Welles sent the United States
response to the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs.3 17 The note
made it clear that the United States was freezing the Baltic assets in
conformity with the legal principles underlying the Stimson doctrine.
The systematic application of the Stimson doctrine by the United
States continued when Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov ordered all
foreign missions in the Baltic cities of Kaunas, Riga and Tallinn closed
by August 25. On August 13, the United States agreed to close its lega-
tions but refused to admit "the legality of the acts which had given rise
to the request."318
Concern was also expressed in the State Department for the fate
of the many Baltic merchant vessels around the world:
For the last several months the Soviet Embassy has been en-
deavoring to arrange for the charter of Latvian bottoms in or-
der to transport material to Vladivostok. Apparently the Soviet
Miss Avietenaite, the United States Ambassador was pulled aside and told quietly:
"Please disregard all of our protest. We do not act independently anymore. We appreci-
ate what Washington is doing more than we dare tell." The Ambassador concluded that
Miss Avietenaite had "expressed the exact sentiments of all who count for the good of
Lithuania and for the other two Baltic countries as well. While the Lithuanians would
prefer to have their investments held safe until better times return, the Bolsheviks ap-
parently are much annoyed . I..." Id. On July 20, 1940 the new Estonian Government
made a similar protest to the United States Ambassador in Tallinn. Id. at 399.
317. Id. at 410. The note from the United States declared:
The measures against which the Soviet Government protests are neither ar-
bitrary nor isolated manifestations of national policy. They are acts of conserva-
tion and control fully within the rights of the Government of the United States
and involve no infringement of international law. Similar measures have been
applied with respect to property situated in the United States belonging to vari-
ous countries, or nationals thereof, which have been occupied by the armed
forces of a foreign Power or otherwise deprived of their freedom of action by
force or threats of force, giving rise to practical problems of the appropriate pro-
tection of American institutions and nationals from adverse claims which might
result from the making of payments by them on instructions issued under du-
ress, and of the protection of the interests of the rightful owners.
The attempt to transfer the gold belonging to the Banks of Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia was made at a time when it had become apparent that the
governments and peoples of those countries were being deprived of freedom of
action by foreign troops which had entered their territories by force or threats of
force. The attitude of the Government and people of the United States with
regard to the use of force or threats of force in the conduct of international
relations is well known. In keeping with this attitude, it is proper that the au-
thorities of the American Government, in administering the orders and regula-
tions referred to, should not fail to take into consideration the special situation
existing in the three Baltic countries.
Id.
318. Id. at 420.
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plan now is to force the Latvian Government and private own-
ers to permit Soviet organizations to charter Latvian and other
Baltic ships and to call these ships into Soviet ports where they
are to be nationalized . . . . The Latvian minister states that
at the present time a Latvian vessel is in Baltimore taking on
cargo for Vladivostok in pursuance of a recent Soviet
charter.3 9
The Executive Order of July 15, 1940, interned these vessels in United
States ports.3 "'
With the declaration of war by the United States in December
1941, and the growing awareness of United States dependence on So-
viet military might, Soviet pressure on the United States to eschew its
support for the Baltic nations increased.32 ' Throughout early 1941, So-
viet authorities stressed that improvement of United States-Soviet re-
lations was not conceivable unless the activities of the "former" Baltic
Missions and consulates in the United States were discontinued and
the freezing of Baltic assets was ended. In a February 1941 meeting
between the Russian Ambassador to Washington, Constantine Ous-
mansky, and Under Secretary of State Welles, the Ambassador
brought up the subject of the Baltic ships in United States ports. Ous-
mansky pointed out to Welles that former Secretary of State Bain-
bridge Colby had refused to recognize the Baltic States in the early
1920's in order not to alienate territory of the Russian people without
their consent. The Ambassador saw present United States policy as
contradicting Colby's position. Welles replied that even before the
United States had recognized the independence of the Baltic States,
the Soviet Government itself had recognized the sovereignty of these
three countries. He went on to declare that the policy of the United
States had been identical to that of the Soviet Government until a few
months before, and that the United States hoped that the policy of the
Soviet Union would be identical to that of the United States. That
policy, which acknowledged the desirability of safeguarding the legiti-
mate interests of the smaller countries of the world, sought to
strengthen and fortify the rights of small nations to independence and
territorial integrity. Welles added that the Ministers of the Baltic Re-
publics were still recognized as representatives of their respective na-
tions in conformance with the United States policy of nonrecognition
of forcible seizure of territory. The Secretary pointed out to Ousman-
sky that for a number of months after the total occupation of Czecho-
319. Id. at 392.
320. Exec. Order No. 8484, 5 Fed. Reg. 2586 (1940).
321. Juda, supra note 315, at 274.
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slovakia by Germany, the Soviet Government had continued to recog-
nize the credentials of the Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow.322
The signature of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, and the
U.S.S.R.'s accession to the Charter one month later, increased United
States resolve to adhere to a policy oriented towards the self-determi-
nation of peoples and nonrecognition of forcible seizure of terri-
tory-especially with regard to eastern Europe. 323 The depth of the
United States resolve became apparent when the British Government
advanced a proposal for an Anglo-Soviet treaty which would acknowl-
edge a Soviet right to absorb Eastern Poland and the Baltic States into
the Soviet Union.124 The proposal was strongly opposed by the United
States. President Roosevelt noted that the proposed treaty "contained
nothing in the nature of any safeguard for the peoples of the Baltic
Republics. 3 2 5 Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles characterized
the proposed pact as a flagrant violation of the Atlantic Charter and
"indefensible from every moral standpoint." ' When the Anglo-Soviet
322. 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 708-10 (1941). On March 18, 1939, the Soviet Government
delivered a note to the German Ambassador in Moscow protesting the German annexa-
tion of Czechoslovakia. The note declared: "In the absence of any expression of the will
of the Czech people, the occupation of the Czech provinces by German troops and the
subsequent actions of the German Government cannot but be considered as arbitrary,
violent and aggressive .... ." The Soviet Government refused to recognize Czechoslova-
kia's incorporation into the Reich as being legitimate and in conformity with the gener-
ally accepted rules of international law and justice or the principle of self-determination
of nations. MAREK, supra note 106, at 288.
323. Juda, supra note 315, at 275. The Atlantic Charter was a joint declaration made
by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill after their meeting on August 12,
1941. It set forth certain common principles on which they agreed to base their foreign
policy during World War II and afterwards. In part, it stated that neither nation would
seek territorial aggrandizement and that no territorial changes would be permitted which
did not accord with the "freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." It also de-
clared the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live
and the desire to see sovereign rights and self-government returned to those people who
had been forcibly deprived of them. Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14, 1941, United Kingdom-
United States, 204 L.N.T.S. 382. The Soviet Union acceded to the Charter on September
24, 1941. 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 378 (1941).
324. See W. CHURCHILL, THE HINGE OF FATE 327 (1950).
325. 3 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 538 (1942).
326. Id. at 541. Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle wrote:
[Wie have not been unmindful of the extreme and unjust hardship of the
fate which the Baltic Republics would suffer if their entire national life were
submerged either by Russia or by Germany.
We have been and are fully mindful of the wholly legitimate interest which
Soviet Russia has in the area of the Baltic Republics, namely, the necessity that
they shall not be used as military or "fifth column" springboards against her;
and the necessity to her of full outlet to the Baltic Sea . . . . It is true that by
comparative standards the fate of these unhappy peoples (the total number of
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treaty was signed in May 1942, no provision was made for British rec-
ognition of the Soviet conquest of the Baltic countries. This was largely
due to United States pressure."s 7
actual Ests, Letts and Lithuanians is probably not more that three million) [sic]
is a small one in comparison to the whole picture. It is even possible that at long
last the good sense of the Russian people will work out a humane arrangement
I should have preferred . . . a blunt and frank statement of our views,
namely, a full willingness to assure the satisfaction of every Russian interest con-
sistent with the maintenance of the cultural and racial existence in their home-
lands of three free, decent, unambitious and hard working peoples who are now
apparently to be eliminated from the earth.
3 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 539 (1942).
327. Juda, supra note 315, at 276. A major consideration in British foreign policy
during this period was the possibility that under certain conditions the Russians might
arrange a separate peace with Germany. Within the British Government, it was felt that
the British needed the Soviets more than the Soviets needed the British. Consequently,
Great Britain was very reluctant to antagonize the Soviet Union by failing to recognize
Soviet claims to the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. Id. See Kirby, Morality or Expe-
diency? The Baltic Question in British-Soviet Relations, 1941-42, in THE BALTIC STATES
IN PEACE AND WAR 160 (V. Vardys & R. Misiunas eds. 1978). See infra notes 397-430 and
accompanying text for a more detailed description of the United Kingdom's policy vis-a-
vis the Baltic States.
Unfortunately, the United States failed to logically and consistently apply the legal
principles inherent in the Stimson doctrine when the time came for the foundation of a
new international body to replace the League of Nations. On January 2, 1942, twenty-six
of the world's nations signed the Declaration of the United Nations. The Latvian ambas-
sador to the United States made a request to the United States Department of State
that Latvia be allowed to sign the Declaration, but his request was denied. 1 FOREIGN
RELATIONS U.S. 28-30 (1942). Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle, Jr. indicated to
Latvian Ambassador Alfred Bilmanis that the United States was deeply sympathetic to
the plight of the Latvian people. Nevertheless, Berle requested the Latvian Ambassador
not to "press for an answer" to the Latvian diplomatic note. Berle made it clear that the
United States position was a result of "the complications" which the Latvian signature
would cause with the Soviet Union. Id.
On January 12, 1942, the Estonian Consul General in New York, Johannes Kaiv,
made the following declaration in a message to the United States Secretary of State:
[t]he Declaration of the United Nations signed at Washington on January
first is of greatest importance to the Estonian people.
Unfortunately at present the Estonian nation, silenced by military force
... , does not have the possibility to speak through its legal Government and
elected representatives, practically all of whom have been deported to Russia
.... Under the provisions of the Constitution of Estonia the authority to ad-
here to acts of the nature of the Declaration of Washington . . . rests with the
Government and the Parliament of Estonia.
In due time, when the Estonian people will again become free in their delib-
erations and decisions, Estonia will join other free nations in the common strug-
gle against all brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world.
1 FOREIGN RELATIONS U.S. 34 (1942).
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The adherence by the United States to the Stimson doctrine also
had important domestic legal consequences. During the Second World
War, the Baltic Legations in Washington offered those ships of Baltic
registry in United States ports to the United States Government to
help the war effort. Pursuant to this offer, the United States Govern-
ment requisitioned the vessels and compensated their owners. Repre-
sentatives of the Soviet Government, however, contested the ownership
of the ships, and as a result, United States courts were called upon to
determine the legitimacy of the various claims. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided one such case involving
the Estonian ship Maret in 1944.
The Maret, s28 a ship of Estonian registry, had been in port at St.
Thomas, Virgin Islands, in July 1940, when its captain was informed
that the ship had been nationalized by the new Estonian "peoples"
regime.8 2 9 The regime ordered the Maret's captain to proceed to Mur-
mansk, Russia, but the Estonian Consul General in New York, Johan-
nes Kaiv, acting pursuant to paragraph 84 of the Estonian Consular
Law and article XXII of a 1925 treaty between the United States and
Estonia, countermanded that order.33 0 On September 16, 1941, the
United States War Shipping Administration requisitioned the Maret
pursuant to its statutory authority.3 ' Compensation was provided and
deposited on account with the Treasurer of the United States.3 12 Am-
torg, a Soviet trading company, sought to obtain payment for the req-
uisition of the ship.
88
Mr. Kaiv filed an answer as Consul General of the Republic of
Estonia, as trustee or custodian under the principle of Estonian law
known as negotiorum gestor, and as attorney in fact for some of the
owners of the beneficial private interests in the Maret.8 ' The United
States District Court for the Virgin Islands rendered judgment in favor
of Amtorg. Kaiv then appealed.
3
Amtorg first sought to show that Mr. Kaiv, as Consul General, did
not have standing, and hence, did not have any right to appeal. The
court of appeals dismissed this contention on the grounds that consu-
328. The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944).
329. Id. at 433-34.
330. Id. at 434.
331. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1271 (1941) (expired July 1, 1953).
332. 145' F.2d at 437.
333. Id.
334. Id. at n.29. Negotiorum gestor embraces a principle of volunteer trusteeship of
property entered into by a third person without the mandate or authority of the owner
of the property in order to protect the owner's interest. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1188
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
335. 145 F.2d at 437.
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lar agents are accorded the right to appear in United States courts to
protect their nationals and their nationals' property.3 36 The court em-
phasized that the United States "continued to recognize Mr. Johannes
Kaiv as Acting Consul General of Estonia in New York." In response,
Amtorg asserted that it was the lawful owner of the ship based on the
nationalization decrees passed by the Socialist Republic of Estonia.
The Court noted that the viewpoints of United States courts and
learned writers were not in harmony on the issue of whether the judici-
ary should defer to Executive Branch determinations regarding the ef-
fect of decisions by unrecognized foreign sovereigns on domestic prop-
erty rights.88  Nevertheless, the court felt itself bound by the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Pink.'" The
court cited Justice Douglas' opinion which declared that the authority
of the Executive to determine a political matter such as the recognition
of a foreign government "is not limited to a determination of the gov-
ernment to be recognized. It includes the power to determine the pol-
icy which is to govern the question of recognition."'
The court went on to state that "no valid distinction can be drawn
between the political or diplomatic act of nonrecognition of a sovereign
and nonrecognition of the decrees or acts of that sovereign. ' 340 The
court noted that the Department of State had certified that the United
States had not recognized the absorption of Estonia by Soviet Russia,
the legality of the so-called nationalization laws and decrees or any of
the acts of the regime now functioning in Estonia.3 41 Accordingly, the
court concluded that it could not recognize Amtorg or its principal, the
Estonian State Steamship Company, as the owner of the Maret.
3 
2
A similar case involved the Estonian ship Signe.143 The vessel was
in Cuba at the time of the Russian invasion and under the command of
its master and part owner, Captain Pahlberg.3 " Immediately after the
nationalization decrees, the Signe, like the Maret, received orders from
the new Estonian regime to proceed to Murmansk, Russia.3 45 Captain
Pahlberg sailed the ship to the United States upon completion of its
charter and appealed for protection to Estonian Consul Kaiv in New
336. Id. at 437-38.
337. Id. at 438-39 n.34.
338. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
339. Id. at 229.
340. 145 F.2d at 442.
341. Id. at 438 n.32.
342. Id. at 442.
343. The Florida, 133 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1943).




York.84 Mr. Kaiv declared himself trustee of the ship and assumed
control of its affairs.3 4 7 Thereafter, under the direction of the Consul,
Estoduras Steamship Company was organized for the purpose of hold-
ing title to the ship and changing its registry from that of Estonia to
Honduras for the "specific purpose of protecting and conserving the
property rights of all the co-owners of the said S.S. Signe as those
rights existed prior to June 17, 1940.
' '348
The newly named "Florida" was at the Port of New Orleans in
December 1940, when a libel of possession was filed in the name of
Oskar Tiedemann and thirty-five other Estonian citizens. The libel had
been cabled to the United States from Russia and was purportedly
signed by Tiedemann, who claimed to have a power of attorney from
the other libellants.
3 49
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment which allowed Estoduras to retain posses-
sion of the vessel in trust for the co-owners.3 50 Although the court
noted that the United States did not recognize the government "set up
in Estonia after the invasion," the primary rationale for its decision
rested on the evidence that Tiedemann "was under duress of the Rus-
sian authorities when he made and executed the filing of the libel. 3 6 1
The court stated that Rudolph Pahlberg and Boris Shivolovitch:
who were named by Tiedemann as consenting part owners of
the "Signe", and who were beyond the influence and domina-
tion of the Russian authorities, testified that they had not au-
thorized anyone to sue for them; that the [Soviet steamship
line was] not authorized to file the original libel on their be-
half; [and] that Tiedemann in ordering the libel to be filed was
under the domination of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics . .. "832
The court also noted that one of the reasons for the effectiveness of
Soviet nationalization decrees was the warning that those who refused
to comply "would be considered traitors to the state and subject to
dire penalties, and that their families and near relatives would be held







352. Id. at 719.
353. Id.
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On June 1, 1942, the United States Government requisitioned the
Lithuanian steamship Denny.14 The Latvian State Cargo and Passen-
ger Steamship Line (an instrumentality of the Soviet Union) brought
an action in the United States Court of Claims to recover the compen-
sation paid for use of the ship.385 The court held that the plaintiff was
not entitled to recover on the ground that:
[t~he Executive Department of our Government has refused to
recognize the incorporation of Lithuania into the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics and has refused to recognize the valid-
ity of any decrees by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or
of the Peoples Commissars of the Soviet Socialist Republic of
Lithuania relative to persons and property within the territory
of Lithuania.35 8
In The Kotkas,35 7 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York reached a similar result. The court noted that one of
the important reasons for the Executive order, freezing Baltic assets,
was to "preven[t] the transfer of property of nationals of invaded
countries so that such property may not inure to the benefit of the
aggressors."35 8
Other cases before United States courts have continued to reflect
the impact of United States nonrecognition of the Soviet takeover of
the Baltic States. In 1945, a meeting of the majority of the stockhold-
ers in the Estonian Corporation A/S Merilaid & Co. was held in Stock-
holm, Sweden.3 59 The shareholders re-elected the former board of di-
rectors and, gave them the authority to continue the business of the
corporation. The directors thereupon decided to withdraw $45,000
from a deposit account in the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York.6
Chase refused payment on two grounds. First, it asserted that the ac-
count was frozen under Executive Order No. 8389, and second, it con-
tended that the plaintiff corporation had been nationalized by the laws
of the new Estonian regime from which it had received orders to trans-
fer the funds to Soviet banks.3 6'
354. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 717
(Ct. Cl. 1953).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 720.
357. The Kotkas, 35 F. Supp. 983 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
358. Id. at 985.
359. A/S Merilaid & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank of New York, 189 Misc. 285, 286 71
N.Y.S. 377, 378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947).
360. Id., 71 N.Y.S. at 377-78.
361. Id., 71 N.Y.S. at 377-78.
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In the opinion of the court, the decree of nationalization was con-
fiscatory in effect and contrary to the public policy of New York.362 In
addition, the court noted that the United States Government did not
recognize the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union or the le-
gality of the nationalization laws. Accordingly, the court held that the
directors and shareholders were permitted to act as they did and were
entitled to the funds deposited with Chase if they could obtain a li-
cense from the Secretary of the Treasury granting permission for a
transfer of the money to Sweden. "
United States courts have also applied the Stimson doctrine to le-
gal proceedings involving the settlement of estates. In In re Estate of
Antonia S. Niggols" the Surrogate's Court of Suffolk County, New
York held that the Estonian Consul General in New York would be
allowed to accept, as trustee, a bequest for Estonian nationals residing
outside of Estonia pursuant to article XXVI of the American-Estonian
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights of 1924 .65 Arti-
cle XXVI permitted the consuls of either nation to receive on behalf of
his nonresident countrymen shares derived from estates in the process
of probate "provided he remit any funds so received through the ap-
propriate agencies of his Government to the proper distributees
... "366 The court stated that there was a "reasonable assurance"
that the payees outside of Estonia would actually receive their respec-
tive checks, but:
with respect to the share of Alice Niggol, a resident of Estonia,
the application should be denied. This court takes judicial no-
tice of the fact that the sovereignty of the Republic of Estonia,
which [the consul] represents, does not obtain in that country
today. It would be impossible, therefore, at the present time,
for petitioner to remit [the share of Alice Niggol] through the
appropriate agencies of his government to the proper dis-
tributees.3s 7
362. Id. at 287, 71 N.Y.S. at 379.
363. Id., 71 N.Y.S. at 379-80.
364. 202 Misc. 290, 115 N.Y.S.2d 557 (Suff. Surr. Ct. 1952).
365. Id. at 291-92, 115 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
366. Id., 115 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
367. Id. See also In re estate of Kasendorf, 222 Or. 643, 353 P.2d 531 (1960), in
which the Oregon supreme court ruled that the State of Oregon could not claim escheat
of the estate of an American citizen of Estonian nationality who had made a bequest to
his family in Estonia. Because the Treaty of Friendship with Estonia was still in force,
its provisions were to be applied normally, and the Estonian Consul General was allowed
to receive the bequest on behalf of his countrymen. Id. See also 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 410
(1963). The United States had no similar treaty with Lithuania, so the Department of
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In In re Mitzkel, s 8 the Surrogate's Court for Kings County, New
York, declined to accept a power of attorney given to a New York law
firm by two Lithuanian distributees under a United States will.369 The
power of attorney had been notarized in the Soviet Union and authen-
ticated by the United States Consul in Moscow. The Consul expressly
stated that his certification did not imply recognition of Soviet sover-
eignty over Lithuania.3 70 The Lithuanian Consul General in New York
moved to strike the power of attorney granted to the respondent New
York law firm which allegedly represented the distributees..7 ' The
Consul contended that the instrument was executed under duress and
that the distributees' agreement to the representation by respondents
was procured and directed by an agency of the Soviet Government.
The court concluded that the respondents had been hired by an instru-
mentality of the Soviet Ministry of Justice, and that to uphold the
power of attorney would be to tacitly recognize the Soviet Govern-
ment's incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union .
2
In a similar case, In re Azna, the Sheboygan County Court of Wis-
consin declared:
The court takes note that the testimony indicates there is no
freedom of choice of an attorney in fact by a Lithuanian na-
tional. The power of attorney as filed herein is written in Rus-
sian and English languages; the delegation of power goes to a
firm representing the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Dispute
exists as to its validity because it was executed under and by
way of Russian Law instead of Lithuanian Law before a gov-
ernment official not recognized by the valid Lithuanian Gov-
ernment . . . To recognize the power of attorney would be to
disregard the law and give effect to the apparent attempt of
the Russian authorities to circumvent the sanctions of the
United States against its conquest.
17
Although consistent United States application of the Stimson doc-
trine had a positive effect on domestic legal decisions, perhaps its most
State in 1962 advised United States courts to use their discretion in the distribution of
estates of Lithuanian decedents. B. BOT, NON RECOGNITION AND TREATY RELATIONS 225
(1968).
368. 36 Misc.2d 671, 233 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Kings Surr. Ct. 1962).
369. Id. at 672, 679, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 520, 528.
370. Id. at 674, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
371. Id. at 671-72, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
372. Id. at 675, 679, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 524, 527.
373. Id. at 678, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 526-27, citing In re Azna, Sheboygan County Court,
Wis. (Dec. 14, 1959).
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important impact, insofar as Baltic nationals were concerned, lay in
the field of human rights.
As the Second World War drew to a close, the Soviet Government
began to shift the focus of its foreign policy from victory over Nazi
Germany to post-war domination of Europe.37 ' One of the Soviets'
prime concerns became the reassertion of control over millions of dis-
placed persons, many of whom had sympathized with Germany's anti-
Communist foreign policy.375 Consequently, great pressure was exerted
by the Soviets on the United States, Great Britain and France to com-
pel these governments to repatriate "Soviet citizens" from the allied
military occupation zones in Central Europe.7 6 Meeting at Yalta on
February 11, 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin executed agree-
ments to that effect.377 The tragic results of the forcible repatriations
which followed are now well-known. Hundreds of thousands, if not mil-
lions, of repatriated Cossacks, Volga Germans, Kazakhs, Georgians,
Ukrainians, Poles and Russians were subsequently executed or impris-
374. See FLORINSKY, supra note 246, at 562-71.
375. Id. at 554. The number of Soviet citizens and refugees from Soviet-occupied ter-
ritory who found themselves in German-controlled Europe is estimated at between 8 and
15 million. Id. Of these, nearly three million were forced laborers in the factories and
mines of the Reich. Almost six million were prisoners of war, although only 1.1 million of
these men survived until May 1945. The third great category consisted of refugees trying
to escape Soviet rule-Balts, Cossacks, Armenians, Bessarabians, Georgians, Kalmucks,
Ukrainians, Poles and Volga Germans. Their number no doubt surpassed one million. A
fourth category, estimated at more than one million people, was composed of those Rus-
sians who had volunteered to help the German invaders, in order to further the estab-
lishment of a more democratic and pluralistic Russian Government. N. TOLSTOY, THE
SECRET BETRAYAL 36-41 (1977).
376. See TOLSTOY, supra note 375, at 42-61. On September 4, 1944, the British War
Cabinet adopted British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden's suggestion that all Soviet
prisoners under British control be repatriated "irrespective of whether the men wish to
return or not." Id. at 63-64. This decision was made despite the Foreign Office's knowl-
edge of statements made by the "Soviet repatriation General himself, Sudakov, that
many of the prisoners 'are due for liquidation on their return.'" Id. at 55. Indeed, the
British Secretary of State for War had written Eden on August 24 to express his disgust
at the prospect of handing Russians over to certain death. Id. at 63. In the United
States, Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko demanded the repatriation of all Soviet citi-
zens under the control of United States forces. Id. at 80-81. On October 16, 1944, Eden
met with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in Moscow and assured him that all "Soviet
citizens" would be repatriated regardless of their wishes. Id. at 75.
377. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, FOREIGN REL. U.S., 985 (1945). Article I of
the United States-Soviet agreement declared that "[a]ll Soviet citizens liberated by the
forces operating under United States command and all United States citizens liberated
by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation,
be separated from enemy prisoners of war ... until they have been handed over to the
Soviet or United States authorities." 59 Stat. (2) 1974. See also ToLsTOY, supra note 375,
at 93-99.
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oned by Soviet authorities.'"" But United States and British support of
the Stimson doctrine had salutory effects for those Estonians, Latvians
and Lithuanians who found themselves in British, American or French
occupation zones of Germany.37 9 The Western Allies refused to recog-
378. TOLSTOY, supra note 375, at 409. Of the five and one-half million repatriated as
"Soviet citizens" from formerly occupied areas of the Soviet Union, 20% received a
death sentence or 25 years in concentration camps (a virtual death sentence); 15-20%
received sentences of five to ten years; 10% were exiled to frontier regions of Siberia for
a period of not less than six years; 15% were sent to work as conscripts in the Donbas,
Kuzbas and other devastated areas and were not allowed to return home after the expi-
ration of their sentences; 15 to 20% were allowed to return home and 15 to 25% either
died en route or escaped. Id. The first rebellion connected with the forced repatriations
occurred in December 1944 when three Soviet citizens attempted suicide at Fort Rupert,
Idaho, rather than be returned to the Soviet Union. Id. at 88. In February 1945, an
interned Soviet citizen committed suicide in Britain. Id. at 128. In March 1945, British
sailors on board the British ship Duchess of Bedford witnessed a massacre of repatriated
Soviet citizens in the Black Sea port of Odessa. Id. at 129. On April 18, 1945, former
Soviet prisoners of war were massacred by the Soviet secret police after disembarking
from the British ship Almanzora. Id. at 129. By June 1945, it was clear that those intern-
ees who refused to return voluntarily to Soviet Russia were especially marked for execu-
tion. More than 150 people who, while in Britain, had claimed Polish or other national-
ity, were shot by the NKVD in June 1945 after disembarking from the ship Empire
Pride in Odessa. Id. at 140. Similar massacres occurred as the British and United States
armies turned hundreds of thousands of Cossaks and Moslems from the Soviet Central
Asian Republics over to the NKVD and Red Army in Austria. Id. at 188, 306. It now
appears that up to 40% of the emigrees and former prisoners of war were unwilling to
return to the Soviet Union. Id. at 316. On June 11, 1945, the United States Ambassador
to Moscow, Averill Harriman, wrote:
While Embassy has no evidence to support reports of stern treatment of
Soviet citizens repatriated from Allied occupied areas, it would be unwise to dis-
count the general basis for these reports. Soviet Govt. and military authorities
have never been at pains to disguise their scornful attitude toward Soviet troops
taken prisoner. Soviet Govt. is not signatory of Geneva Convention and during
entire course of war refused all overtures from enemy powers for agreement re-
garding treatment of prisoners which might have improved lot of Soviet prison-
ers in Germany. . . .Although repatriation of liberated Soviet citizens has now
been proceeding for months, Embassy knows of only a single instance in which a
repatriated prisoner has returned to his home and family. . . .It is known that
repatriates are met at ports of entry by police guard and marched off to un-
known destinations. Trainloads of repatriates are passing through Moscow and
continuing east, the passengers being held incommunicado while trains stand in
Moscow yards . . . .It is quite possible that persons considered guilty of delib-
erate desertion or anti-state activity are being shot . ...
Id. at 323-4. The forced deportations to Russia continued through November 1945 de-
spite British and United States knowledge of the certain fate which awaited the depor-
tees. Id. at 427.
379. See id. at 134-35. In October 1944, the British first became concerned about the
forced repatriation of individuals who were natives of territories conquered and annexed
by Soviet Russia after 1939. Id. at 134.
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nize Baits as "Soviet citizens" within the context of the 1945 Repatria-
tion Agreement since the Allies did not recognize the Soviet conquest
of the Baltic States.880 Accordingly, only those nationals of the Baltic
States who affirmatively claimed Soviet citizenship were repatriated.38 1,
This policy appears to have contributed to saving hundreds of
thousands of lives.
3 82
The steadfast United States support for the Baltic States contin-
ued into the post-war period. In 1950, the United States Treasury, act-
ing on the advice of the State Department, modified its interpretation
of the 1940 Executive Order, freezing all Baltic funds in United States
banks, so that the funds could be invested in certain securities. The
annual return on these investments was then freed for use by the Bal-
380. Id. at 135. In October 1944, the British Foreign Office issued a directive stating:
"Soviet citizens are prima facie citizens coming from places within the boundaries of the
Soviet Union as constituted before the outbreak of the present war." Id. at 135, 336. This
definition was adhered to by the United States. The Conferences at Malta and Yalta,
FOREIGN REL. U.S. 796 (1945).
381. TOLSTOY, supra note 375, at 135.
382. The Bulletin of the Lithuanian Telegraph Agency, [ELTA] Jan. 20, 1962 at 1
(ELTA Information Bulletin). The number of Baltic refugees in post-war Europe was
over two hundred thousand. Id. The Soviet delegation to the Potsdam Conference de-
manded the return of "all Soviet citizen emigrants from the Baltic Republics and the
Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia." Potsdam, 2 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 1165 (1945).
Tolstoy provides a description of an incident in May 1945 which highlights the value of
the nonrecognition doctrine in terms of its promotion of human rights values. Three
Latvians, fearing forced repatriation, escaped from a British internment camp in Eng-
land and sought refuge at the Latvian Embassy in London. Latvian Ambassador, Kdrlis
Zarini, insisted on and received Foreign Office assurances that no Latvian would be repa-
triated against his wishes. TOLSTOY, supra note 375, at 147. It should be noted that the
nonrecognition doctrine also helped save Poles, White Russians, Ukrainians and Bes-
sarabians from forced deporation. Id. at 137. The best indication of the human rights
value of a nonrecognition policy can be found by contrasting the fate of the Baltic refu-
gees with that of over one hundred thousand Georgians captured by United States and
British forces after the war. The Kingdom of Georgia had been annexed by Russia in the
late 18th century, but in 1918, the Georgian people had used the chaos of the Russian
Revolution to restore their independence. Georgia sent delegates to the Versailles Con-
ference and the Allies recognized Georgia's sovereignty. On May 9, 1920, the Soviet Gov-
ernment "unreservedly" recognized the independence of the Georgian State. Id. at 33.
On February 11, 1921, the Red Army invaded the small nation and defeated the Geor-
gian Army. REI, supra note 75, at 142. The country was thereafter ruthlessly ruled by the
future chief of the NKVD, Lavrenti Beria. TOLSTOY, supra note 375, at 33. The Allies
acquiesced in the Soviet fait accompli and Georgia was once again considered de jure
part of the Soviet Union. The 1941 German invasion was seen by thousands of Georgians
as an opportunity to reestablish their sovereignty by joining the Germans to fight the
Red Army. Id. at 33 and 452. Because Georgia was considered to be legally part of the
Soviet State, Georgians were considered Soviet citizens pursuant to the Yalta accords.
Accordingly, all Georgians captured in Italy were turned over to Soviet forces after Ger-
many's defeat. Id.
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tic diplomatic and consular officials in the United States, and a few
other countries, to carry on their work.883
United States officials also began to speak out publicly on the
seizure of the Baltic States for the first time since 1940. On June 14,
1952, President Harry S. Truman sent a message to the representatives
of the Baltic nations in the United States:
On the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the lawless inva-
sion of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union, I send you warm
greetings. The Government and the people of the United
States feel instinctive and profound sympathy for the enslaved
people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Coupled with revul-
sion at the acts of the occupying power, whose forcible incorpo-
ration of the Baltic States we have never recognized, we pay
tribute to the determined endeavors of the diplomatic and
other representatives of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on be-
half of their homelands. We shall not forget our Baltic friends.
We extend through you to them wherever they may be our
heartfelt hope that they may have the fortitude and the pa-
tience to live through the grinding tyranny now imposed upon
them and to enjoy once again independence and freedom
within the community of free nations.""4
President Eisenhower reaffirmed the Baltic States' right to indepen-
dence in his address to a joint session of Congress on January 6,
1957.385 Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey proclaimed Baltic Free-
dom Day, June 12, 1966, with the following declaration:
The U.S. Government is committed now, as in the past, to the
right of self-determination of the Baltic and all other people.
Our Government has soundly refused either to condone or to
accept the forced illegal annexation of the Baltic Nations and
their territories into the Soviet Union. To the contrary,
throughout the forums of the world, including the United Na-
tions, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the right of the Baltic
peoples to restoration of sovereignty. So, too, we continue to
recognize the diplomatic and consular representatives of the
pre-World War II Baltic Governments. Reliable reports con-
firm that the Baltic peoples do continue to revere their respec-
tive national and cultural traditions. Despite alien occupation,
oppression and mass deportation, the love of liberty burns
383. 4 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 337 (1950).
384. LATVIAN LEGATION IN WASHINGTON D.C., LATVIA 48 (1976).
385. 36 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 917 (Jan. 21, 1957).
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strongly in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian hearts. We
Americans deeply respect these brave peoples for their
steadfast devotion to freedom. The United States re-pledges it-
self to the universal principles of independence, personal lib-
erty and human dignity.""
Prior to the signature by the United States of the Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at Helsinki, Fin-
land, in July 1975, great concern was expressed by Estonians, Latvians
and Lithuanians that the treaty would legitimize the Soviet annexation
of the Baltic nations by tacitly recognizing the legitimacy of post-war
frontiers.88 7 In response to these concerns, many members of Congress
went on record to make it clear that the United States did not inter-
pret the Final Act as legitimizing Soviet occupation. s8 8 President Ger-
ald Ford indicated that United States policy regarding the Baltic
States would not change as a result of the signing by the United States
of the Helsinki accords. Speaking to representatives of Americans of
East European background before leaving for Finland, President Ford
declared:
[Wle have obtained the public commitment of the Warsaw
386. LATVIA, supra note 384, at 52.
387. Baits in U.S. Fear American Policy Shift on Soviet Incorporation of Nations,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1975, at A12, col. 1.
388. Among the representatives were Rep. Frank Annuzio (D.-Ill.); Rep. Edward J.
Derwinski (R.-IlI.); Rep. John McCollister (R.-Neb.); Rep. Mario Biaggi (D.-N.Y.); Rep.
Edwin B. Forsythe (R.-N.J.) and Rep. Edward I. Koch (D.-N.Y.). Representative Koch
declared:
Mr. Speaker, 57 years ago today, on November 18, 1918, the leaders and
people of Latvia declared their independence, as our forefathers did 150 years
earlier. And like our forefathers, Latvians paid a huge price in lives for freedom
while expelling two invaders in 1918 and 1919. That Republic which rose from
the ashes of World War I surely had every hope and chance of success. Latvia
had educated, devoted leaders, a sense of national purpose, a victorious army,
fertile lands, and hardy farmers. The Latvians proved their devotion to democ-
racy by establishing an advanced form of representative government, with a par-
liament, cabinet, president, and freely organized parties. All the basic freedoms
enunciated in our own Bill of Rights were guaranteed to Latvians.
In 1940 the Soviet Union invaded Latvia and destroyed the independence of
that small Republic. Thirty-five years later, it appears that most countries have
accepted the status quo by signing the Helsinki Agreement. But this Congress
does not accept the Helsinki Agreement .... In fact, we believe that the people
of Latvia will-and should be-free and independent. The 57th anniversary of
Latvian independence provides all of us the opportunity to rededicate ourselves
to the principle of self-determination for all countries, especially for Latvia,
where the fire of freedom burns fiercely in the hearts of all Latvian patriots.
121 CONG. REc. 37,267 (1975).
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Pact governments to the possibility of peaceful adjustment of
frontiers-a major concession which runs quite contrary to the
allegations that present borders are being permanently frozen
. . . . Specifically addressing the understandable concern
about the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic Na-
tions, I can assure you as one who has long been interested in
this question that the United States has never recognized the
Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and is
not doing so now. Our official policy of non-recognition is not
affected by the results of the European Security Confer-
ence.There is included in the declaration of principles on terri-
torial integrity the provision that no occupation or acquisition
of territory in violation of international law will be recognized
as legal. This is not to raise the hope that there will be any
immediate change in the map of Europe, but the United States
has not abandoned and will not compromise this longstanding
principle.38 9
On November 13, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolu-
tion declaring the continued recognition of the sovereign and indepen-
dent Baltic States by the United States. The resolution stated that the
United States policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet annexation was
unaffected by the Helsinki Final Act."'0
389. 2 PUB. PAPERS, Gerald R. Ford, 1032 (1975) (emphasis added).
390. 121 CONG. REc. 38,128 (1975):
Whereas the three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have
been illegally occupied by the Soviet Union since World War II; and
Whereas the Soviet Union appears to interpret the Final Act of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki, as giving per-
manent status to the Soviet Union's illegal annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania; and
Whereas, although neither the President nor the Department of State issued
a specific disclaimer in conjunction with the signing of the Final Act at Helsinki
to make clear that the United States still does not recognize the forcible con-
quest of those nations by the Soviet Union, both the President in his public
statement of July 25, 1975, and the Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs in his testimony before the Subcommittee on International Political and
Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations stated quite
explicitly that the long-standing official policy of the United States on nonrecog-
nition of the Soviet Union's forcible incorporation and annexation of the Baltic
nations is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved, that notwithstanding any interpretation which the Soviet Union
or any other country may attempt to give to the Final Act of the conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki, it is the sense of the
House of Representatives (1) that there has been no change in the longstanding
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On June 26, 1979, Robert Barry, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs, testified before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding
the United States policy towards the Baltic nations. 9 1 Mr. Barry
stated that the United States did not recognize the forcible and unlaw-
ful incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, and that it
continued to recognize diplomatic representatives of the last three in-
dependent Baltic governments. Mr. Barry summarized United States
policy as follows:
Our nonrecognition policy is manifested in a variety of ways.
The Secretary of State annually issues national day greetings,
through the Charg6s d'Affaires, to the Baltic peoples, and rep-
resentatives of the Department of State attend the official Na-
tional Day functions of the three Legations. We also seek to
coordinate the actions of other U.S. agencies with respect to
such matters as the captions and place names on official U.S.
Government maps, so that the U.S. Government speaks with a
consistent voice in relation to our nonrecognition policy. We
attempt to stay in touch with the Baltic peoples by means of
the Voice of America and Radio Liberty broadcasts in their na-
tive languages. Some Americans are troubled by the fact that
we deal with the Soviet Union on particular matters affecting
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, these generally in-
volve matters affecting the welfare of individuals. If we wish to
assist in the reunifications of families by facilitating the depar-
ture of family members from the area, we must talk with So-
viet officials. Americans wishing to visit the Baltic republics
must obtain Soviet visas. The necessity of dealing with the So-
viets on particular topics does not in our view detract from the
integrity of our Baltic nonrecognition policy.
8 92
Mr. Barry also indicated the value of such a policy of nonrecognition to
the Baltic people living in the occupied territories:
policy of the United States on nonrecognition of the illegal seizure and annexa-
tion by the Soviet Union of the three Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lith-
uania, and (2) that it will continue to be the policy of the United States not to
recognize in any way the annexation of the Baltic nations by the Soviet Union.
Id. A similar statement was passed by the United States Senate on May 5, 1976. See The
Joint Baltic American Committee and The European Security Conference, 9 J. BALTIc
STUD. 256 (1978).
391. R. Barry, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (June 26, 1979), reprinted in 79 DEP'T ST.
BULL., Sept. 1979, at 52.
392. Id.
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I understand that you are particularly interested in discussing
what measures the United States might take to help the people
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Department of State's
view is that continuation of our nonrecognition policy remains
an appropriate way of expressing nonrecognition of the forcible
Soviet incorporation of the three Baltic states. It has been
made clear to us repeatedly in the postwar years that many
people in the Baltic states look to the U.S. nonrecognition pol-
icy as a reminder that we have not forgotten them and as a
symbol of hope for the future. We also believe that the empha-
sis which this Administration has placed on human rights
worldwide meets some of these concerns. The Baltic Legations
in the United States remain important symbols to the Baltic
peoples, and our continued recognition and accreditation of the
diplomatic representatives of the last independent govern-
ments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania serve to give tangible
expression to our nonrecognition policy. It should be under-
stood that we do not regard the Baltic Legations as govern-
ments-in-exile. The Baltic Charg6s d'Affaires are persons who
were commissioned diplomatic officers of the last three inde-
pendent governments in 1940. Their role is to uphold the ideal
of a free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania... . . In these remarks
I have tried to review our concerns with regard to Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania, emphasizing the importance that we at-
tached to our policy of nonrecognition of their forcible incorpo-
ration into the Soviet Union in 1940. We feel that in the era
following the Helsinki Final Act with heightened interest in
human rights worldwide, our Baltic policy remains relevant
and important to overall U.S. policy interests.
393
In recent years, United States officials have repeatedly used inter-
national fora to discuss the Baltic States. On March 3, 1982, United
States Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, Max M. Kampelman, criticized the Soviet Union for its con-
tinued subjugation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. He urged the So-
viets to comply with the Helsinki Act by withdrawing from the occu-
pied territories, stating that it would be in their own best self-interest
to do so. If this were done, Ambassador Kampelman said, the Helsinki
accords would have a renewed strength and meaning." On June 13,
393. Id.
394. Remarks of Ambassador Max M. Kampelman (Mar. 3, 1982), reprinted in LAT-
VIAN INFORMATION BULL. 1 (1982). Kampelman stated:
On Friday, the head of the Soviet delegation spoke of "imperialism." It is
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1983, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed the 18th Baltic Freedom
Day. In his proclamation, he linked the Stimson doctrine to increas-
ingly important right of national self-determination:
The people of the United States of America share the just aspi-
rations of the people of the Baltic nations for national indepen-
dence, and we cannot remain silent in the face of the continued
refusal of the government of the U.S.S.R. to allow these people
to be free. We uphold their right to determine their own na-
tional destiny, free of foreign domination. The government of
the United States has never recognized the forced incorpora-
not my purpose today to engage in a fruitless discussion of Marxist ideology.
Thinking of his comments, however, I was struck by the fact that he spoke on
our last working day in February; and that during the month of February, Es-
tonians and Lithuanians through the world were marking their countries' decla-
rations of independence.
The Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia understand the meaning
of imperialism and the loss of liberties that follow it. Between 1918 and 1939,
these three Baltic republics were proud members of the world's community of
free nations. In 1940, consistent with the earlier Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, these
nations were forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union. The United States con-
demned that annexation then, and we reaffirm our opposition to it now. We do
not recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet
Union. Our commitment to the principles of liberty and self-determination re-
quires no less.
Lenin, in his first decree to the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets,
known in the Communist world as the "Decree of Peace," said on the first day
that he took power:
If any people is held by force in defiance of its expressed wish. . . is not
given the right of decision, free from every duress, by free elections, without
the presence of those armed forces of the incorporating state or any more
powerful state, of what form of national existence it wishes to have. . . then
the incorporation of such a state should be called annexation, an act of
seizure and force.
We have here indeed an act of "annexation," and "act of seizure and force"
against the Baltic States ....
I respectfully suggest to the Soviet authorities that those nations of the
world which, in the course of their own histories, have experimented with impe-
rialism have learned that there are decided limits to imperial attainments. Those
that have abandoned the imperial mode have found relief from its burdens, not
regret at their loss. Universal opinion today rejects the right of any power to
conquer and subjugate other peoples. Furthermore, former imperial powers
have learned that they gain little from their efforts. I suggest that the Soviet
Union is now finding that its imperial objectives, its dangerous adventurism
have proven to be and will continue to be extremely expensive, an unnecessary
burden.
The Helsinki Final Act will have renewed meaning and strength for all of us
when that lesson is finally learned and acted upon.
Id. (emphasis added).
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tion of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union and will not do
so in the future.8
The United States also made it clear in 1980 that it will continue
to recognize the diplomatic representatives of the last three Baltic gov-
ernments. On November 7, the State Department agreed to permit the
current Baltic Charg6 d'Affaires to name their successors in office, pro-
vided they hold Baltic citizenship. Subsequent to that decision, Esto-
nian Counsul General Ernst Jaakson appointed Dr. Aarand Roos as
Estonian Consul in New York. The Chief of the Lithuanian Diplomatic
Service, Stasys Backis, named Mr. Stasys Lozoraitis, Jr., as Counselor
of the Lithuanian Legation in Washington. These accreditations have
established a policy which assures effective representation of Baltic in-
terests in the future.396
B. The United Kingdom
The United States is only one of many world governments which
continue to apply the Stimson doctrine to the Soviet annexation of the
Baltic countries. Although the government of Great Britain at first ap-
peared to waver in its determination not to accept the annexation, it
later declared that it would not recognize the legality of the Soviet tour
de force. s97 On December 21, 1944, the British Foreign Secretary de-
395. United States Mission to the U.N., Press Release, (July 29, 1983). On July 29,
1983, Ambassador Jeane T. Kirkpatrick, United States Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, delivered the text of President Reagan's statement to United Nations
Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, and requested that the statement be made an
official document of the United Nations General Assembly. Id.
396. Conversation with Mr. Ernst Jaakson, Consul of the Republic of Estonia, New
York City (Sept. 1984).
397. On August 15, 1940, the Soviet Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Ivan
Maiskii, made a request to British Foreign Secretary Halifax for the termination of the
Baltic Legations in Great Britain. Halifax refused to grant Maiskii's request and de-
nounced the Soviet Union's aggression in the Baltic region. Maiskii responded by citing
the allegorical story of the Siberian peasant Ivan. During Ivan's illness, his neighbors
came and stole his property. After his recovery, Ivan forcibly took back that which had
been stolen from him. "So now, Lord Halifax, who was the aggressor in your opinion, the
peasant Ivan or his neighbours?" I. MmISUi, MEMOIRS OF A SovtET AMBASSADOR: THE
WAR, 1939-1943, at 139-40 (1967), cited in R. Misiunas, Soviet Historiography on World
War II and the Baltic States, in THE BALTIc STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 187 (V.S. Vardys
& R. Misiunas, eds. 1978).
On September 5, 1940, in response to the general political situation in Eastern Eu-
rope, British Prime Minister Churchill declared in an address to the House of Commons:
"[W]e do not propose to recognize any territorial changes which take place during the
war, unless they take place with the free consent and goodwill of the parties concerned."
365 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 40 (1940). A similar statement was made the same day in
the House of Lords by Foreign Secretary Halifax. In July 1941, Britain and the Soviet
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clared that "His Majesty's government has not recognized any govern-
Union signed a treaty of alliance in the war against Germany. The treaty soon proved
inadequate and the Soviet Union pressed for a broader agreement which would extend
the July 1941 accords into the post-war period. Kirby, supra note 327, at 160. In Decem-
ber 1941, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden traveled to Moscow to begin negotia-
tions which, it was hoped, would lead to the conclusion of a new treaty of alliance. Before
his departure from London, Eden received messages from United States Secretary of
State Cordell Hull and Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles urging him not to agree
to Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States. Id. at 161. Stalin raised the issue of British
recognition of the Soviet Union's 1941 frontiers at his second meeting with Eden on
December 17, 1941. When Eden tried to point out that the Atlantic Charter would not
permit such recognition, Stalin retorted that the question of the Baltic States was "abso-
lutely axiomatic" and ought not to require a decision by the British Government. Id.
Stalin then asked if the British would support the entry of the Baltic States into the
U.S.S.R. at the end of the war. Eden responded that his government was "bound by its
promise to the United States not to commit itself to any decision on frontiers before the
end of the war without prior consultation with the United States government." Id. at
162. When Churchill learned of Stalin's demands, he wrote:
Stalin's demand about Finland, the Baltic States and Rumania are directly
contrary to the first, second, and third articles of the Atlantic Charter, to which
Stalin has subscribed. There can be no question whatever of our making such an
agreement, secret or public, direct or implied, without prior agreement with the
U.S. The time has not yet come to settle frontier questions, which can only be
resolved at the Peace Conference when we have won the war.
W. CHURCHILL, THE GRAND ALLIANCE 630 (1950). On January 8, 1942, Churchill wrote to
Eden:
We have never recognised the 1941 frontiers of Russia except de facto. They
were acquired by acts of aggression in shameful collusion with Hitler. The trans-
fer of. . .the Baltic States to Soviet Russia against their will would be contrary
to all the principles for which we are fighting this war and would dishonour our
cause. This also applies to Bessarabia and to Northern Bukovina, and in a lesser
degree to Finland, which I gather it is not intended wholly to subjugate and
absorb. Russia could, upon strategical grounds, make a case for the approaches
to Leningrad. . . .Strategical security may be invoked at certain points on the
frontiers of Bukhovina [sic) or Bessarabia. In these cases the population would
have to be offered evacuation and compensation if they desired it. In all other
cases transference of territory must be regulated after the war is over by freely
and fairly conducted plebiscites . . . .In any case there can be no question of
settling frontiers until the Peace Conference . . . .You have promised that we
will examine these claims of Russia in common with the United States and the
Dominions. That promise we must keep. But there must be no mistake about
the opinion of any British Government of which I am the head, namely, that it
adheres to these principles of freedom and democracy set forth in the Atlantic
Charter, and that these principles must become especially active whenever any
question of transferring territory is raised. I conceive, therefore, that our answer
should be that all questions of territorial frontiers must be left to the decision of
the Peace Conference.
Id. at 695-96. In 1950 Churchill wrote, with regard to the above letter, "Juridically this is
how the matter stands now." Id.
While the British sought to find a way to placate the Soviet Union in its desire for
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ments in the republics of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania since the
territorial expansion, the United States Department of State came out resolutely against
any British-Soviet discussion of the issue. In a memorandum to President Roosevelt,
United States Secretary of State Hull declared that Soviet security needs could best be
met by the creation of a strong post-war organization. The absorption of the Baltic
States was not necessary to Soviet security interests. 2 C. HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF
CORDELL HULL 1167-70 (1948), cited in Kirby, supra, note 327, at 164. When British
Foreign Secretary Halifax met with President Roosevelt in February 1942, Roosevelt re-
fused to sanction any compromise on the Baltic issue and indicated he would take up the
territorial issue with Stalin himself. Id. at 165. See also THE HINGE OF FATE, supra note
324, at 327. Although Churchill admits he wavered on the Baltic question in the spring
of 1942 (due to a series of Allied military reversals), he never succeeded in convincing
Roosevelt to approve a British-Soviet treaty which would recognize the annexation. Id.
at 327-28. He later indicated his satisfaction that United States pressure had prevented
Great Britain from recognizing the Soviet tour de force. Id. at 328. Hostile reaction to
proposed recognition of Soviet actions in the Baltic States was also forthcoming from the
governments of Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Kirby, supra note 327, at 167.
As British preparations for the 1942 negotiations leading towards a new Soviet treaty
advanced, Foreign Secretary Eden became increasingly willing to grant official recogni-
tion to Soviet territorial demands. Others at Whitehall disagreed. Sir Alexander Cardo-
gan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, warned that it was better not to "crawl to the
Russians over the dead bodies of all our principles." Id. at 168.
On May 21, 1942, Soviet Foreign Commisar Molotov arrived in London for the long-
anticipated Anglo-Soviet conference. Molotov was adamant that the minimal condition
acceptable for a treaty was British recognition of the U.S.S.R.'s June 1941 boundaries,
including Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, Eastern Karelia and the Baltic States. Although
Eden admitted he was ready to acquiesce in Soviet claims to the Baltic region, he was
unwilling to grant the Soviet demands insofar as Eastern Poland was concerned. As a
result, the London negotiations began to stall. Id. at 169-70.
In Moscow, United States Ambassador Harriman indicated to Stalin his govern-
ment's determination not to recognize the legality of any frontier changes effected during
the war. In return, Harriman "dangled the bait of a second front." Id. at 170. In London,
Churchill pressed Molotov to consider a new draft treaty worked out by Whitehall which
would avoid any mention of the frontiers of the U.S.S.R.: "Molotov appeared convinced
that there would be serious repercussions in the United States if the frontier treaty was
signed. It appears that the Kremlin was similarly convinced, for on May 25, 1942, Molo-
tov signified his willingness to discuss the new British draft." Id. The British-Soviet
treaty of alliance was signed the following day. Churchill was clearly relieved that the
treaty did not require Great Britain to recognize the Soviet conquests in Eastern Europe.
It was, he wrote, "a far better solution than I had dared to hope." THE HINGE OF FATE,
supra note 324, at 336.
Indeed, the treaty incorporated the same legal principles enshrined in the Atlantic
Charter. Article 5 of the British-Soviet agreement states that the U.S.S.R. and Great
Britain would neither seek "territorial aggrandizement for themselves" nor interfere "in
the internal affairs of other States." Treaty of Alliance, May 26, 1942, Great Britain-
U.S.S.R., 204 U.N.T.S. 353.
Shortly after the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet accord, a strange development oc-
curred with regard to the Baltic Legations in London. The names of the Baltic States
disappeared from the Diplomats Annual (Annual Edition of the Diplomatic Bulletin).
The names, titles and ranks of the Baltic envoys and counsellors were relegated to the
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changes which occurred in June 1940.'"3s8 The British view has, offi-
cially, remained the same since 1944. In 1979, Member of Parliament
Winston Churchill, Jr., asked the Lord Privy Seal if the acceptance by
the United Kingdom of a Soviet invitation to observe a Soviet military
maneuver in Lithuania was not an implied recognition of the Russian
annexation of that nation. The Under Secretary of State replied:
In accordance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act the
Soviet Government notified us of the military maneuvre
"NEMAN", which will be held in Lithuania from 23-27 July.
Under a further voluntary provision, the Soviet Government
invited the United Kingdom and others to send observers. The
United Kingdom has accepted, in common with a number of
other Western countries and in accordance with our wish to
take full advantage of the Final Act. This has no implications
for our position on the recognition of the incorporation of the
Baltic States into the Soviet Union in 1940: we recognize this
incorporation de facto but withhold full recognition. 5 '"
Annex, entitled "List of Persons no longer included in the Diplomatic List but still ac-
cepted by H.M. Government as Personally Enjoying Certain Diplomatic Courtesies,"
without any indication of which country they represented. Up until the early 1970's,
when the last of the Baltic consuls died, this extraordinary position was maintained. In a
bizarre twist, the Foreign Office List continued to mention the Baltic diplomatic mis-
sions in the normal manner. MAREK, supra note 106, at 404-05.
Despite this unusual situation, the Baltic Missions carried on with their normal bus-
iness in Great Britain for over 30 years. They were able to issue passports, appoint hon-
orary consuls and work for the protection of Baltic nationals. Official exchanges between
the Missions and the Foreign Office continued to take place. Id. at 406.
398. LANGER, supra note 4, at 265. Langer notes that the real issue was not recogni-
tion of governments, but the recognition of the sovereignty of Soviet Russia over the
Baltic territories.
399. 970 PARL. DER., H.C. (5TH SER.) 849 (1979).
Perhaps the most eloquent statement regarding British Baltic policy was made by
Prime Minister Churchill in 1950. In his book, The Grand Alliance, Churchill wrote:
I was much disturbed by the reports which Mr. Eden had brought back with
him from Moscow [in 1941] of Soviet territorial ambitions, especially in the Bal-
tic States. These were the conquests of Peter the Great, and had been for two
hundred years under the Czars. Since the Russian Revolution they had been the
outpost of Europe against Bolshevism. They were what are now called "social
democracies", but very lively and truculent. Hitler had cast them away like
pawns in his deal with the Soviets before the outbreak of war in 1939. There had
been a severe Russian and Communist purge. All the dominant personalities and
elements had been liquidated in one way or another. The life of these strong
peoples was henceforward underground. Presently, as we shall see, Hitler came
back with a Nazi counter-purge. Finally in the general victory the Soviets had
control again. Thus the deadly comb ran back and forth, and back again,
through Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. There was no doubt however where the
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As in the United States, the British adherence to a policy of non-
recognition of forcible territorial annexation has had a salutory effect
on legal decisions. In The Estate of Feivel Pikelny,40 0 the English High
Court was called upon to determine the proper administration of the
estate of a Lithuanian citizen who, along with his family, was mas-
sacred by German police outside of Kaunas on October 28, 1941. The
court recognized that although the estate in question was within the
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, an English court was obliged to
make the grant of administration by applying the law of the country of
domicile at the date of death. If Lithuanian law applied, then a grant
of administration could be made to the next of kin. If Soviet law ap-
plied, it was conceivable that the Soviet State might take the estate as
ultimus heres.4 0 1 Mr. Justice Karminski of the High Court applied to
the British Foreign Office for a certificate stating the British Govern-
ment's viewpoint on the matter. The certificate indicated that "Her
Majesty's Government recognize the Government of the Lithuanian
Soviet Socialist Republic to be the de facto Government of Lithuania,
but do not recognize it as the de jure Government of Lithuania." The
Government's nonrecognition of the legality of the Russian seizure of
Lithuania required the English court to apply Lithuanian law in the
case. Accordingly, the court granted administrative powers to Pikelny's
four brothers and his sister, who at the time were residents of the
United States.0 2
Similar results have been reached in British admiralty cases on the
basis of the Government's adherence to the Stimson doctrine. In the
1949 case of The Jaak and other Estonian Vessels, 40 3 the British Ship-
right lay. The Baltic States should be sovereign independent peoples.
W. CHURCHILL, THE GRAND ALLIANCE 694-95 (1950).
400. 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 288 (1955-56).
401. Id. at 290.
402. Id. at 293.
403. 83 LLOYD'S LIST L.R. 45 (1949). The Shipping Claims Tribunal, which heard the
Jaak case, noted that the Soviet Government had, as early as October 9, 1940, claimed
ownership of all six ships in dispute. In July 1947, the Soviet Ambassador in London was
notified by the Foreign Secretary of the commencement of proceedings before the Tribu-
nal. The Soviet Embassy refused to present its claims to the ships before the Tribunal
on the ground that no British court had jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The Tribu-
nal eventually awarded all six claimants complete or partial compensation for their ship-
ping losses. Id. at 50, 55. In light of recent attempts by the Soviets to obtain the deporta-
tion of alleged Baltic war criminals to the U.S.S.R. through the use of Soviet evidence in
United States courts, see infra note 568, it is interesting to note the Tribunal's refusal to
accept an alleged revocation of the power of attorney by an Estonian living in Soviet-
occupied Estonia: "In any case, we are not satisfied that, if the telegram was actually
sent by Mr. Bergmann himself, it was freely or voluntarily sent. The proper inference, in
our view, having regard to the context of this telegram in relation to others which passed
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ping Claims Tribunal addressed the question of whether claims for
compensation by Estonian shipowners, whose ships had been requisi-
tioned by the British Government during the Second World War, were
time barred. The court was advised that during the summer of 1941
(i.e., within a period of less than twelve months after the requisition),
the Estonian Minister had lodged a notice of claim on behalf of the
absent owners of the vessels. The court relied on this evidence in up-
holding the claim. It is quite possible that if the British Government
had withdrawn its recognition of the Estonian diplomatic delegation
because of the Soviet occupation of Estonia, such representations on
behalf of absent Estonian parties in interest would not have been made
and compensation would not have been awarded.
Despite these official pronouncements, the British Government
has taken three major steps since 1967 to deny the full force and pro-
tection of the Stimson doctrine to the Baltic States. These decisions,
made by a nation which had so willingly granted recognition to Musso-
lini's and Hitler's conquests during the 1930's, have increasingly
alarmed millions of Balts, overseas and in the occupied territories.40.
at the time, and in the light of the state of affairs prevailing at the time, is that the
telegram, if genuine, was sent as the result of some form of coercion or undue pressure."
Id. at 52. See also A/S Tallinna Laevaihisus and Others v. Tallinna Shipping Co. and
Another, 79 LLOYD's LIST L.R. 241, 251 (1945) In this shipping case, the court refused to
give effect to the nationalized decrees of the Soviet authorities in Estonia. Having asked
for the Foreign Office position on the Soviet annexation of Estonia, the court received
the following statement:
1. His Majesty's Government recognise the Government of the Estonian
Soviet Socialist Republic to be the de facto Government of Estonia, but do not
recognize it as the de jure Government of Estonia.
2. His Majesty's Government recognise that Estonia has de facto entered
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but have not recognized this de jure.
3. Her Majesty's Government recognize that the Republic of Estonia as
constituted prior to June, 1940, has ceased de facto to have any effective
existence.
The effect of such recognition, and in particular the date to which it should
be deemed to relate back, appear. . . to be questions for the Court to decide in
the light of the statements set out above and of the evidence before it ....
4. His Majesty's Government recognised the Republic of Estonia as consti-
tuted prior to June, 1940, to be neutral; and after the 22nd June, 1941,
recognised the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be bel-
ligerent. The territory of Estonia came under German military occupation early
in July, 1941, and terminated towards the end of September, 1944.
Id. at 251-52.
In the Taflinna case, the court decided: 1) that the Soviet decrees did not have the
effect of dissolving the plaintiff Tallinna Shipping Co.; 2) that none of these decrees were
legal under the Estonian Constitution; and 3) apart from their illegality; that the decrees
did not apply to choses in actions situated outside Estonia. Id. at 252.
404. 782 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5TH SER.) 719 (1969).
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The first of these decisions was taken in 1967, when the Labor
Government of Prime Minister Wilson agreed with visiting Soviet Pre-
mier Alexi Kosygin to use Baltic gold and other assets, valued at nearly
seven million pounds and held in trust by the Custodian for Enemy
Property, for the settlement of claims by individuals in Britain against
the Soviet Union.40 5 These assests had been deposited in British banks
by the three Baltic governments before the Soviet invasion of June
1940.406 In exchange for a payment of 500,000 pounds, the Soviet Gov-
405. Id. at 1704. The agreement relating to Baltic assets in Great Britain "resurfaced,
neatly signed, sealed and delivered, in the shape of two brief paragraphs in the joint
communique recapitulating the highlights of Kosygin's visit and its accomplishments."
Ginsburgs, Soviet Views on the Law of State Succession with Regard to Treaties and
Acquired Rights, in RES BALTICA 215, 217 (A. Sprudzs & A. Rusis eds. 1958). The com-
muniqu6 declared:
The two Governments agreed on the final settlement of mutual financial
and property claims and counterclaims between the two countries arising after
January 1, 1939, which have been the subject of negotiations in recent years, and
have undertaken not to pursue these claims further or to give support to any
pursuit of them. In accordance with this agreement, Her Majesty's Government
will at an early date make a payment to the Soviet Government of £500,000
sterling to be found from the assets held in the'United Kingdom.
The Soviet Government has agreed to take this payment in the form of
British manufactured consumer goods. The formulation of this agreement will
be completed by the two Governments in the near future.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1967, at 10. Reprinted in Ginsburgs, supra, at 217. Ginsburgs notes
that the Soviets won their point that the negotiations concentrate on post-1938 claims.
In all previous calculations, the United Kingdom had been considered as a net credi-
tor-chiefly as a result of its claims to assets in the Baltic States. Indeed, the
Manchester Guardian Weekly had reported that British claims against the Soviets
added up to £12 million and the Soviet claims against Britain amounted to £7,500,000.
Ginsburgs, id. at 218. The Wall Street Journal reported that:
[T]he British claims, estimated at between $31 million and $40 million, stem
mainly from confiscated British property and outstanding loans and debts in the
Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which were taken over by the
Soviet Union after the outbreak of World War II and made Soviet Republics.
The Russian claims are centered on about $22 million of gold and other assets
that were lodged in London by the central banks of those Baltic States. These
assets were impounded when Russia overran the states in 1940.
Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1967, cited in Ginsburgs, supra. Based on these figures, Ginsburgs
estimated that after subtracting the $1.4 million worth of British products scheduled for
shipment to the U.S.S.R. (i.e., £500,000), about $20.6 million would be available for dis-
tribution among British citizens to satisfy their claims. Id. "The Baltic [States'] financial
position in the United Kingdom [wail wiped out in fact, whatever the legal pretenses
still being maintained by London on the related question of recognition." Id.
406. Id. at 1724. The Governor of the Bank of England stated that the Bank kept the
gold for "physical safe custody." Id. The history of British negotiations with the U.S.S.R.
over Baltic assets dates back to 1956:
It was announced by Moscow Radio on Jan. 10 that the Soviet Union had sug-
gested to Britain that sums still outstanding in compensation to two British
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ernment agreed to drop any claims it might have against Britain." 7 In
June 1967, the Baltic gold was sold by the Custodian. On January 12,
1968, the British Government made payments to the Soviet Union and
the British claimants.0 s At this time, Parliament was in recess. Only
after it returned, on January 17, was it informed of the fait accom-
pli "0 In response to angry questioning, the Under Secretary for Com-
monwealth and Foreign Affairs justified the British-Soviet agreement
on the ground that British citizens had patiently waited for nearly
thirty years to receive compensation for their assets in the Baltic
States expropriated by the Soviet Union following its 1940 invasion.
4 1 0
In addition, it was stated that the agreement was to be judged from the
"criterion of what is practicable rather than by ideal standards of jus-
tice. '41 1 The following excerpts from the January 1969 debate in the
companies formerly operating in Russia should be settled out of the former gold
holdings of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, amounting to £5,700,000 which were
"frozen" by the Bank of England under an Order-in-Council in July 1940, when
these countries were occupied and subsequently incorporated in the Soviet
Union. The two British companies concerned were the Tetiukhe Mining Corpo-
ration and the Lena Investment Trust, whose properties and holdings in Russia
were seized by the Soviet government in 1932 and 1934. A British Foreign Office
spokesman stated on Jan. 11 that claims for compensation under these heads
amounted to £2,500,000, but that they represented only a small part of total UK
claims against the Soviet Union. The Moscow announcement said that the So-
viet offer had been made last autumn but that there had been no British reply."
KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 16952 (1959), quoted in Ginsburgs, supra note 405,
at 216-17. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1956, at 8, for a similar account.
In 1959, the United Kingdom's Minister of State, Foreign Office, Mr. Ormsby-Gore,
announced in the House of Commons that:
As a result of discussions held in Moscow recently between experts repre-
senting HM Government and the Soviet Government, it has been agreed that
both sides should obtain full particulars of all outstanding claims which have
arisen since 1939, including those relating to the Baltic States, with a view to the
opening of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement.
Ginsburgs, supra note 405, at 217. Mr. Gore added: "The Soviet government have so far
refused to discuss claims which arose before 1939. HM Government have reserved their
position so far as these claims are concerned." Id. at 217. The discussions were evidently
to focus on British claims for compensation for assets expropriated in Eastern Karelia,
Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Id. Nothing fur-
ther was heard of the matter until 1967, upon the occasion of Soviet Premier Kosygin's
trip to Great Britain. Id.
407. 782 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1704 (1969).
408. Id. at 1705.
409. Id. at 1713.
410. 776 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 583 (1969).
411. Id. at 592 (quoting William Whitlock, Undersecretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs). Such a statement would seem to contradict the very underpin-
nings of British foreign policy. Indeed, with regard to the entrance of Great Britain into
World War II, the former British Secretary of War, Hore Belisha, declared:
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House of Commons sheds light on the legal aspects of the agreement.
Sir Tufton Beamish (Lewes) declared:
All wars leave an unhappy aftermath of legal and political
problems. There are inevitable disputes about the ownership of
property, the validity of treaties and such things as the recog-
nition of new territorial boundaries. The illegal and forcible an-
nexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the Soviet Union
places Britain in all of these quandaries. That is no justifica-
tion for disregarding accepted principles of international law
and using Baltic assets in settlement of Soviet debts to British
subjects which the Soviet Union refuses to meet. Imagine the
outcry in Parliament had this Bill been presented in 1940 after
the Soviet occupation, or shall I say in 1941, during the Nazi
occupation. Imagine the outcome. The legal or illegal position
has not changed since then. It is exactly the same. Yet now we
are asked to agree that the passage of years makes what was a
grave affront to three friendly countries, brutally thrashed by
bullying neighbors, both respectable and acceptable-merely
the passage of years! It is neither respectable nor acceptable to
me. . . My feelings when I came to vote against this Bill, must
be those of anger and shame. This is a thoroughly bad Bill. It
is highly questionable on a number of evil grounds. It is mor-
There was a conflict between the forces of good and forces of evil, and what
had to be determined was which should possess the soul of countries and of man.
We did not enter the fight merely to reconstitute Czechoslovakia; nor did we
fight merely to reconstitute a Polish State. Our aims were not defined by geo-
graphical frontiers. We were concerned with the frontiers of the human spirit
Broadcast by Hore Belisha, Secretary of State for War (Oct. 21, 1939) reprinted in THE
Tis (London), Oct. 23, 1939, quoted in 1 POLAND IN THE BarrsH PARLIAM T 353 (W.
Jedrzejewicz ed. 1946).
With regard to Britain's policy vis-a-vis the Baltic States, a similar statement was
made by Foreign Secretary Halifax to the House of Lords in December 1939:
Earlier in the year we had tried to improve our relations with Russia, but in
doing so we had always maintained the position that rights of third parties must
remain intact and be unaffected by our negotiations. Events have shown that the
judgment and instinct of Her Majesty's Government in refusing agreement with
the Soviet Government on the terms of the formulae covering cases of indirect
aggression on the Baltic States were right. For it is now plain that these formu-
lae might well have been the cloak of ulterior designs. I have little doubt that
the people of this country would prefer to face difficulties and embarrassment
rather than feel that we had compromised the honor of this country and of the
Commonwealth on such issues.




Mr. R.J. Maxwell-Hyslop (Tiverton):
I share the indignation which has been voiced at this shoddy
Bill. The countries in question may have been temporarily
overrun by Russia. This has happened before in history. Po-
land has disappeared as a nation at various times in history
and has reemerged; and Lithuania was once one of the great
military powers of Europe. Are we to assume that these States
have ceased to exist for all time merely because the Govern-
ment wants to do, by the authority of Parliament, something
which if it were done by any citizen, he would be sent to prison
for fraudulent conversion? If any citizen of this country, with
money entrusted to him for a specific purpose; namely to be
safeguarded for him, did . . . what the Government proposes
to do, he would be convicted . .
Sir J. Foster (Northwich):
The occupation of these three countries by the Soviets is not
recognized by this country. The nationalization of the central
banks is not recognized and the Government of the Soviet Re-
public is not recognized as the de jure Government of any of
these three Republics. None of the assets which are to be dis-
tributed are in Soviet territory . . . [The Government] does
not have to pay the Soviet Government 500,000 pounds. [The
Under Secretary speaks of] possible international claims [by
the Soviet Government]. If the occupation is unrecognized, and
the Government are not recognized, there is no possibility of
an international claim. 14
Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop:
We all know who is the originator [of this Bill] . . . the Prime
Minister, because he wanted to feel nice and warm when Mr.
Kosygin visited this country. He wanted to give away some-
thing in order to produce a smile on Mr. Kosygin's face. What
better, thought the Prime Minister, to give away than the
property of somebody else who has not authorized it and is
powerless to stop him: What a miserable fraud. 15
412. Id. at 592-93.
413. Id. at 596.
414. Id. at 599.
415. Id. at 598.
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Mr. William Teeling (Brighton):
According to Russia the Baltic States belong to her. That is
why she has always wanted to put these problems together and
keep them together. We must try to put ourselves in the minds
of the Russians if we are to have discussions and arrive at
agreements with them. We have to think of the financial ques-
tions of trade with Russia and friendship with Russia." 6
On May 1, 1969, another debate took place on the issue. Mr. J. Grim-
mond (Orkney and Shetland):
Having listened to the debate so far and read a little of the
background history, it appears to me to be one of the most
squalid minor embezzlements ever perpetrated by a British
Government . . . .[It is] a rather disreputable little crime at
the expense of people who trusted us. Very few people will en-
trust their assets to the British Government when they find
that they can be disposed of without their consent and con-




Russia will now tell the people of the Baltic States that while
Britain still pays lip service to the principle of withholding de
jure recognition of the captivity of their countries, in practice
Britain has conceded Soviet sovereignty and the Soviet right to
enforce an illegal annexation . . . . By entering into this
shameful agreement the Government has not only robbed the
Baltic States of their assets but of their confidence in this
country. ... What about the benefits which were to flow from
this payment of 1/2 million pounds to the Soviet Union . . .?
Since the agreement was signed, the Soviet Union has again
invaded a country in flagrant breach of international treaties
. . . and the bullying . . . in Czechoslovakia still goes on.""'
Mr. Maxwell Hyslop:
Why not send for [the Foreign Secretary] to come to the House
to defend his shoddy work?
Sir Arthur Vere Harvey (Macclesfield):
416. Id. at 603.
417. 782 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1710 (1969).
418. Id. at 1716-17.
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Because he is having his dinner.
Mr. Maxwell-Hyslop:
Probably my honorable friend is right. He is having his dinner,
while 500,000 pounds of the reserves deposited in the Bank of
England by these three little countries is paid to the Russians:
to the people who over-ran their country, who deported so
many of their citizens literally to be murdered and who tore up
no fewer than 13 treaties guaranteeing their independence
... . It is a shameful thing in which we are asked to
participate.""
Despite the intense criticism of the bill and charges that it was a viola-
tion of international law,'"0 it passed the House of Commons on its
first reading by a vote of 161 to 115.' All of the representatives of the
Baltic States in Great Britain submitted notes of protest to the For-
eign Office in response to the British-Soviet agreement.
42 2
In 1974, the British Government made a second decision adversely
affecting the Baltic States when it refused to recognize a successor to
Estonian Envoy August Torma who had died in 1971.42 The third
blow to Baltic interests came in 1982 when the British Government
decided to tax the Estonian Legation Building in London as commer-
cial property by withdrawing a substantial tax abatement for diplo-
matic premises which had theretofore applied to the building.424
The British position, as enunciated in 1967 by the Under Secre-
tary for Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs, Mr. William Whitlock,
was that the Baltic governments had ceased to exist at the time of the
Soviet invasion. 425 Britain, Mr. Whitlock went on to say, used the crite-
rion of "effective control" to determine whether a government received
the recognition of Her Majesty's Government.'2 6 This criterion is a to-
tal repudiation of past international practice by Britain. Indeed, the
Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Holland, Norway,
Yugoslavia and Poland functioned for over five years (1939-1945) on
British soil, and were recognized as such, without having any degree of
419. Id. at 1721.
420. 776 PARL. DEB., (H.C. (5th ser.) 588 (1969).
421. Id. at 614. Among those voting against the bill were Members of Parliament
Margaret Thatcher, William Whitelaw and Michael Heseltine. Id. at 615-616.
422. ELTA, May 1, 1967, at 1.
423. Conversation with Dr. Aarand Roos, Estonian Consul, New York City (Sept.
1984).
424. Id.
425. 776 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 609 (1969).
426. Id. at 610.
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effective control of their respective territories.2 7 This criterion also
contradicts present day British policy. Her Majesty's Government cur-
rently recognizes the Cambodian coalition organized by Prince
Norodom Sihanouk as the lawful representative of the Cambodian peo-
ple. 428 The British Government routinely votes to support its seating in
the U.N. General Assembly' 29 even though the coalition has no effec-
tive control of Cambodian territory-a fact made painfully clear during
the course of 1985.430
C. Germany
The West German Government has also refused to recognize the
forcible seizure by the Soviet Union of.the Baltic States. The present
German position is reflected in The Republic of Latvia Case,"31 which
427. 1 POLAND IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT 436, 477 (W. Jedrzejewicz ed. 1946). The
British Government even permitted the allies to form autonomous armies on British soil.
These forces trained under their own flags, with their own commanders and were subject
to their respective national military laws. Id. at 437.
428. British recognition of the Cambodian Coalition Government headed by Prince
Norodom Sihanouk is implicit in British sponsorship of United Nations General Assem-
bly Resolution 39 of November 1, 1984. That Resolution noted "the continued effective-
ness of the coalition with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk as President of Democratic
Kampuchea" and called for "respect for the national independence, sovereignty, and ter-
ritorial integrity of all States" while simultaneously urging the withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Cambodia. G.A. Res. 39, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/5
(Nov. 1, 1984).
429. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 39, see id., passed by a vote of 110
in favor to 22 against, with 18 abstentions.
430. See Crossette, Vietnamese Attack Cambodia Camp, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1985, at
A3; Crossette, Clamor Over Cambodia, id., Feb. 14, 1985, at Al, col. 3; Crossette, Viet-
nam's Troops Said to Take Bases of Cambodia Foes, id., Feb. 16, 1985, at Al, col. 6;
Crossette, Cambodia Rebel Unit Orders Pullout From Its Main Camp, id., Jan. 9, 1985,
at A6, col. 1; Russell, Assault and Pursuit, TIME, Jan. 21, 1985, at 40; Russell, The
Greatest Victory, id., Feb. 25, 1985, at 37.
The January 1985 offensive by Vietnam, which had invaded Cambodia in 1978, dealt
a serious blow to the coalition government of Prince Sihanouk. Over 100 Cambodian
troops were killed and more than 85,000 civilian refugees living in camps controlled by
Sihanouk's forces were driven over the border into Thailand. Russell, Assault and Pur-
suit, TIME, Jan. 21, 1985, at 40. In response to the Vietnamese offensive, China reaf-
firmed its support for the coalition under Prince Sihanouk and called for the withdrawal
of 160,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. China declared: "The Vietnamese authorities
can never realize their vicious aim of perpetual occupation and annexation of Cambodia
by military attack or political tricks." Burns, China Belittling Vietnam's Advances in
Cambodia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at A3, col. 1.
431. 20 I.L.R. 180 (1953). The Republic of Latvia Case was instituted by Josephine
Weinmann to obtain compensation for certain real property which had been taken from
her by the Nazi regime. In 1945, her dwelling was located in the United States sector of
West Berlin. After its expropriation by the Nazi Government in the 1930's, the dwelling
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was first considered by the Restitution Chamber of Berlin in 1953.
That court stated: "[T]he Republic of Latvia is regarded as continuing
to exist because the annexation of the territory of Latvia is not recog-
nized by the Federal Republic of Germany."432 On appeal, the Su-
preme Restitution Court for Berlin made it clear that its determina-
tions were influenced by the West German Government's refusal to
recognize forcible territorial annexation.4 3 Boris Meissner, an expert
on the international legal ramifications of the Baltic States annexation,
points out that as a result of the German-Soviet War, an exchange of
the already-completed ratification documents of the German-Russian
Border Treaty of January 10, 1941 never took place.4 3 4 De jure recogni-
tion of the Soviet annexation was therefore never granted by the Ger-
had been purchased by the Latvian Legation in Berlin for use by the Latvian Ambassa-
dor. Following Latvia's occupation by the U.S.S.R., the dwelling was used by the Soviet
Union, and after June 1941 it was taken over by a German ministry.
In the years after World War I, Weinmann brought suit against the Republic of
Latvia to recover restitution for the property which by 1945 had become an uninhabit-
able ruin. 28 I.L.R. 385-85 (1959). The Court allowed the Latvian Minister in London,
Karl Zarins, to represent Latvia in the proceedings. The Court stated:
There is no legal obligation to the recognition of the locus standi of the
Republic of Latvia. According to a communication received from the Foreign
Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Latvia is regarded as
continuing to exist, because the annexation of the territory of Latvia by the So-
viet Union is not recognized by the Federal Republic. The diplomatic represen-
tative of Latvia who is domiciled in London, where he exercises his functions,
has therefore validly [been] delegated his powers ... to act in the present resti-
tution proceedings.
Republic of Latvia Case, 20 I.L.R. 180-82 (Restitution Chamber of Berlin 1953).
The Latvian Ambassador to Britain contended that Weinmann's claim was barred
by sovereign immunity. The Restitution Chamber rejected this argument on the ground
that the plea of sovereign immunity depended on the actual use of the premises for
diplomatic activities and that re-use of the building for such purposes was unlikely.
Weinmann v. Republic of Latvia, 28 I.L.R. 385-91 (Supreme Restitution Court for Berlin
1959). On appeal, the Supreme Restitution Court affirmed the decision of the Restitution
Chamber. Id. at 391; As a result, the Republic of Latvia was held liable for restitution to
Weinmann. Id.
This case has important precedential value because the city of Berlin is now seeking
to redevelop the Tiergarten Diplomatic District where the Embassy of the Republic of
Estonia still stands. Based on the decision in Weinmann v. Republic of Latvia, it would
seem that Consul General Ernst Jaakson, the senior member of the Estonian diplomatic
service and the charg6 of Estonian interests in New York and Washington, could legally
represent the Republic of Estonia in any future negotiations with the city of Berlin re-
garding the fate of the Estonian Legation. See infra note 441.
432. Id. at 181.
433. 28 I.L.R. 230 (1959).
434. See, e.g., B. MEISSNER, DIE SOWETUNION, Dig BALTISCHEN STAATEN UND DAS
VOLKERRECHT (1956); B. MEISSNSR, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die baltische
Frage, in JAHRBUCH DES BALTISCHEN DuTscHTuMs (1977).
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man Empire, and from the standpoint of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Baltic States have not forfeited their sovereign international
rights.4 "3 The West German Government continues to honor the pass-
ports issued by the consular representatives of the Baltic States and
has shown its willingness to accept semi-official diplomatic representa-




The resumption of diplomatic relations between the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the U.S.S.R. did not imply any de jure recogni-
tion of the de facto frontiers of the Soviet State. This was explicitly
expressed by German Chancellor Conrad Adenauer in his letter of res-
ervation to the Soviet Government on September 14, 1953.""7
Adenauer's position was later reaffirmed by a unanimous vote of the
Bundestag on September 14, 1955.438 In 1970, Germany and the
U.S.S.R. signed a treaty in Moscow which called on both parties "to
respect the territorial integrity of all European states within their pre-
sent boundaries." 4 No de jure recognition of the Soviet annexation
of the Baltic States arises from the agreement, however, since delimita-
tion of the U.S.S.R.'s western boundary is excluded from the treaty." 0
In response to a petition from Baltic representatives concerned about
the treaty's implications for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Ger-
man Foreign Office stipulated in a communiqu6 of August 27, 1970,
"that the Federal Republic has not altered its commonly known posi-
tion on the question of the Baltic States."""1
435. Meissner, supra note 280, at 147. On April 29, 1953, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany notified the judicial organs of Berlin that it
considered Latvia to be still in existence because neither the German Reich nor the Fed-
eral Republic had ever recognized Latvia's annexation. Krivickas, supra note 310, at 103.
A circular letter from the German Foreign Ministry, dated March 2, 1953, states that
because the annexation of the Baltic States is not recognized in international law and the
nationals of those states have not become citizens of the Soviet Union, their Baltic citi-
zenship remains unchanged. Accordingly, Baltic passports issued by Baltic consulates
remain valid. Id.
436. Riismandel, The Continued Legal Existence of the Baltic States, 12 BALTIC
REV. 55 (1958).
437. Id. at 57.
438. Meissner, supra note 280, at 147.
439. Treaty of Moscow, Aug. 12, 1970, Germany-U.S.S.R., 1972 BGBL 353 (1972); 10
I.L.M. 127 (1970).
440. Meissner, supra note 280, at 147.
441. Id. This position was reaffirmed in 1983 by Foreign Minister Alois Mertes in a
letter to Baron Hans Huyn. Mertes stated: "Was die Annexion der baltischen Staaten
durch die Sowjetunion anbelangt, so anerkennt die Bunderegierung diese Annexion
bekanntlich nicht." Letter from Dr. Alois Mertes, German Foreign Minister, to Baron
Hans Huyn (July 27, 1983).
The nonrecognition of the Baltic States' annexation has created an interesting di-




Ireland has also refused to recognize the seizure of the Baltic
countries. As in other nations, the refusal to recognize the legitimacy of
laws passed by Baltic "People's Assemblies" has had an effect on the
decisions of the Irish courts. One such case was The Ramava, decided
by the Irish High Court in May 1941.42 The facts are similar to that of
The Maret. Five privately owned Latvian and Estonian ships arrived
at Irish ports between July 26 and August 15, 1940. After the military
occupation by the U.S.S.R. and the subsequent annexation of Latvia
lated and forgotten area of the city, surrounded by the ruins of the former foreign diplo-
matic quarters-including those of Japan and Italy. The Estonian Embassy Building is
currently a dwelling place for a dozen young German students whose monthly rent is
collected by a Berlin attorney and placed into a supervised account at a city bank. The
city acts, in effect, as a fiduciary for the property of Estonia until such time as it can
regain control of its affairs. See Im Tiergarten ist Estland noch selbstandige Republik
[In the Tiergarten district, Estonia is still an independent Republic], DER TAGES-
SPIEGEL/BERLIN, Jan. 20, 1980, at 16, col. 1; Estland bleibt im Tiergarten ein Pfleg-
schafts-FaU, DER TAGESSPIEGEL/BERLIN, Dec. 15, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
On March 6, 1985, Klaus Hermann, a representative of the governing CDU/CSU
faction of the German Federal Parliament sent a letter to Herr Erich Weiss of the Inter-
national Committee for Viktoras Petkus, a Lithuanian human rights activist, imprisoned
by the Soviet Union. The letter outlines what appears to be the policy of the Govern-
ment of Chancellor Helmut Kohl vis-A-vis the Baltic States:
Furthermore, what matters for the CDU/CSU is that the Federal Republic
of Germany as well as most of the Western countries do not recognize the annex-
ation of the Baltic States. In this respect, all the federal Governments have been
so far conscious of their historic responsibility. Because, after all, it was the
Hitler-Stalin Pact and, especially, the secret agreements of August 23 and Sep-
tember 28, 1939 that have first opened the possibility for the annexation of the
Baltic States, because the National Socialist Regime had declared to the Soviet
Union that it was disinterested in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However, the
secret agreements do not mean any & priori recognition of the annexation. And
even the closing of the Baltic embassies and consulates in the fall of 1940 cannot
be interpreted as a de jure recognition of the annexation.
The moral impact of this historic phase remains, of course, independent of
the specific impact on international law. Therefore, it is even more urgent today
to hold on to the existing legal interpretation of the non-recognition of the So-
viet annexation of the Baltic States, and at the same time to openly address and
to represent the subject politically, but with a particular attention to the human
rights in connection with the destiny of the Baltic States.
The CDU/CSU faction will deal with this subject in the future as it has
already done in the past. Because our constant endeavor remains to make the
partition of Germany and of Europe more bearable for the people and ultimately
to overcome it entirely. This, however, can be achieved only by focusing on the
goal of a free right to self-determination for all the nations of Europe - which
means also the Baltic nations - and in a peaceful European arrangement.
Lithuania's Case on the International Agenda, 5 ELTA 6 (May 1985).
442. 10 INT'L. L. REP. 91 (1949).
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and Estonia, agents for the Soviet shipping company arrived in the
ports where the ships were docked and claimed the right to lower the
flags of Estonia and Latvia and hoist the flag of the U.S.S.R. The dip-
lomatic representatives of Estonia and Latvia thereupon commenced
actions in the Irish courts seeking a declaration that they were trustees
for the lawful owners of the ships, and injunctions restraining removal
of the national flags and preventing any change of nationality. 83 The
Soviet Union entered an appearance and made a motion seeking to
have the proceedings set aside on the ground that the ships were the
property of the Soviet state."' The court dismissed the motion, stating
that the "Government of Eire does not officially recognize the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a Sovereign Govern-
ment of the Republics of Latvia and Estonia," and held that the Soviet




The Canadian Government has periodically reaffirmed its policy of
nonrecognition of forcible seizure of territory and continues to apply
that policy to the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries.44' Replying
to resolutions and letters on the subject, Mr. W.M. Fairweather, Dep-
uty Director of the Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs,
wrote on March 19, 1982:
As you know, Canada continues to deny de jure recognition to
the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet
Union. Over the past year and a half, the Madrid Meeting of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has
provided the most appropriate forum in which to restate that
443. Id.
444. Id. at 92.
445. Id. at 93.
446. Riismandel, supra note 436, at 62. The Canadian Government continues to rec-
ognize Baltic Consuls in Canada as representatives of the Baltic States. This represents
one substantive gesture that Canada does not recognize de jure the Soviet Union's occu-
pation of Baltic territory.
In March 1985, the Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs,
declared:
[I]t is quite clear. We do not recognize de jure the incorporation of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. This position has been firmly main-
tained over the last forty years and is based upon our disapproval of such forci-
ble incorporation which is contrary to international law. The Soviet government
is well aware of our position, which was reiterated specifically at the time of the
signing of the Helsinki Final Act.




policy. During the review at the meeting of the implementation
by the participating states of the Helsinki Final Act, the Cana-
dian delegation denounced the continued subjugation of the
Baltic peoples, the russification policy of the Soviet govern-
ment, and the suppression of human rights and fundamental
freedom in the Baltic States. I can assure that. . . we will con-




Australia, like Canada, has consistently refused to recognize the
legitimacy of the Soviet claim to territorial title in the Baltic region.""8
Except for a brief period in the early 1970's when a Labor government
granted de jure recognition to the Soviet annexation of the Baltic
countries, Australia has adhered to a strict application of the doctrine
of nonrecognition of forcible seizure of territory.44 9 On November 8,
1982, Acting Prime Minister Doug Anthony commemorated the sixty-
fourth anniversary of Latvian independence by sending a message to
all Australians of Latvian ancestry:
On the anniversary of the Proclamation of the Independence of
Latvia, I join with you in celebrating the declaration of Latvian
sovereignty. We recall the tragic and brutal events which have
stifled the freedoms of the Latvian people in their own land
... . We recall again today the continued Soviet occupation of
Latvia, and the heroism of the men and women who resisted
that occupation. . . . I take great pleasure in conveying to the
Latvian community the best wishes of the Australian Govern-
ment and my own personal regards.
4
5
447. LATVIAN INFORMATION BULL. Oct. 1982, at 3.
448. See E. DUNSDORF, THE BALTIc DILEMMA (1982).
449. Id. Recognition of the Soviet annexation was immediately withdrawn by the suc-
ceeding conservative government. Id.
450. LATVIAN INFORMATION BULL. Jan. 1983, at 1. On the anniversary of Estonian and
Latvian independence in February 1984, Australian Prime Minister Robert J.L. Hawke
declared:
I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm that the Australian Govern-
ment does not recognize de jure the incorporation of the Baltic States into the
Soviet Union. In doing so, we demonstrate our continuing commitment to the
principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and to the cause of peace
and freedom in the world.
Hawke, Incorporation Not Recognized, 10 BALTIC NEWS 1 (Tasmania, Australia Mar.
1983).
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G. France
The French Government's position was defined by France's Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs, Claude Cheysson, on December 17, 1981. Mr.
Cheysson stated:
France has not recognized the annexation of the States of
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania by the U.S.S.R. in 1940. Since
then, it has not extended any recognition, either expressly or
tacitly. This attitude was confirmed in 1975 at the time of the
signing of the Helsinki Final Act by the president of the Re-
public when he indicated that "[iun the view of France, the
texts signed here do not imply the recognition of situations
which it would not have recognized otherwise
H. Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia has indicated that it too does not accept any legal right
of the U.S.S.R. to the territory of the Baltic States. On July 29, 1951,
Yugoslavian Communist Party Chief Josip Broz Tito spoke out on the
Baltic issue and Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe. Tito declared:
451. 100 S JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA R.PUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, D91BATS PARLEMENTAIRES
4320 (Dec. 17, 1981). The Vichy Government of Marshall P~tain ordered the closing of
Baltic embassies in Paris on August 15, 1940, despite the energetic protests of the Baltic
emissaries. Shortly afterwards, in compliance with the demands of the Soviet Ambassa-
dor, the Vichy regime turned the keys to the embassy building over to the Soviets.
Krivickas, supra note 382, at 99. Negotiations between France and the Soviet Union
began in late 1940 for the transfer to the U.S.S.R. of three tons of Baltic gold held by
French banks. By March 1941, the P~tain Government was ready to concede Soviet
claims to Baltic holdings, but the German attack on Russia in June put an end to the
dialogue. Ginsburgs, supra note 405, at 227. It has been recently reported that Soviet
Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev requested French President
Francois Mitterand to turn the Baltic gold over to the U.S.S.R., during his visit to
France in 1985, but the French Government refused his request to do so. 4 BALTIC BULL.
Dec. 1985, at 8, citing the French newspaper Le Canard Enchain .
Although the Vichy Government appeared to recognize Soviet claims to the Baltic
States, such recognition, if granted at all, failed to survive the collapse of the fascist
French regime. In a 1951 French Supreme Court ruling in the case of Gerbaud v.
Medem, the court stated:
Considering that no act of international significance has intervened to oblit-
erate the recognition of the Latvian State; that no treaty has intervened to sanc-
tion the disappearance of that state as a holder of rights and liable to legal obli-
gations, that the Court of Appeals rightly decided that so long as the Peace
Treaty has not determined the fate of Latvia it is impossible to say that Latvi-
ans at present have no nationality.
Krivickas, supra note 310, at 103. Significantly, Baltic diplomatic representatives were
accorded full diplomatic courtesies in a 1948 audience with the President of France. Id.
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The actions of the Russian state have had terrible conse-
quences for the non-Russian nations. Some of these nations
were independent states and they have been totally erased
from the surface of the earth with such cruelty that even Hitler
himself would envy it. . . . Where are hundreds of thousands
of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians? They don't exist any
longer-they are being deported to Siberia . . . . Who then is
the criminal? Who is perpetrating genocide? Who is annihilat-
ing entire nations and committing mass murder?4 52
An article by Melos Prelevic in a recent issue of the Yugoslav periodi-
cal Socialism described Soviet foreign policy during the Second World
War as follows: "A new Soviet foreign policy led to the Hitler-Stalin
Pact of August 1939 and as a result the Soviet armed forces occupied
and annexed more than half of Poland's territory, and several months
later completely overran the territories of sovereign countries such as
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia."" Clearly implicit in such a quasi-offi-
cial discussion of Soviet policy is a denial of the legality of Soviet
claims of sovereignty in the Baltic States.
I. Denmark
The Danish Government does not recognize the annexation of the
Baltic States.' In late 1982, the Danish periodical, Aktuelt, in connec-
tion with rumors about an epidemic of anthrax in the Baltic countries,
revealed the official attitude.' 5 Danish officials, who were eager to ob-
452. Quotation from the Yugoslavian newspaper, Borba, November 4, 1952, reprinted
in ELTA, June 10, 1965, at 12.
453. LATVIAN INFORMATION BULL., 4 (July 1983).
454. Id.
455. Id. Like Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, Denmark has ignored the impor-
tance of economic sanctions which logically flow from the doctrine of nonrecognition of
forcible seizure of territory. Denmark entered into a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1964
to put an end to the protracted financial and property dispute between the two states
revolving around the question of satisfactory compensation for Danish holdings affected
by the nationalization decrees in the Baltic States. The treaty also settled Danish claims
for property taken in the western Ukraine, White Russia and that section of German
East Prussia annexed to the R.S.F.S.R. in 1945. Ginsburgs, supra note 405, at 216. For a
text of the agreement see 509 U.N.T.S. 286-93 (1964). The treaty, signed in Moscow on
February 27, 1964, permitted Denmark to keep all Baltic property found within its bor-
ders to which the U.S.S.R. asserted a legally valid title, and the Soviet Union retained
possession of all Danish assets which it had seized. To make up the difference, the
U.S.S.R. paid Denmark the sum of $385,000. Id. The Soviet payments were to be made
in the form of exports by the U.S.S.R. of oil, coal and sugar to Denmark. The Danish
Government was then to make payments to those Danish concerns whose property had
been taken. Id. at 228 n.76.
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tain accurate information on the actual situation in order to protect
Danish livestock from the threatening danger of infection, refrained
from making direct inquiries to Moscow through the Danish Foreign
Ministry and used other channels. The Danish Foreign Ministry de-
clared that an official confirmation of the rumors was impossible:
We have never recognized the annexation of these three
countries to the Soviet Union. It is for this reason that we can-
not inquire with Moscow about the rumors affecting these
three countries. This is very inconvenient . . . [but] we don't
want [the Russians] to get from us any piece of writing which
they then could interpret as the recognition of the annexation
of these three small countries."8
The author of the Aktuelt article, Henrik Skrov, criticized the Soviet
assertion that the three Baltic countries had joined the Soviet Union of
their own free will. 57 He wrote: "In the opinion of Denmark . . . the
election of 1940. . . has no relation to what we call democratic proce-
dure. That is why these three small countries continue being indicated
on the map of the Danish Foreign Minister.' 58
J. Belgium
The position of the Belgium Government was stated by the High
Court of Brussels on October 26, 1946, in its decision in the case of
Compagnie Belgo-Lithuanienne d' Electricite v. Societe des Centrales
Electriques Regionales.4 9 The Court stated that "Belgium ha[d] not
recognized the annexation of Lithuania de jure and that 'no document
issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade estab-
lishes that the Belgian Government considers such annexation recog-
nized de facto.' "460 Consistent with this principle, the Belgian Govern-
ment joined the United States and Britain in refusing to repatriate to
the Soviet Union the nationals of the Baltic States on Belgian territory
at the conclusion of the Second World War.
46 1
During the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the Belgian Government became concerned that the Soviet
Government would interpret the final agreement as legitimizing its an-









ment was issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs declaring that
"as far as Belgium is concerned it has not recognized the annexation of
Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. The participation at the conclusions of
the European Conference on Security and Cooperation does not mod-
ify this attitude at all, since it is evident that Belgium can recognize a
change of the frontiers only in the case of a specific agreement." '6 2
K. Spain and Portugal
Spain and Portugal have also refused to recognize the annexa-
tion.46s Although no official statement by the Spanish Government has
been made to this effect, it has continued to accept Estonian and Lat-
vian diplomatic representatives. "' The Government of Portugal de-
clared in 1940 that it did not recognize the incorporation of the Baltic




According to the official bulletin of the Vatican, Osservatore Ro-
mano, the Holy See refuses to recognize the Soviet tour de force in the
Baltic States. Only Lithuania maintained a resident minister at the
Vatican, and his name has been carried on the list of the diplomatic
corps accredited to the Holy See since 1940.4"
M. Malta
The Maltese Government has supported the Baltic States in the
United Nations."' On October 15, 1969, Malta's delegate to the United
Nations, Victor J. Grauci, criticized the Soviet occupation of Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia and accused the Soviets of using a double stan-
dard in international affairs. During a discussion of a Soviet-sponsored
project to strengthen international security, Mr. Grauci declared:
The denial of the right of self-determination of peoples-not
only of those peoples comprised under the conventional defini-
462. ELTA, Aug. 1975, at 2.
463. Riismandel, supra note 436, at 58. Both Spain and Portugal are parties to the
Saavedra Lamas Pact, supra note 96, and are therefore legally. bound not to recognize
forcible seizure of territory.
464. Id.
465. Id. The Portuguese Foreign Minister announced that all treaties with the Baltic
States would be suspended as long as the situation remained unresolved. A. MAKAROV,
DIE EINGLUEDERUNG DER BALTISCHEN STAA'rEN IN DIE SOWJETr UNION 706 (1941), cited in
Krivickas, supra note 310, at 104.
466. Id.
467. ELTA, Dec. 1969, at 3.
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tion of colonial peoples under Chapters 11 and 12 of the Char-
ter, but of all peoples, wherever they may live-is a major root
cause of international insecurity. Until the domination and ex-
ploitation of weak peoples . . . by a stronger state, disappears
from the face of the earth, there can be no real peace; no real
security, particularly for small countries. Yet this domination
and exploitation are widespread from Namibia to Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia, from Angola to Armenia, Georgia and
Azerbaijan. In none of these cases was the consent of the
weaker nation clearly and freely given; in none did the annex-
ing stronger nation withdraw its forces .... 468
N. Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Turkey, Norway and The
Netherlands
On November 9, 1979, the German State Minister, Mrs. Hamm
Brucher, declared in response to written interrogatories submitted by a
member of the German Bundestag, that neither Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Norway or Turkey had recognized the annexation of the
Baltic States. 69
468. Id.
469. 48 VERHANDLUNGEN DES DEUTSCHEN BUNDESTAGES, 8 Wahlperiode, 184 Sitzung,
[Proceedings of the German Parliament] 14,541 (Nov. 9, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
V.D.B.]. Although the German minister mentioned Norway, it would appear that Nor-
way has, at least, recognized de facto the incorporation of the Baltic States. In 1959, the
Norwegian Government entered into an agreement with the U.S.S.R. to settle claims
concerning the "Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian S.S.R.'s" and the Karelian Autono-
mous S.S.R., as well as fishing vessels on which Norwegian citizens escaped to Russia
during World War I. Ginsburgs, supra note 405, at 215. For the text of the agreement,
see 3 THE TREATIES OF NORWAY 784 (Oslo n.d.). The Norwegian treaty would seem to be
a classic example of international obfuscation and refusal to acknowledge the legal and
moral principles which underlie the doctrine of nonrecognition of forcible seizure of ter-
ritory. Amazingly, the Norwegian Government signed a treaty which, according to Gin-
sburgs, settled the question of mutual financial, property, and other claims arising out of
the Baltic Republics' "decision to join the U.S.S.R." Ginsburgs, supra note 405, at 215. It
is hard to imagine that the country that coined the phrase "quisling" can seriously be-
lieve that the Baltic States made a voluntary decision to join the Soviet Union in July
1940. To agree to the use of such language in a treaty with an aggressor state, while at
the same time being bound by the 1933 Anti-War Treaty and the legal obligation of
nonrecognition, is the height of Orwellian hypocrisy.
The solution adopted by Norway and the Soviet Union entailed the renunciation by
the Soviets of any and all claims to assets situated on Norwegian soil and owned, before
their nationalization in 1941, by persons of Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian national-
ity. Ginsburgs states that a corollary waiver by the Norwegian Government of its right to
press claims against the U.S.S.R. should be presumed. Indeed, the very purpose of the




The Swiss Government has refused to give de jure recognition to
the annexation. In August 1940, the Swiss closed their consulates in
Riga, Tallinn and Kaunas, and in 1941, the Federal Council also de-
cided to close, officially, the missions of the Baltic States in Switzer-
land.4 10 Baltic diplomats, however, continued to reside in the Latvian
Embassy in Geneva. On April 3, 1946, Switzerland resumed relations
with the Soviet Union, but the Federal Council did not specifically rec-
enable them to use the money realized to satisfy the claims of Norwegian citizens against
the U.S.S.R. Id. at 215-16.
The Netherlands has not officially decided whether it will or will not grant de jure
recognition to the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. For this reason, German State
Minister, Dr. Hamm-Brucher, did not mention the Netherlands along with the other
NATO governments in her message to the German Parliament on November 9, 1979. See
V.D.B., supra. In 1942, when diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and the
U.S.S.R. were established, nothing was said by the Dutch regarding the recognition or
nonrecognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. Timmermans, The Baltic
States, The Soviet Union and the Netherlands: A Historical Note, 32 NETH. INT'L L.
REV. 288, 290-91 (1985). To date, for political reasons, the Netherlands has not made any
statement regarding the Baltic question:
Unofficially, however, the [Dutch] Foreign Ministry does not regard the an-
nexation as legal, and in practice the Dutch Government follow[s] the policy of
the other NATO countries which means that they do not deal with Moscow in
matters regarding the Baltic States and do not let their high-level diplomats pay
official visits to these countries.
Letter from Herr Imants Gross, European Director, United Baltic Appeal, to the
author (Jan. 9, 1986) (Herr Gross's comments are based upon a 1985 visit to the Nether-
lands Foreign Ministry).
The Netherlands has, however, entered into an agreement with the U.S.S.R. for the
settlement of reciprocal financial and property claims connected with the incorporation
of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, White Russia and the western Ukraine into the Soviet
Union, and the expenses incurred for the mutual repatriation of their citizens during and
after World War II. See G. GINSBURGS & R. SLUSSER, A CALENDAR OF SOVIET TREATIES
412 (1981). For a text of the agreement, see 656 U.N.T.S. 46-57 (1969). The agreement,
signed in Moscow on October 20, 1967, indicates de facto recognition of the Soviet an-
nexation. Unlike Norway, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Finland and Yugoslavia, the Nether-
lands was not bound by the 1933 Anti-War Treaty of Nonrecognition. Nevertheless, it is
legally obligated not to recognize the annexation based upon its vote in favor of the
League of Nations Resolution of 1932 which, as already noted, "declares that it is incum-
bent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty
or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenant of the
League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris." LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 87
(1932); see supra note 90 and accompanying text. The Netherlands is also bound by the
requirement of nonrecognition embodied in the U.N. General Assembly Resolution of
1970. See infra note 553 and accompanying text.
470. J. KNIGHT & E. DELNS, BALic STTEs: A Doszsic IssuE, AN INTERNATioNAL
PROBLEM 16 (1980).
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ognize Soviet title to Baltic territory. 7
The Baltic archives and land in Switzerland were placed under the
fiduciary administration of the Federal Political Department (F.P.D.).
These belongings of the Baltic States were not, however, considered res
nuUius; rather, their owners were considered to be in such a position
that they were unable to manage their assets. This fiduciary adminis-
tration was to continue until such time as the proprietors were able to
resume their international legal activities, or until there was a case of
state succession.
47 2
In 1947, the head of the Soviet Mission in Switzerland asked to
use the Latvian Mission Building in Geneva on the ground of succes-
sion of states. The Swiss refused the Soviet request in light of the fact
that no such succession had occurred.
47 3
The F.P.D. has not tried to obtain rights to the Latvian gold de-
posited with the Bank for International Settlements in Geneva because
the Bank believes that the question should be solved by a "competent
court." Other Baltic assets deposited in Swiss banks are, the Swiss






473. Id. The former Latvian Legation Building in Geneva, "the Villa Rosa," is still
listed in the Geneva Real Estate Register as property of the "Latvian Government." As
recently as 1984, the U.S.S.R. attempted to change the building's entry in the Register,
but was rebuffed by the Foreign Ministry because "Switzerland [has] never recognized
the annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union." Meeting on Latvian Owned
Ground Termed Paradoxical by Exiles, Associated Press, Nov. 1, 1985.
The decision by United States President Ronald Reagan to meet the U.S.S.R.'s Sec-
retary General on what is still legally Latvian territory was criticized by Latvian and
Baltic representatives as a direct violation of the doctrine of nonrecognition. Id.
On December 11, 1985, shortly after the meeting between President Reagan and
Secretary General Gorbachev at the former Latvian Legation Building, the President of
the Swiss Confederation restated the Swiss position vis-h-vis the Baltic States:
Switzerland has never recognized the incorporation of the three Baltic Re-
publics in the Soviet Union, and she does not intend to give up this attitude. On
various occasions, the Swiss authorities emphasized the importance of freedom
for individual persons and peoples. During his talks with Secretary General
Gorbachev in Geneva, President Furger stressed particularly the indissoluble
link between freedom and international security.
Letter from Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs to Dr. C.K. Bobelis, President, Su-
preme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (Dec. 11, 1985) (By order of the Presi-
dent of the Swiss Confederation).




The Finnish Government has also refused de jure recognition of
the annexation. 47 5 The 1947 peace negotiations leading to the Treaty of
Paris required Finland, as a defeated German ally, to sell its Baltic
assets and turn the proceeds over to the U.S.S.R. 47 ' The Finnish Gov-
ernment, however, has never made any formal decision concerning the
Baltic States. There has been no mention of the Baltic question in the
Finnish Parliament nor has the matter been debated in public since
the 1940's. If officials from Soviet Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania are in-
cluded in official Soviet delegations to Finland, they are regarded as
members of the delegation of the Soviet Union and not as representa-
tives of the Baltic States."77
Q. Poland, Bulgaria, Czeckoslovakia, Hungary and Romania
Although it must be presumed that the current Government of Po-
land has recognized the legality of Soviet actions in the Baltic, there
are indications that the general populace is not in agreement with such
a state of affairs. Because the Polish people were never granted the
"free and fair" elections promised by the Yalta accords,4 78 the interna-
tional acts of the Polish State since 1945 cannot necessarily be deemed
representative of the will of the population. Recently, there have been
indications that any future, freely elected Polish Government may be
called upon to reverse a de jure recognition of the Soviet annexation of
Lithuania, if in fact such recognition has been given. In the article
"The Europe of the Future" published in the February 1984 issue of
the underground Polish publication Niepodleglosc (Independence) the
authors call for an independent Lithuania whose border with Poland is
determined "by a sovereign Polish decision and not as a result of some
ultimatum in Yalta by the three powers."47
475. Id. at 20.
476. Id.
477. Id. It should, however, be noted that Finnish President Kekkonen visted Esto-
nia in 1964. This official visit was given great publicity by the Soviet occupation authori-
ties. Clearly, the Soviets viewed Kekkonen's visit as a sign that Finland had finally
granted de jure recognition of the Soviet conquest, of the Baltic States. For a discussion
of Kekkonen's visit see generally MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA, supra note 209, at 174.
478. See, e.g., FLORINSKY, supra note 246, at 562-70.
479. ELTA, Sept. 1984, at 6. A more interesting question is the legal position of Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia and Romania. According to the Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Treaty
of 1933, these three nations are bound not to recognize forcible seizures of territory. It is
likely, however, that with staunchly pro-Soviet governments now in power, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia and Romania have officially accepted official Soviet accounts of true
"people's revolutions" in the Baltic nations in the summer of 1940. Thus, no illegal an-
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R. The European Parliament and Council of Europe
The European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, recently took an
outspoken position with regard to the Baltic States.4 8 0 In 1982, M.P.
Dr. Otto von Habsburg submitted a report calling for submission of the
issue of independence for the Baltic States to the U.N. Special Com-
mittee on Decolonization.8 On January 13, 1983, the Parliament
nexation has occurred, and the three nations have therefore not violated their commit-
ments under the Anti-War Treaty.
In 1958, within a span of a few months, bilateral protocols were signed by the Soviet
Union and Bulgaria (January 18), Romania (March 7), Hungary (March 14), and Czecho-
slovakia (June 30), regulating the settlement of mutual claims concerning Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia. Ginsburgs, supra note 405, at 215. See also GINSBaUGS & SLUSSER,
supra note 469. The original text of the Soviet-Bulgarian treaty can be found in 20
SBORNIK DEISTVUYSHCHIKH DOGOVOROV, SOGLASHENII I KONVENTSII, ZAKLYUCHENNYKH
SSSR S INOSTRANNYMI GOSUDARSTVENNI 411-12 (Moscow n.d.) [hereinafter cited as
S.D.D.]. For the text of the Soviet-Romanian agreement, see id. at 413-14. For the text
of the Soviet-Hungarian Agreement, see id. at 412-13. For the text of the U.S.S.R.-
Czechoslovakia protocol, see id. at 417.
Ginsburgs states that the protocols, addressing the settlement of mutual financial
and property claims arising from the incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R.,
are identical in content, mutatis mutandis. Their purpose is described as a desire to
"fully and finally settle all property and financial questions connected with the entry of
the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian republics into the Soviet Union." Ginsburgs,
supra note 405, at 215. The protocols declare that the respective parties forthwith waive,
vis-h-vis each other, all claims directed at Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia outstanding at
the time of the annexation of these nations into the U.S.S.R.. All property and financial
claims (i.e., property, trade exchange, loans, taxes and other obligations, as well as di-
verse kinds of accounts) of state organs and juridical persons of the other signatory to
the protocol, existing on the eve of the three countries' "admission" into the Soviet
Union, are declared fully and finally settled and liquidated. Id.
480. LATVIAN INFORMATION BULL. 2 (Jan. 1983).
481. LATVIAN INFORMATION BULL. 4 (Apr. 1983). In remarks to the Los Angeles World
Affairs Council on July 12, 1983, Dr. von Habsburg discussed his view of the importance
of the historic Baltic Resolution:
Finally, please permit me just a short remark about one subject in which I
am particularly interested. You know, I am a strange person in the European
Parliament. I am the only member who has dual nationality, one inside of the
Common Market-the German-and one outside of the Common Market-the
Austrian. And I am also one of the few who comes from Central Europe, that is
to say who feels himself deeply tied to those nations which are today under So-
viet rule. It has been my personal endeavor, aided by many friends-and I must
pay tribute here especially to my British Conservative friends who have been a
tremendous support in all situations-to make this European union declare very
clearly and in a language that cannot be mistaken that for us the artificial line
which was drawn clear across the continent of Europe, in February 1945 at
Yalta, is not the border of Europe. We feel responsible for the European nations
beyond the Yalta line, and we shall not rest until they have their right of self-
determination. For us, decolonization should not stop in Africa or Asia. Europe,
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adopted a resolution to that effect by a vote of ninety-eight to six with
eight abstentions. In his speech to the Parliament, Dr. von Habsburg
explained that the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
had not been recognized by most European states. He said that al-
though the European Parliament could not change the situation, it
could mobilize public opinion in favor of Baltic independence.8 2
too, has a right to be decolonized.
From that point of view, I am happy to report to you that we have now the
support of the crushing majority of the European Parliament on this question.
In January of this year, we passed a resolution on the Baltic nations which de-
clares our solidarity with these nations. I am sure you also know that your coun-
try and your great President have just made a declaration whereby June 14 is
Baltic Independence Day. For us, this is an issue of profound international mo-
rality. Because we do not want to have the sort of double standard which
decolonizes in all corners of the world but forgets old Christian nations which
have a right to be decolonized as well.
0. von Habsburg, The Soviet Union and Europe: Challenges and Perspectives, Address
to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, July 12, 1983, reprinted in 2 WORLD AFF. J.
23-29 (1983).
482. Id. The text of the resolution read as follows:
Motion For a Resolution
On the situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
The European Parliament,
A. having regard to the joint declaration of 45 nationals of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, in April 1979, calling on the United Nations to recognize the rights of
the Baltic States to self-determination and independence, and demanding a ref-
erendum on this issue,
B. having regard to the bilateral peace treaties between the Soviet Union and
the three Baltic States in Dorpat (2 February 1920), Moscow (12 July 1920) and
Riga (11 August 1920), in which the Soviet Union guaranteed the three Baltic
States the inviolability of their territory and eternal peace,
C. having regard to Article VIII of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on
Security and Cooperation, which secures the right of self-determination of peo-
ples and their right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their
internal and external political status,
D. condemning the fact that the occupation of these formerly independent and
neutral states by the Soviet Union occurred in 1940 pursuant to the Molotov/
Ribbentrop Pact, and continues,
E. whereas the Soviet annexation of the three Baltic States has still not been
formally recognized by most European states and the USA, Canada, the United
Kingdom, Australia and the Vatican still adhere to the concept of the Baltic
States,
F. having regard to the eight-year long struggle and armed resistance of Estoni-
ans, Latvians and Lithuanians fighting for their freedom, the thousands of vic-
tims of this struggle and the 665,000 Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians who
have been resettled and removed to labour camps in Siberia by the Soviet rulers
since 1940,
G. having regard to the motion for a resolution on the situation in Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania (Doc. 1-777/80),
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S. Sweden
The Swedish position comes closest to a de jure recognition of the
Soviet annexation although the Swedish Government has never offi-
cially affirmed it.48  On December 13, 1944, Foreign Minister Gunther
H. having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 1-656/
82),
1. Calls on the Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in political coopera-
tion to attempt to form a common favourable approach to the declaration ad-
dressed to the United Nations in 1979;
2. Suggests that they submit the issue of the Baltic States to the Decoloniza-
tion Subcommittee of the UN;
3. Considers that the plight of the peoples of these states be the subject of
review during the conferences to monitor implementation of the Helsinki Final
Act;
4. Expresses the hope that the Conference of Foreign Ministers will use their
best endeavours to see that the aspirations of the peoples of these states as to
their form of government is realized;
5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers of
the Member States of the European Community meeting in political coopera-
tion, and to the governments of the Member States.
1982-1983 EuR. PARL. Doc. (No. 7.908) 432-33 (1983).
On May 20, 1983, Herr Hans Dietrich Genscher, the German Foreign Minister,
stated in a question-and-answer period before the European Parliament that the foreign
ministers of the ten member E.E.C. had not complied with the wishes of the Parliament
vis-a-vis the resolution calling for the submission of the problem of the Baltic States to
the Decolonization Subcommittee of the United Nations. The Foreign Minister pro-
ceeded to tell the Parliament that the ministers were not planning to do so. Gross, Get-
ting on the International Agenda: Legal Status and Political Action, 2 BALTIC F. 2 (Fall
1985). See also Timmermans, supra note 469, at 288.
Herr Genscher stated that the Council of Ministers of the E.E.C. was aware of the
difficult plight of the Baltic peoples, but that a realistic political assessment indicates
that formally raising the matter at the U.N. offered no hope for success and that the
Baltic peoples' cause would be more likely to suffer if such action met with a negative
result. Letter from I.R. Whitting, Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, to the Latvian
National Council in Great Britain (May 4, 1984). See also Levits, Die Baltische Frage im
Europaischen Parlament, 22 ACTA BALTICA 9 (1982). A new resolution regarding the Bal-
tic States was introduced on August 1, 1984, by Members of Parliament Jakobsen, Hahn
and Habsburg, calling for an end to the conscription of young Baits by the Soviet Union
for service in Afghanistan. See Appendix VII.
Another major development occurred on January 30, 1985, when the Council of Eu-
rope (representing all 21 non-Communist European states) began consideration of a res-
olution on the right of the Baltic peoples to self-determination. The resolution is sched-
uled for a vote in September 1986. See Appendix VIII for the text of the resolution.
483. Riismandel, supra note 436, at 64. See also KNIGHT & DELINS, supra note 470, at
19. For a discussion of law suits in Swedish courts relating to Soviet nationalization de-
crees in the Baltic States, see Bekeris, Foreign Nationalizations and Their Conse-
quences in Sweden, in REs BALTICA 230-46 (A. Sprudzs & A. Rusis eds. 1958). Swedish
cases have not utilized the doctrine of nonrecognition to decide the equities of opposing
claims to Baltic assets. Rather, as in the 1944 case of The S.S. Toomas, courts have
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emphasized in a statement to the upper chamber of Parliament that
"practical considerations" had led Sweden to take certain steps with
regard to the Baltic States.4" The Swedish Government turned the
Baltic embassies in Sweden over to the Soviets in the summer of
1940, ' and on May 30, 1941, signed an agreement with the Soviet
Union which settled their mutual economic claims in the Baltic States.
In exchange for a payment by the Soviets of twenty million Swedish
crowns, the Swedes released gold, belonging to the Baltic States, with a
value of eighteen million Swedish crowns which had been deposited in
Sweden. The Swedish Government also released a number of Baltic
ships lying in Swedish ports.'" In addition, the Swedes turned over to
the Soviets a number of Baltic soldiers who had fought with the Ger-
man Army against the Soviet Union, during World War II. s  Conse-
looked to see whether the nationalization decree is contrary to public policy. Id. at 241.
In the case of the Toomas, the ship had been handed over to the Soviet authorities by its
master in October 1940 and the Soviet flag had been hoisted on its mast. Although the
confiscation of the ship was viewed by the Swedish Supreme Court as contrary to the
Swedish ordre public, the Court found that the doctrine of sovereign immunity entitled
the U.S.S.R. to immunity from prosecution by the vessels' private owners. Id. at 240.
"The court's rejection of the Soviet title was thus purely nominal or, as a Swedish jurist
put it, 'a shot in the air'" Id. at 241.
In the Toomas, the Swedish Supreme Court also relied on a series of Swedish deci-
sions which declared that foreign nationalization decrees lack legal effect outside the
territory of the confiscating State. Id. at 234. In one such case, the Lake Lucerne, the
Supreme Court of Sweden was called upon to settle a dispute between the Soviet Esto-
nian state shipping line and some Estonian refugee shipowners who had been deprived of
their vessels by the Soviet authorities. The dispute centered on title to funds deposited
in Sweden by the original shipowners as security for salvage costs. Noting that no com-
pensation had been paid to the owners, the Court found that "title advanced by the state
shipping line is derived from a nationalization decree having the character of confisca-
tion." The Soviet state shipping line's claim was consequently dismissed. Id. at 233. For
the text of The Lake Lucerne, see Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 279 et seq (1954). For the text of
The Toomas, see Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv 264 et seq (1944). An English text can be found
in 12 I.L.R. 61-62, 112-114 (1943-45).
Bekeris notes that one Swedish court decision concerning family law had held that
the annexation of Estonia had been recognized de jure by Sweden. This assertion, how-
ever, was dropped on appeal. Bekeris, supra, at 245 n.17.
484. Riismandel, supra note 436, at 65.
485. KNIGHT & DmLINS, supra note 470, at 19.
486. 1 FoREIGN RatL.U.S. 442 (1940).
487. ELTA, Mar. 1971, at 11. Those Balts handed over to the Soviet Union consisted
of 167 men: 7 Estonians, 11 Lithuanians and 149 Latvians. They had arrived in May
1945 on the Swedish Islands of Gotland and Bornholm. TOLSTOY, supra note 375, at 382.
These individuals were for the most part members of the 15th Latvian Division of the
German Wehrmacht-a division formed by the Germans for the purpose of using Bats
against the Red Army. Id. Faced with the impending disintegration of Nazi Germany,
the Baltic soldiers had sailed for Sweden from Danzig on March 27, 1945. the day Danzig
fell to the Red Army. Id. These ships finally landed at the Swedish port of Ystad. Other
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quently, no Baltic nationality is recognized in Sweden and former na-
men among the 167 had escaped from the Courland Pocket on board the tug Gulbis, and
had eventually landed at the Island of Gotland. Id.
The Swedes interned all 167 Baits in a camp in southern Sweden near Eksjo. On
June 2, 1945, the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, Madame Kollontay, enquired of the
Foreign Ministry what Sweden intended to do with the several thousand Wehrmacht
troops then in Sweden. Kollontay noted the Allies had inserted in the Armistice terms
which required German units to surrender to the nearest Allied command. Thus, all
Germans on the Eastern Front were to give themselves up to the Red Army. The armi-
stice naturally did not apply to Sweden, but, she asked, would the Swedes nevertheless
align their policy to that of the Allies? To this the Swedish Foreign Office replied, after
brief consideration, that it would do so. However, the Foreign Office indicated that the
matter had to be confirmed by the Government. Id. at 383. On June 15, the Cabinet met
and approved the Foreign Ministry's agreement. Thirty-six thousand civilian Baits were
not to be deported on humanitarian grounds, but all German soldiers were to be deliv-
ered into Soviet hands. Foreign Affairs Minister Christian Gunther concluded his argu-
ment for deportation by stating:
Among the Germans there are also a few other groups, those who enlisted
but are not really Germans. There's a group of Baits, for instance. But we can't
be expected to sit here making distinctions between them. They're all part of the
German Army and I suppose should all be extradited.
Id. at 383.
The next day, the Soviet Embassy was informed of the Government's decision. The
German and Baltic soldiers, however, were unaware that their fate had been so rapidly
decided. Id. at 384. In November, the news of the Swedish-Soviet accord leaked out. The
Swedish Prime Minister, Per Albin Hanson, attempted to silence the press reports, but
"the storm burst and the matter became thenceforward a public controversy." Id. at 384.
The Swedish Church was in the forefront of opposition to the accord. When on Novem-
ber 20, 1945, a group of church leaders called on the Social Democratic Foreign Minister
Osten Und6n, they were given a hostile reception. Und6n declared: "I'm at a loss to
understand this particular sentimentality in regard to the Balts." Id.
Many sectors of society regarded the impending deportations as a betrayal of Swed-
ish honor and a flagrant disregard of human rights. The Swedish soldiers guarding the
camp signed a protest petition which declared that "[o]ur consciences and our honor as
soldiers enjoin us to express in the strongest possible manner our sense of shame in
having to assist in the imminent extradition." Id.
The Baltic soldiers began a hunger strike on November 22, 1945 to protest their
extradition and the entire contingent was hospitalized after one week of fasting. On No-
vember 28, the first suicide occurred; a Latvian officer named Oskars Lapa. Another
Bait, Edvards Alksnis, attempted to kill himself by stabbing a pencil into his eye. Mirac-
ulously, he survived and aided by Swedish doctors regained his strength. When it be-
came apparent that he was still scheduled for deportation, he escaped from the deporta-
tion camp and sailed to England, where he was granted asylum. Id.
On January 23, 1946, the extradition began. Swedish policemen arrived at the camp
in buses and began boarding the Balts for a trip to the port of Trelleborg where the
Soviet ship Beloostrov was docked. As the Balts moved through Trelleborg's streets, one
Latvian smashed his hands into a window and attempted to slash his wrists. He was
promptly grabbed by the Swedish police, bandaged and forced to board the Beloostrov.
Another Bait, Latvian Lieutenant Peteris Vabulis, was more successful. He stabbed him-
self in the bus and was laid on the quay as "his living comrades filed past and up the
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tionals of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are officially considered Soviet
citizens or stateless persons.,"" Baltic nationals are considered stateless
if they left their home country before the enactment of the Soviet na-
tionality edict of September 7, 1940, which declared the citizens of the
Baltic States to be Soviet citizens. In administrative and judicial prac-
tice, on the other hand, Sweden has considered the refugees of the Bal-
tic nations as political refugees and, as such, stateless persons."8 9
In 1977, a spokesman for the Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs stated that the "Swedish Government had not 'made up its





gangway." Id. at 386. Soon afterwards the Beloostrov slid silently out of the harbor on
her journey eastwards. Id.
In a letter to a friend, written a week before, Vabulis had declared:
Despite my youth ... I've seen a lot, both in Latvia and on my travels
through many foreign countries in Europe. I have seen countries where slavery
prevails and countries which deliver slaves to them quite openly. As this is hap-
pening in our century it is not hard to die, for if such things are allowed to
continue, the end of the world must near. I feel sorry for my wife and my chil-
dren who are to lose their breadwinner in such a harsh way, just when hope and
the prospects of a reunion were greatest. But each one of us must bear his fate,
and we ourselves cannot change it.
Id. at 387.
The Baltic soldiers' deportation has caused controversy in Sweden since 1946. Yet,
over 71% of the Swedes actively favored their deportation at the time. As Sweden's So-
cialist Foreign Minister later remarked: "[tihere was not the slightest reason to suspect
the Soviet administration of injustice, and ... it was tactless to regard the Soviet Union
as anything but a state governed by law." Id.
488. Riismandel, supra note 436, at 65.
489. Id.
490. KNIGHT & DELINS, supra note 470, at 18. Following the events of June 1940, the
Swedish Government had allowed the Baltic missions in Stockholm to be taken over by
the Soviet Government "as the de facto government in force in the Baltic States." Id.
Apart from this action and those with respect to certain debts owed Sweden... "[tihe
Swedish Government had made no arrangements to recognize either de facto or de jure
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union, and no state-
ments ever had been made in this respect." Id. Although Sweden had entered into an
agreement with the U.S.S.R. in 1941 to settle claims arising from nationalizations in the
Baltic States, see supra note 486, this agreement did not settle all of the financial dis-
putes arising from the events of 1940. The possibility of a new agreement on Baltic
claims was broached by Swedish Prime Minister Erlander during a visit to the U.S.S.R.
in 1956. The joint communiqu6 issued after his meetings with Soviet leaders indicated
that an understanding had been reached to initiate talks regarding settlement of the
remaining mutual claims in accordance with the Soviet-Swedish agreement of 1941.
Ginsburgs, supra note 405, at 216. Swedish sources estimated that the net amount of
Swedish claims in this connection, after deduction of Soviet counterclaims, totaled
2,700,000 Swedish crowns. Id. at 228 n.77. On May 11, 1964, an agreement was concluded
with the U.S.S.R. whereby the Swedish Government in December 1965 distributed
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T. South Africa
The attitude of most major Latin American countries concerning
the annexation reflects the majority view in Europe and North
America.' 1 Uruguay has been a leader among those nations refusing to
acknowledge the legality of the forcible seizure of territory along the
Baltic. On February 16, 1963, the President of Uruguay received a
Lithuanian delegation and delivered a speech in which he affirmed the
Uruguayan position. In Brazil and Colombia, Baltic diplomatic person-
nel are active, and Ecuador and Chile have received semi-official diplo-
matic representatives of the Baltic States. Guatemala, Paraguay and
Venezuela continue to send representatives to diplomatic receptions
held at Baltic embassies in South America.4' 2Costa Rica has become an
outspoken advocate of Baltic sovereignty and continually criticizes the
Soviet seizure of Baltic territory. In April 1967, Sefiora Emilia Barish,
Minister Counsellor of the Costa Rican Mission to the United Nations,
raised the issue of the Baltic States during a session of the U.N. Coin-
among 127 companies and private persons a total of 1,340,000 Swedish crowns held by
various Swedish banks and firms as payment for Baltic debts due since 1940. The recipi-
ents were said to have received 37 cents on the dollar for their claims-the funds being
channeled through the Foreign Ministry. Ginsburgs, supra note 405, at 216 and 228 n.78.
The text of the agreement can be found in 23 S.D.D. 76-78 (Moscow n.d.) and Sveriges
Overenskommelser Med Utlandska Makter, No. 48 (1964); GINSBURGS & SLUSSER, supra
note 469, at 257.
491. ELTA, Apr. 20, 1963, at 12. Argentina was the only South American State to
close a Baltic Legation. In 1948, Argentina suspended the functions of the Lithuanian
Embassy until such time as the question of the Baltic States was resolved by the United
Nations. J. REPECKA, DER GEGENWAERTIGE VOLKERRECHTLICHE STATUS DER BALTISCHEN
STAATEN 296 (1950), cited in Krivickas, supra note 310, at 104. The Lithuanian Legation
moved to Montevideo, Uruguay where it continued to function. Id. The Argentine posi-
tion, even if only de facto, would hardly seem to befit a nation whose elder statesman of
foreign affairs, Dr. Saavedra Lamas, was instrumental in forging the Anti-War Treaty of
Non-Aggression of 1933 and its mandatory obligation of nonrecognition of seizure of
territory.
Most South American States, including Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Nicara-
gua, Peru, El Salvador and Venezuela, are legally bound by that treaty not to recognize
the Soviet Union's seizure of the Baltic States. See supra notes 96-97, and accompanying
text.
492. Riismandel, supra note 436, at 59. The Lithuanian consulate in Rio de Janiero
was raised to the level of an embassy after the U.S.S.R.'s invasion of 1940, and the Bra-
zilian Foreign Ministry recognized the grant of the title of Minister to Dr. F. Meier,
formerly Lithuanian Charg6 d'Affaires in Brazil, by President Antanas Smetona.
Krivickas, supra note 310, at 104. A Lithuanian consulate was also established after 1940
in Bogota, Colombia, and on August 25, 1954, the Colombian Government accepted the




mittee to Determine the Concept of the Aggressor. Seflora Barish de-
clared that the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States was a violation of
international law. 9 3 On April 19, Sehiora Barish again attacked the So-
viet position. Defining the Soviet policy as "neo-colonialism," she went
on to discuss the Stalin-Hitler pact and subsequent Soviet military
moves against the Baltic States."94 Sefiora Barish specifically rejected
Soviet contentions that the three nations had joined the Soviet Union
voluntarily-noting that at the time each of the Baltic States had been
occupied by the Red Army and their incorporation had been achieved
only upon the application of great political and military pressure.49
The Costa Rican position on the Baltic States was reaffirmed on Janu-
ary 12, 1980.496 Costa Rican Ambassador to the U.N. Varela-Quiros
told the General Assembly emergency session on Afghanistan that the
Soviet behavior in Afghanistan had a striking resemblance to the
seizure of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940, and accused the So-




In Asia, there have been statements of nonrecognition of the So-
viet conquest from the Philippines, South Korea and both Chinas.4" 8
On February 24, 1968, the President of the Senate of the Philippines,
the Honorable Gil J. Prijat, issued a statement to commemorate the
fiftieth anniversary of the Independence of Lithuania. Prijat declared:
"It is my fervent hope that [the] campaign for the return of democracy
to your beloved country will come to fruition soon and that Lithuania
will be allowed an independent existence as a member of the commu-
nity of civilized nations."'4 99 Similar statements were made that year to
Baltic representatives by Foreign Minister Kyu-hah Choi of South Ko-
rea and the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of China. In fact, until its
expulsion in 1970, the Republic of China was an outspoken supporter
of the Baltic States at the United Nations.!00
The Government of the People's Republic of China has also main-
tained that the Soviet seizure of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was a
violation of the principles which form a basis for the Stimson doc-
493. ELTA, Apr. 20, 1967, at 12.
494. Id.
495. ELTA, June 20, 1967, at 2.
496. ELTA, Jan. 1980, at 2.
497. Id.
498. ELTA, May 1968, at 1.
499. ELTA, Apr. 20, 1968, at 2.
500. See, e.g., the remarks of China's United Nations delegate, Yu Chihsueh, re-
printed in ELTA, Apr. 20, 1964, at 12.
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trine. 0 1 The Chinese Government takes the position that Russia has
illegally annexed a great deal of territory in both Europe and Asia
since the 1800's. China has demanded the return of the territory to its
rightful owners. Chinese Communist Party Chief Mao Tse-tung made
the Chinese territorial demands public in 1964 and listed a series of
illegal Russian territorial annexations-including the Baltic States.50 2
In August 1967, the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, distributed
pamphlets indicating that a "movement of national liberation" was ac-
tive in the Baltic States, whose goal, according to the Chinese, was
emancipation from "Moscow's slavery. "503
Several major Asian nations, Japan, India, Pakistan, Iran, Indone-
sia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Thailand, Burma and Saudi Arabia, have
not announced an official position on the Baltic States. In Africa, most
nations acquired their independence long after the Soviet conquests in
World War II and, consequently, have not spoken out on the issue of
Baltic sovereignty. It must be noted, however, that international law
does not recognize the legitimacy of the maxim "qui tacet, consentire
videteur."' 0 4 Moreover, the African continent continues to regard the
inviolability of territorial integrity as the most important international
prescription currently regulating inter-African relations. 05
501. ELTA, Oct. 20, 1964, at 2. See S. Leng, The Sino-Soviet Dispute in CHINESE
FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA AND SELECTED PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 269
(1972).
502. ELTA, Oct. 20, 1967, at 3. Five years later, a Venezuelan newspaper reported
that China's interest in Soviet-occupied nations was growing and that Peking continued
to maintain connections with exiles from Eastern Europe, including Lithuania. ELTA,
Jan. 1972, at 3.
503. Id. at 4. Sympathetic Chinese reporting on the Baltic States continues. In 1984,
the Xinhua Overseas News Service reported the defection of the Estonian Communist
youth leader, Valdo Randpere, and his wife, Leila Miller, to Finland. Soviet Defectors
Granted Political Exile in Sweden, Xinhua General Overseas News Service Reps., Aug.
16, 1984 (available on NEXIS) [hereinafter cited as Xinhua]. Xinhua attributed the rea-
son for the defection to a Kremlin-ordered crackdown on Estonian nationalism. Id. On
February 8, 1984, Xinhua reported that a series of letters had been written to Soviet
newspapers urging that Estonians be permitted to decide matters relating to "the future
of their State and Nation." Finnish Paper Exposes Russianization in Estonia, Xinhua,
Feb. 10, 1984 (available on NEXIS).
A Xinhua editorial in 1978 denounced the Brezhnev regime for its persecution of the
Baltic peoples, the Crimean Tartars, Ukrainians and other nationalities of the Soviet
Union. The editorial LCited specific examples of nationalism in the Baltic region, including
the self-immolation of Lithuanian students in 1972 and massive anti-Soviet student
demonstrations in Tartu, Estonia in 1976. Commentary On Brezhnev's Shameless Boast
About Nationalities [sic] problems. Xinhua, Sept. 14, 1978, (available on NEXIS).
504. He who is silent is deemed to have consented. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1414
(4th ed. 1968).
505. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S.
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VI. POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF LAW PROHIBITING FORCIBLE SEIZURE
OF TERRITORY
The establishment of the United Nations and the U.N. Charter
precipitated major changes in the international law of territorial acqui-
sition.5°6 Although the Charter does not contain a provision analogous
to article 10 of the League of Nations covenant, the authors of the new
world organization's constitutive document were of the opinion that
the principle underlying article 10 was upheld and indeed expanded by
article 2(4) of the Charter. 50 7 Article 2(4) declares: that "All members
39. The preamble to the Charter declares the fundamental concern of African nations for
the inviolability of their borders:
DETERMINED to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence
as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States, and to fight
against neo-colonialism in all its forms ....
Id. at 70.
506. Chen & Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title, 81 YALE
L.J. 599 (1972).
507. The motivation for the omission of any provision similar to article 10 of the
League Covenant was explained in an official British commentary on the draft of the
United Nations Charter. The British view was as follows:
By the principles [of the Charter] the members would enter into undertak-
ings as regards their own individual conduct as well as regards their conduct in
the Organisation itself. The first principle gives effect to the provision in the
Moscow Declaration [1942] that the Organisation should be based on the princi-
ple of the "sovereign equality" of all peace-loving states. The first criterion for
action is thus not power but the equal rights of all States to the maintenance of
their political independence. In the League of Nations the political indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of all members was guaranteed against external
aggression, but no definite obligation was laid upon other members to give effect
to this provision. Many of them indicated their dislike of this obligation from
time to time. The greatest threat to the political independence and territorial
integrity of States comes from war, and the Covenant machinery for the preven-
tion of war was incomplete.
Now that the undertaking to prevent war is absolute and much more defi-
nite responsibilities to secure that end are laid on all States, such a guarantee, if
literally interpreted, would prevent any change in frontiers from being carried
out, even if all the other members of the Organisation thought such a change
was just and desirable. It is considered that the recognition of this general prin-
ciple of "sovereign equality" gives protection to states against arbitrary action
by other states, or by the Organisation itself, while at the same time it does not
involve the maintenance of the status quo for all time.
LANGER, supra note 4, at 87-88. Langer criticized the deletion of the affirmative require-
ment of nonrecognition of forcible seizure of territory from the Charter:
This attempt to motivate the elimination from the future international
charter of what President Wilson had called the 'backbone' of the old world or-
ganization is anything but convincing ..... [T]o abandon the principle alto-
gether would seem to be warranted only in case a fully adequate equivalent were
inserted in the law of the new organization. The mention of the 'general princi-
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[of the U.N.] shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations." '
Although some scholars criticized the deletion of the affirmative
requirement of nonrecognition of seizure of territory, others, such as
Professor R.Y. Jennings of Cambridge University and Sir Hersch Lau-
terpacht, maintain that the practice and principle of nonrecogition of
forcible seizure of territory are implicit in the Charter." 9 Professors
Lung-chu Chen of New York Law School and Michael Reisman of Yale
go even further and contend that the principle of nonacquisition of ter-
ritory by force has become a basic authoritative expectation of the in-
ternational legal order. In their view, the Stimson doctrine has become
inextricably linked by the Charter to the principles of self-determina-
tion and decolonization. 10
The latter view raises the question of whether international law
has developed a customary rule since the annexation of the Baltic
States which forbids seizure of territory and denies the legality of title
gained through belligerent means. The requirements for the formation
of such a customary prescription were set forth in the North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf case by the International Court of Justice in 1969.511 In
its decision, the Court declared:
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not nec-
essarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of
customary international law on the basis of what was originally
a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement
would be that within the period in question, short though it
might be, State practice, including that of States whose inter-
ests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and
ple of sovereign equality' is entirely out of place in this respect and appears to
indicate the inability-or unwillingness-to state the true reasons for the aban-
donment of the principle embodied in article 10 of the League Covenant.
Id.
Professor R.Y. Jennings of Cambridge University disagrees. He concludes that con-
quest as a title to territory has ceased to be a norm of international law and that the new
norm is codified in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. R.Y. JENNINGS, THE AcQuI-
SITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-68 (1963).
508. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
509. JENNINGS, supra note 507, at 67; See also H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (1947).
510. M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPEC-
TIVE, 662-64 (1981).
511. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment of Feb. 20).
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virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;-and
should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a gen-
eral recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is
involved.
512
The world's highest international judicial organ has thus made
clear what it considers to be the conditions necessary for the formation
of a positive rule of customary international law. 13 First, it must be
ascertained whether there has been a constant and uniform usage.
Such usage must include consistent repetition, a sufficient degree of
generality and a certain lapse of time. Second, those states acting in
accordance with the claimed prescription must do so because they re-
gard their adherence to it as being a legal duty incumbent upon them
as members of the international community, that is, in conformity with
the ancient Roman maxim "opinio iuris sive necessitatis."
A. Constant and Uniform Usage
1. Consistent Repetition
Since the annexation of the Baltic States by Soviet Russia in 1940,
the world community has continued to deny the validity of title to ter-
ritory acquired by conquest, and whenever possible, the legitimate sov-
ereign has been restored to his former domains. Adherence to such a
principle was indicated by the reconstitution of the independent states
512. Id. at 44. The Court of International Justice took a similar position in the Asy-
lum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Judgment of Nov. 20). In its holding, the
Court rejected Colombia's assertion that a customary rule existed with regard to asylum
and stated:
[The Colombian government) has not shown that the alleged rule of unilat-
eral and definitive qualification was invoked or-if in some cases it was in fact
invoked-that it was, apart from conventional stipulations, exercised by the
States granting asylum as a right appertaining to them and respected by the
territorial States as a duty incumbent on them and not merely for reasons of
political expediency. The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court disclose so
much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the
exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed on various occa-
sions, there has been so much inconsistency in the rapid succession of conven-
tions on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others, and the practice
has been so much influenced by considerations of political expediency in the
various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all this any constant and uni-
form usage, accepted as law, with regard to the alleged rule of unilateral and
definitive qualification of the offence.
Id. at 277.
513. For an in-depth discussion and analysis of the legal bases for the re-establish-
ment of subjugated states grounded on the nonrecognition doctrine, see generally
MREK, supra note 106.
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of Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia and Poland after the end
of the Second World War '
514. Although the allied powers restored the states of East Central Europe to mem-
bership in the international community, the victors failed to respect the very principles
enunciated in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Atlantic Charter, and the Dec-
laration of the United Nations, i.e., territorial integrity of states and self-determination
of peoples. In the headlong rush by the Anglo-American powers to appease their Soviet
ally and secure Stalin's cooperation in the founding of the United Nations, the United
States and Great Britain were willing to unilaterally surrender Eastern Poland, Kbnigs-
berg and its hinterlands, Bessarabia, Bukovina, southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands
to the U.S.S.R.; to strip Germany of its eastern provinces of Silesia, Pomerania and East
Prussia; and to acquiesce in the Soviet-inspired expulsion of 12 million Germans from
their ancestral homes. See generally .DE ZAYAS, supra note 1; A. LANE, I SAW POLAND
BETRAYED (1948); S. TERRY, POLAND'S PLACE IN EUROPE: GENERAL SIKORSKI AND THE ORI-
GIN OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE, 1939-1943 (1983). Contra E. STETrINIUS, ROOSEVELT AND
THE RUSSIANS: THE YALTA CONFERENCE (1949).
The decision to award the Soviet Union eastern Poland, Bessarabia, and Bukovina
had been made initially at the 1943 Tehran Conference by Stalin, Churchill and
Roosevelt. The territorial decisions made at Tehran were later confirmed by the "Big
Three" in the agreements signed at Yalta in February 1945. Id. at 151-59. See also, Jew-
sbury, An Overview of the History of Bassarabia in THE TRAGIC PLIGHT OF A BORDER
AREA: BASSARABIA AND BUCOVINA 1-18 (M. Manoliu-Manea ed. 1983). The Yalta agree-
ments were clearly a breach of international law and have been consistently attacked and
criticized by legal scholars since their inception. The Polish scholar Krzystina Marek
notes that "by entering into the Yalta compact, the contracting parties disposed of the
rights of the Polish State without any legal authority, and . . . of all such rights, to the
extent of the actual destruction of the State. No such procedure can conceivably be legal
under general international law." MAREK, supra note 106, at 489. The French scholar, M.
Flory has declared: "Or, I'U.R.S.S., les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne Rtaient bien
les seuls pays & prendre part a l'entretien de Yalta; aucun represMtant polonais n'y
fut convi6. On s' tonne dans ces conditions qu'une telle conference ait pu disposer de
l'avenir de la Pologne, organisant ses pouvoirs publics et modifiant ses frontiers, sans
mime que le gouvernement existant et la population soient le moindrement consult s."
M. FLORY, LE STATUT INTERNATIONAL DES GOUVERNEMENTS RFUGIAS ET LE CAS DE LA
FRANCE LIBRE, 1939-1945, at 252 (1952), quoted in MAREK, supra note 106, at 489. The
United States scholar Herbert Briggs referred to Yalta as "a historical curiosity and a
legal monstrosity." Briggs, The Leaders Agreement of Yalta, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 376, 383
(1946).
Eastern Poland. In his analysis of the legal effect of the Crimean Conference accords
on the eastern Polish provinces, one scholar, L.H. Woolsey, has stated:
Can this fifth partition of Poland be said to conform to the ...Atlantic
Charter? In my opinion it can not. . . .It is submitted that whatever may be
the ...make-up of the improvised Polish Government, these things are being
imposed on the Polish nation without its consent and under untoward circum-
stances (dating back to 1939) of military occupation, foreign administration,
movement of populations, repression of sentiment, redistribution of lands and
the like. It is but inflicting a festering sore of discontent and revolt on the body
of a gallant and faithful ally. Can such a decision make for a stable new world?
Is it not contrary to the ideals and aims of a just peace which is to be main-
tained by the new world organization?
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Woolsey, Poland at Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 297-98 (1945).
Churchill's plans to give British backing to the termination of Polish rights to the east-
ern provinces were condemned by a series of Members of Parliament. In one particularly
notable speech given in Parliament on January 18, 1945, Conservative M.P. Professor
D.L. Savory declared:
The Prime Minister laid stress on the fact that it was in order to carry out
our guarantee to Poland that we have gone into this war . . . . I feel that this
question of the Eastern Provinces of Poland is one of the most vital importance.
Great stress was laid on the fact that Poland was being asked to sacrifice 47
percent of her territory and a third of her population. This proposed border is
really almost exactly equivalent to the partition line of 1795, when the whole of
Poland was annexed to the three neighboring states. What you are proposing
under the arrangement that has been suggested is that you should hand over to
Russia everything that she obtained by the final partition of Poland in 1795. One
of our greatest historians, a distinguished Member of the House and President
of the Board of Education, Mr. H.A.L. Fisher, said of the partitions of Poland
that the story was one of the most shameful in the annals of Europe. No one
pointed out in the Debate that the proposal to hand over Eastern Galicia is to
give Russia something which in the whole course of her history she has never
possessed . . . .With regard to the other territories-the Northern territories
and the White Russian territories-even those were Polish for more than 400
years before the first partition of 1772. We have heard a very great deal with
regard to the question of race and we all know that Eastern Poland is inhabited
by a mixed Polo-Ukrainian race, but it is certain that the Poles are in the rela-
tive majority. In any case . . . there are practically no Russians in the whole of
that territory. I doubt very much whether the whole Russian population exceeds
100,000-that is one percent of the whole population.
Further, I would ask the House never to give its consent to handing over
those two great centers of Polish culture, Vilno and Lvov, to Russia, because
they are essentially Polish . . . . May I make a comparison? If you were to ask
Poland to hand over Lvov it would be just as much as asking Ulster to hand over
the sacred and historic city of Derry .... You could not do it without provok-
ing civil war throughout Ireland . . . . I would make this appeal to our Russian
friends. Do not insist on a frontier which will always throughout the ages be a
bone of contention. No Pole who is faithful to his country will ever consent to
give up that noble heritage of his race, Galicia and the North-Eastern provinces.
Do not make the mistake that was made by the Germans in 1870. Bismarck was
very much against the proposal to seize Alsace and Lorraine, but he was over-
borne by the King and the military party. Germany annexed Alsace and Lor-
raine and that was a bone of contention for over 40 years, and was . . . one of
the causes which led to the outbreak of the war in 1914. After all, the line of the
Treaty of Riga [of 19211 was a very fair compromise. Poland was asked by the
Treaty of Riga to give up 120,000 square miles which had belonged to her in
1772 and which. . . Lord Castlereagh was anxious to give her at. . . [The Con-
gress of Vienna], but when the Emperor Alexander [of Russia] got up from his
seat, stood against the map and put his hand on it and said, "Poland is mine",
he was the master of great legions and it was impossible for justice to be carried
out . . . . We have been told that we were obliged to accept the Munich Agree-
ment and that as it was a question of force, we could not resist it. . . . [I]t left a
nasty taste in the mouth because it handed over 800,000 Czechs to Hitler and
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thousands of Sudeten Germans who had no wish to be Nazified. On this ques-
tion, let me implore the Government not to hand over these provinces which are
sacred to Poland against the will of Poland, or we shall be doing an action which
we shall afterwards regret. We may have to submit to force majeure; I do not
deny it, but do not let us be a party to it. Do not let us play the Bismarckian
role of the honest broker. Do not let us even give our consent to it. Let us re-
member those glorious words of the "Chanson de Roland"... . Let no charge
be brought against us in history, as it was against the traitor Ganelon: "II a
forfait 6 l'honneur."
3 POLAND IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT 277-81 (W. Jedrzejewicz ed. 1962).
Perhaps the most outrageous aspect of the three Allied Powers' conduct with regard
to Poland was the great lengths to which Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt went so as to
keep their deliberations secret from their erstwhile ally, the London-based Polish Gov-
ernment-in-exile. The former United States Ambassador to Warsaw, Arthur Bliss Lane,
noted that Roosevelt's decisions regarding Poland which were made at Tehran were
never embodied in a treaty and hence did not receive the consent of the Senate as re-
quired by the Constitution of the United States. Indeed, Roosevelt's tentative decision to
accept Stalin's territorial claims to Eastern Poland were not made public during his life-
time and were kept secret until after the presidential elections of 1944. A. LANE, I SAW
POLAND BETRAYED 306 (1948).
None of the statesmen at Tehran or Yalta seemed to give much consideration to the
legal or human consequences which were bound to flow from the territorial decisions
made by the Big Three. In one particularly irreverent moment at Tehran, Stalin indi-
cated that he would insist upon the Curzon line as the eastern border of Poland. Instead
of reminding Stalin that the Atlantic Charter forbade such an annexation, Churchill
agreed to the Soviet leader's demands. "Personally", Churchill later wrote, "I thought
Poland might move westward, like soldiers taking two steps 'left close.' If Poland trod on
some German toes. that could not be helped, but there must be a strong Poland .... "
W. CHURCHILL, CLOSING THE RING 362 (1953). The British Prime Minister proceeded to
lay three matches on the conference table-representing Russia, Poland and Germany.
Churchill then pushed the Russian match westwards, thus displacing the Polish and Ger-
man matches. Churchill noted: "This pleased Stalin, and on this note our group parted
for the moment". Id. De Zayas has observed:
A solution had been found for saving face with the Poles. Weary of war and
unwilling to fight against the Soviet Union over the fate of Eastern Poland, the
Western Allies preferred to compensate Poland at the expense of the common
enemy-Germany. Principle was thus sacrificed to political expediency and a
quasi-Hitlerian settlement, totally disregarding the rights of the millions of per-
sons affected ....
DE ZAYAS, supra note 1, at 42.
While the three powers secretly discussed the future territorial configuration of Po-
land, the Polish Government made it clear that it would enter into no territorial agree-
ments until after the war had been won. Thus, Polish Prime Minister Sikorski told Sta-
lin in early 1942 that Poland would refuse to recognize the U.S.S.R.'s claims to the Baltic
States, East Prussia, Bessarabia and Bukovina. 3 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 124 (1942). Sikorski
emphasized that Polish foreign policy was based upon the principles embodied in the
Stimson doctrine:
At the outset of the war all the Allies as well as almost all neutral nations,
including the United States, expressed the just principle that any changes of
boundaries between States, effected by force and by methods of aggression, can-
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not be recognized, and that no settlement of the political status of Europe or of
the other parts of the world can be attained before the end of the war ....
After the downfall of France, Great Britain advanced this view as formulated
above to the status of an official political doctrine, expressed in the declaraton of
the Prime Minister on September 5, 1940. The other Allied Governments rallied
to this doctrine. Thanks to these declarations, the thesis of non-recognition of
acts of physical coercion committed during the war, has become a basic principle
for which the Democracies are fighting.
Memorandum from General W. Sikorski, Prime Minister of Poland, to Anthony Eden,
Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom (Mar. 24, 1942), id. at 126.
After the conclusion of the Crimean Conference, the Polish Government of Prime
Minister Tomasz Arciszewski isssued the following statement on February 13, 1945:
Before the Conference began the Polish Government handed to the Govern-
ments of Great Britain and the United States a Memorandum in which the hope
was expressed that these Governments would not be a party to any decisions
regarding the Allied Polish State without previous consultation and without the
consent of the Polish Government ....
In spite of this the decisions of the Three Powers CoIference were prepared
and taken not only without the participation and authorization of the Polish
Government, but also without their knowledge.
The method adopted in the case of Poland is a contradiction of the elemen-
tary principles binding the Allies and constitutes a violation of the letter and
spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the right of every nation to defend its own
interests.
The Polish Government declares that the decision of the Three Powers Con-
ference concerning Poland cannot be recognized by the Polish Government and
cannot bind the Polish Nation.
The Polish Government will consider the severance of the eastern half of
the territory of Poland through the imposition of a Polish-Soviet frontier follow-
ing along the so-called Curzon Line as a fifth partition of Poland, now accom-
plished by her Allies.
The intention of the Three Powers to create a "Provisional Polish Govern-
ment of National Unity" by enlarging the . . . [Soviet] appointed Lublin Com-
mittee with persons vaguely described as "democratic leaders from Poland itself
and Poles abroad" can only legalize Soviet interference in Polish internal affairs.
As long as the territory of Poland will remain under the sole occupation of So-
viet troops, a Government of that kind will not safeguard to the Polish Nation
even in the presence of the British and American diplomats the unfettered right
of free expression.
3 POLAND IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, supra, at 368-69.
On August 16, 1945, the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the communist-dominated
Polish Provisional Government, which had been organized by the U.S.S.R. in 1943, con-
cluded a treaty in Moscow regarding the Polish-Soviet frontier which transferred the
eastern provinces to the U.S.S.R. See Soviet-Polish Boundary Treaty, August 16, 1945,
10 U.N.T.S. 193-201, reprinted in 14 DEP'T ST. BULL. 341-43 (1946).
East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia. With respect to Poland's western frontiers, a
provisional decision was made at Yalta to accept the Soviet plan, initially proposed at
Tehran, for the handing over to Poland of the historic German provinces of East Prussia,
West Prussia, Upper Silesia and unspecified other German territories. The great German
city of K6nigsberg and its hinterlands along the Nieman river were to be awarded to the
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Soviet Union. DE ZAYAS, supra note 1, at 57. Churchill agreed to the transfer of these
territories' inhabitants, but cautioned Stalin that such a transfer would be dependent
upon the rump German State's capacity for the reception of the deportees. Id. at 85. The
Yalta conference closed, however, without an agreement on the actual number of
Germans to be transferred or the timing of such a massive population movement. Id.
The effects of such an agreement were not lost on the British Parliament and the parti-
tion of Germany was attacked by a considerable number of M.P.s. Labor M.P. R.R.
Stokes declared:
[W]e are told that Poland is to be compensated in the West by giving her
East Prussia and . . . the cumulative effect of all the [territorial] changes that
are to be made in [the eastern German provinces] . . . will be the uprooting of
10,000,000 people from their homes and planting them elsewhere. I protest, first
of all, against the inhumanity of the thing, which should never be done at all,
and, secondly, against the complete and utter idiocy of it, because you will never
get peace if you treat millions of people in that way, a way which is indescrib-
ably inhuman and absolutely bestial.
So far as East Prussia is concerned, I cannot even follow the Prime Minis-
ter's mind. In his own book he writes that East Prussia . . . is more German
than Germany itself. How can you expect to get peace if you cut great chunks off
Germany and hand them over to people who will have to fight at some time in
the future to maintain them? . . . [p]eace will not depend on whether you and I
think it is just at this moment; it will depend on whether our children and the
next generation after them really think that what has been done has been fair,
and will fight to uphold it.
3 POLAND IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT, supra, at 275-76.
Meeting at Potsdam, near Berlin, in July 1945, the Western Allies finally approved
the transfer of all Germans living in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. DE ZAYAS,
supra note 1, at 87-89. The Allies' decision led to the eventual expulsion of over 16
million Germans or ethnic Germans from their homes in eastern Europe. Id. at 89. Of
the 16 million expellees, over two million perished during the displacement. Id. at 103.
As Soviet and Polish troops occupied the lands which constituted eastern Germany
in 1945, expulsion of the German population began immediately. The resulting horror
prompted Bertrand Russell to protest the deportations in the British publication New
Leader:
It was agreed at Potsdam that these expulsions should take place 'in a hu-
mane and orderly manner,' but this provision has been flouted. At a moment's
notice, women and children are herded into trains, with only one suitcase each,
and they are usually robbed on the way of its contents. The journey to Berlin
takes many days, during which no food is provided. Many are dead when they
reach Berlin; children who die on the way are thrown out of the window. A mem-
ber of the Friends' Ambulance Unit describes the Berlin station at which these
trains arrive as 'Belsen over again-carts taking the dead from the platform, etc.'.
A large proportion of those ejected from their homes are not put into trains, but
are left to make their way westward on foot. . . . According to a British officer
now in Berlin, populations are dying, and Berlin hospitals 'make the sights of
the concentration camps appear normal.'
See id. at 109.
The United States Political Advisor for Germany, Robert Murphy, in a memoran-
dum to the State Department declared:
In viewing the distress and despair of these . . . [expellees], in smelling the
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odor of their filthy condition, the mind reverts instantly to Dachau and Buchen-
wald. Here is retribution on a large scale, but practiced not on . . [Nazi party
members], but on women and children, the poor, the infirm . . . The mind re-
verts to other mass deportations which horrified the world and brought upon the
Nazis the odium which they so deserved . . . Now the situation is reversed. We
find ourselves in the inviduous position of being partners in this German enter-
prise and as partners inevitably sharing the responsibility.
Id. at 115.
Because the end of the Second World War was never followed by a peace treaty with
Germany, the legal status of Germany's eastern provinces was never definitively decided,
although Poland regarded the Potsdam accords as a legal basis for her rights to East
Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia. Frowein, Legal Problems of the German Ostpolitik, 23
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 105, 111 (1974). On December 7, 1970, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many signed a treaty with Poland wherein it agreed to recognize the Oder River-Neisse
River frontier (created by the Potsdam Protocol as an administrative demarcation-line)
as the western border of Poland. Id. at 110. See also 2 BGBI 353 (1972) and 10 I.L.M.
127 et seq. (1970), for the German text of the treaty and its English translation. Frowein
notes that the careful wording of the German-Polish treaty leaves it open as to how the
Polish People's Republic acquired title to the territory. Frowein, supra, at 110. Because
the Western Powers do not recognize the Federal Republic as the de jure government of
all Germany, the Federal Republic is deemed incapable of legally binding the German
nation in its bilateral or multilateral treaties. Accordingly, the United States and Britain
still regard the territorial status of East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia as unsettled. Id.
at 106 and 112. Any legal settlement must thus await a German peace treaty with the
Allied nations and a reunification of the German nation.
Bessarabia and Bukovina. For a historical account of the ties between Bessarabia
and Bukovina and Romania see Appendix XIII. See also supra note 278 for details of
the Soviet ultimatum of June 1940. Romania declared war on the U.S.S.R. on June 22,
1941. The Romanian leader, General Antonescu declared in his order to the Romanian
army: "Free your oppressed brothers from the yoke of Bolshevism; bring all Bessarabia,
and the woods of Bukovina, your fields and meadows, back into the fatherland." Gra-
ham, The Legal Status of the Bukovina and Bessarabia, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 667, 671 n.13
(1944). Within a month of the outbreak of the Romanian-Soviet war the Romanian
Army had recaptured the territory taken by the U.S.S.R. in late June 1940. From the
Romanian viewpoint, war with the U.S.S.R. had dissolved the Soviet-imposed agreement
of 1940 and the two border provinces had reverted to the status quo ante bellum. Id. at
672. The Romanian victory was brief. In the summer of 1944, the Romanian Army was
pushed out of the two provinces by the Red Army, and the deportations of the summer
of 1940 were subsequently resumed with increased cruelty by Soviet administrators. In-
deed, by 1949 some 10% of the entire Bessarabian peasantry had been deported to the
interior of the U.S.S.R. The Romanian deportations, which were directed by Mikhail
Suslov on orders from Stalin and the Moldavian S.S.R.'s Central Committee, began in
July 1949. Florescu, A Tragedy of the Populaton of Bassarabia: The Deportations in
THE TRAGIC PLIGHT OF A BORDER AREA: BASSARABIA AND BUCOVINA 130-33 (M. Manoliu-
Manea ed. 1983). One eyewitness has described the terrible suffering which occurred at
the time.
At the beginning of July, 1949, towns and cities were practically besieged by
the KGB troops. [A]rrests [were] made according to special lists. All family
members were included in the warrants for arrest, from the oldest persons to the
babies. . . . Nobody was permitted to remain, not even pregnant women or per-
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sons seriously ill. The streets were emptied. The arrested persons were pushed
into cars and transported to the stations: Falesti, Floresti, Calaras, Orchei, etc.
These stations with their echelons were already alerted. People were pushed into
two-leveled, iron-grated cattle wagons . . . . Once the wagons were loaded, the
gates were locked and sealed. Each wagon was accompanied by two KGB
soldiers.
The trip was very long. It was very hot. Drinking water was given every two
days. Bread was introduced through the gates every three days. In those wagons,
which had been just emptied of cattle, the stench was horrible. The persons
traveled over one month; from July 6th to August 27th. They stopped only four
or five times and during these stops they cleaned the wagons from soil. The
corpses were taken away and placed alongside the railway . . . . In this way 72
echelons with 350,000 persons were sent to Siberia, Altai, Kuzbas, Karaganda, to
the plains of Culundia, close to the border of China and Mongolia ....
Id. at 132.
Private property was completely liquidated and efforts were made to destroy or
transform Romanian national monuments such as the Romanian Orthodox Cathedral of
Kishniev, some twenty 15th and 16th century Romanian monasteries, and hundreds of
churches. DIMA, supra note 278, at 45-47. While hundreds of thousands of Romanians
were deported from these provinces, hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians
poured into Bessarabia: thus demonstrating the Soviet goal of denationalization and rus-
sification of the area. Id. at 47.
Instead of opposing the Soviet Union's annexation of the Bukovina and Bessarabia,
both Washington and London were willing to approve the transfer of the territories to
Moscow at the end of the war. In a 1943 meeting between Roosevelt and British Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden, a decision was made "that Russia should have Bessarabia be-
cause it has been Russian territory during most of its history." 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S., supra, at 14. For an eloquent rebuttal of this astonishing premise, see Jewsbury,
supra.
The Peace Treaty of Paris, which ended the state of war between Romania and the
Allied nations, including the United States, Canada, the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, was
signed on February 20, 1947. Its articles 1 and 2 establish Romania's frontiers as those
existing on January 1, 1941, and confirm the transfer of Bessarabia and northern Buco-
vina to the U.S.S.R. The treaty also nullified the infamous Vienna Award of 1940 and
returned Transylvania to Bucharest. 16 DEP'T ST. BULL. 183-86, 1081-82 (1947). Bulgaria,
which had seized the southern Dobruja region from Romania during the war, was
awarded that territory by the treaty. Id. at 1081.
The peace treaty with Romania cannot in any way be deemed consistent with the
principles underlying the Stimson doctrine, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Atlantic Char-
ter or the generally recognized principle of self-determination. Moreover, the territorial
clauses in the treaty are based on a non-existent agreement. The relevant territorial
clause states: "The Soviet-Romanian frontiers were established in accordance with the
dispositions of the Soviet-Romanian accord of June 28, 1940." This is in fact a flagrant
inexactitude, for on June 28, 1940, no accord had been signed: Romania had ceded the
territories when faced with a brutal ultimatum from the U.S.S.R. Indeed, the Romanian
Foreign Minister of 1940, Gheorgiu Tatarescu, had declared: "The Government was com-
pelled to yield under the threat of force and violence and against right and justice."
Stere, The Principle of Self-Determination as Applied to Bassarabia in THE TRAGIC
PLIGHT OF A BORDER AREA: BASSARABIA AND BUCOVINA 25-36 (M. Manoliu-Manea ed.
1983). See also Butariu, Instead of Conclusions: The Rights of Romania to Bassarabia
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and Bucovina, in THE TRAGIC PLIGHT OF A BORDER AREA: BASSARABIA AND BUCOVINA 215-
19. The former Romanian Charg6 d'Affaires in Washington, Professor Brutus Coste has
noted that the peace treaty also clearly violates the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression
and Conciliation of October 1933 and its provisions committing signatories not to recog-
nize forcible territorial changes. Coste notes that the United States and Romania are
both signatories of the Anti-War Treaty. Coste, An Episode in the Diplomatic History
of Bassarabia and Northern Bucovina in id. at 222-23.
The Romanian people have consistently rejected the 1947 peace treaty's territorial
clauses relating to Bessarabia and Bucovina. In 1966, Romanian Communist Party Secre-
tary Nicholai Ceausescu openly criticized the pre-war Romanian Communist Party lead-
ership for having accepted the alienation of Romanian lands and Romanian historians
have begun to re-assert the historical links between Bessarabia and the Romanian State.
DIMA, supra note 278, at 50-52. The 1960's also witnessed a series of demonstrations in
Soviet Moldavia (Bessarabia) which consistently favored reunion with Romania. "When
on June 28, 1966, the Alexandrani sugar refinery called a meeting to commemorate the
'union' with the U.S.S.R., an engineer climbed up the smoke stack and unfolded a huge
Romanian flag." Id. at 53. A performance by the Bucharest musical group "Mondial" in
Soviet Moldavia in 1970 was attended by a massive crowd of 12,000 spectators-although
the seating capacity of the Kishniev theatre was only 7000. The concert went on until
3:00 a.m. since both spectators and musicians refused militia orders to leave. Signifi-
cantly, the audience shouted "Brothers, Brothers" when acclaiming the Romanian musi-
cal performers. Id. That autumn, huge slogans such as "Russians go home" and "We
want to be with Romania" were printed on the Kishniev Press House, the Interior Minis-
try and "Moldavian" high schools. Id.
Massive Romanian discontent with the territorial situation continues. During the
August 1980 International Congress of Historians in Bucharest, a German historian
questioned a Soviet panelist's praise of the U.S.S.R.'s resolution of ethnic questions. He
stated that the three Baltic republics were occupied by Moscow following the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Agreement of 1939 and said that Bessarabia did not "re-enter" the U.S.S.R.
of its own free will, but as a result of an ultimatum backed by dire threats from Moscow.
Other East European historians attending the conference broke into applause and the
packed hall cheered loudly for several minutes. Id. at 58.
Southern Sakhalin and The Kurile Islands. The agreements concluded at Yalta
also called for the surrender by Japan of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to the
U.S.S.R. The agreements were later confirmed at Potsdam by Clement Atlee, Harry Tru-
man and Josef Stalin. D. ZAGORA, SOVIET POLICY IN EAST ASIA 126 (1982) See also Agree-
ment at Yalta on the Kuriles and Sakhalin, 14 DEP'T ST. BULL. 189-90 (1946).
A peace treaty with Japan was signed at San Francisco by 49 nations on September
8, 1951. Article 2 of chapter II of the treaty provides: "Japan renounces all right, title
and claim to the Kurile Islands and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent
to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Ports-
mouth of September 5, 1905." 25 DEP'T ST. BULL. 349 (1951). This clause unfortunately
gives the impression that the Kurile Islands were Japanese solely as a result of the Japa-
nese-Russian War of 1905. This is a direct contradiction of previous United States inter-
pretation of the Kuriles' legal status. Indeed, United States Secretary of State Edward
R. Stettinius had stated:
The Kurile Islands, of course, were Japanese territory before the Russo-Jap-
anese War of 1904. During the nineteenth century both Russia and Japan had
[laidl claims to the Kurites, and Japanese ownership was recognized near the
close of the century.
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STETTINIUS, supra, at 93.
Despite the fact that Japan renounced its claims to Sakhalin and the Kuriles, the
Soviet Union refused to sign the peace treaty because it contained no specific provision
which required the territories to be transferred to the U.S.S.R. S. Pan, Legal Aspects of
the Yalta Agreement, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 56 (1952) Significantly, the chief architect of the
treaty, United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, indicated that the U.S.S.R.,
by its violation of certain aspects of the Yalta agreement, could not expect other parties
to fulfill Soviet claims to the Japanese territories:
As regards southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, the treaty carries out
the provisions of the Potsdam surrender terms, the only agreement by which
Japan and the Allied Powers as a whole are bound. So long as other Govern-
ments have rights under the Yalta Agreement which the Soviet Union has not
fulfilled there is at least question as to whether the Soviet Union can with
"clean hands" demand fulfillment of the parts of that agreement it likes.
25 DEP'T ST. BULL 462 (1951) (emphasis added).
The Japanese Peace Treaty was ratified by the United States Senate on March 20,
1952, with the following reservation:
As part of such advice and consent the Senate states that nothing the treaty
contains is deemed to diminish or prejudice, in favor of the Soviet Union, the
right, title, and interest of Japan, or the Allied Powers as defined in said treaty,
in and to South Sakhalin and its adjacent islands, the Kurile Islands, the
Habomai Islands, the Island of Shikotan, or any other territory, rights, or inter-
ests possessed by Japan on December 7, 1941, or to confer any right, title, or
benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet Union; and also that nothing in the said
treaty, or the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification thereof, im-
plies recognition on the part of the United States of the provisions in favor of
the Soviet Union contained in the so-called "Yalta agreement" regarding Japan
of February 11, 1945.
Proclamation of Treaty of Peace with Japan, reprinted in 46 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 96-97
(1952).
The Kuriles and southern Sakhalin are currently under military occupation of the
USSR. Japan and the Soviet Union have entered into a series of discussions over the
past 40 years aimed at concluding a formal peace treaty but have failed to reach an
agreement-largely due to Japan's insistence that "native" Japanese territories be re-
turned to it as part of any settlement. ZAGORA, supra, at 133.
Forty-one years after the 1945 Crimean Conference it is now generally accepted that
the Yalta agreements were a breach of international law. At best they represent an at-
tempt by Roosevelt and Churchill to compel Stalin to guarantee freedom of self-determi-
nation to the peoples of east-central Europe. This may have been a noble scheme but its
methodology was patently illegal since the affected parties were never consulted as to the
relevant territorial and political changes decided upon at the conference.
It is important to recognize the fact that the Yalta agreements are not a treaty.
Insofar as the United States is concerned, the Yalta agreements were signed by Franklin
Roosevelt without any mention of his status as President of the United States. Secretary
of State James Byrnes referred to the agreement as "this memorandum" and one promi-
nent legal scholar suggests "this agreement might well be considered merely as a memo-
randum recording the personal agreement of the three 'leaders'." Briggs, supra, at 382
(1946). At most, the Yalta accords represent an executive agreement on the part of Presi-
dent Roosevelt. There is no reason under United States law why an executive agreement
cannot be regarded by a subsequent administration as beyond the competence of a pre-
[Vol. 6
BALTIC STATES ANNEXATION
ceding Executive and therefore merely his personal pledge. Accordingly, such an agree-
ment does not necessarily bind the United States under international law. Id.
Secretary of State Dulles in his discussion of the Yalta accords during Senate hear-
ings on the Japanese Peace Treaty clearly indicated that the United States administra-
tion of President Dwight D. Eisenhower regarded the Yalta accords as a contract which
the U.S.S.R. had broken, thus relieving the United States of any obligation to fulfill its
side of the bargain. See 25 STATE DEP'T BULL., supra, at 462 (Dulles' statement). It ap-
pears that President Harry S. Truman interpreted the legal significance of the Yalta
accords in a similar fashion as Dulles. In the Forrestal Diaries, Truman's Secretary of
the Navy, James Forrestal wrote on April 23, 1945:
The President said he was seeing Molotov within the hour and that he pro-
posed to put it to him quite bluntly that . . . . He said that if one part of the
agreements which they [the Soviets] had entered with President Roosevelt at
Yalta were breached he (the President) would consider that the entire Yalta
Agreement was no longer binding on any of the parties interested.
Pan, supra, at 58.
On January 19, 1947, the long anticipated "free elections" called for in the Yalta
accords took place in Poland. The elections were neither free nor fair. The political par-
ties opposed to the Communist block parties were deprived of practically all means of
fighting an election-electoral lists were suppressed; candidates' and voters' names were
removed from the voter registries, and opponents of the regime were either arrested or
murdered. MAREK, supra note 106, at 506. On January 28, 1947, the United States De-
partment of State made the following declaration:
The reports received from the United States Embassy in Poland in the pe-
riod immediately prior to the elections as well as its subsequent reports based
upon the observatons of American officials who visited a number of Polish voting
centers confirmed the fears which this Government had expressed that the elec-
tion would not be free. These reports were corroborated by the general tenor of
the dispatches from foreign correspondents in Poland. It is clear that the Provi-
sional Government did not confine itself to the suppression of the so-called 'un-
derground' but employed wide-spread measures of coercion and intimidation
against democratic elements which were loyal to Poland although not partisans
of the Government "bloc". In these circumstances the United States Govern-
ment cannot consider that the provisions of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements
have been fulfilled.
16 DEP'T ST. BULL. 251 (1947)(emphasis added).
On February 3, 1947, a spokesman for the British Government made the following
statement regarding the Polish "elections":
H.M. Government cannot regard these elections as fulfilling the solemn con-
tract which the Polish Provisional Government entered into with them and with
the United States Government and Soviet Government that free and unfettered
elections would be held. They cannot, therefore, regard the results as a true ex-
pression of the will of the Polish people.
Reprinted in MAREK, supra 106, at 506. See also President Truman's Report to the
United States Senate of May 29, 1948 listing Soviet Violatons of Treaty Obligations, 18
DEP'T ST. BULL. 738-44 (1947).
Whatever the impact of the Yalta accords in 1945, by 1947 they seemed to have
been completely repudiated by the United States Government. The Government of the
United Kingdom, while not repudiating the agreements as a whole, openly admitted that
any binding contract which the accords may have represented in 1945 had been broken
19851
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The re-establishment of nations which at one time had been ab-
sorbed by stronger states was not confined to Europe. From 1948 to
1965, the major European powers restored the territories of African
and Asian kingdoms which they had annexed in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. India, Pakistan, Morocco, Israel, Egypt, Syria,
Algeria, Mali, Ghana, Cambodia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Zanzibar and
many other colonies reemerged as independent states after more than
a century of occupation and foreign domination.
Another important indication of the consistency with which the
world community has applied the nonrecognition principle can be dis-
cerned by examining the response of the United Nations to a series of
post-war forcible territorial annexations and occupations. These in-
clude the Israeli occupation of Arab lands after the six-day War of
1967; the 1975 Moroccan-Mauritanian tour de force in the Western
Sahara; the Indonesian annexation of East Timor in 1976; the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan.
The 1967 passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, in re-
sponse to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Golan Heights and
Sinai Peninsula, was a major reaffirmation of the principle of nonrecog-
nition of territorial conquest. The Resolution declared that the acquisi-
tion of territory by force was "inadmissible" and called for the with-
drawal of Israel's armed forces from Arab lands. 515 Diplomatic practice
has supported the principle embodied in the resolution. Those states
with whom Israel maintains diplomatic relations have refused to trans-
fer their embassies from Tel Aviv to the new Israeli capital at Jerusa-
lem for fear that such a move would be seen as implying recognition of
by the Soviet Union and its allies in the communist-dominated governments of eastern
Europe.
The failure of the Soviet Union to comply with the agreements of the Crimean Con-
ference has, as is generally recognized in the law of contract, released the United States
and the United Kingdom from any legal duty, if one existed in the first place, of compli-
ance with the agreements. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that either the
United Kingdom or the United States recognize today the legality of the Soviet occupa-
tion of Poland's eastern territories, including the city of Lvov, nor Soviet presence in the
German city of K6nigsberg or its hinterlands. As has already been mentioned, the
United States and the United Kingdom have never recognized the legality of Polish
claims to Pomerania, Silesia or East Prussia. The Poland-Federal Republic of Germany
Boundary Treaty of 1970, however, makes it extremely unlikely that the Western Allies
would ever object to the Polish incorporation of these territories in the future. Such
recognition is dependent, however, on the signing of an Allied peace treaty with Ger-
many-an event which would appear to be unlikely at this time.
515. 1967 U.N.Y.B. 257, 22 U.N. SCOR (138 2d mtg.) at 8-9 (1967), reprinted in
McDouoAL & REISMAN, supra note 510, at 667-68.
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Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank.5"6
Eight years after the six-day War, Morocco and Mauritania occu-
pied the former Spanish colony of Rio de Oro." 7 Both nations claimed
that the colony was terra nullius and asserted historic claims to the
region. Spain and Algeria disputed the Moroccan-Mauritanian claims
and submitted the case to the International Court of Justice. The
516. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1980, at A3, col. 1. See also Gwertzman, Compromise Move
on Israel Embassy, id., Aug. 29, 1985, at A5, col. 1. In 1984, members of the United
States Congress introduced a bill calling for the United States to move its Embassy from
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The bill was opposed by Secretary of State George P. Shultz as
contrary to United States interests in the Middle East. Although Israel's supporters in
Congress lobbied hard for passage of the bill, the Senate leadership vowed to keep the
measure from a floor vote. Id. The United States official position remains that the status
of Jerusalem should be left to eventual peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab
States. Id.
The number of Jewish settlers living in the Israeli-occupied West Bank grew in 1983
by 21.5% to approximately 51,600. This figure does not include Israelis living in East
Jerusalem which has been officially annexed. Id., Nov. 25, 1985, at A7, col. 3. Approxi-
mately 800,000 Palestinians now live on the West Bank. Id. The Israeli Government of
Prime Minister Shimon Peres has imposed a virtual freeze on new settlements in the
occupied territories because of a shortage of funds and political disagreements. Id. The
Peres government officially stands ready to negotiate the fate of the West Bank if
"meaningful negotiations" can be started with Jordan. An Interview with Shimon Peres,
TIME, July 9, 1984, at 32. An Israeli poll printed in June 1984 showed the nation almost
evenly divided over whether Israel should give up its conquered territory in exchange for
a peace agreement. Forty-three percent of the population favored some territorial con-
cessions, while 41% opposed such a solution. "Those who call themselves Palestinian
Arabs should be grateful that we permit them to live in our homeland," said one West
Bank settler. Id., at 34.
Three distinct phases have occurred in the process by which Israel has come to dom-
inate the West Bank. In the first phase, immediately after the Six-Day War, military
settlements were established on the West Bank's periphery in the mountains and empty
spaces of the Jordan Valley. The second phase was a building boom that spread outward
from Jerusalem, southeast to Jericho, northwest to the road to Tel Aviv and southwest to
the Judean Desert. The housing that was constructed provided living quarters for pri-
marily middle-class families who could not afford to live in Jerusalem proper. The third
phase, begun by the Likud Government of Menachem Begin, accelerated an annexation-
ist tendency by building a string of strategic settlements through the middle of the occu-
pied territory. Perlmutter, Peres Couldn't Return the Land, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1984,
at A21, col. 1.
United Nations Resolution 242 still remains the center of any Middle East peace
plan. On December 3, 1984, both Egypt and Jordan issued a joint communiqu6 which
called on the Palestine Liberation Organization to accept Resolution 242 as a basis for
peace talks. The communiqu6, issued by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek and Jor-
dan's King Hussein, defined the principles of Resolution 242 as the "inadmissibility of
acquisition of territories by force" and "land for peace." Miller, Jordan's Formula
Backed by Egypt, id. Dec. 4, 1984, at A13, col. 1.
517. McDoUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 510, at 641. See generally Franck, Stealing
the Sahara, 70 Am. J. INT'L L. 694 (1976).
19851
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
Court rejected the claim that the colony was terra nullius. Although
admitting some historic ties between the indigenous tribes and the Mo-
roccan Crown, the Court declared that such ties were too tenuous to
form a basis for disregarding the international norms calling for self-
determination."'8
Despite the Court's opinion, Morocco and Mauritania refused to
withdraw from what had come to be known as the Western Sahara. In
1977, the former colony was divided into sectors and annexed by the
occupying states. Following a coup in the Mauritania capital in 1978,
Mauritania withdrew from its position in the territory and Morocco
extended its control south to the Mauritanian border.51 9
The joint annexation was condemned by many African states. In
July 1976, the Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers de-
nounced what it styled a "foreign occupation" and called for a
Mauritanian-Moroccan withdrawal to be followed by free elections for
the nomadic inhabitants.2 Algeria announced that it would back a lo-
cal political organization dedicated to the independence of the territory
and condemned the Moroccan fait accompli. Algeria declared that it
did not recognize forcible seizure of territory since such action consti-
tutes a flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter. 21 The Algerian position
was supported by a majority of the members of the world community.
On November 21, 1979, the General Assembly voted eighty-five to six
in favor of a resolution calling for a Moroccan evacuation of the West-
ern Sahara and self-determination for its inhabitants. Similar resolu-
tions have been adopted every year since 1979 and few nations have
granted recognition to the Moroccan claims.
522
A comparable response has been forthcoming in reaction to the
Indonesian occupation and annexation of the former Portugese colony
of East Timor in December 1975. The General Assembly and Security
Council have adopted a series of resolutions since that time demanding
an Indonesian withdrawal so that the inhabitants may vote in a plebi-
518. Western Sahara, (Request for Advisory Opinion), 1975 I.C.J. 4 (Order of May
22, 1975).
519. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1979, at A5, col. 5.
520. 30 U.N.Y.B. 738 (1976).
521. Id. at 739.
522. 33 U.N.Y.B. 1063 (1979). On November 12, 1984, the Organization of African
Unity voted to seat a delegation claiming to represent an independent state in Western
Sahara, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. C. May, Morocco Quits O.A.U. Over
Polisario, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1984, at A12, col. 1. The Moroccan delegation immedi-
ately left the organization, followed by Zaire, to protest the seating of the guerillas,




scite on the question of independence.52 3 The Timorese problem has
523. 30 U.N.Y.B. 728-34. (1976). Resolution 384 of the United Nations Security
Council declared:
The Security Council,
Having noted the contents of the letter of the Permanent Representative of
Portugal (S/11899),
Having heard the statements of the representatives of Portugal and
Indonesia,
Having heard representatives of the people of East Timor,
Recognizing the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-deter-
mination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514
(XV) of 14 December 1960,
Noting that General Assembly resolution 3485 (XXX) of 12 December 1975,
inter alia, requested the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples to send a fact-finding mission to East Timor,
Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in East Timor,
Gravely concerned also at the loss of life and conscious of the urgent need
to avoid further bloodshed in East Timor,
Deploring the intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in East Timor,
Regretting that the Government of Portugal did not discharge fully its re-
sponsibilities as administering Power in the Territory under Chapter XI of the
Charter,
1. Calls upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor as
well as the inalienable right of its people to self-determination in accordance
with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
2. Calls upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw without delay all
its forces from the Territory;
3. Calls upon the Government of Portugal as administering Power to co-
operate fully with the United Nations so as to enable the people of East Timor
to exercise freely their right to self-determination;
4. Urges all States and other parties concerned to co-operate fully with the
efforts of the United Nations to achieve a peaceful solution to the existing situa-
tion and to facilitate the decolonization of the Territory;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to send urgently a special representative
to East Timor for the purpose of making an on-the-spot assessment of the ex-
isting situation and of establishing contact with all the parties in the Territory
and all States concerned in order to ensure the implementation of the present
resolution;
6. Further requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of
the present resolution and, taking into account the report of his special repre-
sentative, to submit recommendations to the Security Council as soon as
possible;
7. Decides to remain seized of the situation.
U.N. SCOR (1869th mtg.) at 10, UN. Doc. 8/P.V. 1869 (1975).
Voting in favor of the resolution were: Cameroon, China, Costa Rica, France,
Guyana, Italy, Japan, Iraq, Mauritania, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, White
Russia, Tanzania and U.S.S.R.
1985]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
also been considered by the U.N. Committee on Decolonization. Dur-
ing the 1979 committee hearings, representatives from many newly
emerged developing countries indicated that their opposition to the In-
donesian annexation was based upon the principles underlying the
Stimson doctrine. According to the representatives from Barbados, In-
donesia was attempting to legitimize an act of annexation by crushing
every semblance of resistance.2" Uganda stated that it rejected the an-
nexation as an illegal act, and Ghana said that it could under no cir-
cumstances recognize a situation brought about by the use of force. 52 5
Several years after the Indonesian tour de force in Timor, Viet-
nam invaded and occupied Cambodia.5 26 On October 22, 1980, the Gen-
eral Assembly adopted Resolution 35/6 by a vote of ninety-seven to
twenty-three. The Resolution called for the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Cambodian territory and reaffirmed the need for all states
to adhere strictly to the principles of the Charter of the United Na-
tions. The Resolution noted that these principles call for the respect of
national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; noninter-
vention and noninterference in the internal affairs of states; nonre-
course to the threat or use of force and peaceful settlement of
disputes.
527
The General Assembly has also indicated its strong opposition to
the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. On January 14, 1980, by a
recorded vote of 104 to 18, the Assembly called for a withdrawal of
Russian troops and appealed to the Soviet Government to respect the
territorial integrity of Afghanistan in conformity with article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter. 2 8 The Soviet Union rejected the Assembly resolu-
tion on the ground that it was a blatant interference in the internal
affairs of the Afghan State and maintained that its troops were in Af-
524. 34 U.N.Y.B. (1980), at 867-70, U.N. Sales No. E.83.I.1. (1980).
525. 33 U.N.Y.B. 1040 (1979).
526. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1979, at A2, col. 1. See also supra notes 428-30 and infra
note 553 for a more extensive discussion of the Cambodian Crisis.
527. 34 U.N.Y.B. 334-35 (1980).
528. Id. at 307. On November 15, 1984, the General Assembly again demanded the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The vote tally of 119 votes to 20 with 14
abstentions gathered three more votes than in 1983, and five more votes than a similar
resolution in 1982. U.N. Demands Soviet Quit Afghanistan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1984,
at A5.
On November 13, 1985, the United Nations General Assembly called for a with-
drawal of Soviet troops by an overwhelming margin of 122 votes to 19. In addition to a
troop withdrawal, the resolution called for "preservation of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, political independence and nonaligned character of Afghanistan," the right of
the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their eco-
nomic, political and social system. E. Sciolino, U.N., 122-19, Asks Troop Pullout in Af-
ghanistan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985 at All, col. 1.
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ghanistan at the invitation of the legitimate Afghan Government 2 9
Strong indicia of consistent and uniform acceptance of the princi-
ple of nonrecognition of forcible territorial acquisition can be found in
several important post-war declarations and charters of international
organizations. The first such declaration was made at the Inter-Ameri-
can Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held in February-
March 1945, at Mexico City, Mexico. On March 6, 1945, at Chapulte-
pec Castle, the Conference adopted a "Declaration on Reciprocal Assis-
tance and American Solidarity," which subsequently became known as
the "Act of Chapultepec." The preamble to the Declaration empha-
sized that the principle of nonrecognition of territorial conquest had
been incorporated by the American States in their hemispheric law
since 1890.530 In 1948, the principle of nonrecognition was inserted into
the Charter of the Organization of American States. Article 17 of the
Charter declares:
The territory of a state is inviolable, it may not be the object,
even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures
of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advan-
tages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion
shall be recognized.
3 1
A similar affirmation of respect for the sovereignty and territorial in-
tegrity of states is contained in article III of the Charter of the Organi-
zation of African Unity, signed at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 25,
1963.532
In 1970, the United Nations Special Committee on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States adopted a declaration containing the following principle:
"No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force
shall be recognized as legal." The declaration was adopted later that
year by the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. 3
529. Id. at 308-09. For further discussion of the Afghanistan crisis see infra note 533.
530. LANGER, supra note 4, at 82.
531. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 17.
532. O.A.U. CHARTER art. 3.
533. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 30, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970).
See generally Blix, supra note 13. The debate on the obligation of states to refuse legal
recognition of those territorial acquisitions resulting from the threat or use of force was
initiated in 1964 at the first session of the United Nations Special Committee on Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States.
Id. at 662. The Committee noted the precedents established by the Anti-War Treaty of
Non-Aggression and Conciliation of Oct. 10, 1933; the Act of Chapultepec of Mar. 3,
1945; and the Charter of the Organization of American States. Id. Later that year, the
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2. Sufficient Degree of Generality
The world community's claim to prescribe the doctrine of nonrec-
ognition to seizure of territory has not been limited to any specific
group of nation states. It has been applied to states whose territorial
community processes, bases of power and value structures are highly
diverse, and whose geographic location encompasses five continents. As
a result of the various General Assembly resolutions, it is clear that the
vast majority of world states embrace the doctrine of nonrecognition
and apply it with a high degree of universality.
3. Lapse of Time
The Baltic States were annexed by the U.S.S.R. in 1940, yet, forty-
six years later, none of the world's major nation states have recognized
the legitimacy of the Soviet occupation. Such a refusal to recognize the
conquest for nearly half a century represents a major historical and
Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries meeting
in Cairo, Egypt, adopted a declaration. which stated, inter alia, that situations "brought
about by the threat or use of force shall not be recognized." Id.
The most eloquent arguments in favor of such a proposal were made by the Mexican
representative, Mr. Castenada, who stated that nonrecognition of territorial conquests
was a general principle of international law embodied in a large number of conventions
and a corollary of the prohibition of force. Id. at 663. Indeed, Castenada maintained that
the principle of the criminality of aggressive wars "would make any recognition of the
conquest an act of criminal complicity." U.N. Doc. A/AC119/S.R. 9 (Record of the 9th
meeting on Sept. 3, 1964), quoted in Blix, supra note 13, at 663.
At the Committee's third session, in 1967, the representative from Madagascar indi-
cated that most of the developing nations supported the Stimson doctrine in principle.
Madagascar's representitive maintained that the territorial inviolability of a State was
essential to developing countries and that they were not in a position, either materially
or financially, to defend themselves. Therefore, "nonrecognition of military occupation or
territorial acquisition achieved by force was a vital principle." Id. at 664. Other states,
such as Japan, Sweden and France, voiced concern about conforming their international
behavior to the doctrine of nonrecognition. The Japanese delegate stated: "While an ille-
gal threat or use of force was undoubtedly to be condemned, it was a delicate point as a
strictly legal proposition whether one could deny even the existence of any and all conse-
quences that would flow therefrom." Id. at 665.
Blix states that the debates of the Committee indicate:
no formal admission may be made of the legality of a forcible territorial
acquisition . . . . This would appear to allow States to determine for them-
selves-in the absence of any collective action by the United Nations-to what
extent they would allow practical cooperation and courtesies without any formal
admission of the legality of the situation. There had been concern that a flat
provision for nonrecognition could have been used for arguments against any
practical relations and courtesies predicated upon an illegal situation-a position
deemed unrealistic.
Id. at 664-65 (emphasis added).
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legal precedent. Before the Baltic States' annexation, refusal of recog-
nition of territorial conquest had never spanned more than eight or
nine years; today there are half a dozen additional areas of interna-
tional controversy where the legality of title to the territory in question
has been denied by the world community for ten years or more. Such
statistics underscore the fact that the nonrecognition principle has
withstood the passage of a considerable period of time.
B. Opinio Iuris Sive Necessitatis
The second major element of customary law is the principle em-
bodied in the Roman maxim "opinio iuris sive necessitatis." The In-
ternational Court has clearly affirmed this principle's necessity for the
formation of a positive customary prescription. The Court declared
that States, by acting in conformity with the claimed rule, must con-
sider it a legal duty to do so. This requirement is reinforced by the
repeated repudiation by the Court of "political expediency" as a legiti-
mate motive for acting in conformity with the alleged law."3
Although it is extremely difficult to adduce proof of such a motive
behind a recognition or nonrecognition of seizure of territory, "it can
hardly be contested that the former practice of States, involving the
de-recognition of States which were the victims of illegal acts and the
recognition of their annexation and extinction, had been overwhelm-
ingly dictated by political expediency."5 The overwhelming refusal to
recognize the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States constitutes a volte
face in international diplomatic practice. The history of the global
community's response to the Italian annexation of Ethiopia and Ja-
pan's dismemberment of China prior to the 1940 annexation of the
Baltic States are sufficient indications that most nation states viewed
the nonrecognition of forcible territorial seizure as a purely political
instrument to be applied for a limited period of time as a means of
achieving national foreign policy objectives. The majority of the
world's nations, with the exception of a few states such as New Zea-
land, the United States and Argentina, clearly felt they were under no
legal obligations to refuse recognition of title acquired by conquest.538
In contrast to the purely political motivation vis-&-vis the doctrine of
nonrecognition in the 1930's, it is difficult to see what immediate polit-
ical interest the world community had in a restoration of the Baltic
States in the 1940's and afterwards. Indeed, it could be asserted that
the recognition of their annexation would have suited the interests of
534. See supra notes 511-12 and accompanying text.
535. MAREK, supra note 106, at 571.
536. LANGER, supra note 4, at 147.
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third party states by leaving such states completely free of any conven-
tional obligations which they may have had with the Baltic nations. In
addition, it would have put such third party states in a much better
position to resume trade and other exchanges of resources with
U.S.S.R. A similar analysis may be made with regard to Czechoslova-
kia, Poland and Albania. It is not readily apparent why it was politi-
cally expedient for the Allied states to restore sovereignty to these vic-
tims of Axis aggression on the basis of their unbroken continuity, 5 3
and not simply create new territorial alignments in Eastern Europe.
Thus, recent state practice, measured by the standards of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, backed by the generally conforming prac-
tice of international organizations, expressed in conventional law such
as the U.N. Charter, and supported by a considerable volume of na-
tional court decisions, would form a strong case for asserting the exis-
tence of a new customary rule in international law proscribing the for-
cible seizure of territory and requiring the nonrecognition of any claim
to title based uniquely on such a tour de force.
In light of this postulation, it must be asked whether such a posi-
tive rule of international law has certain outer limits beyond which it is
no longer effective. Although the linkage between the suppressed state
and the rightful sovereign has been known to survive lengthy periods
of separation, it is not to be imagined that the de facto presence of the
occupying power is to be flouted forever. 8 Indeed, without an effec-
tive, centralized international authority able to use coercive instru-
ments in order to vindicate violated rights, there is little chance that
an occupier can be compelled to withdraw from subjugated territory.
Professor Krzystyna Marek points out that in matters of occupa-
tion and annexation, "[T]he operative factor in the practice of states
holding the principle of the ideal continuity of occupied states as
against effectively existing new territorial delimitation is that of tem-
porariness." She notes that international law cannot withstand a per-
manent divorce between validity and effectiveness without the threat
of becoming "a fiction to the point of disappearance" and declares that
such a permanent divorce must end by a new adaptation of fact to law
or vice versa. 39
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht recognized the dilemma in which positivist
537. MAREK, supra note 106, at 571.
538. Id. at 576. See Gerson, War, Conquered Territory, and Military Occupation in
the Contemporary International Legal System, 18 HARV. J. INT'L L. 525, 544 (1977).
"The truth is that international law can no more refuse to recognize that a finally suc-
cessful conquest does change title to territory than municipal law can change a regime
brought about by a successful revolution." Id.
539. Id. at 577.
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legal theory placed international law. He proposed three possible ways
by which an illegal annexation might be validated-prescription, vali-
dation by the injured party, and recognition by the international com-
munity-the latter representing a "quasi legislative act."54
According to Professor Oppenheim of Cambridge University, pre-
scription is "the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory through
continuous and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over it, during such
a period as is necessary to create under the influence of historical de-
velopment the general conviction that the present condition of things
is in conformity with international order."
'54 '
The difficulty with prescription as a form of validation is the ease
with which it can be disturbed by protests of third party states and
representatives of the conquered nation.542 The effectiveness of a pre-
scriptive claim is also called into doubt by historical precedent. Two
glaring examples are those of Poland-Lithuania and Guinea. Despite
the fact that Poland-Lithuania was annexed by Russia, Prussia and
Austria in the eighteenth century, the Polish and Lithuanian people
never regarded their nation's absorption as a legal state-of-affairs, and
in 1918 the Polish and Lithuanian nations reemerged as independent
members of the global community. 54 3 After the First World War, Po-
lish courts and legal scholars used the concept of post liminium in or-
der to assert the continuity of the modern Polish state with the prepar-
tition kingdom. The concept was also used to explain the nullity of at
least some of the legislative and executive acts of Russia in respect to
its Polish provinces.
544
A similar situation has occurred in Guinea. Guinea was annexed
by France in 1889 after the conclusion of an Anglo-French convention
which delimited the borders of Sierra Leone, Guinea's southern neigh-
bor and a British colony. It was not until 1898, however, that France
was able to subdue the forces of the Guinean King, Samory Tour&
Samory's memory lived on in song and story and his role in resisting
French rule later contributed to popular support for his great grand-
son, Sekou Tour6.5 45 Tour6 later became Guinea's first President in
1958 when the French withdrew their military forces from the West
540. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 509, at 427-30.
541. MAREK, supra note 106, at 577 (quoting F. LISZT, DAS VOLKERRECHT 527 (1925)).
542. Id.
543. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 620 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1961). See gener-
ally The Resurrection of Poland in A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS 217-
98 (H. Temperley ed. 1924).
544. Id. at 620 n.1.
545. 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 584 (1978).
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African nation. 46
These historical precedents underscore the weakness of the pre-
scriptive segment of Lauterpacht's tripartite test of validity of seizure
of territory. Many scholars, such as the Italian, Danzilo Anzilotti5 7 and
the German, Franz Liszt,548 maintain that no amount of passage of
time can determine the acquisition or extinction of rights in territory if
they were illegally obtained. Professor Marek has similarly concluded
that there seems to be no solid ground on which to accept prescription
as a valid institution of international law.
54 9
Validation of an annexation by the injured party seems to be the
most convincing way out of an illegal situation. It is clear, however,
that no legally relevant validation can result from a fraud as, for exam-
ple, a legitimization undertaken by a puppet government created for
that purpose, or by a spurious plebiscite. Moreover, such a validation
by the subjugated populace seems most unlikely today in light of the
normative nature of the right to self-determination."'
There remains, according to Lauterpacht, the third possibility of
validation by way of a "quasi-legislative act," that is, recognition on
the part of the international community of the annexation. 55' Marek
indicates that such an act might have validity if enacted within the
framework of an existing, fully organized international community
functioning on a strictly legal basis and endowed with proper organs to
adjudicate such an issue. But so long as such a quasi-legislative act
lacks any legal basis-in other words, so long as it is an arbitrary act of
third party states-it has little to commend itself as a legal solution to
the problem.55 2 Most importantly, this act of "quasi-legislating" by
546. Id. at 585.
547. See D. ANZILOTTI, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 336-37 (1929). Anzilotti
declares:
Le droit international ne connait pas l'institution de la prescription, tant
acquistive qu'extinctive, m~me sous la forme de ce qu'on appelle la prescrip-
tion imm~moriale; en rgle, l'coulement du temps ne suffit pas pour deter-
miner lacquistion ou la perte des droits.
Id., quoted in MAREK, supra note 106, at 577 n.2.
548. See F. LISZT, DAS VOLKERRECHT 241 (1925). Liszt states:
Zu den naturlichen Tatsachen gehort im Gebiete des nationalen Rechts
auch der Ablauf der Zeit. Auf dem Gebiete des Volkerechts aber muss der
rechtbegrundende oder rechtvernichtende Einfluss der Zeit in Abrede gestellt
werden. Die Verjahrung hat volkerrechtlich weder als acquisitive (als Er-
sitzung) noch als extinctive die Kraft einer rechtserheblichen Tatsache.
Id., quoted in MAREK, supra note 106, at 577 n.2.
549. MAREK, supra note 106, at 578.
550. Id. See generally Meissner, supra note 197.
551. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 509, at 427-30.
552. MAREK, supra note 106, at 577.
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third party states is antithetical to the principle of self-determination
of peoples. It is doubtful that the inhabitants of an annexed territory
would ever consider themselves legally bound to honor the sovereignty
of the conquering state simply because of third party acquiesence or
approval. The Polish-Lithuanian and Guinean examples point out the
weakness of such a theory. In both of these instances, the annexation
was accepted by the world community, but repudiated by the inhabi-
tants. In both instances, superior military power resulted in the sub-
mergence of the conquered state for a considerable period of time.
Nevertheless, these states reemerged as independent nations on the
strength of their populations' demands for the right of self-determina-
tion. The "quasi-legislative acts" of third parties had no effect on legal
validity of the tour de force and no effect on the eventual putcome of
the legal process. Concrete examples of communities where a majority
of the population refuse to acknowledge the will of a conquering state
can be found today in the Baltic States, Cambodia, Eritrea, Namibia,
Timor, Afghanistan and the West Bank. 53
553. For an example of recent Baltic dissent against Soviet rule, see Soviet Students
in Estonia Demonstrate Against New Tsars, Xinhua, June 24, 1977, item no: 062321
(available on NEXIS). The Chinese report stated that "Soviet troops and police savagely
cracked down on a demonstration of students in the Estonian City of Tartu last Decem-
ber who protested against the new Tsars' fascist rule. ... Id. A soirbe held by the
Estonian Academy of Agriculture and Tartu State University was banned on December
3, 1976 by Soviet authorities because its program was filled with "political nuances." Id.
Police and police vans were sent to interfere. Id. This intervention aroused strong emo-
tions in the crowd and students began to march through the city of Tartu, demanding
democratic rights and an end to national suppression. Id. When the march passed the
local KGB headquarters, the demonstrators "shouted for the secret police to get out of
Estonia." Id. The demonstration lasted till 2:30 a.m. and Soviet authorities were panic
stricken.
The Chinese news agency asserted that "KGB men arrived on special planes from
Tallinn and army units were put on alert." Id. Even the fire brigades were called out- Id.
All streets leading to the city hall square were blocked off by a chain of police and those
who attempted to force their way to the square were arrested and shoved into police
vans. Id.
For a discussion of the conflict between Cambodians and the Vietnamese forces oc-
cupying Cambodia, see Gwertzman, Gains for Rebels Seen in Cambodia, N.Y. Times,
July 13, 1984, at A4, col. 3. A Cambodian coalition group led by Prince Norodom
Siahnouk currently comprises nearly 50,000 rebels fighting against a well-armed
Vietnamese occupation force of 160,000 men. Id.
For an indication of the lack of fundamental freedoms in Vietnamese-occupied Cam-
bodia, see B. Crossette, Hanoi Linked to Cambodian Torture, id. Nov. 15, 1984, at A3.
Floyd Abrams, a noted United States human rights attorney, stated after visiting Cam-
bodia that "when you put together a society in which people are arrested without charges
being made and jailed without being convicted, in which confessions are forced and tor-
ture seems to be commonplace, you simply are not talking about a society that seriously
recognizes the rule of law." Id.
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Although resistance in the Baltic States has not employed the mil-
For an account of the fight by Eritrean guerillas to recover their homeland which
was annexed in 1962 by Ethiopia in violation of Eritrea's internationally guaranteed au-
tonomy, see Russell, Flight from Fear, TIME, Jan. 21, 1985, at 36. Eritrean guerillas have
been fighting steadily for over twenty-three years against Addis Abbaba's control. Id. at
37. The Marxist government of Colonel Haile Mengistu Mariam has pursued a harsh
strategy aimed at utilizing the Ethiopian famine to choke off support for the rebels. Id.
Caravans of refugees from rebel controlled areas have been bombed in daylight by Ethio-
pia's Soviet-supplied air force and a forced resettlement of Eritreans to southern Ethio-
pia is now underway. The resettlement campaign may even be causing more fatalities
than the famine-yet its goal is deemed worth the price-collectivization of agriculture
on the Marxist model and destruction of support bases for the rebels in the villages of
the north. Garment, West's Live Aid Digs Graves in Ethiopia, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1986,
at 22, col. 3. Because the rebels control 85% of the Eritrean and Tigrean countryside, the
Ethiopian Army has struck back by bombing villages and mining agricultural land. Id.
See also, May, Ethiopia Rebels Seize Key Relief Center, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1984, at
A3, col. 8; Berger, Eritreans Ask Separate Aid, Saying Rebel Areas Get Little, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 25, 1984, at A20, col. 3.
For an account of the Namibian resistance to the occupation of South-West Africa
by South Africa, see Amnesty International, Namibia: Terrorized by Torture, AMNESTY
ACTION, Summer 1985, Bulletin No. 5, at 1-4. Although South Africa was asked to govern
the territory under the mandate system of the League of Nations, it failed to move the
former German colony to statehood and its mandate was revoked by the United Nations
in 1966. Id. at 1. In 1973, the United Nations recognized the indigenous South West
Africa Peoples Organization as the only legitimate representative of the Namibian peo-
ple. An ongoing guerilla war aims at driving the South Africans from the territory. Id.
For a report on the rebellion in East Timor against Indonesia and its devastating
effects on the people of that former colony, see generally Amnesty International, East
Timor: A Decade of Killing, Torture, and Indonesian Claims of "Normality", AMNESTY
ACTION, Summer 1985, at 1. According to some estimates, up to 200,000 East
Timorese-a third of the population-have died as a result of Indonesian activities since
1975. Id. Virtually all sectors of Timorese society have suffered severe human rights
abuses, including summary reprisal killings, torture, incarceration in squalid concentra-
tion camps, and forced resettlement. Id. An indigenous rebel movement, Fretilin, has
continued its armed resistance to the Indonesian Government's annexation for the past
10 years. Id. See also, Crossette, Indonesians Hope to Settle Disputes In Timor and
Irian Jaya, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1985, at A10, col. 3.
The Indonesian predilection for expansion is evidenced by its successful 1962 drive
to force the United Nations to give western New Guinea to Indonesia. The incorporation
by Indonesia created the impetus for a Melanesian rebellion which has held out against
rule by Jakarta. Id. See also, Letter from B. Nietschmann to The Editor, Disguised In-
vasion in the South Seas, id., Jan. 16, 1985, at A22, col. 3. The Melanesian inhabitants
of western New Guinea (West Irian) "have continuously occupied the region for at least
40,000 years, 1,000 times longer than the existence of the artificial Indonesian state." Id.
The invasion of non-Melanesian settlers, large-scale deforestation, conscription of Pap-
uan labor, the almost complete denial of pre-existing indigenous rights to customary
lands and resources, and the 9000 to 10,000 refugees who have fled to Papua New
Guinea, have fueled the creation of the Free West Papua Resistance Movement (O.P.M.)
led by James Nyaro. Id. Its 300 guerillas seek to defend their lands against Indonesian
"annexation and expropriation." Id.
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itary instrument, it is nevertheless highly active.55 In Estonia, a na-
For accounts of the brutual destruction of the formerly neutral Kingdom of Afghani-
stan, see All But Annexed Afghanistan, id., Nov. 24, 1985, at A30, col. 1 (Editorial). The
N.Y. Times stated:
Afghanistan ostensibly remains an independent country, with its own flag
and seat in the U.N. But the reality is otherwise. A puppet Communist govern-
ment totters in Kabul, held in place by 110,00 Soviet troops. What was sup-
posed to be a temporary intervention in 1979 has lasted longer than the Soviet
Union's war against Hitler. The invaders have made four million Afghans state-
less refugees in Pakistan and Iran-one fourth of the population they allegedly
came to assist.
Id. See also, Afghan Children Reportedly Sent to Soviet, id., Nov. 14, 1984, at A5, col. 4.
(Western diplomats are cited as stating that thousands of primary-school Afghan chil-
dren are being sent to the U.S.S.R. for at least ten years for an indoctrination in commu-
nism and the Soviet way of life); Laber, Disaster for the Afghans, id., Nov. 21, 1984, at
A21, col. 2. ("Terror is the basis of Soviet policy .... Whole villages are bombed into
oblivion, sometimes as a reprisal after a guerilla attack, sometimes for no reason at all.
Soviet soldiers enter the villages, selecting noncombatant men, women and children at
random to be shot, dynamited, beheaded or burned alive. Homes are looted, animals
killed, crops burned".); Middleton, Three Soviet Drives Reported in Afghanistan, id.,
July 25, 1994, at A3, col. 6; Borders, Afghanistan's Five-Year Ordeal: Grim Outlines of a
Ferocious War, id., Dec. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 1. (Borders states that the guerillas fighting
the Marxist regime of Barbrak Karmal and his Soviet supporters are tough, traditional
tribesmen who call themselves, "muyahedeen" or "holy warriors". The guerillas appear
to control most of the country's rural areas and can cross Afghanistan with impunity).
554. Kowalewski, Dissent in the Baltic Republics: Characteristics and Conse-
quences, 10 J. OF BALTIC STUD. 309, 315 (1979). The manifestations of Baltic political
dissent in the 1970's and early 1980's were of such a magnitude and intensity as to indi-
cate a qualitatively new stage in Baltic defiance of the Soviet regime. A. ALEXIEV, DIS-
SENT AND NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET BALTIC 33 (1983). Baltic protest is not only a cry
for human rights, but also an espousal of a nationalist perspective based on rejection of
the Soviet political system. "The ultimate goal of all Baltic dissent philosophies articu-
lated in the past decade is the restoration of the political independence of the three
nations." Id.
Baltic protest has not always been peaceful. Immediately after the second Soviet
invasion of 1944, the Baltic peoples engaged in a heroic, if ultimately unsuccessful,
armed resistance to the Soviet forces occupying their homelands. Organized partisan re-
sistance in Lithuania lasted for ten years (1944-54). At its peak in 1945, the Lithuanian
resistance embraced over 30,000 active fighters with thousands of sympathizers. V.
VARDYS, LITHUANIA UNDER THE SOVIETS: PORTRAIT OF A NATION 85 (1965). The partisans
were especially strong during 1945-1947, when they controlled large sections of the coun-
tryside and held their own against the Soviet forces. Id. Their membership embraced
Lithuanians of all sectors of society: college students, farmers, city workers, former of-
ficers and soldiers in the Lithuanian Army, and members of the clergy. Women acted as
nurses and later as liason agents. Id. at 94.
Organized as conspiratorial military groups, the partisans were dedicated to
the restoration of Lithuanian independence .... [T]he partisans maintained
that according to international law, their country's independence had not been
lost; the occupying power merely prevented the exercise of the nation's sover-
eignty. Consequently, the partisans not only refused to recognize the legality of
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tional liberation organization was recently formed, 555 and similar politi-
Soviet actions, but also maintained their own courts, issued credit papers, passed
decrees, and enforced their regulations on that part of the population that they
could reach, and until 1951, or possibly 1952, maintained an underground gov-
ernment with a President and Council of the Republic.
Id. at 97.
In 1961, a Soviet Lithuanian estimated that during the partisan war about 20,000
"bandits" were killed and "about an equal number of our own people." Id. at 86. The
last leader of the movement, A. Ramanauskas-Vanagas, an American-born former
teacher, was captured in 1956 and executed by the Soviet Union.
In all three Baltic States, the population referred to the guerillas as the "Forest
Brothers". MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA, supra note 209, at 81. In Estonia, the forest brother-
hood may have reached a strength of 10,000, whereas in Latvia, between 10,000 and
15,000 guerillas may have joined to battle the Soviet forces at any one time. Id. In total,
100,000 Lithuanians and 30,000 to 40,000 Estonians and Latvians may have been in-
volved in the struggle over its twelve-year duration. In 1945, a group of 100 rebels at-
tacked Tallinn's central prison and a guerilla unit of 800 men fought the Red Army near
Tartu. Id. at 84, 87. The Soviet response to the forest brotherhood was severe. NKVD
Chief Lavrenti Beria's Deputy in Lithuania, Sergei Kruglov, was assigned the Special
Soviet troops which one month before had deported hundreds of thousands of Crimean
Tartars from their ancestral homeland to Siberia. Kruglov urged his forces to abandon
"their sentimental approach" and to shoot unarmed people who try to run and to burn
farms and villages in which such people take refuge. Id. at 88 (citing testimony of former
Soviet Border Guard Colonel Burlitski before the United States Congressional Commit-
tee investigating the annexation of the Baltic States). The de facto ruler of Lithuania at
this crucial period, Mikhail Suslov, later became the Kremlin's chief party ideologist,
and member of the Politburo. ALEXIEV, supra, at 7.
Mass deportations of the civilian population in guerilla-held areas affected the guer-
illas' strength severely. The forest brothers lost their source of recruits and their source
of food. Other sympathizers were scared off. Indeed, Baltic literature contains images of
entire villages which are grown-over and neglected, their entire populations deported as
"kulaks" to Siberia. MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA, supra note 209, at 89. Eventually, the forest
brothers gave up their struggle. The West had forgotten them-the destruction of the
Hungarian freedom fighters of 1956 made it clear no help would be forthcoming. The
guerillas were exhausted from years in the forest. They faced a population whose ranks
had been decimated by the loss of hundreds of thousands of deportations, and the Red
Army and NKVD forces had outmanned them with overwhelming numbers. Id. at 91.
555. Smith, Elagu Eesti: Estonian Nationalism in Post War Estonia, EsTo AMERICA,
Aug. 1984, at 7-9. In 1972, the West became aware of the existence of two Estonian
nationalist organizations: the Estonian National Front (E.N.F.) and the Estonian Demo-
cratic Movement (E.D.M.). Although both organizations proclaim their goal of a free
Estonia, the E.N.F. declines cooperation with any Soviet citizen of Russian origin. The
E.D.M. favors cooperation with all democratic movements in the Soviet Union. Id. at 8.
On October 24, 1972, and December 23, 1974, these groups sent letters to U.N. Sec-
retary General Kurt Waldheim and the U.N. General Assembly demanding the "restora-
tion of the independent Estonian state in the frontiers fixed by the 1920 Tartu Peace
Treaty .. " Id. They also sought "the admission of Estonia as a former member of the
League of Nations to U.N. membership." Id. Both letters emphasized the dangers which
increasing Russification posed to Estonia. Such a development, in the words of the
E.D.M. and E.N.F. letter, posed a "threat to the very existence of the Estonian nation."
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cal groups exist in Latvia and Lithuania.ss Mass protests have taken
Id.
In the mid-1970's, the Soviet regime was able to arrest and sentence to prison camps
many of the key figures in the Estonian dissident movement. Other groups sprang up to
take their place, however, including the "Estonian Patriotic and Democratic Front" and
the "Association of Concerned Estonians." ALEXIEV, supra note 554, at 35.
In February 1976, four convicted members of the E.D.M., Kalju Matik, Mati Ki-
irend, Sergei Soldatov and Artjom Juskevits, joined fifteen other political prisoners in
the Potma prison camp in Mordavia "in an appeal to all who cherish (the principles of
democracy, freedom, and human rights) asking them to demand that the USSR adhere
to the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement which it had signed." MISluNAS &
TAAGEPERA, supra note 209, at 255. The Association of Concerned Estonians sent a letter
to Esto '76, an emigr6 cultural festival, in April 1976, expressing "concern over the moral
erosion which has accompanied 32 years of Soviet rule." The letter noted that "Christian
ideals and faith in the future had been replaced in Estonia by widespread skepticism,
materialism, pragmatism, and egoism." Id. at 256. In October 1976, representatives of
Estonian Democrats sent another plea to Amnesty International, the United Nations and
United States human rights organizations. Id.
In 1981, Baltic dissidents, who had formed a group called the Democratic Front of
the Soviet Union, attempted to organize strikes and presented a number of demands to
the authorities, including cessation of Soviet interference in Polish affairs. Some strikes
occurred on December 1, 1981, and January 4, 1982, and many Balts were arrested-150
in Tallinn alone. ALEXIEV, supra note 554, at 40.
It would appear that the Solidarity movement in Poland has had a greater impact
on Estonia than other parts of the Soviet Union. Due to the reach of Finnish television
into northern Estonia, a large percentage of the Estonian population was aware of the
importance of the Solidarity union. The vast majority of Estonians welcomed such a
development in Poland. Ristsoo, Solidarnosc and its Effects on Estonia, ESTO AMERICA,
Dec. 1983, at 7-10.
In the late 1970's, it began to appear that Baltic dissidents were cooperating with
each other in attempting to address serious Baltic issues, such as increasing Soviet mili-
tarization of the Baltic region. On August 23, 1979, a statement was issued by 45 Balts
protesting the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 and demanding its publication in the
Soviet Union. MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA, supra note 209, at 258. The statement called for
repudiation of the pact by the Soviet Union and East and West Germany. Both German
States were asked "to assist the Soviet Government to nullify the consequences of that
Pact, namely to withdraw foreign troops from the Baltic States." Id. It was reported that
over 35,000 Lithuanian signatures were gathered in support of this statement. Id. Some
of the signatories were arrested by Soviet authorities, including Antanas Terleckas and
Mart Niklus. Id. at 259. For text of the statement see Appendix X. Another major joint
Baltic statement appeared in October 1981. This open letter signed by Balts of all three
States urged the inclusion of the Baltic region in a nuclear free zone in northern Europe.
ALEXIEV, supra note 554, at 38. For text of the letter, see Appendix IX.
556. Alexiev, supra note 554, at 36. In Lithuania, nationalism has centered in the
Church. Unlike Estonia and Latvia, Lithuanians are almost uniformly Catholics with
some 80% of the population professing Catholicism. Id. at 24. Thus, religious dissent can
be interpreted as a sign of the awareness of nationality in Lithuania. Religious dissent
simmered for years after the second Soviet occupation of 1944. The Church had been
subjected to brutal repression-by 1947 all Lithuanian bishops had been deported or
shot. Countless Catholic priests suffered the same fate. All Catholic monasteries and con-
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vents were closed and monastic orders abolished. Three out of four seminaries, as well as
the Theology Department at the University of Kaunas, were closed. Church lands were
confiscated and priests denied any means of support. Id.
Although the famous "Thaw" under Khruschev lifted the Soviet pressures briefly,
they were reimposed in 1959. Two new bishops, consecrated during the thaw, were pro-
hibited from exercising their duties and were deported to other parts of the Soviet
Union. New laws preventing pastoral work and the catechization of children were passed.
The number of students allowed to study for the priesthood was reduced to 23 from the
previous 80-too few to replenish the natural "attrition" rate for priests. In comparison
with 1986, there were 435 enrolled Lithuanian seminarians in 1940. LITHUANIAN INFORMA-
TION CENTER PRESS RELEASE, Dec. 17, 1982. In 1971, three priests were tried and sen-
tenced for teaching religion to children. A. ALEXIIEV, supra note 554, at 25.
In early 1972, 17,000 Lithuanian Catholics signed a petition listing their grievances
and addressed it to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, but sent it by way of U.N. Secre-
tary General Kurt Waldheim. Two other petitions followed in 1973. One, with 14,604
signatures, was sent to the Ministry of Education for the Lithuanian S.S.R. and another
to the Lithuanian S.S.R.'s Commissioner for Religious Affairs. MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA,
supra note 209, at 244. Another mass petition appeared in 1979 containing 150,000 signa-
tures. It appealed for the opening of the Church of Mary Queen of Peace in Klaipeda,
Lithuania. Constructed between 1956 and 1962 with monies given by Lithuanians from
throughout the nation, it was confiscated by the Soviet occupation authorities after its
completion and converted into a "People's Philharmonic." Id. at (photograph).
In 1976, a Helsinki monitoring group was established in Lithuania. Its method of
operation was to publish samizdat (statements) on human rights violations which were
brought to its attention, including those outside Lithuania. Id. at 247. Most of the mem-
bers of the Lithuanian Helsinki group have been imprisoned or murdered by the Soviet
authorities. Victoras Petkus was sentenced to ten years of prison and five years of exile
in 1978. Balys Gajarkas was sentenced to ten years in a labor camp in 1978. Vytautas
Skuodis was sentenced to seven years in prison in 1980. Dr. Algirdas Statkevicius was
sentenced to compulsory treatment in a psychiatric hospital in 1980. Reverend Bronius
Laurinavicius was killed when he was pushed by four men in the path of an oncoming
truck in Vilnius on Nov. 24, 1981. Two other founding member are currently overseas.
Professor Tomas Venclova was stripped of his Soviet citizenship, while on a teaching
assignment at the University of California. Eitan Finkelstein emigrated to Israel in Dec.
1983. Lithuanian Information Centre, The Lithuanian Helsinki Monitonny Group (June
1986).
Despite these efforts, the Soviet Union continues to intimidate and suppress the
Lithuanian Church. A wave of burning, looting and desecrating churches has spread
across the Lithuanian countryside; KGB units have broken up religious assemblies and
processions; and four activist priests have been murdered in brutal circumstances since
October 1980. ALEXIEV. supra note 554, at 28, 32. The most recent death, that of Father
Juozas Zdebskis in an auto 'accident' on Feb. 5, 1986, was "a carefully planned and exe-
cuted act of violence" according to the underground journal, The Chronicle of the Cath-
olic Church in Lithuania. Although a Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers'
Rights (C.D.B.R.) was formed in 1978, its leaders have been jailed and harassed. In May
1983, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas, a founding member of the C.D.B.R., was sentenced to
7 years in prison and three years in exile for "anti-Soviet activities" Id.
The first indications of Latvian dissent appeared in 1960 when three individuals
were tried for allegedly plotting an armed uprising. In 1962, 8 Latvians were sentenced
from 8 to 15 years in prison for planning to form an organization which would oppose
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place against Russian rule,55Tand some students have immolated
Russification and economic exploitation of the Soviet-occupied Baltic States. MisiUNAS &
TAAGEPERA, supra note 229, at 249
In 1975, a Latvian independence movement sent a letter to Latvian emigres to bring
to their attention the problems faced by the Latvian people, including "oppression, Rus-
sification, moral degradation, family instability, and alcoholism." Id. at 251. These devel-
opments placed the Latvian nation "in question" according to the letter. Id. The year
1975 also saw the appearance of letters from the Latvian Democratic Youth Committee
and the Latvian Christian Democratic Organization. Id. at 251-52. The three groups co-
operated in writing a letter to the Government of the Latvian S.S.R. in June 1976. Writ-
ten on the anniversary of the Red Army's invasion of 1940, the letter protested the Sovi-
etization and Russification of the intervening years. The three groups also sent
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser a letter in 1976, thanking him for his decision
to withdraw Australia's brief de jure recognition of the Soviet Union's annexation of the
Baltic States. Id.
A fourth Latvian group, the Organization for Latvia's Independence, became known
in 1977 when it published a four page pamphlet calling for a referendum on secession
from the U.S.S.R. Id. The pamphlet was said to have an edition of 25,000 copies. The
group claimed to be made up of 210 Latvian representatives from different constituen-
cies. Id. The pamphlet urged particular forms of dissent: whistling when ideological
statements were made; boycotting Soviet elections; and turning on all lights and power
whenever a Latvian was arrested. The resulting power outages would be noticed by the
authorities. Id.
557. See Kowalewski, supra note 554, at 309-20: "Protest demonstrations in the Bal-
tic region have increased since 1966. Whereas only 29.8% of the total occurred in 1966-
71, in the second half of the time-frame under study [1972-77] over twice as many
[70.2%] took place." Id. at 312. Although Soviet news reports tend to portray protesters
in the Baltic as "young hooligans," the vast majority of demonstrations are perpetrated
by Baltic citizens of all ages. Indeed, Baltic dissent is not only carried out by all age
groups, but tends to cut across class distinctions as well. Id. It would appear that such
dissent "disolves barriers set up by daily social role demands and creates conditions for
uniting pockets of dissatisfaction which previously overlapped to a minimum degree." Id.
at 312.
Baltic demonstrations have often attracted large numbers of participants. Fully one-
half of the protests between 1966 and 1977 attracted over 100 demonstrators. One-third
attracted more than 500 participants. "Clearly the Human Rights Movement in the Bal-
tic region can not be described as 'small bands of dissidents'. Rather, the mass character
of dissatisfaction with Soviet regime violations of human rights, and the ability of dissi-
dents to organize to protest these violations, are evident." Id. at 314.
Mass protests were first seen in Lithuania in 1956. Subsequently, they have occurred
in 1960 in Kaunas; in May of 1972 in Kaunas (see infra note 558); in Tallinn in 1972; in
Tartu in 1976 (see supra note 514 for a discussion of this protest); in Liepaja, Latvia in
1977 and in Vilnius in October 1977. More recently, such mass protests occurred in the
fall of 1980 in Tallinn, Tartu and other Estonian towns, and again in Vilnius in 1982.
ALEXIEV, supra note 554, at 34.
One indication that such protests have the tacit support of large sections of the
population is the fact that the Soviet occupation forces are unwilling to use the volunteer
militia, recruited from the local population, for suppression of the demonstrations. In-
stead, Soviet internal security troops, i.e., MVID and the military, made up mostly of
non-Baits, are used consistently. Id. at 34-35.
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themselves to protest the subjugation of the Baltic countries. 5 ' Under-
ground newspapers continue to raise the consciousness of the Baltic
population, 5 9  and a Helsinki monitoring group has been
Some forms of public dissent are much less obtrusive. These include using the now-
forbidden national colors in dress or wearing national flowers to protest the all-pervasive
color red. In Estonia, for instance, the Estonian national flower, the corn flower, is placed
in window vases or worn in buttonholes on suits. Wharton, Cry for this Land of the Lost,
The Mail on Sunday (London), Sept. 2, 1984, at 13, col. 1. In Latvia, flowers appear on
national monuments and political graffiti appears on railway trains. MIsIuNAs &
TAAGEPERA, supra note 209, at 240. A more active form of dissent includes cheering for
non-Soviet sports competitors, particularly when the competitor has some symbolic im-
portance. Thus, in the late 1960's and 1970's, Czech teams were particularly popular
among Baltic audiences. On April 20, 1972, a televised Czech hockey victory over the
Soviet Union prompted several hundred Tallinn Polytechnic Institute students to shout
in celebration "We won" on the streets of the Estonian capital. Id. In Vilnius, in 1977, a
soccer match against a Russian team from Smolensk provided a forum for a demonstra-
tion against the new Soviet Constitution. A crowd of soccer fans began shouting "Down
with the Constitution of the occupying power!" Id.
One of the largest demonstrations occurred in Estonia in October 1980. The protest
began, on September 22, when Soviet officials interrupted a pop concert following a soc-
cer game. Several thousand young people marched towards Tallinn's city center. Two
hundred were briefly arrested and expelled from school. This triggered larger demonstra-
tions and marches on October Ist and 3rd, 1980. Although police arrested some of the
2000 demonstrators, the demonstrations spread to Tallinn Polytechnic Institute, to the
Parnu Merchant Navy School and to Tartu University. Demands included better food in
school cafeterias and "Russians, get out." Estonian workers went on strike on October 1,
at the Tartu Experimental Repair Factory and demanded reduced working hours and
the payment of arrearages on premiums. A special commissar from Moscow finally ended
the strike by granting the strikers' demands. Id. See also Taubman, Estonians' Pensive
Refrain: We are not Russians, N.Y. Times, March 18, 1986 at 2.
558. MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA, supra note 209, at 241. On May 14, 1972, a nineteen
year-old Lithuanian student, Romas Kalanta, poured gasoline over himself and lighted a
match in a Kaunas park in front of the building where Lithuania's incorporation into the
Soviet Union was proclaimed in 1940. He died later in a hospital. Several thousand
youths began rioting on the day of his funeral. Students moved through the streets de-
manding "Freedom for Lithuania!" and fought with the police who were later reinforced
with KGB units and paratroopers. Id. The Soviet security forces arrested some 500 dem-
onstrators. Id. Within a few days, three other Baltic self-immolations occurred.
559. ALEXIEV, supra note 554, at 25-26. In March 1972, one of the best known under-
ground periodicals, The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania, first appeared.
Since that date, the Chronicle has been published continuously. Despite the KGB's ef-
forts to suppress it, 70 issues had reached the West by the summer of 1986. Conversation
with Ms. Ginte Damuiis, Director of the Lithuanian Information Center, in Brooklyn,
New York (June 1986). Hundreds of other publications have been printed by the Lithua-
nian underground press, including journals, bulletins, theological literature and prayer
books. At least 17 underground periodicals have been published regularly since the mid-
1970's. Id. These include Ausra [The Dawn], since 1975 and Varpas [The Bell] since
1979. Id. at 36.
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established in Lithuania despite the continual harassment and impris-
onment of its members. 6s0 In response to these events, prominent Rus-
sian dissidents have joined nationalistic Balts in their calls for the re-
turn of Baltic independence.5"
The most important Estonian samizdat since the 1970's are Eesti Demokraat, pub-
lished since 1971; Poolpaevaleht [The Semi-Daily], started in 1978 but suppressed a
year later; and Lisandusi Motete ja uudiste vabale levikule Eestis [Some Additions to
the Free Flow of Ideas and News in Estonia], which continues to appear regularly, with
at least 13 issues reaching the West so far. Id. at 35. Latvian samizdat are less numerous
than those of Estonia and Lithuania, but have a similar emphasis on the implementation
of human rights. MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA, supra note 209, at 252-53.
The Baltic samizdat have helped to focus attention on the root problems affecting
the Soviet-occupied Baltic nations and help to preserve national identity by combatting
the Soviet regime's program of Russification in all aspects of Baltic life. Their concern
for the fate of Baltic languages, human rights and environmental degradation has met
with relentless opposition by the Soviet occupant, and those samizdat publishers who
have been caught by the security forces have received severe prison terms or have been
confined to mental institutions. ALEXHIV, supra note 554, at 37. See also Moynihan, De-
mographic War on Latvia, Wall St. J., July 2, 1986 at 25, col. 1. Due to a massive in-
crease in Russian immigration, Latvians comprise only 53.7% of the population of
Latvia, compared to 76% in 1935. In Estonia the native share of the population has
decreased from 75.6 to 64.7% between 1959 and 1979. Only in Lithuania has the indige-
nous population managed to retain its share of the population at approximately 80% of
the republics total. ALEXIEV. supra note 554, at 17. See also Ozols, Baltic States growing
fast, and not too happy about it, Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 6, 1981, at 10-D, col. 1.
560. MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA, supra note 209, at 247, 255.
The U.S.S.R. maintains a vast system of forced labor camps, prisons and psychiatric
hospitals throughout the Baltic region. In Estonia, camps can be found in Tallinn (3),
Tartu (2), Vasalemma, Harku and Paldiski Bay, where prisoners from a forced-labor
facility are assigned to clean the exhaust nozzles of atomic submarines at the Soviet
naval base. In Latvia, camps are found in Riga (4), Ventspils, Jelgava (2), Valmiera (2),
Rezekne, Daugavpils, and Brasa. Prisons exist in Riga (2), Dubulti, and Cesis. In Lithua-
nia, there exist 11 Soviet concentration camps and 7 prisons. A- SHIFRIN, THE FIRST
GUIDEBOOK TO PRISONS AND CONCENTRATION CAMPS OF THE SOVIET UNION 113, 124, 251 et
seq. (1982).
561. 125 CONG. Rsc. 26,864 (1979):
The Baltic Republics-Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia-have been by force
incorporated into the Soviet Union, without any regard for the wishes of the
inhabitants of these countries. In fact, this happened as a result of occupation of
the Baltic States by the Soviet armies.
Seeing as we support the principles of equal rights and self-determination of
all nations, and respecting the right of persons to determine their own destiny,
we recognize that given present historical conditions the question of self-deter-
mination for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should be decided by referendum,
and that this should be held under conditions in which the people could freely
express their wishes and intentions.
We support the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian representatives' call to
examine injustices done to these countries, and we recognize their rights to
freely determine their own destiny.
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In light of historical and legal precedents, it must be concluded
that the only truly legal validation of an illegal annexation remains the
genuine approbation by the injured party or total and complete ac-
quiesence in the face of overwhelming force by the indigenous popula-
tion and third party nations.
VII. CONTINUED LEGAL EXISTENCE OF THE BALTIC STATES
Refusal to recognize the annexation of the Baltic States is clearly
mandated by international law. The actual annexation itself was illegal
and nonrecognition of the Soviet tour de force conforms to the princi-
ple of all laws-that illegal acts should be barred from producing legal
results. It is, therefore, the principle embodied in the maxim "ex ini-
uria ius non oritur" that constitutes the legal basis for the continuity
of the Baltic States, just as it constituted the legal basis of the survival
of Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland and Ethiopia from 1936 to 1945. It
must be asked, however, why the antinomic principle, "ex factis ius
oritur," has not yet been able to prevail, and how much longer the
international legal system can withstand the anomaly of a "divorce be-
tween validity and effectiveness."
The International Law Institute has adopted an extremely cau-
tious position regarding state extinction-requiring it to be definite
and final.562 Such an attitude is understandable in light of recent his-
tory. Since 1918, the global community of nations has witnessed the re-
establishment of territorially based body politics which had theretofore
been considered "gone-with-the-wind"; states as disparate as Poland,
Ghana, Mali, Israel and Zimbabwe.
Clearly, the finality of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States
cannot be admitted. The international community has consistently re-
jected the legitimacy of the U.S.S.R.'s claim to title and no post-war
international agreement has confirmed the existing state of affairs in
the region. Indeed, the Western signatories to the Helsinki accords
made it clear that their ratification of the agreement did not affect the
Baltic States except as to guarantee their inhabitants the same rights








562. MAREK, supra note 106, at 9.
563. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1975, at A2, col. 8.
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Nothing even approximately final has taken place which would to-
tally destroy any reasonable chance of an ad initegrum restitution of
the Baltic States. It is this possibility of a reasonable chance of restora-
tion which determines the time limit up to which the international le-
gal system can withstand a divorce between validity and effectiveness.
The Soviet Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinov, declared to the
League of Nations in 1938:
We have to reckon not only with the question whether any
struggle between the aggressor and his victim has come to an
end, but also-should that have occurred for the time be-
ing-whether there are any chances of the struggle being re-
newed, and likewise we have to reckon with other circum-
stances which may bring about a change in the situation
created by aggressive acts of violence.'
It would be inappropriate today to assert that the possibility of a
restoration of the three Baltic States has finally vanished beyond all
hope. "The State or States who would affirm this today would run the
risk of having to go back on their own attitude at some future time, as
in the case of Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Poland."'
It is impossible to say whether in the long run the Baltic States
may become legally extinct and their territory part of the Soviet
Union. It can, however, be safely asserted that no such extinction has
taken place and that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania continue to main-
tain a legal, albeit subjugated, existence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The annexation of the Baltic States has served as a major prece-
dent-one which has moved international law onto a plane much
higher than that existing in 1940. For the first time in recorded history,
the majority of the members of the world community have refused over
a lengthy period to recognize the legitimacy of title acquired through
conquest.
The annexation has helped to establish nonrecognition of forcible
territorial seizure as an important customary rule of international law
and has had a major impact on the development of law prohibiting
seizure of territory. The nonrecognition of the Soviet annexation has
pointed out the salutory aspects of the Stimson doctrine as a whole.
Such positive aspects can be divided into the political, juridical and
564. LEAGUE Ov NAosS OJ. 341 (1938).
565. MAREK, supra note 106, at 416.
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ethical spheres."' 6
Politically, the nonrecognition of a seizure of territory is of consid-
erable value for upholding the morale of the population of the occupied
area. Such nonrecognition serves to strengthen their spirit of resistance
and remind them that the world has not forgotten their plight. The
Baltic peoples rely on it as a symbol of hope for the future."6 7
Juridically, nonrecognition has important effects for those citizens
of the seized state who find themselves or their property within the
territory of a nonrecognizing state. Local courts will refuse to honor the
conqueror's decrees with respect to private property. Nonrecognizing
governments will refuse to repatriate nationals of subjugated nations,
especially if the conqueror has instituted draconian measures such as
execution or deportations to quell resistance to its presence. 56 8
566. LANGER, supra note 4, at 288.
567. See Appendix XII for a discussion by two Latvian nationalists of the importance
of the nonrecognition doctrine to the Baltic peoples.
568. See TOLSTOY, supra note 375, at 334. See also 1A C. GORDON AND H. ROSENFELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 5-197 (1986). Due to the refusal by the United States
to recognize the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by the Soviet Union, the
United States will not regard nationals of such States as nationals of the annexing
power. Id. See also 8 C.F.R. § 243.8 (1986), which states that no United States sanctions
will be applied to the Baltic States because their governments do not accept deportees
who are Baltic nationals. Id.
The long standing policy of a nonrecognizing State not to deport nationals of an
occupied State was recently breached by the United States Department of State. In the
case of In re Linnas, the Legal Advisor to the Department of State, Davis R. Robinson,
advised the United States Department of Justice that the deportation of Karl Linnas, an
Estonian citizen, to the U.S.S.R. "would not as a matter of law contravene the longstand-
ing and firmly held United States policy of nonrecognition of the forcible incorporation
of Estonia into the U.S.S.R." Letter from Davis R. Robinson to the United States De-
partment of Justice, (Dec. 20, 1984). Linnas had been held deportable based on the so-
called Holtzman amendment to the United States immigration laws which excludes from
the United States any alien who assisted the Nazi Government of Germany in the perse-
cution of persons because of their race, religion, national origin or political opinion dur-
ing the period between March 23, 1933 and May 8, 1945. In Re Linnas, B.I.A. Decision of
July 31, 1984, at 2. See also In Re Linnas, B.I.A. Decision of October 16, 1985; Linnas v.
Ins., No. 85-4163, slip opinion (2d Cir. May 8, 1986).
Robinson's statement is not only incorrect but unconscionable. The very purposes of
the doctrine of nonrecognition, as formulated by Secretary of State Stimson, were to
promote territorial inviolability and self-determination of peoples by penalizing the con-
queror or occupying State with a refusal to recognize the validity of its title to territory
and its jurisdiction over the population of such territory seized by force. By deporting a
national of Estonia to the Soviet Union, the United States would be admitting the exis-
tence of a legal nexus between the Soviet judicial organs (which have demanded Linnas's
return since 1962) and the people of Estonia against whom Linnas allegedly perpetrated
war crimes in 1941. See United States v. Linnas 527 F. Supp. 426, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
To admit the right of the Soviet Union to judicially prosecute and try an Estonian citi-
zen for alleged crimes committed in German-occupied Estonia while at the same moment
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Ethically, nonrecognition is the most relevant indication of the
professing adherence to a doctrine of nonrecognition is hypocritical. The deportation of
Linnas to the U.S.S.R. is contrary to international law and tends to support the wide-
spread notion that international law is an intellectual exercise unsuited to the realities of
world politics. Marek notes that it is not the existence of illegal acts which forms the
supreme challenge to international law. Rather, it is the possibility of such acts giving
rise to legal titles on equal footing with lawful acts. MAREK, supra note 106, at 554. Sir
Arthur McNair has pointedly stated that "it is idle to think that mere nonrecognition
will solve the problem [of illegal seizure of territory] and operate as an adequate sanction
. . . there is a danger of its becoming a slogan which will serve as an excuse for thinking
that an effective method of preventing breaches of international order has been discov-
ered and that no further action is required beyond a declaration of nonrecognition." Mc-
Nair, The Stimson Doctrine of Non-recognition, BAIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 74 (1933) (cited in
MAREK, supra note 106, at 561). Pursuant to Robinson's letter, a United States Immigra-
tion Judge ordered Linnas' deportation to the Soviet Union on April 9, 1985. In Re Lin-
nas, (United States Immigration Court, Apr. 9, 1985). For the first time in United States
legal history, a judge made a finding that the Soviet Union had succeeded to the sover-
eignty "of a district where alien resided and from which he came," i.e., the Republic of
Estonia. Id. at 2. Despite the protests of the legally recognized representative of the
Republic of Estonia, Consul General Ernst Jaakson, the United States had, for the first
time since 1940, sanctioned the right of the Soviet Union to decide the fate of a Baltic
citizen. See also Mathews, An American Trial for Kurt Linnas, Washington Post Aug.
30. 1986 at A28 col. 1.
The decision by the court to ignore the protests of the Republic of Estonia's recog-
nized diplomatic representative is particularly shocking in light of judicial precedents in
this area. In the well-known case of Delany v. Moraitis, 136 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1943),
concerning a Greek sailor liable to deportation to Nazi-occupied Greece, the court was
faced with the decision of whether the sailor should be deported instead to England
where the Greek Government-in-exile was based. Overruling the district court's decision
to deport the sailor to his occupied homeland, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit decided to order his deportation to the United Kingdom:
It is true, of course, that the term "country" as used in the [immigration]
statute must be construed, ordinarily, to refer to the territory. . . . But a man's
"country" is more than the territory in which its people live. The term is used,
generally, to indicate the State, the organization of social life, which exercises
sovereign power in behalf of the people. . . . Ordinarily the State exercises sov-
ereignty only within the territory occupied by its people; but a different situa-
tion is presented when the territory is overrun by its enemies and its government
is in exile in the territory of a friendly nation exercising power in international
matters in behalf of its nationals. In such cases, the government in exile has
taken over the only exercise of sovereign power left to the people of the country
and is the only agency representing the country with which a foreign government
can deal.
Id. at 130-31.
Unfortunately, the Linnas case is not unique. The United States Department of Jus-
tice, Office of Special Investigations, is currently involved in several de-naturalization or
deportation proceedings of Baltic or former Baltic citizens. Many of these Balts may
soon face deportation to the Soviet Union. See United States v. Palciauskas, 734 F.2d
624 (11th Cir. 1984); States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Kungys, No. 83-5884, slip opinion (3rd Cir. June 20, 1986); Maikovskis v. I.N.S., 773 F.2d
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principle that unilateral aggression should not be allowed to bring
about a valid change in the existing territorial order.
Professor Myres McDougal has written that "the effective author-
ity of any legal system depends in the long run upon the underlying
common interests of the participants in the system and their recogni-
tion of such common interests, reflected in continuing predispositions
to support the prescriptions and the procedures that comprise the
system."56'
The prevention of seizure of territory has long been of major inter-
est to all members of the global community. The history of the devel-
opment of the doctrine of nonrecognition since the Peace of Westpha-
lia indicates its growing acceptance as a normative rule in international
conduct largely because it reflects such an interest held in common by
all nations.
Although the nonrecognition doctrine, in the absence of regularly
functioning international legal machinery for enforcing the law, is ad-
mittedly an imperfect weapon of enforcement, it must be regarded as a
supplementary weapon of considerable legal and moral potency. It pre-
vents any law-creating effect of prescription and it constitutes a stand-
ing legal challenge to the legitimacy of a situation brought about by an
unlawful act:
As municipal law requires that persons aggrieved by depriva-
tion of rights or property shall oppose the actions of those who
injure them by recourse to peaceful means through negotiation,
appeal to public law enforcement authorities, or to judicial pro-
ceedings, rather than by means of the infliction of personal vio-
lence, so the gradual spread of the doctrine of non-recognition,
and its further application and implementation, may bring us
one step nearer to the establishment of international relations
on the basis of law and justice.
7 0
William J.H. Hough, III
435 (2d Cir. 1985); Laipenieks v. I.N.S., 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Virkutis No. 83 Civ. 1758 (N.D. I1. 1983); In re Kalejs, No. All-655 361 (Immigration
Court Miami, Fla.); United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (refusing to
prevent taking of depositions in Latvia). For an overview and analysis of the use of So-
viet evidence supplied to the United States Department of Justice for use in the denatu-
ralization and deportation of alleged collaborators with Nazi Germany, see S.P.
ZUMBAKIS, SovIET EVIDENCE IN NORTH AMERICAN COURTS (1986).
569. McDOUGAL & REisMAN, supra note 510, at 18 (1981 Supp.).
570. Comment of Dr. Norman J. Paddleford, Professor of International Law, Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, quoted in BIGos, supra note 5, at 89.
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List of highranking persons arrested, deported
and murdered by Soviet occupational
authorities.
From 1940 to 1941, the following highranking persons from
the political, military and judicial leadership of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania were deported by the Soviet
authorities.
Estonia
1. The President of the Estonian Republic.
Konstantin Pdts, 66, arrested and deported on July 30, 1940.
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian' armed forces.
Johan Laidoner, General, 56, arrested and deported on July 13, 1940.
3. From the last Government of the Estonian Republic (11 members)
10 members were deported
A. Piip (Foreign Affairs) A. Assor (Justice)
N. Reek (Defence) A. JUrima (Interior)
L. Sepp (Finance) 0. Kask (Health and Welfare)
A. Tupits (Agriculture) P. Kogerman (Education)
N. Viitak (Transportation) A. Oiderma (Propaganda)
Only the Prime Minister Juri Uluots managed to go into hiding and escaped in 1944 to
Sweden where he died in 1945.
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Kogermann, Paul, Piirimaa, Johan,
Kohver, August, Puhk, Joakim,
Kokk, Jaan, Pung, Mihkel,
Konno, Evald, P&Ira, Jaan,




5. From the Estonian Supreme Court (15 members) 7 were arrested and
deported.
P. Kann, K. Saarmann,
R. RAugo, P. Valbe,
R. Eliaser, E. Reisberg,
A. Hellat,
6. Of the 10 former heads of the Estonian Governments, 9 were arrested
and deported.
F. Akel, A. Piip,
A. Birk, 0. Strandman,
K. Eenpalu, J. Teemant,
J. Jaakson, J. Tbnisson,
J. Kukk,
Only A. Rei, former Prime Minister, escaped to Sweden.
7. 0. Tief, Prime Minister of the Estonian Government, proclaimed in
September 1944. Arrested and deported.
Latvia
1. The President of the Latvian Republic
Ulmanis, Karlis
2. The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces
General Balodis, Janis
Members of Government
Adamovics, Ludis Birznieks, Alfreds
Apsitis, Hermans Bite, Erasts
Aronietis, Peters Dukurs, Roberts
Balodis, Antons Ivbuls, Stanislavs
Bergis, Peters Gulbis, Vilis
Bergs, Arveds Kaulins, Janis
Birznieks, Janis Keninis, Altis










































1. The President of the Lithuanian Republic
Smetona, Antanas, fled to Germany and later left for the United States
2. Members of Government
Bistras, Leonas Papekys, Juozas
Caplikas, Julius Petrulis, Vytautas
Carneckis, Voldemaras Sakenis, Konstantinas
Indrigiumas, Julius Skaisgiris, Juozas











4. Leadership of other Parties
Puodiius, Juozas Kalnenas, Jonas
Dagelis, Jonas Rackauskas, Vytautas














Sources: Baltiska Kommitt~n, Balticum Ungern Sovjet, Stockholm 1957, p. 71-79
E. Kareda, Estonia the Forgotten Nation, Toronto 1961, p. 61-62
Reprinted from Estonian Information Center (Stockholm), Mass Deportations of the
Population from the Soviet Occupied Baltic States (1981)
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APPENDIX II.
INSTRUCTIONS
REGARDING THE MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE
DEPORTATION
OF THE ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENT FROM LITHUANIA, LATVIA
AND ESTONIA
Translated from the Russian language. Strictly Secret.
1. General Situation
The deportation of anti-Soviet elements from the Baltic States is a
task of great political importance. Its successful execution depends
upon the extent to which the county administrative triumvirates and
administrative headquarters are capable of carefully working out a
plan for executing operations and of foreseeing in advance all indispen-
sible factors. Moreover, the basic promise is that the operations should
be conducted without noise and panic, so as not to permit any demon-
strations and other excesses not only by the deportees, but also by a
certain part of the surrounding population inimically inclined toward
the Soviet administration.
Instructions regarding the manner of conducting the operations
are described below. They should be adhered to, but in individual
cases the collaborators conducting the operations may and should, de-
pending upon the peculiarity of the concrete circumstances of the op-
erations and in order correctly to evaluate the situation, make different
decisions for the same purpose, viz., to execute the task given them
without noise and panic.
2. Manner of issuing Instructions
The instructing of operative groups should be done by the county
triumvirates within as short a time as possible on the day before the
beginning of the operations, taking into consideration the time neces-
sary for traveling to the place of operations.
The county triumvirates previously prepare necessary transporta-
tion for transferring the operative groups in the village to the scene of
operations.
In regard to the question of allotting the necessary number of
automobiles and wagons for transportation, the county triumvirates
will consult the leaders of the Soviet party organizations on the
premises.
Premises in which to issue instructions must be carefully prepared
[Vol. 6
APPENDIX II
in advance, and their capacity, exits, entrances and the possibility of
strangers entering must be studied.
During the time instructions are issued the building must be se-
curely guarded by the administrative workers.
In case anyone from among these participating in the operations
should fail to appear for instructions, the county triumvirate should
immediately take measures to substitute the absentee from a reserve
force, which should be provided in advance.
The triumvirate through its representative should notify the of-
ficers gathered of the decision of the government to deport an ac-
counted for contingency of anti-Soviet elements from the territory of
the respective republic or region. Moreover, a brief explanation should
be given as to what the deportees represent.
The special attention of the (local) Soviet-party workers gathered
for instructions should be drawn to the fact that the deportees are ene-
mies of the Soviet people and that, therefore, the possibility of an
armed attack on the part of the deportees is not excluded.
3. Manner of Obtaining Documents
After the issue of general instructions to the administrative
groups, they should definitely be issued documents regarding the de-
portees. The personal files of the deportees must be previously dis-
cussed and settled by the administrative groups, parishes and villages,
so that there are no obstacles in issuing them.
After receiving the personal files, the senior member of the admin-
istrative group acquaints himself with the personal files of the family
which he will have to deport. He must check the number of persons in
the family, the supply of necessary forms to be filled out by the de-
portee, and transportation for moving the deportee, and he should re-
ceive exhaustive answers to questions not clear to him.
At the time when the files are issued, the county triumvirate must
explain to each senior member of the administrative group where the
deported family is to be settled and describe the route to be taken to
the place of deportation. Roads to be taken by the administrative per-
sonnel with the deported families to the railway station for embarka-
tion must also be fixed. It is also necessary to point out places where
reserve military groups are placed in case it should become necessary
to call them out during possible excesses.
The possession and state of arms and munitions must be checked
throughout the whole administrative personnel. Weapons must be
completely ready for battle, loaded, but the bullet should not be kept
in the barrel. Weapons should be used only as a last resort, when the
administrative group is attacked or threatened with an attack, or resis-
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tance is shown.
4. Manner of Executing Deportation
Should a number of families be deported from one spot, one of the
operative workers is appointed senior in regard to deportation from
that village, and his orders are to be obeyed by the administrative per-
sonnel in that village.
Having arrived in the village, the administrative groups must get
in touch (observing the necessary secrecy) with the local authorities:
chairman, secretary or members of the village soviets, and should as-
certain from them the exact dwelling of the families to be deported.
After that the operative groups together with the local authorities go to
the families to be deported.
The operation should be commenced at daybreak. Upon entering
the home of the person to be deported, the senior member of the oper-
ative group should gather the entire family of the deportee into one
room, taking all necessary precautionary measures against any possible
excesses.
After having checked the members of the family against the list,
the location of those absent and the number of persons sick should be
ascertained, after which they should be called upon to give up their
weapons, regardless of whether weapons are delivered or not, the de-
portees should be personally searched and then the entire premises
should be searched in order to uncover weapons.
During the search of the premises one of the members of the oper-
ative group should be left on guard over the deportees.
Should the search disclose hidden weapons in small numbers, they
should be collected by and distributed among the administrative
group. Should many weapons be discovered, they should be piled into
the wagon or automobile which brought the administrative group, after
any ammunition in them has been removed. Ammunition should be
packed and loaded together with rifles.
If necessary, a convoy for transporting the weapons should be mo-
bilized with an adequate guard.
Should weapons, counter-revolutionary pamphlets, literature, for-
eign currency, large quantities of valuables, etc. be disclosed, a short
search act should be drawn upon the spot, which should describe the
hidden weapons or counter-revolutionary literature. Should there be
any armed resistance, the question of arresting the persons showing
armed resistance and of sending them to the county branch of the Peo-
ple's Commissariat of Public Security should be decided by the county
triumvirates.
An act should be drawn up regarding those deportees hiding them-
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selves before the deportation or sick, and this act should be signed by
the chairman of the Soviet-party organization.
After having been subjected to a search the deportees should be
notified that upon the decision of the Government they are being de-
ported to other regions of the Union.
The deportees are permitted to take with them household necessi-








8. Food-an estimated month's supply to a family.
9. The money at their disposal.
10. Haversack or box in which to pack the articles.
It is not recommended that large articles be taken.
Should the contingent be deported to rural districts, they are per-
mitted to take with them a small agricultural inventory: axes, saws and
other articles, which should be tied together and packed separately
from the other articles, so that when embarking in the deportation
train they are loaded into special freight cars.
In order not to mix them with articles belonging to others, the
name, father's name, and village of the deportee should be written on
his packed property.
When loading these articles into the carts, measures should be
taken so that the deportee cannot use them as means of resistance
while the column is moving along the highway.
At the time of loading the administrative groups together with
representatives of the Soviet-party organizations shall prepare a list of
the property and the manner in which it is to be preserved in accor-
dance with instructions received by them.
If the deportee has at his own disposal means of transportation,
his property is loaded into the vehicle and together with his family is
sent to the designated spot of embarkation.
If the deportees do not have any means of transportation, wagons
are mobilized in the village by the local authorities upon directives of
the senior member of the administrative group.
All persons entering the home of the deportees during the execu-
tion of the operations or found there at the moment when these opera-
tions are begun must be detained until the conclusion of the opera-
tions, and their relationship to the deportee should be ascertained.
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This is done in order to disclose persons hiding from the police, militia
and other persons.
After having checked the detained persons and ascertained that
they are persons in whom the contingent is not interested, they are
liberated.
Should the inhabitants of the village begin to gather around the
home of the deportee while the operations are going on, they should be
called upon to disperse to their homes, and crowds should not be per-
mitted to be formed.
Should the deportee refuse to open the door of his home in spite
of the fact that he is aware that members of the People's Commissariat
of Public Security are there, the door should be broken down. In indi-
vidual cases neighboring administrative groups performing operations
in that vicinity should be called upon to assist.
The conveyance of the deportees from the village to the gathering
place at the railway station should by all means be done in daylight;
moreover, efforts should be made that the gathering of each family
should take not more than two hours.
In all cases throughout the operations firm and decisive action
should be taken, without the slightest pomposity, noise and panic.
It is categorically forbidden to take any articles away from the de-
portees except weapons, counter-revolutionary literature and foreign
currency, as well as to use the food of the deportees.
All members of the operations must be warned that they will be
held strictly responsible before court for attempts to appropriate indi-
vidual articles belonging to the deportees.
5. Manner of Separating Deportee from His Family
In view of the fact that a large number of the deportees must be
arrested and placed in special camps and their families settled at spe-
cial points in distant regions, it is necessary to execute the operation of
deporting both the members of his family as well as the deportee si-
multaneously, without informing them of the separation confronting
them. After having made the search and drawn up the necessary docu-
ments for identification in the home of the deportee, the administra-
tive worker shall draw up documents for the head of the family and
place them in his personal file, but the documents drawn up for the
members of his family should be placed in the personal file of the de-
portee's family.
The moving of the entire family, however, to the station should be
done in one vehicle, and only at the station should the head of the
family be placed separately from his family in a railway car specially
intended for heads of families.
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While gathering together the family in the home of the deportee,
the head of the family should be warned that personal male articles are
to be packed into a separate suitcase, as a sanitary inspection will be
made of the deported-men separately from the women and children.
At the stations the possessions of heads of families subject to ar-
rest should be loaded into the railway cars assigned to them, which will
be designated by special administrative workers appointed for that
purpose.
6. Manner of Convoying the Deportees
It is strictly prohibited for the operators convoying the column of
deportees moving along in wagons to sit in the wagons of the depor-
tees. The operators must follow by the side and at the rear of the col-
umn of deportees. The senior operator of the convoy should periodi-
cally go around the entire column to check the correctness of
movement.
The convoy must act particularly carefully in conducting the col-
umn of deportees through inhabited spots as well as in meeting pass-
ers-by; they should see that there are no attempts made to escape, and
no exchange of words should be permitted between the deportees and
passers-by.
7. Manner of Embarking
At each point of embarkation the member of the administrative
triumvirate and a special person appointed for that purpose shall be
responsible for the embarkation.
On the day of the operations the chief of the point of embarkation
together with the chief of the deportation train and of the convoying
military forces of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs shall
examine the railway cars furnished to see whether they are supplied
with all necessities (sleeping board, toilet cans, lanterns, railings, etc.)
and shall discuss with the chief of the deportation train the manner in
which the latter will take over the deportees.
Embarkation at the station shall be detached by the soldiers of the
convoying forces of the people's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
The senior member of the administration group shall deliver to
the chief of the deportation train one copy of the list of deportees in
each railway car. The chief of the deportation train thereupon shall
call out the deportees according to this roll and shall carefully check
each family and designate their place in the railway car.
The possessions of the deportees should be loaded into the car to-
gether with the deportees, with the exception of the shall agricultural
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inventory, which should be loaded into a separate car.
The deportees shall be loaded into railway cars by families; it is
not permitted to break up a family (with the exception of heads of
families subject to arrest). An estimate of 25 persons to a car should be
observed.
After the railway car has been filled with the necessary number of
families, it should be locked.
After the people have been taken over and placed in the deporta-
tion train, the chief of the train shall bear responsibility for all the
persons turned over to him and for their reaching their destination.
After turning over the deportees the senior member of the admin-
istrative group shall draw up a report to the effect that he has per-
formed the operations entrusted to him and addressed the report to
the chief of the county administrative triumvirate. The report should
briefly contain the name of the deportee, whether any weapons and
counter-revolutionary literature were discovered, and how the opera-
tions took place.
After having placed the deportees on the deportation train and
submitted reports of the results of the operations performed, the mem-
bers of the administrative group shall be considered free and shall act
in accordance with the instructions of the chief of the county branch of
the People's Commissariat of Public Security.
DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF PUBLIC SECURITY OF THE U.S.S.R.
Commissar of Public Security of the Third Rank
Signed: (Serov)
October 11, 1939




N.Y. Times Editorial, July 20, 1940
DEMOCRACY, RUSSIAN STYLE*
Suppose that our voters next November were to be offered a single
ticket on their ballots. Suppose that the ticket had been drawn up by a
foreign dictator whom we hated and feared; suppose that the polls
were watched by the dictators troops, that each voter were required to
bring a passport to the polls for stamping; that every nonvoter were
faced with future punishment as an "enemy of the people." Suppose,
then, that the foreign dictator and his controlled press and his puppet
party in this country should claim an overwhelming triumph by more
than 90 percent of the votes, and should regard it as a popular en-
dorsement of annexation to his country. This is what has just hap-
pened in the former republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, now
garrisoned by Soviet troops, and soon to be swallowed whole by the
Soviet Union. In holding such an "election" in the Baltic States Stalin
has outdone Hitler again. This time the master of the Kremlin has
staged a travesty of democracy, which, for sheer cynicism, excels any of
Hitler's notorious "plebiscites" in Germany.
The people of the Baltic States had no more desire to vote "yes"
in their one party election than ours would have in similar circum-
stances. They had won their freedom from Russia in the chaos of the
Bolshevik revolution. They had lived in independence and peace for
more than 20 years. But there is no room for weak nations in a Europe
dominated by Germany and Russia. No doubt at the appropriate time,
the new puppet governments will decide, spontaneously, that they
want to be annexed to the Soviet Union. . . . This is democracy Rus-
sian style. The wonder is not that so many voted in this most sordid
and most pitiful of all elections, but that any one dared to stay away at
all.
* Copyright © 1940 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by
permission.
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APPENDIX IV
Reprinted from A. Bilmanis, Baltic States and World Security Organization (1945).
Comparative Statistics
DIFFERENCE between Baltic States' economic system based on pri-
vate property and cooperatives and the Soviet system based on state
property, collectives and foreign trade monopoly, becomes evident
from the following table:*
Area (in 1000 sq. km.) .....
Population in millions .....
Racial majority ...........
Growth rate ..............
Density per sq. km ........
Cultivated land ...........
F orests ..... .............
Soviet
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Russia
........ 48 66 68 21,176






Land under cereals in 1938; index:
1923 = 100 ............... .. .
Use of artificial fertilizers on one ha
agricultural land in 1929 ........
Yield per ha (in quintals), average:
1926-30-
R y e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
W heat .... ..................
B arley .... ..................
O a ts ........................
P otatoes ... ..................
F la x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
L inseeds ........... .........
Sugarbeets ...................






































* Compiled from: Statistical Yearbook of Latvia of 1938, Latvian Encyclopaedia, Vol.
XI; Statistical Yearbooks of the International Institute of Agriculture; League of Na-
tions Statistics, Study about World Production and Prices, published by the League of
Nations; Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1940, Review of World Trade of 1936, published
by the League of Nations; V. RAUD, THE SMALLER NATIONS IN WORLD'S ECONOMIC LIFE,
(1944); COLLIN CLARK, CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS, (1940); J. E. HUBBARD, SOVIET




Estonia Latvia Lithuania Russia
Per capita production (in kg.);
average: 1929-32-
Rye .......................... 164 137 221 144
Barley ....................... 109 100 100 38
Oats ......................... 136 180 167 100
Potatoes ...................... 740 590 750 190
Livestock per 100 inhabitants in
1932-
H orses ....................... 19 19 25 10
Cattle ........................ 63 61 48 23
P igs ......................... 28 31 51 7
Sheep ........................ 47 52 25 31
Livestock (in 1000-
Cattle in 1929 ................ 603.9 978.4 1,160.1 67,230.1
Cattle in 1938 ............ 660.9 1,224.3 1,193.1 63,200.0
Pigs in 1929 .................. 270.1 382.2 946.6 20,532.0
Pigs in 1938 .................. 384.5 813.5 1,249.5 30,600.0
Livestock production in 1938; index:
1913 = 100 ..................... 139 140 111 126
Livestock per 100 ha of agricultural
land in 1932-
Horses ....................... 7 10 14 (in 1933) 9
Cattle ...................... 25 31 27 7
Pigs ......................... 11 16 29 2.3
Sheep ........................ 18 27 15 9
Per capita production in 1930 (in
kg.)-
M ilk ......................... 690 680 - 120
M eat ......................... 56 63 - 16
Export butter ................. 12 10 4 0.2
Purchasing power of weekly wages
of a laborer in 1938 (in kg.)-
Rye bread .................... 104 125 106 66
Wheat bread .................. 36 95 44 32
M eat ......................... 31 28 30 4.3
Butter ....................... 12 10.5 11.6 2.7
Purchasing power in 1938 of one
pood (36.11 lbs.) of rye flour-
Sugar kg ...................... 5.9 4.9 3.8 0.5
Soap kg . ..................... 5.5 4.3 2.4 1.3
Cotton metre ................. 4.0 3.3 2.8 0.5
Kerosene liter ................ 17.1 14.5 11.9 4.2
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APPENDIX V.
BALTIC MEMORANDUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CONDEMNING SOVIET COLONIALISM*
The Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians have lived on their pre-
sent territories as independent and sovereign nations for many centu-
ries. They lost their freedom to imperialist powers, the last of which
was tsarist Russia.
Although Russia introduced a rule of oppression and russification,
she could not annihilate our peoples, nor their aspirations for freedom.
The Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians not only conserved their na-
tional customs and their languages, but were furthering their litera-
ture, arts and education and establishing economic and cultural enter-
prises and organizations of their own in spite of Russian restrictions.
After the downfall of the tsarist regime in 1917 our peoples readily
seized the opportunity to reestablish their independence in 1918.
In spite of the Soviet decree for self-determination of the nations
of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Government tried to regain our
countries by force of arms. Wars between Russia and the Baltic States
ensued, lasting from 1918 until 1920. Russia lost. In subsequent peace
treaties the Soviet Government renounced for ever all the rights Russia
allegedly had had over the people and over the territories of our
countries.
After they became free, our nations developed on an unprece-
dented scale both culturally and economically. They became members
of the League of Nations. They established friendly relations with all
nations and in particular were scrupulously correct and anxious to de-
velop good-neighborly relations with their eastern neighbor, the Soviet
Union. They granted the latter the most favorable transit facilities on
their rail- and waterways and other accommodations. This situation,
however, did not last.
As it became known later, the USSR concluded secret agreements
with Nazi Germany in August and September 1939 by which our coun-
tries were included into the Soviet sphere of influence.
In conformity with these secret agreements, in September and in
October 1939 the Soviet Union forced upon the Baltic States the so-
called Mutual Assistance Pacts, by virtue of which the Soviet Union
acquired the right to establish on the territory of our countries in fixed
localities, on lease terms, its naval and air bases and to maintain on
such sites a strictly limited number of forces. Here again the USSR
reaffirmed once more that the existing treaties will remain as basis for
its relations with our countries.
Our governments scrupulously adhered to the existing treaties in-
[Vol. 6
APPENDIX V
cluding the last mentioned Mutual Assistance Pacts. This has been of-
ficially confirmed by the Soviets themselves.
In June 1940 the USSR suddenly presented ultimatums to our
countries demanding the formation of new governments and admission
of unspecified numbers of Soviet troops into our countries. The accusa-
tions in these ultimatums were Moscow fabrications. The Soviet Gov-
ernment has never taken the trouble to try to prove them. The presen-
tation of these ultimatums was contrary to the Pacts of Non-
Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts and to the Convention
of Conciliation of 1932.
At the time of these ultimatums the Soviet army units had been
concentrated at the borders of the Baltic States, also army units at
their bases on the territories of our countries had been put in combat
readiness.
The Baltic peoples being faced with the overwhelming odds had to
yield.
In June 1940 Soviet armed forces invaded and occupied Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania. The Moscow appointed emissaries set up pup-
pet governments, the parliaments were dissolved, heads and higher of-
ficers of governmental agencies were dismissed and replaced by Soviet
agents. Civil liberties were suspended. The governments took over all
newspapers, printing establishments and broadcasting systems.
The puppet governments amended the Electoral Laws in violation
of our Constitutions. So-called elections on the Soviet pattern were
conducted whereby only one list of candidates - the Communist - was
allowed. Contrary to the Constitutions of the three Baltic republics
and other basic laws these illegally composed bodies passed the resolu-
tions for joining the Soviet Union.
The resolutions of these bodies composed by Moscow emissaries in
usurpation of our Constitutions and Electoral Laws and passed in vio-
lation of our basic laws are null and void.
There were never any plebiscites in our countries on the question
of joining the Soviet Union.
There were in our countries no conditions which might have been
considered as justification for the application of the principle of the so
called law of revolution, as there were no revolutions in our countries.
Our nations have never renounced their independence and free-
dom and they legally continue to be independent and sovereign mem-
bers of the community of nations.
The invasion and occupation of our countries and imposition of
the Soviet regime was a flagrant act of aggression and the present occu-
pation is a continuation of this international crime.
Besides this general act of aggression, the Soviet Union has com-
19851
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
mitted and is committing at present other innumerable crimes against
our peoples. The Soviets have murdered thousands of our people, have
deported to Russia over half a million people from our countries, re-
gardless of the fact that the USSR has joined the Genocide Conven-
tion. Taking the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations, as a code of principles
governing the civilized world, we can state on the basis of available
evidence that there is not a single article in the said Declaration which
has not been grossly violated by the Soviet Government. The Soviets
have committed crimes in the Baltic States similar to those for which
the Nazi leaders were convicted and executed in Nurnberg.
The USSR is systematically exploiting the natural resources, labor
and national production of our countries. It represents the worst type
of a colonial power. The Soviet colonialism differs from traditional
colonialism only in the following: a) the USSR does not have any legal
basis for the occupation of our countries, but is trying to justify its
domination by forgeries and usurpation of the will of our peoples; b)
the USSR is anxious to lower the cultural level of our people by sup-
pression of any independence in the works of art and literature, by
russification, by atheism, by Communist indoctrination; c) in addition
to mass-deportations, the Soviet Union is forcibly resettling young and
educated Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians in Russia and bringing
into the Baltic States uneducated Russians; d) having nationalized pri-
vate property of any size, the Soviet Union is exploiting our countries
directly through its agencies, being the sole owner of all land and en-
terprises, the sole employer who at the same time determines all wages
and working conditions.
The case of the Baltic States is not a question about the rights of
self-rule of our nations, since this is established beyond any reasonable
doubt, but the question is how to stop the Soviet crime and restore the
freedom and independence of our countries.
In summary we have to state:
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are old independent nations whose
independent existence has been interrupted by invasions on the part of
imperialist Russia and her imposed domination.
Our people have never voluntarily joined the U.S.S.R.
They rid themselves of the Russian domination in 1918 and re-
sumed their independent national life. By this they restituted their
self-rule in conformity with the modern right of self-determination.
After the Soviets attacked our countries a war ensued and the So-
viet armed forces were repulsed from our territories i.e. our nations
reconquered their territories and the Soviet Union renounced forever




They were recognized by other countries. They were law-abiding
and peaceloving members of the family of nations. They became mem-
bers of the League of Nations.
The Soviet crimes against our nations are:
1) By invasion and occupation of our independent countries the
Soviet Union violated general provisions of International Law and all
existing treaties, in particular the peace treaties and treaties of non-
aggression.
2) The USSR has and is violating the Atlantic Charter and the
Charter of the United Nations.
3) It has violated the Yalta agreement about the liberated
countries.
4) It has violated the Genocide Convention.
5) It is acting against the provisions of the Declaration of Human
Rights.
6) It has and is committing crimes enumerated in the Nurnberg
Charter of the War Crimes Tribunal.
7) It has not complied with the resolution of December 14, 1960 of
the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding the self-deter-
mination of the colonial countries and peoples.
The continuation of the Soviet occupation and of the imposed
Communist rule in the Baltic States aggravates the tensions in Eastern
Europe. This continuing crime is poisoning international life. It under-
mines respect towards governments and international organizations.
World order cannot be built on violence and crime. It should be
based on justice, otherwise the world will succumb to the rule of vio-
lence . ...
Washington, D.C., November 1961
Johannes Kaiv
Acting Consul General of Estonia






Charg6 d'Affaires a.i. of Lithuania
* The memorandum was originally presented to His Excellency, Mongi
Slim, President of the United Nations, on November 16, 1961.
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APPENDIX VI.
Letters to the West Written by Estonian President Konstantin Pats.
Translation from Estonian
Since the year 1940 1 am being held without a court order, without
any charges, as a prisoner in Russia in a hospital. . . where I, as Presi-
dent of the Republic of Estonia, am being subjected to degradation in
every way and my life threatened. As a result of my advanced age and
indescribably difficult conditions of life my health has deteriorated
here very much. It is difficult to describe all that how ruthless force has
been used here against me, all my personal belongings which I had
along with me have been taken away. I have even been refused to use
my own name. Here I am only No. 12. I don't even have permission to
correspond with my family and to receive any help from them. The
food here is bad, I have become weak, my hearing and eyesight have
weakened. My protests that I am being held here without any lawful
basis are being disregarded. For my selfprotection I do not even have
that support which in other places is offered by societies for the pre-
vention of cruelties to animals. I will be soon 80 years old, there are
few days of life left for me. Having been born free, I would also want to
die in freedom.
No sentence has been passed upon me, I have lived as a free
human being and I wish to end my days of life in freedom. I am still
the President of the Republic of Estonia and I have the right (word
illegible) to expect corresponding treatment, as my home country is a
free and independent state. I hope that a just public opinion will ex-
tend its protection also to my human rights and will help to bring
about my release from this terrible place of imprisonment where brute




I hereby certify that the above is a true and correct translation of
the Estonian original which is on file at the Consulate General of Esto-
nia in New York and which is written and signed by Konstantin Pts,
President of the Republic of Estonia, whose signature and handwriting
are personally known to me.
New York, N.Y., June, 1977
Ernst Jaakson
Consul General of Estonia
In charge of Legation
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To the Secretary General of the United Nations.
I turn to the United Nations and the entire civilized world with
the request to help the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
against whom the Russian occupants are using ruthless force and who
therefore could perish.
I declare the annexation of the Baltic states which was carried out
in the year 1940 a brutal violation of international law and a falsifica-
tion of the free will of the annexed peoples.
Save these peoples from complete annihilation and allow these
peoples freely to decide their own fate. Establish an agency of the au-
thority of the United Nations in the Baltic states so that the citizens of
the Baltic states could under their supervision and control freely ex-
press their true will through a vote of the people.
May Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania be free and independent
states.K. Pats (fingerprint)
I hereby certify that the above is a true and correct translation of
the Estonian original which is on file at the Consulate General of Esto-
nia in New York and which is written and signed by Konstantin Pats,
President of the Republic of Estonia, whose signature and handwriting
are personally known to me.
New York, N.Y., June 20, 1977
(Signature)
Ernst Jaakson
Consul General of Estonia
In charge of Legation
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APPENDIX VII.
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT MOTION REGARDING FORCIBLE








MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
tabled by Mr JAKOBSEN, Mr HAHN, and Mr HABSBURG
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on the conscription of young Balts by




A. Outraged at the accumulating reports of conscription by the Soviet
Union of young Baits in the Soviet war of aggression against the
Afghan people,
B. having regard to the decision of the European Parliament of 13
January 1983 on the right to self-determination of Baltic
Europeans,
C. recognizing that the enforced conscription of citizens for military
service in a war of aggression to which their countries of origin are
not party constitutes a dual violation of international Law,
D. in the spirit of the European Parliament's commitment to stand
up for the rights of all Europeans,
1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting for political cooperation:
(a) to make representations to the Soviet government in this
matter, and to call on it emphatically to adhere to basic
principles of human rights in this connection,
(b) to remind Moscow yet again of the Helsinki Final Proto-
cols to which it is signatory,
(c) to raise the problem of the continuing oppression of the
Baltic peoples with the UNO;
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2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign
Ministers meeting in political cooperation, to the governments of the
Community Member States, and to the Soviet government.
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
ON THE RIGHT OF THE BALTIC PEOPLES TO SELF-
DETERMINATION
presented by Mr JAGER and others
The Assembly,
1. Referring to the joint Declaration adopted in April 1979, in which
45 citizens of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ask the United Nations to
recognise the right to self-determination and independence of the Bal-
tic peoples and demand that a referendum be held on the question;
2. Further referring to the bilateral peace treaties signed by the So-
viet Union and three Baltic countries at Dorpat (2 February 1920),
Moscow (12 July 1920) and Riga (11 April 1920), under the terms of
which the Soviet Union promised territorial integrity and lasting peace
to the three countries;
3. Having regard to Article VIII of the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe, which guarantees the right of
peoples to dispose of themselves and to determine (when and how they
so desire) their internal and external status in complete freedom;
4. Having regard to Article 1 of the International Pact on Civil and
Political Rights (10 December 1966) and the International Pact on Ec-
onomic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which affirm the right of
peoples to dispose of themselves and of which the Soviet Union is a
Contracting Party;
5. Condemning the fact that the occupation in 1940, by the Soviet
Union, of these three previously independent and neutral states, was
based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and continues to the present
day, and condemning the massive Russianisation which has been un-
dertaken by the Soviet authorities with increasing intensiveness in
these countries;
6. Observing that until now the Soviet annexation of the three Baltic
countries has not been officially recognised by the majority of the
states of Europe and that the United States, Canada, the United King-
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dom, Australia and the Holy See continue to recognise the concept of a
Baltic state;
7. Paying homage to the fight for freedom and the resistance in which
Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians engaged for eight years, and to
the thousands of victims of that struggle, and also to the 665,000 Es-
tonians, Latvians and Lithuanians who, since 1940, have been deported
and sent by the Soviet authorities to the Siberian work camps;
8. Having learned of the serious violations of human rights, particu-
larly the right to freedom of worship, which have been and are still
being committed by the Soviet authorities in the three Baltic
countries;
9. Referring to the resolution adopted on 13 January 1983 by the Eu-
ropean Parliament, on the situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
(Official Journal of the European Communities, No. C/42/77 of 14 De-
cember 1983);
10. Requests the Government of the USSR to restore freedom and
self-determination to the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania;
11. Requests the governments of the member states of the Council of
Europe to take action, in the framework of the CSCE process, and in
particular at the forthcoming conference in Vienna, on behalf of the
granting of the right to self-determination to the peoples of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania, and to approach the Government of the USSR
to that end;
12. Requests the governments of the member states of the Council of
Europe to draw the attention of participants at the meeting of CSCE
experts to take place in Ottawa on 7 May 1985 on the serious violations
of human rights committed by the Soviet authorities in the three Bal-
tic countries, and to attempt to secure their redress as a matter of
urgency;
13. Requests the Committee of Ministers:
a. to co-ordinate, when preparing for the above-mentioned
CSCE meetings, the attitudes of delegations from member
states and ensure a concerted approach;
b. to condemn, in a joint declaration, the persistence of the
intransigent colonialism being practised by the USSR in
regard to the peoples of Europe who aspire to freedom;
c. to invite the governments of member states to inform the
relevant bodies of the United Nations of the continuing vi-
olations of the right to self-determination and of human
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rights in the three Baltic countries.
Signed: JAGER, BENNETT, REDDEMANN, ZIERER, KIT-
TELMANN, SCHWARTZ, LENZER, UNLAND,
HORNHUES, SPIES von BOLLESHEIM, GRANT, OEHRI,
van der WERF-TERPSTRA, MICHEL, HENNICOT,
BUTTY, VOYATZIS, PAPADOGONAS, EYSINK,
CAVALIERE, BOHM, LEMMRICH, ROBLES, de BONDT,







OPEN LETTER FROM BALTIC NATIONALS IN THE BALTIC
STATES
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN NORTH EUROPE
To: The Heads of the Governments of the USSR, Iceland, Norway,
Denmark, Finland and Sweden Concerning the Establishment of
a Nuclear-Free Zone in North Europe
OPEN LETTER
The peoples and the Governments of North Europe are at present con-
sidering various aspects of the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone
in North Europe, expressed by the Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Herewith we pronounce to supplement
the above idea by including the Baltic Sea and the Baltic countries -
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - in the above-mentioned nuclear-free
zone.
The extension of the nuclear-free zone to the Baltic Sea and to the
Baltic countries would be logical because the area in question is actu-
ally a part of North Europe. Moreover, this would render a possible
future treaty all the more important because it would be a brilliant
example of an equal and balanced disarmament. The extension of the
nuclear-free zone to the Baltic Sea and to the Baltic countries would
also be in the interests of the small Scandinavian and Baltic nations,
more particularly by contributing to their future survival.
The Baltic nations have paid dearly for the Great Power conflicts.
Their sufferings were particularly deep during the Second World War
when the front passed twice over their territories. Here it must be em-
phasised that the Governments of the independent republics of Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania made every effort to avoid involvement in
the Great Power conflicts. The Baltic nations know, too, that the lead-
ers of the Great Powers of that time ignored completely the wishes, the
fate and the opinions of the Baltic peoples when they divided the area
into their spheres of influence. A drastic example of this is the Pact of
August 23, 1939, between Nazi Germany and the USSR, and its secret
appendix which has not been published in the USSR to this day.
Because of the above we consider it extremely important to devise
guarantees which would help ensure the survival of small nations in
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case of possible Great Power conflicts.
We consider it natural and acceptable to all nations that an agreement
concerning a nuclear-free zone in North Europe would ban the produc-
tion and stationing of nuclear weapons, as well as the stationing and
movements of any means (ships, aircraft, missiles) designed to carry
nuclear warheads, in the appropriate territories of the High Con-
tracting Parties and in the Baltic Sea.
We hope that the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Powers will be able to
guarantee the ban on nuclear weapons in the nuclear-free zone in
North Europe, including the Baltic Sea and the Baltic countries. Such
a ban on nuclear weapons in one area would be an important step to-












































JOINT DECLARATION OF 45 NATIONALS OF ESTONIA,
LATVIA AND LITHUANIA
To the Government of the USSR
Government of the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany)
Government of GDR (German Democratic Republic)
Governments of the nations signatories of the Atlantic Charter
Secretary General of the UN Kurt Waldheim
In Soviet juridical science, the term "national sovereignty" encom-
passes the supreme rule of a nation, its political freedom, its real ca-
pacity to determine fully its destiny, in the first place its ability to
exercise self-determination including separation (from another state)
and creation of its own independent state. National sovereignty is
characterized by political, territorial, cultural, linguistic independence
of a nation which manifests itself in the plenitude of sovereign rights in
all the described spheres of the social life, ensuring their full
realization.
National sovereignty cannot be given or taken away, it can only be
violated or reestablished.
In 1919 Lenin acknowledged the de facto existence of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania which had separated from the Russian empire. In
1920 Soviet Russia concluded peace treaties with these countries which
meant the de jure recognition of the Baltic States by Russia. In behalf
of the Soviet Government, Lenin "for all time" renounced "all the sov-
ereign rights" (of Russia) over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Never-
theless, ninteen years thereafter Stalin and Hitler committed a con-
spiracy against the sovereignty of these nations. The 23rd of August
this year marks the 40th anniversary of the signing of the so-called
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, implementation whereof meant the end of
the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression treaty was concluded be-
tween the German Reich and the Soviet Union. Attached thereto was a
strictly Secret Additional Protocol on the division of Eastern Europe
into so-called spheres of influence. The objects of the confidential ne-
gotiations between People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the
USSR V.M. Molotov and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany J.
Ribbentrop were Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bessara-
bia and Northern Bukovina. The substance of the Additional Protocol
was to the effect that the fate of Finland, Estonia and Latvia was en-
trusted to the USSR, and of Lithuania, to the German Reich.
On September 28, 1939, a Friendship and Boundary Treaty was
concluded between the USSR and Germany. This treaty amended the
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Secret Additional Protocol of August 23, 1939 to the effect that Lithua-
nia was "entrusted" to the USSR, with the exception of the left bank
territory along the Sesupe River, which, in the event of "special mea-
sures", was to be occupied by the German Army.
Between June 15 and 17, 1940, by order of the Government of the
USSR, the Red Army had "implemented the special measures" on the
territory of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Also incorporated was that
territory of Lithuania, which according to the agreement between Sta-
lin and Hitler, was to be annexed to Germany.
On January 10, 1941, the German ambassador to the USSR, Dr.
von Schulenburg, on the one side, and Chairman of the Council of Peo-
ple's Commissars V. M. Molotov on the other, signed another Secret
Protocol wherein the object of bargaining was the above-mentioned
Lithuanian territory. The Government of Germany renounced to the
USSR the territory on the western bank of the Sesupe River, receiving
a monetary compensation in amount of seven and one-half million dol-
lars in gold, or thirty-one and one-half million reichsmarks.
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a conspiracy between the two
greatest tyrants in history - Stalin and Hitler - against peace and hu-
manity, and it inaugurated World War Two. We consider the date of
August 23 the day of shame.
On August 14, 1941, President F.D. Roosevelt of the United States
and Prime Minister W. Churchill of Great Britain signed the Atlantic
Charter of 6 Points. The 2nd point of this Charter declared that the
USA and England approve "no territorial changes that do not accord
with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned." Point III:
"they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government
which they will live under; and they wish to see sovereign rights and
self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of
them." On September 24, 1941, the USSR acceded to the Charter.
The declaration of the USSR stated: "The Soviet Union in its ex-
ternal policies, shall be guided by the principle of self-determination of
the people . . . .The Soviet Union champions the right of every peo-
ple to a State independence and territorial integrity of their country,
the right to establish a social order and a form of government of their
choice which they deem proper and necessary in order to safeguard the
economic and cultural welfare of their country."
It behooves to remind that, according to International Law, reali-
zation of the right of the peoples to self-determination is impossible
under the presence of occupation forces on the territory of these peo-
ples. This is also emphasized in Lenin's Decree on Peace which states
that "if any people is held by force in defiance of its expressed wish
.... is not given the right of decision, free from every duress, by free
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elections, without the presence of those armed forces of the incorporat-
ing state or any more powerful state of what form of national existence
it wishes to have. . . then the incorporation of such a state should be
called annexation, an act of seizure and force."
The results of the ill-famed Munich agreement of September 29,
1938 were erased by the very fact of the military defeat of Germany in
World War II. The Government of FRG (Federal Republic of Ger-
many), pressured by the public opinion of Czechoslovakia, pronounced
the Munich accord void from the moment of its signing.
However, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact apparently retains its ju-
ridical force to date. We deem that the silence of the world public
opinion encourages the aggressors of the past, the present, and of the
future.
We address:
- the Government of the USSR with a plea to publish in full the
contents of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and of all the supplementary
secret protocols attached thereto. We remind that (Lenin's) Decree of
Peace declared the Soviet Government's renunciation of secret diplo-
macy. Likewise we request to declare the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to
be void since the moment of its signing;
- The Governments of the FRG and the GDR with a plea to pub-
licly pronounce the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to be void since the mo-
ment of its signing, and to help the Government of the USSR to liqui-
date the consequences of the said Pact, to withdraw the foreign troops
from the territories of the Baltic States. For implementing the said
task, a Commission should be created of representatives of the USSR,
FRG and GDR to liquidate the consequences of the Molotov-Ribben-
trop Pact;
- The Governments of the countries, signatories of the Atlantic
Charter, with a plea that they, from the position of their moral respon-
sibility, express their decisive condemnation of the Molotov-Ribben-
trop Pact and its consequences. We remind that, according to Interna-
tional Law, actions which by their substance and purpose constitute a
threat to peace and security, and grossly violate the universally recog-
nized international norms, are not domestic concerns. The principle of
self-determination of peoples and nations presupposes the rightfulness
of various forms and methods of the struggle against colonialism which
is an international crime. This is connected with the rightfulness of
international support for the liberation struggle. Moreover, according
to the Declaration of Principles of International Law, every State is
obliged to cooperate in lending help to concerned and independent ac-
tions in realizing the principle of equality and self-determination of
peoples;
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- the Secretary General of the UNO, with a reminder that this in-
ternational organization is the direct successor of the League of Na-
tions whose membership included Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania until
the implementation of the "special measures". Therefore, on your
shoulders rests the juridical responsibility for the destinies of these
countries.
We ask you to raise at the nearest session of the UNO General
Assembly the question of undoing the consequences of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact.
We remind that the principle of self-determination is recognized
by contemporary International Law. This was done by incorporating
the principle of self-determination of nations in such most significant
international documents as the UNO Charter (Art. 1, 13, 55, 76), the
Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peo-
ples adopted by the XXV session of the General Assembly of the UNO
on December 14, 1960, the General Assembly Resolution of December
20, 1965 which recognized the legality of the struggle of the colonial
peoples; the International Convention on abolishing all forms of racial
discrimination confirmed by the General Assembly XX session on De-
cember 21, 1965; International Pacts on Human Rights adopted by the
General Assembly XXI session on December 16, 1966, and the Declara-
tion of Principles of International Law adopted by the XXV Jubilee
session of the General Assembly on October 24, 1970. These and other
international legal acts of the UNO disclose the contemporary context
of the principle of equality of rights and self-determination of peoples.
This means:
- the right of all peoples to freely shape their destinies, that is
under conditions of full freedom to decide their internal and external
political status without external interference, and to shape according to
their own wishes their political, economic, social and cultural
development;
- the right of all peoples to enjoy their natural wealth and
resources;
- the duty of all States to cooperate by collective and independent
actions toward the realization of the principle of equality and self-de-
termination of peoples in accord with the provisions of the UNO
Charter;
- the equality and the right to determine their own destinies are
proclaimed as a more important principle of International Law in the
Final Act of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.
As you know, Mr. Secretary General, the above indicated interna-
tional documents, which are binding, are being violated by certain
States, members of the UNO. We wish that the next session of the
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UNO Assembly would consider the matter of the situation of Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia, to the extent that the peoples of these coun-























































THE BALTIC TRIBUNAL IN COPENHAGEN DECLARES
THAT THE OCCUPATION AND ANNEXATION OF ONCE-INDE-
PENDENT ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA SERVES AS A
PRIME EXAMPLE OF THE VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC LAW AND TREATIES RATIFIED BY THE SOVIET
UNION.
MASS RUSSIAN IMMIGRATION HAS SERIOUSLY DAM-
AGED BALTIC IDENTITY AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE; LAN-
GUAGE, CULTURE, RELIGION, EVEN THE LEARNING OF HIS-
TORY IN SCHOOLS, HAVE SUFFERED UNDER SOVIET RULE.
THE MILITARIZATION OF THE BALTIC STATES SERVES AS A
CONSTANT REMINDER OF THE CONTINUING THREAT TO
WORLD PEACE.
THE RIGHT OF THE BALTIC PEOPLES TO SELF-DETER-
MINATION, TO NON-DISCRIMINATION AND TO NON-INTER-
FERENCE ON THEIR ANCESTRAL SOIL MUST BE
REINSTATED.
AFTER HEARING EXPERIENCED WITNESSES ON NU-
MEROUS ASPECTS OF LIFE AND LAW AND PRACTICE IN OC-
CUPIED ESTONIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA, THE BALTIC
TRIBUNAL CONCLUDES THAT SEVERE INJUSTICE HAS
BEEN AND IS BEING DONE TO THESE PEOPLES BY THE SO-
VIET UNION.
THE FATE OF THE THREE BALTIC STATES IS UNIQUE IN
HUMAN HISTORY. NOWHERE ELSE IN THE WORLD ARE
FORMER PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES OCCUPIED, AN-
NEXED AND COLONIALIZED BY THE CONQUERING POWER.
A UNIQUE FATE DESERVES UNIQUE POLICIES FROM THE
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD. WE CALL
UPON THEM TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF SOVIET OCCUPATION
OF THE BALTIC COUNTRIES IN ALL WORLD FORUMS, DE-
MANDING FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE FOR ESTONIA,
LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA.
19851
518 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. [Vol. 6
BY THIS COPENHAGEN MANIFESTO WE DECLARE THAT
THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES IS
DAMAGING THE CHANCE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM IN EU-
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APPENDIX XII
APPENDIX XII.
Testimony Regarding the Importance of the Non-Recognition Doc-
trine to the Baltic Peoples
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the proceedings
in the matter of In Re: Linnas, A8 085 628, Honorable Howard I. Co-
hen, Judge, United States Immigration Court, presiding, held on April
5, 1985 at New York, N.Y.
THE COURT: What is your name, Ma'am?
MS. CELMINA: My name is Helen Celmina.
THE COURT: How do you spell that?
MS. CELMINA: C-e-l-m-i-n-a.
THE COURT: Helen, you thought I knew how to spell Helen?
MS. CELMINA: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay, stand up, please. Raise your right hand.
(Whereupon, the witness was sworn in.)
THE COURT: Your witness, Mr. Berzins.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BERZINS:
Q Now, Ms. Celmina, when you testify, please look at His
Honor and speak loudly so that we can all hear you.
A Yes.
Q I will ask you the questions, and you answer them slowly so
that the microphone can pick it up.
A I will try.
Q How long have you been here in the United States now?
A Six years and a half.
Q What year did you come here?
A June 12, 1978.
Q Where did you come from?
A From Latvia.
Q What were you doing in Latvia?
A I was working as an artist in Latvia.
THE COURT: Working as an artist?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: What kind of an artist?
THE WITNESS: A kind of commercial art. I was not working, not
exactly in Latvia. The organization was in Latvia, but I was working in
Moscow.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q While you were living in Latvia and in Moscow, or where-
ever else you were -
A Yes.
Q Were you ever imprisoned?
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A Oh yes, two times.
Q What were the offenses for which you were imprisoned?
A The first time I was in prison I was 18 years old, because my
mother was living in Liepaja.
THE COURT: Would you spell that, please.
MR. BERZINS: L-i-e-p-a-j-a.
THE WITNESS: And, my father was living in Riga, the capital.
And, I was going to my father without a special permission from the
police. I had a passport violation, and I got one year of very hard labor
in prison for that passport violation.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q Did you say you were in prison, again?
A And, the second time was in 1962.
THE COURT: When was the first time? What year was
that?
THE WITNESS: It was '47.
THE COURT: 1947, and the second time?
THE WITNESS: The second time 1962.
THE COURT: What happened then?
The WITNESS: That happened, I had - the big crime was that I
had 16 copies of the READER'S DIGEST and some Western German
magazines, and they were all in the Court on the table, and I could not
help. Because, first they came to my house; and they searched my
house, because an informer told about this, that I had anti-Soviet
literature.
They made a home searching. And, after all of the literature was
in the Court on the table, and especial for READER'S DIGEST I got
four years. I was sentenced to four years hard labor.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q Did you serve those four years?
A All four years, yes. Because, that is not possible to get out
before.
Q Now, Ms. Celmina, while you were living in Latvia did you
have occasion to hear about the United States policy of nonrecognition
of the forceable incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union?
A Everybody knows that, even the people who work in the
fields in the country; because, everybody is listening to Radio Free Eu-
rope and Voice of America, Voice of America even more. And, every-
body who is listening to the radio, that is a little bit risk to do that.
But, the people do that; because they look to America like to a big
light, like to a God, like to somebody who may come and help them.
Q Why is that?
A Because the people, they don't like the Soviets because the
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Soviet government, it doesn't treat our countries, all three Baltic coun-
tries, as a part of the Soviet Union. Even they doesn't treat us as a part
THE COURT: Who doesn't?
THE WITNESS: The Soviet Government.
THE COURT: Why?
THE WITNESS: Because they use our countries as research for
food. Because, our countries, all three Baltic, small countries, they feed
such big places like Leningrad and Moscow. Also, they use our coun-
tries to take young people in the military to send them to Afghanistan.
Because mostly Baltic people were sent to Afghanistan and other dan-
gerous places.
They can never make that military service in the country where
they are born, absolutely impossible. Also, a KGB man in Moscow, he
once told so long, as long in the Baltic States the people will use their
own languages, so long there will never be peace between us and the
worker people in the Baltic States. So, we feel all the time that we are
occupied.
And, also, the same thing when I was in the labor camps in the
Soviet Union. I was speaking with other prisoners, my fellow prisoners.
I was speaking. And, they did ask - everybody would ask what is my
crime. There was from Boris Pasternak's, like there was Mrs. Ivinskaja
- so, other people, when they heard that I was sentenced for four
years for these magazines, THE READER'S DIGEST and illustrated
magazines from Western Germany, so they said it would never happen
in Moscow or in Leningrad. Never the people would be sentenced for
having such magazines in their house.
But, this happens only in the occupied place like the Baltic States.
So, we feel in each -- yes, the people used to say "For that crime, that
somebody was taken in for investigation in Moscow, then he would be
clipped the nails."
THE COURT: Let the record show that she pointed to the nails in
the form of clipping.
THE WITNESS: Yes, so the same crime for somebody in the oc-
cupied republics would cut off the whole arm. That is the
compartment.
THE COURT: Comparison.
THE WITNESS: Yes, comparison.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q Now, in the camps, when you were serving your time, did
you have any occasion to hear of or come in contact with any discus-
sion of the nonrecognition policy?
A Of course. There it is even worse. Everybody who comes
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from Ukraine and (unrecognizable).
MR. BERZINS: White Russia.
THE COURT: Mr. Berzins, could you spell it for the record,
please, to the best of your ability.
MR. BERZINS: Your Honor, that one is too hard for me.
THE WITNESS: It is very hard to spell.
THE COURT: I know, but this is part of the test for today. B-y-e-
l-o- r-u-s-s-i-a. Will you accept that?
MR. BERZINS: I will adopt that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you. So, even those - they are also,
but they are occupied a very long time ago. And, also, they want to say
that they are not a part of the Soviet Union. Nobody wants to be a
part of the Soviet Union.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q Do the people in Latvia and the other Baltic States have any
appreciation or regard for the nonrecognition policy?
A Oh yes, of course. They are - how to say - that is a big
moral satisfaction that they know that big countries like Australia -
no, before it was - and USA, that they don't recognize the Baltic
States as a part of Soviet Union. That is just a big moral satisfaction.
Because of this, just because of this, they don't lose hope that some
[day] to get independence.
That's the only hope why people live. They would not be that
hope. Maybe many people would make suicide in this time. Also, an-
other thing what is happening, the alcoholism; because, some people
they have lost already maybe the hope that it will be in their life, the
elderly people. they are now all drinking too much. They realize what
is going on in those countries. Because, it is really a very hard life there
for everybody.
Q Do the people of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia wish to get
out of the Soviet Union or secede from the Soviet Union, or be
independent?
A They want only to be independent, and that's why they
speak their own language, and that's why they try to keep their chil-
dren speaking their own languages. Also, there are very few marriages
between the Russians. They avoid to have mixed families.
Q Do the people themselves express the nonrecognition of the
Soviet occupation in any tangible ways that you can tell us about?
A Of course, they express. There are many times. Young peo-
ple have been arrested many times because of national flags. when it is
the day of our independence, they repair many times our national
flags. And, there are many times slogan on walls and slogans on the
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driveways. "Russians get out." In Estonia two years ago some people
were visiting Estonia, and not exactly, you know, in the big cities have
-to see something. But, in the country roads, they saw young Estonian
girls riding bicycles. They were wearing only blue, white, black. That is
the Estonia national flag when the country was independent.
They wear blue, white and black, yes. Latvia has dark red with
white stripe in the middle. This flag appears many times. One time it
was even on the radio tower.
Q Do the people, or do the young men ever refuse to go into
the Soviet military service?
A They do, but then they put them in the psychiatric
hospitals.
THE COURT: What kind, psychiatric hospitals?
THE WITNESS: They put them in the hospitals.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q Are you aware of any refusals to accept Soviet passports?
A Oh, yes, many people. You see, after the war, the people
were too scared. In the Stalin time they could shoot them to refuse to
take the Soviet passport. But, now, the times are a little bit changed.
So many people, they refuse to take the Soviet passport. I know one
family now -
Q Why would they refuse to take the Soviet passport?
A Because they say that they are born in the country, which
once was free, Latvia, that was never belonging to Soviets. They want
to remain as Latvians. They don't want to be Soviet citizens. They are
asking to be stateless. It is not a status, not allowed a status to be
stateless in the Soviet Union. But, they want to be stateless, so they
just don't take the passport. Or, if they have already the passport, they
bring it back to the police. They put it on the table. They say, "We
don't recognize your Government, so we don't want to be your
citizens."
Q Ms. Celmina, if a citizen of Estonia or Latvia or Lithuania
was to be deported from the United States to the Soviet Union, what
effect would that have on the people in the Baltic countries today?
A Oh, no, that would be a very hard stroke to everybody who is
listening radio, to everybody who is listening radio. Everybody would
know it, and they would tell to other people. In about one week all
three Baltic States would be informed about that. If something like
that would happen, if a criminal or not a criminal, never mind. If
somebody would be deported, especially from the United States, this
would be a big stroke.
THE COURT: Would it make a difference if the person was a
criminal or noncriminal; is that what you said?
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THE WITNESS: Yes, in any case. Because if somebody is a crimi-
nal, he has to go somewhere in a prison. But not to be deported.
THE COURT: Anyone.
THE WITNESS: Yes, a criminal belongs to a prison, but not to
deport him.
MR. BERZINS: I have no further questions....
THE COURT: What is your name, Sir?
MR. KALNINS: Kalnins, Victor.
THE COURT: Would you raise your right hand, Sir.
Whereupon, the witness was sworn in.)...
Q Now, Mr. Kalnins, where were you born?
A Officially I was born in Moscow. But, because I am born
from parents who were sort of diplomats - they are Latvians by na-
tionality, but they were in Soviet Union as Communist immigrants.
Because, at this time Latvia was an independent country, and they
serve the Soviet Union. Actually I born in Ankara in Turkey. But, offi-
cially the papers are in Moscow.
THE COURT: I don't understand. You said you were born in
Moscow, and now you were born in Ankara, Turkey. How could you be
born in two places at the same time? I don't understand that?
THE WITNESS: You don't understand. It is a regulation in the
Soviet Union that nobody from Soviet diplomat children can born
abroad. And, if they born abroad, they must write Moscow.
THE COURT: Really.
THE WITNESS: Really.
THE COURT: I learned something today.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q At the time when you were born your parents, or your
mother, was stationed in Ankara, Turkey; is that correct?
A Only my mother. At this time when I was born my father
was arrested in Moscow. Actually, this is only I know after this, that
about this time when I born she was executed in Stalin terror time.
Stalin terror 1937, 1938. I was born in January 1938.
Q That was your father that was executed when you were
born?
A Yes.
THE COURT: I thought you said your mother? You mentioned
your mother.
THE WITNESS: (Pause)
MR. REDINS: (Interpreted for the witness.)
THE WITNESS: My father, yes.
BY MR. BERZINS:





Q Now, you lived in the Soviet Union until when, before you
returned to Latvia?
A Yes, I lived to age eight years. I returned to Latvia in 1946.
This is after World War II and when Latvia become Soviet republic,
Soviet occupied republic.
Q Did you have any education in Latvia?
A Only secondary school.
Q Now, did there come a time when you were imprisoned?
A No, I was imprisoned after my graduating from Moscow
University.
Q Let me back up and ask you this: What education have you
had in the Soviet Union?
A Yes, I graduated Moscow University in 1960.
Q What did you do after graduating from the Moscow
University?
A Yes, I worked in Latvian Academy of Science as editor in
magazine, and then I worked as editor in Latvian Trade Union
Magazine.
Q What years were those that you are referring to now?
A This is from 1960 to 1962.
Q What, if anything, happened in 1962?
A In 1962 I was arrested by KGB.
Q Why were you arrested; do you know?
A I was a member of a discussion group. The theme of discus-
sion is Latvia and other Baltic States, Estonia and Lithuania,
independence.
MR. REDINS: (Interpreted for the witness.)
THE WITNESS: Independence from the Soviet Union, from Rus-
sia, actually.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q Mr. Kalnins, did you come from a Communist family?
A Yes. Not only my parents, father who was executed and
mother who was died when I was ten years old. I was adopted by her
sister and her husband. They are top official in occupied Latvia, the
same that named Soviet Latvia.
Q Now, how did you come to speak in terms of independent
Latvia if you came from this political background?
A I thought about it. I thought about position of my people, of
my country. I felt that I belong to my country and my people, my na-
tionality. And, I saw that Latvians in Latvia - this is own country -
are oppressed.
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THE COURT: Oppressed.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q Mr. Kalnins, what happened to you after you were arrested
by the KGB?
A I was arrested with some other people, among them one
writer, one library worker, one student of (unrecognizable) I was sen-
tenced to ten years in strict labor camp.
Q Did you actually serve all of any part of your sentence?
A Yes, I served all ten years.
(Whereupon, there was a short recess.)
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q Where did you serve your sentence?
A I served my ten-year sentence in some prison camp, some
hard labor prison camp in (unrecognizable)
THE COURT: How do you spell that?
MR. REDINS: M-o-r-d-o-v-i-a Autonomous Republic.
THE WITNESS: It is one of (unrecognizable) in Russian
federation.
MR. REDINS: Volga, like the River Volga.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q When did you get out of the prison camp?
A In 1972.
Q Now, during the period of time that you returned to Latvia
in the 1946 and, say, 1972, did you have occasion to learn of the exis-
tence of the United States policy of nonrecognition of the forcible in-
corporation of Latvia to the Soviet Union?
A Yes, I know that United States, the United States and some
other Western countries don't recognize incorporation or occupation of
Baltic States. I heard about it from radio stations, the same as Liberty
or the Voice of America. And, I read about it in some books; for exam-
ple, one book in English was I received from American students, who
had an American exhibition in Moscow. This name, if I remember
good, this book named is - the name is THE U.S. POLITICAL
SYSTEM.
Q Did that book have any reference to the nonrecognition
policies?
A Yes. This is a reference about U.S. policy against Baltic
States, and it was written that they don't recognize - the United
States don't recognize incorporation in the Soviet Union.
THE COURT: Does not recognize.
MR. REDINS: Does not.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q Now among the people with whom you had this discussion
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group about Latvia's independence, was this policy also known to
them?
A Yes, all of us know very well about this policy. I will tell that
- I won't tell that it is some that supporting our hopes.
Q Well, what practical benefit or significance did that policy
have to you and to your friends at that time?
A You see, this is more psychological sphere. Because, if you
feel alone in our world, some people don't hope about their indepen-
dence, their freedom, and other - also human rights, also. But, if you
know that you have friends in another world, it gives you some hope.
Q Did you, while you were serving your ten years in the prison
camps, also have occasion to run across any discussion of this nonrec-
ognition policy?
A Yes, we discussed about it, not only with Baltic people, Bal-
ticmen, but also we discussed this with Ukrainian and Russian and
men with - and other nationalities, also, other nationalities.
Q Do you know whether the views that you have told us you
had back then were shared by Estonians and Lithuanians, or was this
just simply Latvians?
A Yes, not only Latvians. Estonian and Lithuanians knew and
know it very well. And, among my friends there are a lot of Estonians
and Lithuanians.
Q They were, also, to your knowledge, aware of this nonrecog-
nition policy?
A Yes, they know it. They know it, and not only know, but in
some undergrounds documents, some (unrecognizable)
THE COURT: What? I don't understand that.
MR. BERZINS: Samizdat
THE COURT: How do you spell that?
THE WITNESS: This mean not official, but -
THE COURT: I need the spelling.
MR. REDINS: Would this be correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. REDINS: S-a-m-i-z-d-a-t.
THE WITNESS: They write that it is the U.S. and other coun-
tries official policy.
BY MR. BERZINS:
Q If a Latvian or an Estonian or a Lithuanian were to be de-
ported; that is, taken from the United States and sent back to the So-
viet Union, what effect or what might your friends behind the Iron
Curtain think of that?
MR. GOLDBERG: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled. I will permit it.
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MR. REDINS: (Interpreted for the witness.)
THE WITNESS: I think that it was very strong (unrecognizable)
their hopes, because they need friends in the world. Never mind, it
makes no difference who will be deported. That mean that the United
States in one case doesn't recognize our occupation but in another case,
if it means special, real politics, that's mean German term (unrecogniz-
able) [Real Politik].
THE COURT: R-e-a-I p-o-l-i-t-i-k.
THE WITNESS: Sometimes they make it and forget about
principles.
MR. BERZINS: I have no other questions.
APPENDIX XIII
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Washington, D.C., September 4, 1941
Sir;
I am instructed by my Government to inform Your Excellency
that, as a result of military operations begun June 22, 1941, the
Romanian Army has recovered the Romanian Provinces of Bessarabia
and Northern Bucovina which since July, 1940, had been occupied by
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
With regard to the foregoing, the Romanian Government desires
to recall the political and legal status of these territories prior to the
Russian ultimatum to Romania on June 28, 1940, as well as the cir-
cumstances and conditions under which they became subject to forced
occupation by the USSR.
The territory known today as Bessarabia has been an integral part
of the Principality of Moldavia since its founding in the 14th century.
In 1812, in disregard of the will of the autochthonous Romanian popu-
lation and in violation of the treaty between Moldavia and the Otto-
man Empire whereby the latter, as a suzerain power, guaranteed the
integrity of the Romanian Principality, Bessarabia was annexed by
Russia after her victory over the Turks.
The treaty recognizing Turkish suzerainty over Moldavia, con-
cluded by Bogdan, Prince of Moldavia, with Sultan Bajazet II, in 1511,
subsequently confirmed by several almost identical treaties, and ac-
knowledged by the Paris Convention of 1858 as the basis of the rela-
tions between the Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire,
recognized the complete freedom and independence of Moldavia and
imposed upon the Ottoman Empire the duty to "defend Moldavia
against all those who may attack her and shall preserve her integrity,
without doing any injustice to her and without permitting anybody to
take the smallest parcel of her territory."
The action of the Ottoman Empire in ceding Moldavian territory
to Russia in 1812 was thus an abuse and violation of treaty obligations,
for as a suzerain, exercising clearly defined rights, the Ottoman Empire
could not have transmitted to Russia more extensive rights to Bessara-
bia than it had itself at the time by the consent of Moldavia.
By the Treaty of Paris of 1856, three southern Bessarabian dis-
tricts were returned to Moldavia and as such were later included in the
Principality of Romania formed by the union of Moldavia and Wal-
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lachia in 1859; but in 1878 the Congress of Berlin returned them to
Russia over the strong protest of Romania, a compromise in the inter-
est of peace branded by Gladstone as "an impolitic and culpable
spoliation."
Following the Russian revolution of 1917 and the separation of the
Ukraine from Russia, the population of Bessarabia availed itself of the
right of self-determination which, as proclaimed by the Council of the
People's Commissars of Soviet Russia in November 1917, included the
right of the peoples of Russia "to free self-determination to the point
of separation and formation of independent governments". Conse-
quently the Bessarabians declared themselves on October 20, 1917, an
autonomous Republic with the RSFSR. On January 24, 1918, the au-
tonomous republic proclaimed itself fully independent as the Demo-
cratic Moldavian Republic of Bessarabia. Lastly, on March 27, 1918,
the independent Bessarabian State voted to unite with the Kingdom of
Romania.
The first of these decisions was made by the Congress of all
Moldavians assembled at Chisinau, where all the Bessarabian parties
and nationalities were duly represented. It was this Congress that pre-
scribed the composition of a national parliament for Bessarabia (Sfatul
Tarii), which in turn by a strong majority vote, proclaimed the inde-
pendence and subsequently the reunion of the province with Romania.
Concerning the validity of these decisions, an American authority
on international law, Professor James Brown Scott, has written as
follows:
The precedent for the establishment of the Bessarabian
Republic was the Declaration of Independence of the United
States of America. The justification for the transfer of their
territory and the allegiance of the inhabitants to Romania is
President Wilson's doctrine of self- determination.
Romania has steadfastly held that the decision whereby the Sfatul
Tarii proclaimed the independence of Bessarabia and her reunion with
Romania were acts of self-determination internationally valid regard-
less of the formal recognition of any foreign power, the USSR not ex-
cepted. Romania has nevertheless acknowledged that from the political
viewpoint the recognition by other powers of the factual and legal sta-
tus created by those acts would be desirable. Such recognition was for-
mally given by France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan as signatories of
the Treaty of Paris of October 28, 1920. Other powers have implicitly
recognized the inclusion of Bessarabia in the Kingdom of Romania,




Romania and the USSR by adhering to the Briand-Kellogg Pact of
August 27, 1928, and giving it immediate effect by the protocol of Mos-
cow, of February 9, 1929, renounced forever war as an instrument of
national policy and undertook to settle disputes between themselves by
peaceful means. Moreover, by the London agreements of July 3 and 4,
1933, between the USSR and several states, among them Romania, the
Briand-Kellogg Pact was implemented with a clear definition of
aggression.
The Convention of July 3 between the USSR and her neighbors
became effective October 16, 1933; the identical convention of July 4
between the USSR, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Turkey
became effective February 17, 1934. By Article I of each of these Con-
ventions the contracting parties agreed to accept the definition of ag-
gression as contained in the Politis report of May 24, 1933, to the Dis-
armament Conference, paragraph 23 of which states that "by territory
is here meant territory over which a State actually exercises
authority."
Thus the conventions of July 3 and 4, 1933, constituted a recogni-
tion by the USSR of the Soviet-Romanian boundary as of the dates on
which these instruments took effect.
A further recognition by the USSR of Bessarabia's reunion with
Romania is contained in the note addressed June 9, 1934, on the occa-
sion of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and
the USSR by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR (Mr. M.
Litvinov) to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mr. N. Ti-
tulescu). In this note, Mr. Litvinov declared "The Governments of our
countries mutually guarantee each other the full respect of the sover-
eignty of each of our states . .. .
Finally, on September 17, 1939, Mr. Molotov, President of the
Council of People's Commissars and Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
formally declared to the Romanian Minister in Moscow (Mr. G. Da-
videscu) that the USSR will respect the territorial integrity of
Romania.
But Romania's title to Bessarabia is based not alone on indisputa-
ble historical rights and the decision of the population of Bessarabia to
reunite with Romania,-a decision recognized by other powers as
shown above and reaffirmed by the unwavering pro-union attitude of
the duly elected popular representatives of Bessarabia in all the gen-
eral parliamentary elections held between 1919-1940,-but also on a
clear ethnical reality: the indisputable preponderance of the Romanian
element. Even the last Russian census, that of 1897, which determined
the nationality of the population according to the principle that who-
ever had the least knowledge of the Russian language must be consid-
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ered as Russian, found in Bessarabia not less that 910,919 (47.2 per
cent) Romanians, as against 155,774 (8.05 per cent) Great Russians and
382,169 (19.75 per cent) Ukrainians. Notwithstanding the strong Russi-
fication policy pursued by the tzarist regime until 1917, the Romanian
census of December 28, 1930, based on the free expression of the popu-
lation, found 1,610,757 (56.2 per cent) Romanians, as against 351,912
(12.3 per cent) Russians and 314,211 (11 per cent) Ukrainians.
As regards Bucovina, she formed until 1775 the northernmost part
of the Principality of Moldavia. She was ceded by the Ottoman Empire
to Austria contrary to the stipulations of the treaties above-mentioned
and in disregard of the protest of Prince of Moldavia.
Following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the
population of Bucovina, in majority Romanian, invoking the right of
self-determination, decided on October 28, 1918, by the vote of the Na-
tional Congress of Cernauti, to reunite with Romania. The Treaty of
St. Germain-en-Laye of September 19, 1919, confirmed this act of self-
determination.
On June 28 and 29, 1940, the Government of the USSR presented
to the Romanian Government two ultimata demanding the immediate
cession of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina.
By presenting these ultimata, which excluded any pacific and free
discussion of claims, the USSR violated both the Briand-Kellogg and
the Conventions of London for the definition of aggression.
Threatened in the West by Hungary and unable to defend herself
simultaneously on two extensive fronts, Romania gave way to force and
evacuated her troops and authorities from Bessarabia and Northern
Bucovina. The two provinces were immediately invaded by the Soviet
Army and incorporated into the USSR.
This annexation by the USSR of a territory historically and ethni-
cally Romanian is devoid of validity inasmuch as it lacks both the con-
sent of the population involved and that of the Government of
Romania which never concluded with the USSR any agreement
whatever for the cession of the provinces, or even for the delimitation
of the areas occupied by the USSR. Therefore, in the light of the mod-
ern principle of non-recognition of situations created by the use of
force or the threat to use force, a principle consecrated by international
acts such as the Resolution of March 11, 1932, of the Assembly of the
League of Nations, and the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and
Conciliation signed at Rio de Janeiro, on October 10, 1933, by the rep-
resentatives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uru-
guay, to which Treaty the United States adhered on August 10, 1934,
and Romania on March 12, 1935-the USSR merely occupied by usur-
pation a Romanian territory.
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Consequently, I have the honor to state that the position of my
Government is that Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia and North-
ern Bucovina was not interrupted by the alien occupation to which
they were subjected, and that the recovery of these provinces by the
Romanian Army paces the de facto situation in accord with the situa-
tion de jure based on principles of international law universally
recognized.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
ss. Brutus Coste
The Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
Reprinted from N. Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina 155-59 (1982).

